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WHY SCRIPTURE SCHOLARS AND THEOLOGICAL ETHICISTS NEED ONE 
ANOTHER: 
EXEGETING AND INTERPRETING THE BEATITUDES  
AS A SCRIPTED SCRIPT FOR ETHICAL LIVING 
Yiu Sing Luke (Lúcás) Chan 
Advisor: Professor James F. Keenan, SJ 
 
For a variety of reasons, in the field of biblical ethics, Scripture scholars do not 
use much ethical theory, while theological ethicists do little actual exegesis. Even those 
recent attempts to bridge better Scripture with Christian ethics have either stressed the 
importance of the scriptural text or the importance of ethical hermeneutics. 
Throughout this entire work I advocate for a more integrated approach for a 
Scripture-based Christian theological ethics. In so doing I first propose using Allen 
Verhey‘s distinction of Scripture as ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘: The former refers to exegesis 
and the latter to admonitions for ethical living. A more integrated approach will therefore 
treat Scripture as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘, taking exegesis seriously and interpreting 
the text by using a sound hermeneutical framework. Subsequently, we can both acquire a 
more accurate understanding of the original meaning of the text and obtain a more 
complete and consistent interpretation of the text for today. 
From the perspective of Christian ethics, I further suggest virtue ethics as a 
worthy hermeneutical tool in treating Scripture as ‗script‘. Virtue ethics complements 
principle-based ethical theories by emphasizing practices and the importance of 
  
exemplary models. It also attends to the character formation and identity of both 
individuals and the moral community. Moreover, as I argue, there exists an explicit link 
between Scripture and virtue. Both the biblical link and the uniqueness of virtue ethics 
make it suitable as the hermeneutical tool for doing Scripture-based Christian ethics. 
In order to demonstrate concretely how the methodological shift into a more 
integrated scriptural ethics as such leads to actual benefits and improvements, I offer a 
three-step illustration. I begin with treating the Beatitudes in Matthew 5:3-12 as first 
‗scripted‘; that is, I exegete the text. Then I look at the text as ‗script‘ through the 
hermeneutics of virtue ethics. I identify a new set of core virtues (and corresponding 
practices) not just for personal formation but also for the formation of the community and 
the larger society.  
Third, I then bring the fruits of this treatment forward by exploring the possible 
reception of the Beatitudes and its core virtues by the Confucian tradition. 
Methodologically speaking, Confucianism goes to its own texts in its search of ethical 
teachings; and Confucian ethics is primarily the fruit of careful interpretation of their 
‗sacred‘ texts. In other words, it is both text-based and interpretative, and shares a 
common methodological approach with the Scripture-based Christian ethics proposed 
here. Subsequently, we find significant parallel virtues in Confucian texts although 
dissimilarities (such as worldview) exist between the two traditions. 
As a whole, the proposed methodological shift into a Scripture-based Christian 
ethics produces a more accurate, complete and consistent interpretation of the biblical 
  
text for our contemporary audience and makes Christian ethics more explicable to 
Confucian society and more supportive of cross-cultural dialogue with Confucian ethics.
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Traditionally, the use of Scripture
1
 as the sole authority for Christian ethics has 
been one of the fundamental differences between Protestant and Catholic scholars. Luke 
Timothy Johnson, for example, from a historical point of view, notes that ―the Nicene 
Creed (325 CE) has no statement about Scripture…in contrast, virtually every profession 
of faith from the Reformation contained extensive statements on the authority of 
Scripture over human tradition.‖2 Charles Curran also comments that since the time of 
Patristic period the Fathers of the Church had always insisted that Scripture is not the 
only source of Christian ethical wisdom and knowledge.
3
 Curran further points out that 
between the Councils of Trent and of Vatican II Catholic moral theology was separated 
from dogmatic and spiritual theology, human reason was the primary source of moral 
wisdom, and Scripture was often used by manualists in an uncritical way primarily as 
proof texts.
4
 These manualists perceived the goal of training priests as simply ―judges in 
the sacrament of penance, with an accompanying minimalistic and legalistic approach 
concerned primarily with sinfulness of particular acts.‖5 They usually began their 
argument ―from the magisterial teaching then in place, and worked backward to illustrate 
                                                 
1
 In this work, the term ‗Scripture‘ is used interchangeably with ‗Bible‘ and is referred to those writings 
that the Church has declared to be her canon. 
2
 Luke Timothy Johnson, ―The Bible‘s Authority for and in the Church,‖ in Engaging Biblical Authority: 
Perspectives on the Bible as Scripture, ed. William P. Brown (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2007), 62.  
3
 Charles E. Curran, ―The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology,‖ in Readings in Moral 
Theology No.4. The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology, ed. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1984), 179. 
4
 Ibid., 180; Charles E. Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition Today: A Synthesis (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 1999), 49. 
5
 Curran, ―The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology,‖ 180. 
 2 
how [a] particular doctrine was originally expressed in Scripture and then how [it] was 
subsequently developed.‖6 Scripture was thus used ―primarily as a source for proof-
texts…and simply marshaled to ‗confirm‘ or embellish an argument or moral judgment.‖7 
A concrete example is Gerald Kelly‘s use of the story of Onan in his 1950s book Medico-
Morals. As Richard Gula comments, ―Only after these forms of arguments [i.e., natural 
law and papal teaching] have been used does he then turn uncritically to the evidence of 
scripture in Onan‘s story of Genesis 38:8-10 to give biblical warrants for prohibition.‖8 
During the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, as noted by Curran, there was a call for a more 
biblical approach to moral theology although ―the attempts along this line failed because 
they were entwined in the polemic of the rigorists and probabiliorists against the laxists 
and probabilists.‖9 And since the middle of the twentieth century, it is observed that 
Catholic theologians began to ‗catch up‘.10 Writing in 1953, Philippe Delhaye, for 
example, called for a ―more positive science of moral based on Scripture and 
Tradition.‖11 Around the same time, famous Roman Catholic manualist, Bernard Häring, 
as Curran recalls, also proposed a more biblically centered approach in his 
groundbreaking work on moral theology, The Law of Christ.
12
 
Nevertheless, the impact of the Second Vatican Council on integrating Scripture 
and moral theology needs to be recognized. In fact, in light of this Council, many 
                                                 
6
 James T. Bretzke, A Morally Complex World. Engaging Contemporary Moral Theology (Collegeville, 
MN: Liturgical Press, 2004), 19. 
7
 Ibid.. 
8
 Richard M. Gula, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality (New York: Paulist Press, 
1989), 116. 
9
 Curran, ―The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology,‖ 180. 
10
 Bretzke, A Morally Complex World, 90. 
11
 John C. Ford and Gerald Kelly, Contemporary Moral Theology, vol. 1, Questions in Fundamental Moral 
Theology (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1964), 47-48. 
12
 Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition Today: A Synthesis, 49. 
 3 
Catholic moral theologians quoted the following statement to demonstrate the 
Magisterium‘s effort to emphasize the biblical-theological foundations of Catholic moral 
theology:
13
 
Special care should be given to the perfecting of moral theology. 
Its scientific presentation should draw more fully on the teaching 
of Holy Scripture…14 (Optatam Totius 16) 
 
The late Catholic ethicist William Spohn thus comments that the Vatican 
statement was welcomed by both Scripture scholars and theological ethicists within 
Catholic circles and, as a result, a Scripture-based Christian ethics began to develop 
among these theologians with a growing view that ―exegesis has an ethical direction that 
needs to be acknowledged…‖15 
And over forty years after the publication of this document, the Pontifical Biblical 
Commission publishes a new document entitled The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots 
of Christian Conduct.
16
 Rooted in the spirit of Vatican II, it aims at situating Christian 
morality in the larger context of biblical morality and of anthropology; and showing that 
the Bible does provide some methodological criteria for moral progress.
17
 In other words, 
the Commission is concerned with a Scripture-based morality, and stresses that 
methodological criteria are necessary in order to allow us to refer to Scripture in moral 
                                                 
13
 Daniel J. Harrington and James F. Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics. Building Bridges between New 
Testament Studies and Moral Theology (Lahtham, MD: Sheed & Ward, 2002), xiii. 
14
 Vatican II, Optatam Totius, October 1965, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decree_19651028_optatam-totius_en.html (accessed April 16, 2009). 
15
 William C. Spohn, ―Scripture,‖ in The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, eds. Gilbert Meilaender 
and William Werpehowski (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 93. 
16
 Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots of Christian Conduct (Vatican: 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008). 
17
 Ibid., 12. 
 4 
issues.
18
 Two subsequent fundamental criteria for judging moral actions are thus 
proposed, namely, the conformity with the biblical concept of human beings and 
conformity with the example of Jesus. The Decalogue (Exodus 20: 2-17) and the 
Beatitudes from the Gospel of Matthew (5:1-12) are chosen to illustrate these two criteria, 
based on the conviction that they are the characteristic expressions of biblical morality 
found in the Old and New Testaments respectively, and the latter radicalizes the values 
promoted by the former.
19
 
Still, the two branches, Scripture and moral theology, as Daniel Harrington rightly 
observes, continue to operate separately without much cooperation, and that the 
integration of Scripture and theological ethics is far from satisfactory: Moral theologians 
do not read much what biblical scholars write while few biblical scholars have interest in 
conversing with moral theologians.
20
 Thomas Ogletree of Yale University, however, 
perceives the gap as ―not an indication of a lack of interest in substantive exchanges 
between the two specialties‖ but rather as ―a function of a growing complexity in the two 
fields‖ in terms of materials treated and methodologies devised.21 Ogletree explains that 
it is difficult enough for a Christian ethics specialist to be lively connected with 
theological foundations of ethics, ―let alone to assess the respective merits of tradition 
criticism, redaction criticism, and literary criticism in the study of biblical texts.‖22 
Robert Daly and others further comment that ―not all Christians who are doing ethics are 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., 130. 
19
 Ibid., 132, 138. 
20
 Harrington and Keenan, 13. 
21
 Thomas W. Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics: A Constructive Essay (Philadelphia, PA: 
Fortress, 1983), xi. 
22
 Ibid.. 
 5 
even attempting, let alone succeeding, to integrate the Bible into their work;‖ hence they 
conclude that Christian biblical ethicists are those ―who are at home not just in biblical 
studies but in practically all the other theological sciences as well.‖23 
Such growing complexity in the two fields points to the concrete issues of training 
and communication that lead to the limited influence of Scripture on moral theology. 
With regards to training in each other‘s field, James Gustafson rightly observes, ―Those 
who are specialists in ethics generally lack the intensive and proper training in biblical 
studies, and those who are specialists in biblical studies often lack sophistication in 
ethical thought.‖24 Regarding the lack of communication Canadian Jesuit Edouard Hamel 
points out that both Christian ethicists and Scripture scholars are responsible: On the one 
hand, moralists (and the magisterium) were preoccupied with natural law; on the other 
hand, biblical scholars ―had not as yet demonstrated to the moralists the possibilities for 
using Scripture in moral theology.‖25 Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor, for instance, recalls 
the frustration of the late Richard McCormick, S.J., one of the moral theologians who 
have enthusiastically embraced the Vatican‘s call for a more scripturally informed moral 
theology: ―I try to keep in dialogue with Scripture scholars….However, I‘ve found some 
Scripture scholars frustrating…They‘re not telling us everything they know!‖26 Another 
concrete example is cited by biblical scholar Pheme Perkins who recalls that her 
                                                 
23
 Robert J. Daly, James A. Fisher, Terence J. Keegan, and Anthony J. Tambasco, Christian Biblical Ethics: 
From Biblical Revelation to Contemporary Christian Praxis (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 114. 
24
 James M. Gustafson, ―The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics: A Methodological Study‖ 
Interpretation, 24, no. 4 (October 1970): 430. 
25
 Edouard Hamel, ―Scripture, the Soul of Moral Theology?‖ in Curran and McCormick, Readings in Moral 
Theology, 120-21. 
26
 Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor, Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2003), 159-60. 
 6 
colleague at Boston College, ethicist Lisa Sowle Cahill, upon knowing her new project, 
has persistently asked her to ―make all this New Testament exegesis available for the 
reflection of the Christian ethicist.‖27 Perkins thus admits that ―exegetes all need to be 
blasted out of the ‗biblical world‘ occasionally!‖28  
McCormick‘s frustration, as Odozor understands, apart from the possible 
reluctance of biblical scholars to move from their biblical world, is due to the 
disagreements about ―the authorization for moving from Scripture to moral norms.‖29 In 
other words, ―there is no general agreement about exactly how the Bible should be used 
in a systematic moral theology.‖30  
Another related issue, as identified by Daly and others, is the problem of language 
in interdisciplinary exercise. By using the discussion of the normativity of the Bible and 
the subsequent use of terms like norms and parenesis as an example, they point out that 
―exegetes and ethicists neither speak the same language nor operate in the same 
conceptual world. More often than not, exegetes and ethicists simply talk past each 
other.‖31  
Despite full awareness of these concrete difficulties and the gap between the two 
fields, Ogletree insists that fruitful connections between the two fields need to be 
developed, for such development can only enrich and deepen both.
32
 He rightly says, 
                                                 
27
 Pheme Perkins, Love Commands in the New Testament (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), A Note to the 
Reader. 
28
 Ibid.. 
29
 Odozor, Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal, 160. 
30
 Charles E. Curran, and Richard A. McCormick, eds., Readings in Moral Theology No.4. The Use of 
Scripture in Moral Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), vii. 
31
 Daly, James A. Fisher, Terence J. Keegan, and Anthony J. Tambasco, 74. 
32
 Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics: A Constructive Essay, xii-xiii. 
 7 
―Biblical studies cannot retain their pertinence if they are unable to inform contemporary 
questions about the good life…Christian ethics soon loses its distinctive power if it cuts 
itself off from its biblical foundations.‖33 In concrete terms, Ogletree notes that, for 
example, form and tradition-historical criticisms of the biblical scholarship ―permit us to 
thematize and bring explicitly into view‖ the social, economic, and political foundations 
of our worldly experience, and hence help appropriate biblical understandings into 
Christian ethics.
34
  
Perkins, from the viewpoint of biblical scholarship, likewise comments that both 
exegetes and ethicists are needed ―since one must not only have an appropriate image of 
the first century but also an image of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.‖35 Catholic 
biblical scholar Sandra Schneiders, though not addressing ethicists in particular, takes a 
step further to call for greater responsibilities on the part of biblical scholars to attend to 
the contemporary meaning of the text, and invites theologians to ―become sufficiently 
able in the biblical disciplines that they can enter into the process of interpretation of the 
biblical scholars and not just pick up the latters‘ conclusions.‖36 
These illuminating insights of the 1980s regarding the development of a genuine 
integration between biblical studies and moral theology are best summarized in the words 
of Harrington and Catholic ethicist James Keenan: ―What is needed especially is 
cooperation at the level of interpretation or hermeneutics. Biblical scholars must try to 
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learn the language and conceptuality of moral theology, and moral theologians need to 
learn the language and conceptuality of biblical studies (exegesis and biblical theology). 
Such cooperation can help rescue biblical exegesis from falling into antiquarianism and 
irrelevancy, and can at the same time help to enrich and enliven moral theology precisely 
as a Christian theological discipline.‖37 
Since the 1980s we began to see different attempts among scholars to better 
bridge Scripture with Christian ethics. Still, the progress within academics has been slow. 
For instance, in the past two decades, the Society of Christian Ethics and the Society of 
Biblical Literature published fewer than fifteen and twenty related articles and essays 
respectively in their journals.
38
 Even though both societies set up unit/interest groups in 
the annual conference to study both the relationship between Scripture and ethics and 
how biblical interpretation and hermeneutics intersect with the concerns of ethics and 
engage in interdisciplinary conversations, concrete measures to integrate the two fields 
are still needed to be done. 
However, some of these scholars have taken the challenge a step further and work 
hand in hand with colleagues of the other field. One of the earlier joint efforts is biblical 
scholar Bruce C. Birch and Christian ethicist Larry L. Rasmussen‘s co-authored work 
Bible and Ethics in Christian Life, first published in 1976 and later revised in 1988. In 
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this work they attempt to ―bridge the gap between biblical studies and Christian ethics‖ 
and to ―address the relationship of Scripture and ethics.‖39  Birch and Rasmussen point 
out that both Christian ethics and biblical scholarship ―are called upon most directly to 
aid the faith community in traversing the distance between the primal documents of the 
faith—its Scriptures—and expressions of the faith in daily life.‖40 Although their pioneer 
work is primarily a book about moral life—especially about character formation, virtue 
and moral agency—and only the last two chapters (excluding the concluding chapter) are 
dedicated to the discussion of the role of the Bible in moral life, what is most valuable in 
their attempt is the methodological proposal that encourages interdisciplinary work.
41
 
A more recent attempt along this direction is the works of Harrington and 
Keenan.
42
 They have been trying to build a bridge between the two camps through their 
joint writings and teaching in the past decade. Both Harrington and Keenan are interested 
in listening to what the other says and try to accommodate what is heard into their own 
framework and reflection. In their co-authored book Jesus and Virtue Ethics Harrington 
and Keenan set out a common framework that is built upon certain ethical themes: 
Harrington offers his insights from the biblical exegetical perspective that is normally 
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followed by Keenan‘s moral theological reflections. For instance, in the theme of ‗love as 
the primary virtue,‘ Harrington first offers an exposition on the love of God and neighbor 
in Matthew 22:34-40; it is then followed by Keenan‘s reflection on the primacy of charity 
proposed by Gerard Gilleman.
43
 At the time of writing this work, they have co-taught 
‗Paul and Virtue Ethics‘ a couple of times and a corresponding book will be published in 
near future. These projects illuminate their commitment to bridging the gap and better 
integrating Scripture and Christian ethics. 
However, the joint effort of Harrington and Keenan remains experimental. While 
acknowledging that some other Scripture scholars and theological ethicists have also 
shown similar efforts from their own individual works, this work aims at advancing a 
more integrated scriptural ethics that is built upon the fruit of these theologians. In simple 
terms, theological ethicists need to build upon the works/findings of Scripture scholars 
and vice versa. Subsequently, the first and primary purpose of this work is a 
methodological one, though I also will be doing textual studies. I will first examine the 
fundamental presuppositions of some of the major contributors in the area of scriptural 
ethics in the past twenty five years: Those from biblical theology and those from 
theological ethics. The purpose is to ground my work on concrete developments within 
the disciplines concerned. I believe that only through careful observation of the 
contributions and limitations of these scholars that we can identify specific 
methodological insights that will rightfully shape the future of a Scripture-based ethics. 
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Moreover, in order to be comprehensive and culturally sensitive, the authors I 
choose are not only the most important and influential in their field but also that some of 
them are specifically aware of the relevance of local culture as well as the significance of 
contemporary theologies. Such diversity is important to our investigation: The diverse 
backgrounds among these selected scholars reflect the reality of social change within the 
disciplines—we note that women, non European, and Third World international figures 
begin to come into play. This social change signifies the shift of our theological concerns 
from not just personal guidance to communal practices but more importantly, from 
communal to the global awareness as well. The latter in turn becomes a means to engage 
in dialogue with one‘s own background. 
Still, here I must note a caveat: This is a study from the vantage point of 
theological ethics and not—primarily—biblical studies or Scripture. I am writing as a 
Catholic theological ethicist who does ethics by working with scriptural texts. As Leslie 
Houlden rightly notes, New Testament ethics is often ―studied in connection with moral 
theology rather than New Testament studies‖ although this hints that at times it poses 
difficulty in finding a way to understand New Testament‘s ethical teaching without doing 
violence to the insights and methods of New Testament study.
 44
 
Finally, I am from Hong Kong, a place deeply affected by Confucianism. Our 
ethical values are usually taught and acquired by referring to particular texts. Throughout 
my work, in arguing for greater attentiveness to scriptural texts, I am sure that my own 
Confucian background prompts me in this direction. For this reason, at the end of the 
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work I return to my background and ask if scriptural texts are constitutive of a Catholic 
theological ethics, and if Confucian texts  are constitutive of a Confucian ethics, then 
doing a cross-cultural ethics begins not with analogous generalities but very specific texts. 
 
The Structure of the Work 
Part One deals with current attempts at constructing Scripture-based ethics. In the 
first chapter, I will offer an overview of the tasks of biblical scholars and theological 
ethicists in relation to Scripture and ethics. The subsequent two chapters will review 
some current attempts by contemporary Scripture scholars and theological ethicists at 
constructing scriptural ethics. Using Verhey‘s terminology, Scripture is both ‗script‘ and 
‗scripted‘: 45  As ‗script‘, it means that Scripture is like a script to be performed by an 
actor and the performance itself becomes the interpretation of the script. In the context of 
a Christian community, Scripture directs us to what is repeatedly performed and practiced, 
especially in the community‘s worship and ethics. Thus its focal point lies on the 
performance/practices and characters of the community. As ‗scripted‘, it means that 
Scripture is a written text produced at a particular time by certain writers; it is an object 
to the readers and its focal point is the text itself. Therefore, the exegetical work of 
scriptural ethics pertains to the scripted text; while the interpretative work emerges from 
the text as a script. Nevertheless, Scripture scholars and theological ethicists, within their 
own expertise, employ different methodologies and approaches in their attempts to deal 
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with Scripture and ethics. Three Scripture scholars from Europe and North America are 
important to examine: Wolfgang Schrage, Richard Hays and Frank Matera. Apart from 
these three major New Testament ethics scholars, feminist and non-western scripture 
scholars also attempt to study ethics in Scripture from their specific context and 
perspective. Two of them to be reviewed are Sandra Schneiders and Rasiah Sugirtharajah. 
In the case of theological ethics, I will similarly look at the works of some major 
Christian ethicists who are representatives of their own contexts and perspectives, namely, 
post Vatican II manualist Bernard Häring, liberation theologian Gustavo Gutierrez, 
feminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether, and the late Catholic ethicist William 
Spohn.  
In sum, the above attempts by these Scripture scholars and theological ethicists 
are innovative in their own regards. But do they pay enough attention to the importance 
of the scriptural text and the importance of the hermeneutics of ethics at the same time? 
Thus, in the last chapter of this first part, I will explore the works of Scripture scholar 
Richard Burridge and ethicist Allen Verhey, who seem to have demonstrated certain 
balance in their own investigations and point in the right direction in constructing a more 
integrated scriptural ethics that attends to both the importance of the text and the 
hermeneutics of ethics. 
I have argued that any interpretation of exegeted texts requires an ethical 
framework for bringing our findings to ethical expression. For me a hermeneutics of 
virtue ethics seems a very worthy method. Why? First, in the past few decades, virtue 
ethics began to resurge and has become a prominent alternative to principle-based 
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ethics.
46
 Alasdair McIntyre, one of the most influential figures in advocating virtue ethics, 
even perceives its resurgence as a reaction against the post-World War II moral 
philosophy.
47
 It departs from principle-based ethics in that it deals with the character of 
individuals and their communities, and the practices that both develop those 
characteristics and in turn express them.
48
 Second, as ethicists like Spohn explain, it is a 
matter of necessity to select one form of ethics, for it is not possible to explore Christian 
moral life without it being built upon some form of moral philosophy.
49
 By comparison 
with other approaches to ethics, virtue ethics is one of the oldest approaches and provides, 
I believe, a very appropriate avenue to approach Scripture. Thus, in Part Two I first 
review the hermeneutics of virtue ethics, with special attention to its development and 
revival, its contemporary understanding, and the yields of virtue, especially 1) character 
formation, 2) practices, 3) exemplar, and 4) community and communal identity. Within 
the theological context, Christian virtue ethicists remind us that such formation and 
transformation of character is effected by grace. We rely on God‘s grace so as to make 
our effort and moral growth possible.
50
 Therefore, the role of the Holy Spirit and grace 
will be discussed briefly. 
In the second half of this part, I will look at how two virtue ethicists read the 
Scriptures through their hermeneutics of virtue ethics. The first virtue ethicist is 
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Mennonite Joseph Kotva who has made a Christian case for virtue ethics. Kotva 
establishes a link between the New Testament and virtue theory by pointing out that a 
virtue perspective allows us to ―see the Bible‘s collections of rules as encapsulating the 
guidance and wisdom of some who went before us in faith.‖51 Such perspective also 
helps to identify how the Scriptures can be useful for shaping our understanding of the 
human good, of our community and of the appropriate virtues that would foster both.
52
 
The second ethicist to be explored is Spohn who offered his attempts to integrate 
Scripture and ethics through a hermeneutic of virtue ethics. For Spohn, ethics is a means 
to Christian transformation. Scripture as a whole is the story of a people called and led by 
God to be a distinctive community and a particular sort of person.
53
 Thus, the story of 
Jesus in the New Testament is perceived as a paradigm for moral perception, disposition 
and identity, and a means to guide how we act and form ―who we are in the community 
of faith.‖54 In other words, Spohn understands the Scriptures as offering more than 
specific moral rules but ―shap[ing] the dispositions and identity of Christians.‖55 As a 
result, Spohn argues that the New Testament should converge with both virtue ethics and 
spirituality so as to shape Christian ethics. In sum, Spohn points out that the New 
Testament ―gives content to the formal patterns of virtue ethics‖ by spelling out concrete 
transformative habits.
56
 
                                                 
51
 Ibid.,173. 
52
 Ibid.. 
53
 Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 12-13. 
54
 Ibid., 2. 
55
 Ibid., 3.  
56
 Ibid., 22. 
 16 
In Part Three I aim at demonstrating a more integrated Scripture-based 
theological ethics in the concrete. In doing so, I will exegete the scriptural text of the 
Beatitudes in Matthew 5 and then through a hermeneutic of virtue ethics interpret the text 
for Christian moral living. The choice of the Beatitudes in Matthew 5 is primarily based 
on three reasons. First, it is a matter of popularity. In his Scripture and Ethics: Twentieth-
Century Portraits Jeffrey Siker observes that many of those theological ethicists who are 
representative in the field, from H. Richard Niebuhr to Stanley Hauerwas, from liberation 
theologians to feminist theologians, or from Catholic to ethnic theologians, employ the 
Sermon on the Mount in their writings.
57
 As we will note later, almost all biblical 
scholars and theological ethicists surveyed in chapters Two and Three treat the 
Matthew‘s version of the Sermon and the Beatitudes in one way or another. Therefore, 
their unique ways of understanding and using the text will be briefly explored. 
This popularity points to the second reason of my choice: The importance of the 
Beatitudes in theological ethics, and virtue ethics in particular. Curran, for instance, notes 
that the Sermon on the Mount is generally understood by many as ―either an ideal or a 
realizable morality for life in this world.‖58 Within the discipline of biblical scholarship, 
the contemporary and growing use of social historical criticism helps us to recognize that 
Jesus‘ Sermon on the Mount and the Beatitudes in particular concerns not only the 
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individual moral life but also the relevance of communities of discipleship as well as 
social justice. All these are important to the quest for the meaning of the kingdom of 
God—which is the presupposition of our entire Christian life. In addition, the Beatitudes 
is often understood by ethicists as a source for discussion of Christian virtues demanded 
by Jesus Christ. As seen above, even the Pontifical Biblical Commission‘s latest 
document, though it rejects the reduction of morality into a sum of virtues, still it 
perceives the Beatitudes as a significant characteristic expression of biblical morality 
found in the New Testament and specially stresses the fundamental dispositions and 
virtues found in them.
59
  
Third, being a Catholic of a Confucian Chinese society where prosperity is crucial 
to the life of its people, I note that the whole concept and saying of ‗blessed‘ in Matthew 
5 could be a platform for engaging dialogue between Christianity and Confucianism. 
From the standpoint of a virtue ethicist, I note that the Beatitudes has been 
approached by theologians and ethicists of the past and present in different ways. Still, 
most of them are more interested in the interpretation than the text itself and seem to treat 
the Beatitudes more as ‗script‘ than ‗scripted‘ (or as ‗script‘ alone). A more integrated 
approach proposed here, however, treats the Beatitudes as ‗scripted script‘. Therefore, the 
main focus of this chapter is to exegete and to interpret the Beatitudes using the latter 
approach. In doing so, I first offer an exegesis of the text with the help of contemporary 
biblical scholars from both Catholic and Protestant circles. What follows the exegesis is 
the interpretation of the exegeted text through the hermeneutics of virtue ethics, focusing 
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on issues of character formation, practices, exemplar, and community, and adopting the 
three foundational questions (based on the threefold structure of contemporary virtue 
theory) as the basis. 
So far I have focused on the methodological argument for a more integrated 
scriptural ethics. Still, how does it lead to actual benefits and improvements? In this last 
part, I would like to see if a more integrated scriptural ethics—a virtue ethics that 
understands Scripture as ‗scripted script‘—as such can be helpful to make Christian 
ethics more explicable to Confucian society and more supportive of cross-cultural 
dialogue with Confucian ethics. For while I am interested in bridging the gap between 
Scripture and theological ethics, being a Christian ethicist from a Confucian society, I am 
also interested in bringing Christian ethics and Confucian ethics closer to each other. In a 
Confucian society like Hong Kong where Christianity and Confucianism encounter each 
other in many different ways, if similarities or congruence—beyond the level of 
practice—are found between their ethical systems, it can further enrich the understanding 
of the ethics of the other. 
Therefore, by way of demonstration, I will explore how the Beatitudes as 
‗scripted script‘ can be similar to specific Confucian texts, especially the writings of 
classical Confucian thinkers like Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi. It is because, 
methodologically speaking, Confucianism goes to the texts in its search of ethical 
teachings, for the core values of Confucian tradition are embodied in their ‗sacred‘ texts. 
That means, Confucian ethics is primarily the fruit of careful interpretation of their 
‗sacred‘ texts. Therefore, whenever Confucians encounter another tradition, they are first 
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interested in the texts from that tradition. In so doing, I will explore the conception of 
virtue found in these classical writings. Based on the ‗sacred‘ texts of these classical 
Confucian figures, I will explore the possible Confucian understanding of certain key 
ideas fundamental to the Beatitudes so as to provide a platform for the discussion of 
Confucian engagement of the Beatitudes. These key ideas include ‗next life‘, ‗rewards‘, 
and ‗blessed‘. Then, in concrete terms, I explore how the Beatitudes as ‗scripted script‘ 
can be comparable to Confucian texts and what precautions should be noted. 
In sum, from the exploration of the Confucian understanding of virtues, we may 
expect to find a possible connection between Confucian ethics and Christian virtue ethics. 
In fact, not a few contemporary theological ethicists have begun to draw comparisons 
between major Confucian figures and patristic and scholastic virtue ethicists. However, 
comparative work by Christian ethicists generally goes to ‗script‘ treatment of Christian 
and Confucian ethics and often ignores the texts. But comparative work needs to be both 
text-based and interpretative. Thus, I am convinced that a more integrated Scripture-
based theological ethics as proposed in the previous chapters can further reinforce this 
connection. Moreover, by examining certain key ideas that ground the Beatitudes but that 
appear also in the Confucian context, I hope to provide an opportunity to demonstrate the 
possible benefit resulting from the methodological shift into a more integrated scriptural 
ethics and one that is more capable of cross-cultural exchange. 
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Part One: Current Attempts at Constructing Scriptural Ethics 
 
 The first part of this work is made up of four stages. The first stage is an overview 
of the steps taken up by Scripture scholars and theological ethicists in relation to the 
construction of scriptural ethics. The second stage surveys how contemporary Scripture 
scholars try to construct a methodological framework for scriptural ethics that are built 
upon their particular perspectives. Likewise, the third stage of this part surveys how 
theological ethicists try to construct a Scripture-based ethics compatible with 
contemporary challenges in ethics. The fourth and last stage explores the two scholars 
whose works I think point in the right direction, namely, an integrated scriptural ethics 
that attends to both the importance of the text and the hermeneutics of ethics. 
For various reasons these two surveys are important building blocks upon which I 
construct my work: First, this work is not grounded in pure innovation but concrete 
developments within the disciplines concerned. Second, it is through careful observation 
of the contributions and limitations of these scholars that we can identify specific 
methodological insights that will rightfully shape the future of a Scripture-based ethics. 
Third, these specific insights are found sometimes in more than one author and constitute 
the actual developments toward a more integrated scriptural ethics. Fourth, in proximate 
terms, these surveys set the stage for the discussion that follows. Although they are not a 
thorough historical account, they introduce to us the specific, representative works of 
important biblical scholars and theological ethicists. 
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In sum, I believe that it is only through engagement with these insights and 
developments that a more integrated scriptural ethics can be properly constructed. 
 22 
Chapter One: Foundations: The Tasks of Scripture Scholars and Theological 
Ethicists 
 
With regards to relating biblical studies to theological ethics, Spohn succinctly 
points out that Scripture scholars and theological ethicists are basically dealing with two 
fundamental tasks according to their own perspectives, namely, the study of ethics in 
Scripture and the use of Scripture in ethics respectively.
60
 
Thus, in this first chapter, I offer an overview of the two above-stated 
fundamental tasks of biblical scholars and Christian ethicists. Readers should note that 
this chapter is foundational, heuristic but not exhaustive or historical. Although the state 
of the question of certain issues covered here (such as the question of authority) might 
have changed as time passes, these issues remain foundational to our overall discussion 
for they are essential to understand how scholars treat Scripture in ethical reflection. 
Later I provide a study of the specific contributions of both Scripture scholars and 
theological ethicists in order to show the actual developments in the past two decades. 
 
1.1 The Study of Ethics in Scripture 
 
New Testament Ethics 
Within biblical circles, the study of ethics in Scripture can be divided into Old 
Testament ethics and New Testament ethics. The case of New Testament ethics, for 
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instance, technically refers to ―what modern New Testament exegetes and biblical 
theologians have made out of the ethical teachings of the New Testament.‖61 It is based 
on the careful study of written texts; thus, textual interpretation (i.e., biblical exegesis) ―is 
foundational for all aspects of New Testament ethics.‖62 Hamel, for example, identifies 
three types of moral law from the New Testament as a result of exegesis:
63
 The first type 
of New Testament morality is that of eschatological moral law found in the Synoptic 
gospels. The second, categorical type is developed in Pauline writings that ―establish 
continuity between Christian and non Christian moral law in the area of categorical 
precepts.‖64 The third type is found in Johannine writings that emphasize a return to the 
transcendental and essentials. 
In this work, I limit my study to New Testament ethics. As Richard Hays rightly 
points out, while not perceiving New Testament ethics as an alternative to biblical ethics, 
it is necessary to start somewhere.
65
 Furthermore, the Christian church has often claimed 
that the Old Testament is ―to be read through the hermeneutical lens of the New…the 
normative ethical witness of the OT is dependent upon a prior construal of the gospel, as 
attested by the NT witnesses.‖66 Finally, the discipline of New Testament theology itself 
has gone through certain developments in the past few decades.
67
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Harrington succinctly summarizes its development from the beginning: New 
Testament ethics arose as part of historical criticism in the late 19
th
 Century when 
(predominantly) liberal Protestant biblical scholars, such as German church historian 
Adolph von Harnack and Social Gospel Movement pioneer Walter Rauschenbusch of the 
United States, began to appreciate more ―the historical distance between the biblical 
writings and the present.‖68 These liberal Protestants, for instance, perceived Jesus as a 
model of virtue and good character whose teaching involves certain ideals like love and 
sacrifice, and focused on the search for the internalization of these values.
69
 It then 
entered a new phrase in the 20
th
 Century when scholars began to discuss ―the centrality of 
the kingdom of God in Jesus‘ teaching and [its] eschatological nature.‖70  
These developments cannot be under-estimated. For while this discipline has been 
pursued by Protestant scholars for centuries,
71
 many scholars have thought that ―since 
[Rudolf] Bultmann‘s monumental Theology of the New Testament New Testament 
Theology (NTT) has become a sterile discipline.‖72 Only in the past decade or so has 
there been ―a determined attempt to move forward.‖73 One advance has been ―the 
scholarly necessity to respect the diversity and individuality of the NT compositions‖ and 
―[the] emerging consensus that for a work to count as an actual NTT it must address the 
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problem of the NT‘s unity.‖74 This key area, as seen later, has an impact on our 
understanding of Scripture as authoritative and a source for Christian ethics. Another 
development that is more explicitly relevant to ethics is the claim of Heikki Räisänen in 
his recent work Beyond New Testament Theology: ―New Testament theology should be 
replaced with two different projects: ‗the history of early Christian thought‘ and ‗critical, 
philosophical, ethical and/or theological reflection on the New Testament, as well as on 
its influence on our history and its significance for contemporary life.‘‖75 
In other words, these two major developments within New Testament theology 
have been the connection between a text and the entire corpus, and the influence of 
Scripture in historically shaping our communities of faith. For instance, Stephen Barton 
claims that the New Testament neither presents ―abstract reflection of a philosophical 
kind on the nature and grounds of moral action‖ nor is it ―a compendium of systematic 
reflection on the good‖ but rather ―the story of Israel in the light of the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus‖ that invites us to a new way of life.76 Harrington comments that the 
New Testament helps shape a person and a community and provides important insights 
about human conduct.
77
 It also constantly reminds us of ―the religious context in which 
Christian ethical teachings took form and are practiced.‖78 The text is concerned with the 
relationship with God and others and begins with the person of Jesus in history; thus, 
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Harrington concludes that New Testament ethics is primarily a religious, relational and 
historical ethics.
79
  
German New Testament scholar Eduard Lohse, though taking a different path and 
acknowledging that the term ‗ethics‘ is not found in the New Testament, further uses the 
oldest New Testament writing (1 Thessalonians)  to argue that the New Testament does 
―know the task of reflecting on the nature of the moral life, and sometimes indicates what 
corresponding action should be.‖80 In particular, he points out from the same New 
Testament writing (1 Thessalonians 4:11-12) that our Christian faith and conducts are 
related in the sense that ―the confession of Jesus as Lord is to be validated to ‗outsiders‘ 
by the credible conduct of Christians.‖81 
Developments in scriptural theology have in turn specifically affected Catholic 
moral theology. As Curran notes, ―Scriptures were taken as the soul of theology and the 
starting point for systematic reflection on the Christian life.‖82 He offers three instances 
of Scripture‘s influence:83 In the first place, earlier under the influence of Karl Barth 
scriptural renewal has emphasized the primacy of the relationality and responsibility 
motif as a replacement of the more philosophical teleological/deontological motifs in 
moral theology. Second, it contributes to the promotion of the call to perfection and the 
ideas of growth and development of our Christian life. Third, it emphasizes the 
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importance of historicity and interiority and totality of each person rather than that of 
individual, external acts. 
 
Methodology 
Regarding how to proceed in the study of New Testament ethics, it has been 
customary to begin with a historical order—that is, beginning with ―the preaching of 
Jesus or the kerygma of the early church, then to advance to the great theological figures 
of the New Testament…and to conclude with the so-called later writings.‖84 Another way 
of proceeding attempts to organize the ethical contents thematically. Each of these two 
ways has certain advantages and disadvantages:
85
 For instance, a chronological study can 
pursue a theological course of development but may fail to identify clearly all those 
fundamental and systematic motifs of early Christian instruction. A thematic study, in 
contrast, may sacrifice those distinctive characters of individual witnesses.  
Harrington notes that a wide spectrum of methods and perspectives—from strictly 
historical to descriptive to normative—are pursued.86 Wayne Meeks, for example, 
employs a strictly historical approach which leads him to conclude that ―almost all the 
moral teachings in the New Testament are paralleled in form and content by writings 
from the Greco-Roman world.‖87 Perkins also identifies some other methods employed 
by exegetes: Scholars like Bultmann and Johnson turn to existentialist or 
phenomenological analyses that ―transcend the peculiar religious language and context of 
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the first century.‖88 Others employ a socio-political approach that reflects on the 
community embodiment of the Bible.
89
 However, Perkins herself is convinced that the 
historical-critical study of the New Testament best ―highlights the difference in ethical 
and cultural presuppositions between the first century and [the contemporary world]‖ and 
offers important understanding of the New Testament‘s ethical context.90 
Christian ethicists have their methodological concerns too. Spohn is convinced 
that the most adequate approach is that of character and virtue ethics, for the Christian 
way of life is not a set of ideals/principles that cannot capture the relationships to God 
and others.
91
 Cahill, however, is decisively interested in historical-critical method while 
using social history and sociology to interpret and ―understand the communities that 
produce the Bible and to clarify what impact biblical portrayals of God might have had in 
their original settings.‖92 Harrington and Keenan agree with Cahill: One of the most 
commonly adopted approaches nowadays in the study of New Testament ethics combines 
both historical and hermeneutical concerns—―how Scripture provides a language of 
doing Christian ethics and how it shapes a person and a community that reasons morally 
and acts appropriately.‖93 The historical-hermeneutical approach thus ―seeks to place the 
New Testament texts in their historical setting…highlights the differences between that 
world and the world of the reader today, and challenges the reader to apply the principles 
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of hermeneutical theory of the biblical text.‖94 We will explore this in greater details in 
the chapter on attempts by Scripture scholars. 
 
The Contents of New Testament Ethics 
As we have seen, research requires not only looking at the particular biblical text, 
but also seeing how it is incorporated into the whole of Scripture. Furthermore, the New 
Testament canon is a collection of diverse writings over a long period of time. The ethical 
contents of these writings could then be equally diverse and hence a few biblical scholars 
reject the discussion of the unity of New Testament ethics.
95
 However, most scholars 
continue to discuss this issue in their writings on New Testament ethics.  
The way in which the contents of New Testament ethics are expressed is similarly 
diverse. Lohse points out that although the ethical teachings found in the New Testament 
generally appear in the mode of preaching and teaching/instruction that aims at 
responding to specific questions or criticizing certain behaviors (as in the case of 1 
Corinthians), these ethical statements take various forms such as instruction, prohibitions, 
proverbs and rules of wisdom, and parables and metaphorical expressions.
96
 And he 
agrees with Perkins‘s observation that many of these ethical teachings draw ―heavily on 
the ethical traditions of the Old Testament, of common wisdom traditions, and of the 
Hellenistic ethical codes generally to address concrete situations.‖97 Lohse hence 
proposes that one specific task of New Testament ethics is to ―indicate how traditional 
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content not only received a new grounding by being related to the gospel, but in essential 
parts also had its intrinsic meaning apprehended in a new way.‖98  
This diversity of forms and resources leads Gustafson and others to raise concerns 
about the study of biblical ethics:
99
 Besides the different forms of moral discourse, they 
note that the content of concrete moral teachings of the scriptures, such as the biblical 
notions of justice and peace are treated differently in different texts. Harrington, in a 
similar manner, reminds us that we cannot overlook the historical and literary contexts 
and the theological significance of the text.
100
 
Nevertheless, various themes emerge from the contents. Cahill identifies five 
‗distinctive‘ (but not unique) ones:101 First, the kingdom of God is the presupposition of 
our entire Christian life, for its eschatological and already-but-not-yet nature enables 
ethical action. The second theme is the reversal of worldly values (such as honor and 
shame). The third one is the love of one‘s neighbor that includes those who are seen as 
outcasts and enemies. The fourth theme is the reality of suffering resulted from such 
ethical life. The fifth and last one is the formation of communal identity.  
Perkins, from a biblical viewpoint, makes similar observations: She observes that 
both the eschatological language of the New Testament and the presence of the Holy 
Spirit point to the renewal/building of a new community.
102
 And the New Testament‘s 
ethical vision is closely tied to ―its vision of how God acts‖ which is the symbolic and 
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inclusive love.
103
 Hence New Testament ethics has a different style of teaching that aims 
at showing us what is happening in human behavior and offering a religious view of evil 
rather than a legal view.
104
  
These writings then lead us to recognize some agreement. While looking at the 
ethical content of particular texts, we must see how they relate to the rest of the 
Scriptures; appreciate the actual historical context out of which the text arose; and study 
the impact the texts have had on the community. 
In sum, there are a number of concrete questions that one may ask in studying 
New Testament ethics:
105
 What was the climate of thought within which these writers 
live? What were the determining factors in their consideration of ethical questions? What 
were their standpoints? What solutions did they give to the Christian communities of 
their time? And what use are their ideas and solutions to our present time Christians? But 
Houlden observes that New Testament ethics is often ―studied in connection with moral 
theology rather than New Testament studies.‖106 Here he raises the concern that New 
Testament ethics at times poses difficulty in finding a way to understand New 
Testament‘s ethical teaching without doing violence to the insights and methods of New 
Testament study.
107
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1.2 The Use of Scripture in Ethics 
 
As far as Christian ethicists are concerned, the employment of Scripture in ethical 
reflection has gone through changes and developments too. Some note that in the past 
forty years the state of the question has shifted from debates about norms and the 
authority of the Bible in establishing norms, etc. to the role of Scripture in forming 
vision/values and communities of discipleship and its relevance in social justice. Still, it 
must be noted that the discussions and claims made then (such as the problem of diversity 
and the relationship with other sources) are foundational to the overall quest and deserve 
our attention here. Some of them, as will be seen later in Chapter Three, continue to be 
addressed among scholars. Those developments and shifts observed in more recent time, 
however, will be treated in later chapter.  
 
How is the Bible Used in Ethics? 
Although Protestant ethicists have always used the Bible for ethics, their use of 
Scripture differs widely throughout history and among confessional approaches. The way 
one ―conceives of Scripture and its authority for the life of the believers…determine[s] 
how this text is employed in moral and ethical reflection.‖108  
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In Catholic circles, Kenneth Himes enunciated four separate and yet related tasks 
in using Scripture in ethics—namely, exegetical, hermeneutical, methodological and 
theological tasks.
109
 I will briefly review these four tasks in relation to ethics below. 
The exegetical task determines the meaning of the text as found in the Bible. 
According to Birch and Rasmussen, exegesis and ethics have the common ground of 
seeking ―to discern the disclosure of God‘s will for the people of faith.‖110 The former 
strives ―to interpret the biblical record of God‘s self-disclosure to the communities of 
Israel and the early church in such a way that it illuminates the church‘s understanding of 
God‘s activity‖ while the latter seeks ―to read the signs of God‘s activity and to discern 
the divine will for the present.‖111 They are convinced that exegesis is important if the 
Bible is to serve as an ethical resource, for the Bible is not a self-interpreting but complex 
document; hence they claim that ―without careful exegesis…the biblical witness is not 
fully heard.‖112  
The task of hermeneutics determines the meaning of the text for today and thus 
concerns the issue of interpretation. The issue of interpretation is inevitable for the Bible 
is historically conditioned and new questions emerge from each generation. These new 
questions can in turn ―unearth dimensions of the text [such as liberation] that had been 
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ignored.‖113 In procedural terms, this task requires a fusion of two very different 
horizons—that is, the horizon of the text in its historical setting and that of the interpreter 
here and now—as well as the acknowledgment of the reader‘s pre-understandings or 
prejudices.
114
 Moreover, the work of interpretation has to deal with certain theological 
questions such as the meaning of the kingdom of God and the issue of eschatology.
115
 
The methodological task asks how one employs Scripture within the various 
levels of moral reflection. Spohn points out that ―a theologian‘s estimate of the nature of 
ethics will significantly influence his or her use of Scripture, as well as provide some 
justification for that usage.‖116 For example, those who focus on the moral agent will 
probably select biblical texts that deal with moral development and formation of 
characters and their communities. In these instances, these scholars often turn to 
narratives wherein moral dispositions are conveyed.
117
 
The fourth and last task—theological task—mainly concerns meta-ethical 
questions, such as: What is the relationship between the Bible and other sources of moral 
wisdom? What kind of authority does Scripture have in moral guidance? These questions 
often lead to the core debate on the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. 
Of the four tasks Gustafson highlights the methodological one. He notes that how 
a Christian ethicist uses Scripture is determined by how one defines the task of Christian 
ethics: One who focuses on the structure of moral arguments about specific acts uses 
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Scripture very different from one who is concerned about the formation of the moral 
agent.
118
 Gustafson further points out that Christian ethicists‘ use of Scripture depends 
also on the theological and ethical principles which one uses so as to bring coherence to 
the meaning of the text.
119
  
Moreover, Gustafson believes two fundamental understandings of the Bible 
distinguish the methods we use: Bible as ‗revealed morality‘ and as ‗revealed reality‘. 
The former understands the Bible as the revealed will of God and thus employs 
deontological language and image in its ethics.
120
 It emphasizes the ‗moral use‘ of 
Scripture and in this way one would make moral judgment ―in accordance with moral 
laws, precepts, and commands given in Scripture.‖121 Subsequently, one way of using 
Scripture is applying moral laws (such as the Decalogue) found in Scripture to the moral 
issue. Another way is judging the moral act according to the moral ideals (such as the 
love command) given in Scripture. A third way of using Scripture is by means of analogy 
between biblical narratives and present day reality (e.g., the narrative of Exodus is often 
used to evaluate Latin America‘s situation). A fourth and loose way is to perceive 
Scripture as one of the informing sources for moral judgments that contains various 
forms of moral values/norms/principles and moral themes (e.g., Paul‘s writing on fallen 
human condition in Romans 1:19-32).
122
 This last way of employing Scripture, as is 
preferred by Gustafson, ―[does] provide the basic orientation toward particular 
judgments,…deeply informs these judgments‖ and hence is a better way of using 
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Scripture in ethics, for ―the vocation of the Christian community is to discern what God is 
enabling and requiring man to be and to do in a particular natural, historical, and social 
circumstances.‖123  
‗Revealed reality‘, on the contrary, perceives the Bible as the revelation of God‘s 
activity. It is not like revealed morality in focusing on specific laws or norms or 
prohibitions but rather in disclosing God‘s love to humankind. In return, it calls for our 
response to God‘s act in us and thus perceives the ‗relationality and responsibility‘ motif 
as its primary model for understanding of Christian ethics.
124
 It tends to focus on 
Scripture‘s theological importance rather than its ethical content: When using Scripture 
one focuses on who this God is, on what God does, and who humanity is in the light of 
God‘s revelation as expressed in narratives. Therefore, God‘s love and covenant with 
humankind is foundational to Christian ethics while the law is of secondary importance in 
Christian life. 
 
The Authority of Scripture in Ethics 
David Kelsey notes that the Bible‘s authority is expressed in its doctrinal and 
conceptual content and that it is the source of symbolic and imagistic expression of the 
salvific event.
125
 But he adds that Scripture is ―authoritative for theology only in the 
context of Christian praxis, that is, only in the context of the intentional activities of 
individual persons and communities who understand themselves to be having their 
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identities shaped in distinctively Christian ways.‖126 In other words, for Kelsey biblical 
authority is dependent on the tradition.
127
  
Moreover, Kelsey identifies two types of authority in Scripture:
128
 The first is 
Scripture‘s de facto authority—based on how Scripture actually shapes individual and 
communal life and authors new identities in the common life of the Christian community. 
For instance, Scripture authorizes indirectly theological proposals like those about 
Christian claims‘ truthfulness. The second authority is Scripture‘s de jure authority that 
derives from the end to which it is used and is grounded in God‘s relation to it—that is, 
being the word of God. 
 What about the issue of the authority of Scripture in the context of ethics? Birch 
and Rasmussen point out that the discussion of biblical authority in matters of ethics 
depends on ―the nature and degree of influence to be given to the Bible in shaping 
Christian character and conduct.‖129 They note that traditionally the authority of Scripture 
is rooted in the understanding of the Bible as inspired in content and its function in the 
community to shape and transform individual and communal life.
130
 
Verhey, however, reminds us that one must first distinguish ‗authority‘ from 
‗authorization‘:131 The former focuses on whether Scripture is a source for moral 
discernment while the latter asks what this source provides or how it functions as a 
                                                 
126
 David H. Kelsey, ―The Bible and Christian Theology,‖ Journal of the American Academy of Religion 48, 
no. 3 (1980): 386. 
127
 Lisa Sowle Cahill, ―The Bible and Ethics: Hermeneutical Dilemmas,‖ in Between the Sexes: 
Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1985), 23. 
128
 Kelsey, ―The Bible and Christian Theology,‖ 392-96. 
129
 Birch and Rasmussen, 142-43. 
130
 Ibid., 146-47, 152. 
131
 Verhey, ―The Use of Scripture in Ethics,‖ Religious Studies Review 4 (January 1978): 28. 
 38 
norm—―in spite of the agreement that Scripture is an authority, there are wide 
disagreements about the authorization for moving from Scripture to moral claims.‖132 
James Childress, in a similar manner, emphasizes the distinction between biblical 
authority and the authorizations that Scripture gives for moral claims, and rightly points 
out there are various views regarding the scope of authorizations that Scripture gives.
133
  
Many scholars argue that Scripture is authoritative for Christian ethics because of 
its normativity.
134
 Daly and others, for instance, argue that since one gains access to 
Christ from and through the Bible and since Christ is the ultimate norm of Christian 
ethics; the Bible is ―at least inceptively normative for Christian ethics.‖135 Birch and 
Rasmussen also claim that the authority of Scripture lies on the fact that it is normative 
for the life of the Christian community even though Christian ethics is not synonymous 
with biblical ethics.
136
 Gareth Jones recalls a quick, traditional argument: Scripture ―has 
the authority of ethical decisions because it is the Word of God.‖137 As such, the authority 
of Scripture is normative for all church and ethical teaching.
138
 But Jones adds, ―If one 
sees it as something complete and separate, monumental and eternal (Word of God), then 
its authority is absolute…If, however, one sees it as something to be read and understood 
and embraced within one‘s own world, and that one‘s own world must always be a part 
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of that reading, then one sees the Bible, and its authority, in a different light.‖139 
Moreover, Hamel points out from Dei Verbum (#81) that the Bible can correct, confirm, 
support, protect, and guide human reason (which can be fallible or clouded over by other 
factors like passion) to the right path.
140
  
 Verhey does not want to say that Scripture‘s authority derives from its 
authorizations. He is convinced that the authority of Scripture is a necessary affirmation 
for ethicists, for the acknowledgement of biblical authority ―commits the ethicist to self-
conscious reflection and candor about the authorizations for moving from Scripture to 
moral claims.‖141 Its authority affects our perspective; this biblical perspective ―limits, 
corroborates, and transforms appeals to natural morality [and other sources] on other 
levels of moral discourse.‖142  
Odozor observes that attitudes toward biblical authority range from those who are 
convinced of scriptural authority and the unity of the canon (such as Raymond Brown) to 
those who proposed ‗a canon within the canon‘ (such as Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza). 
The former normally argues that Scripture is inspired by God and thus enjoys ‗biblical 
inerrancy‘ (broadly understood) as well as integrity; the latter argues that there are 
different levels of biblical authority and thus biblical texts need to be qualified.
143
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Few think however of the Bible as the only source for Christian ethics to ―the 
point of making ethical decisions for us.‖144 Its authority is neither absolute nor exclusive 
but relational (or even hierarchical) to other non-biblical authorities.
145
 James Bretzke 
claims: ―The highest and definitive revelation is not found in the bible as a sacred text, 
but rather in the person of Jesus Christ...[who is] the ultimate norming norm…of our 
lives.‖146 Thus, ―only insofar as that biblical claim corresponds to an overall sound vision 
of God and God‘s definitive revelation of God‘s self in Jesus Christ‖ can we insist on the 
authority of Scripture.
147
  
Echoing Kelsey‘s insight on tradition Stanley Hauerwas claims that Scripture is 
an authority because ―the traditions of Scripture provide the means for our community to 
find new life.‖148 He goes so far as to claim that ―the Bible has no authority apart from 
the community of believers.‖149 Johnson seems to agree that the Bible‘s authority is ‗for 
and in the Church‘ in the sense that its authority is not absolute but drawn from the 
decision of the community, and it pertains only to the life and practice of the church.
150
 
He further comments that biblical authority is the least powerful for Christian ethical 
discernment for ―it is at this level that Scripture is most diverse and most constrained by 
its historical circumstances and literary forms and theological perspectives.‖151 
                                                 
144
 Birch and Rasmussen, 141. 
145
 Ibid., 143. 
146
 Bretzke, A Morally Complex World, 81. 
147
 Ibid.. 
148
 Stanley Hauerwas, ―The Moral Authority of Scripture: The Politics and Ethics of Remembering,‖ in 
Curran and McCormick, Readings in Moral Theology, 260. 
149
 Jones, 23. 
150
 Johnson, ―The Bible‘s Authority for and in the Church,‖ 63. 
151
 Ibid., 69-70. 
 41 
Cahill is more nuanced. She notes that it is a ‗faith‘ decision when one uses 
Scripture as an authority, for it involves ―a commitment to the reliability of that authority, 
a commitment grounded in one‘s experience within the community shaped by 
Scripture.‖152 She holds that biblical authority needs to be understood as ―authoritative 
pattern, structure, or form [instead of]…‗substantive canonical authority,‘ or the attempt 
to require that the canon as a whole functions in the ‗authorization‘ of particular moral 
conclusions.‖153 But just as she notes its impact she is concerned about how particular 
texts must be interpreted through the broader canon. 
The diverse views toward the authority of Scripture in the matter of ethics raise 
further issues on the practical level. Many raise the question about its authority against 
other authorities like experience, social context, etc., and wonder if they are equally 
authoritative as the Bible, or if they have any impact on biblical authority.
154
 Moreover, 
the matter of freedom from coercion is crucial to the relationship between the Bible and 
Christian ethics; thus, biblical authority cannot be coercive but rather is one of ‗non-
coercive reconciliation‘.155 Furthermore, when we receive a biblical authoritative claim 
does it have permanent value or not?
156
 Finally, the emergence of historical criticism in 
biblical studies as well as liberation and feminist theologies and their corresponding 
hermeneutics have challenged us to rethink the authority of the Bible, since these 
approaches are so shaped by particular social and cultural concerns.
157
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 To conclude our discussion on the authority of Scripture in theological ethics, I 
recall the reflections of Cahill and Himes which I find helpful and realistic:
158
 Cahill sees 
the New Testament as an authority—though not the sole authority—for Christian ethics 
and understands the New Testament‘s historical circumstances as compatible with its 
authority. She also argues that historical analogues and parallels in other traditions are 
compatible with biblical authority and useful to understand biblical texts better. 
Furthermore, although the contents and forms of the New Testament are often pluralistic 
and diverse, the New Testament still consists of a common allegiance to Jesus who 
inaugurates the kingdom of God and calls us to obedience and love of neighbor. 
From a different angle Himes points out that acknowledging the Bible as 
authoritative does not mean it functions in an authoritarian way; rather it only means 
Scripture is an essential source for moral discernment. Thus, he concludes that the 
discussion on biblical authority naturally moves to the issue of understanding the Bible as 
a source for morality and to ―the relationship of the Bible to other sources of moral 
insight.‖159 Therefore, I now turn to the issue of Scripture as a source for Christian ethics. 
 
The Bible as a Source for Ethics 
Nowadays more and more scholars, Catholics and Protestants alike, would quote 
and/or employ Methodist John Wesley‘s ‗quadrilateral‘ in their own framework and 
discussion regarding the Bible as one of the sources of Christian ethics: Scripture, 
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tradition, human reason and experience.
160
 Still, in practical terms, these sources are in 
tension and hence scholars offer different proposals including prioritization.
161
 There is 
no consensus here, and in fact, there are two extreme views:
162
 Other sources are 
irrelevant or ethics is wholly an autonomous morality and the Bible is only a 
corroboration of what one has come to know. Still, there are many who hold a middle 
ground and ―call for some form of dialogue between Scripture and other sources.‖163 
With regard to the relationship between Scripture and the other three sources, 
Hays points outs the history of this important question being confronted:
164
 During the 
Reformation period, it was the confrontation between Scripture and tradition; in the time 
of the Enlightenment, it was the wrestling between reason and Scripture; and since the 
twentieth century it has been the debate between Scripture and human experience as 
emphasized by liberation and feminist theologies. 
Johnson proposes a dialogical relationship that seems helpful: First, tradition 
―encompasses all the authentic realizations of Christian life based in Scripture and all the 
profound interpretations of Christian life by theologians grounded in the interpretation of 
Scripture.‖165 Second, reason must be free, rigorous and critical, informed by 
contemporary sciences and in accord with the deepest significance and point of Scripture. 
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Third, the Church is called to discern in its reading and interpretation of Scripture ―the 
experience of God at work in human lives.‖166  
Cahill, in addition, points out that due to the diverse and overlapping identities 
including cultural, social and political identities among the believers, the Bible as a 
source thus cannot be used independent of other sources.
167
 Rather, one may profit from 
―sensitive and nuanced incorporation of insights‖ from other sources, including other 
religious traditions.
168
 Cahill later notes that Scripture and other sources ―are [in fact] not 
even fully distinguishable from one another…that all these shaping factors are ‗already‘ 
at work when explicit reference to any one is made.‖169  
 However, Daly and others argue that some sort of prioritization is needed and 
propose that the first priority among these sources is Scripture for it is more 
―encompassing of the reality of an integral Christian life.‖170 Birch and Rasmussen also 
suggest that the primacy of the Bible lies on its function in the church and its uniqueness 
due to its role as the historical origin of the community and its influences on the 
community; thus, for them Scripture is a necessary, unique and constant source for 
Christian ethics.
171
  
Finally, being a source of ethical authority, Scripture can be used as a shaper of 
Christian identity and a source of virtues and values (e.g. the value of inclusiveness and 
renewal), a giver of moral imperatives (e.g. the love of neighbor), a provider of 
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theological perspectives for our ethical responses (e.g. the theology of liberation), a 
resource for identifying creative tension that leads to responsible decision making (e.g. 
the use of force).
172
  
 
The Problems of Using Scripture in Ethics 
While Scripture is a resource for solving moral issues, it is also ―a source of moral 
problems.‖173 Catholics and Protestants alike have raised certain concerns with regards to 
the use of Scripture in ethics, such as the authority of the canon and the tension between 
universality (of human condition) and the particularity of biblical stories.
174
 Moreover, 
the problem of using Scripture has changed over time. In the seventies the issue was 
about the relevance of the Bible: ―Literalists insisted on taking every moral directive 
from the text into contemporary life without any interpretation [while] liberals doubted 
that the Bible had any lasting relevance.‖175 Since the early nineties the problem has been 
an issue of diversity, as highlighted by Hays: Which of the diverse voices in the text is 
authoritative and which of the diverse perspectives of readers should one take? In other 
words, the problem of employing the Bible is directed to whether there is any definite 
meaning at all in the text.
176
 
The problems of diversity can be summarized as follows. First, we must recognize 
that the Bible is ―comprised of many different books written in different historical and 
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cultural circumstances over a long period of time.‖177 There exist diverse perspectives 
among which inconsistencies and even contradictions are found. A typical example is the 
lack of harmony between ―Paul‘s directives to respect and cooperate with the Roman 
Empire (see Romans 13:1-7) and the scathing critique of Roman officialdom and of the 
emperor cult in the [b]ook of Revelation.‖178 Still, as we saw from Cahill earlier, ―some 
efforts at generalization are necessary in order to bring some priorities of biblical 
morality into focus.‖179 Second, these various perspectives and teachings are further 
manifested via different literary forms (such as narratives and commands) that are 
historically and culturally conditioned and hence these moral teachings and perspectives 
cannot be treated as free-floating principles.
180
 Third, even some of these historically and 
culturally conditioned meanings could be erroneous, as in the case of the household codes 
today challenged by feminists.
181
 Fourth, Scripture speaks neither clearly nor directly to 
and cannot deal with the new issues that are peculiar (and/or important) to our 
contemporary world, such as reproductive technologies.
182
 Finally, not a few ethicists 
point out the problem of eschatology as central to the use of Scripture.
183
 For instance, 
Ogletree identifies two types of eschatology that call for different ethical modes:
184
 A 
futurist eschatology (found especially in Old Testament prophetic literature), for example, 
calls for an ethics of hope and patience; and a dialectical eschatology (as in the New 
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Testament) asserts an already-but-not-yet position and thus calls for working out new 
alternatives.  
Apart from these major problems, other minor issues are also identified by both 
biblical scholars and ethicists. First, there exists a practical tension of providing moral 
wisdom from a single Scripture for people of divergent historical and cultural 
backgrounds.
185
 Second, while ―moral theology is scientific, synthetic, and critical study, 
Scripture is primarily a narrative.‖186 Third, the Bible speaks in ancient languages only 
partly grasped by contemporary readers and addresses situations mostly obscure to 
them.
187
 Fourth, the Bible presents a religious ethic that makes its application to secular 
debates difficult.
188
 Finally, as Himes notes, few theologians have acquired the skill to do 
sophisticated biblical exegesis and thus suggests that ethicists should at least learn to 
depend on biblical scholars for exegetical task.
189
 
Despite the challenges of these identified problems of using Scripture in ethics, 
many ethicists, based on their own background and perspectives attempt to propose 
various ways of employing biblical texts in ethical discussions. Some even try to offer 
step by step practical procedures:
190
 Identify and specify the actual moral issue at stake 
(and pay attention to the audience being addressed); select a text; exegete the text, with 
special attention paid to its context and the source of ethical tradition it might have; and 
do the work of hermeneutics and interpretation.  
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1.3 Where are We Now? 
 
In this chapter, I have offered an overview of certain foundational issues treated 
by biblical scholars and Christian ethicists in their respective disciplines in matters 
related to scriptural ethics. For biblical scholars their basic task is the study of ethics in 
Scripture, the New Testament in particular. The discussion mainly focuses on the 
methods and approaches employed in reading the text, and the ethical contents emerged 
from the text. Theological ethicists, on the other hand, deal with the task of employing 
scriptural text in their ethical reflection. They are concerned with foundational issues like 
the authority of the Bible and its relation with other recognized sources in ethical 
discernment. They are also interested in how the Bible can actually be used and the 
problems encountered in the process. Although the state of the question of some of these 
foundational issues has changed over time, others are continued to be treated by scholars 
in their own perspectives. 
Against the background of these wide generalizations let me turn to certain 
contemporary biblical scholars‘ attempt to construct a New Testament ethics. 
 49 
Chapter Two: The Attempt by Scripture Scholars 
 
Since the seventies there has been a growing amount of literature on New 
Testament ethics.
191
 Some of them focus on the ethics of a particular figure (such as Jesus 
and Paul) or theme. For example, Perkins examines certain Pauline letters and points out 
that the ethics of Paul ―presupposes that a new community of moral discernment has 
come into being in Christ‖ and paraenesis is a prominent feature of Paul‘s letters.192 
Elsewhere she identifies the love command as the core theme for New Testament ethics 
and from which she offers textual interpretation of selective New Testament passages.
193
 
Others, like Johnson, focus on a particular New Testament writer (e.g., the author of 
Luke-Acts) or write for a particular issue (e.g. economic issues) or from a particular 
perspective (e.g. feminist).
194
 
Still, many biblical authors attempt to write on New Testament ethics in a more 
comprehensive manner.
195
 For instance, Houlden, in his Ethics and the New Testament, 
examines each of the four gospel writers as well as Paul and James. Houlden argues that 
contemporary Christians should not seek ‗specific‘ ethical guidance from the New 
Testament but rather ask what we should do now based on what we know of God through 
Christ.
196
 Jack Sanders‘s Ethics in the New Testament further expands the examination to 
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the later epistles outside the Pauline tradition and the Apocalypse. Sanders analyzes the 
basic ethical perspectives found in these New Testament writings and highlights that the 
ethical perspective of Jesus ―is inseparably linked to his eschatological expectation of the 
imminent coming of the Kingdom of God.‖197  
However, both Houlden and Sanders‘ works are rather brief in content or scope 
when compared to those written in the eighties and later. Therefore, one of the criteria for 
selecting biblical scholars for our review here is that their works are substantive enough. 
Another criterion is that their works have significant contribution to the discipline in their 
own regards. Finally, I look to diversity—in terms of geographical locations, Christian 
faith, gender, and economic status of the country from which they come—in order to 
provide a certain span to the work of New Testament ethics in the past two decades. In 
fact, such diversity reflects the reality of social change within the discipline: We note that 
women, non European, and Third World international figures begin to come into play. 
This social change also signifies the shift of our theological concerns from not just 
personal guidance to communal practices but more importantly, from communal to the 
global awareness as well. The New Testament scholars chosen thus include Wolfgang 
Schrage, Richard Hays, Frank Matera, Sandra Schneiders, and Rasiah Sugirtharajah. 
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2.1 Wolfgang Schrage 
 
Wolfgang Schrage is a professor of New Testament at the University in Bonn, 
Germany.
198
 He has written on various topics including commentary on 1 Corinthians, 
Pauline studies, and comparative ethics.
199
 His major work on New Testament ethics, 
Ethik des Neuen Testaments, was first published in 1982 and then translated into English 
in 1988.
200
 The book was in general welcomed by biblical scholars and was seen as a 
work that replaces Heinz-Dietrich Wendland‘s earlier work in this area.201 
Schrage is convinced that the Bible provides moral norms for Christian living:
202
 
It ―must be taken as an absolute standard if the conduct required of Christians today is 
still to be Christian standard.‖203 Thus the subject matter of New Testament ethics is ―the 
question of how life was lived in the earliest Christian communities: What were its 
foundations, the support for, and the criteria and principles for [its] way of acting and 
living.‖204 In other words, the key concerns of New Testament ethics are those guiding 
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principles and motivating forces from which ethical expressions emerged.
205
 Schrage thus 
understands his work as primarily a study of theological ethics—―the theological 
motivation and justification of New Testament ethics.‖206 
However, Schrage does not deny that New Testament ethics needs to be 
understood in the context of specific situations.
207
 He is also concerned with the criteria 
and concrete substance of ethics, for the New Testament ―does not aim solely at a new 
foundation or a transformation of basic attitudes…[but] also strives to shape Christian life 
and concrete conduct in detail.‖208 Hence, for Schrage New Testament ethics is 
contextual and situational in nature, as in the case of the institution of slavery.
209
 And for 
this reason he also understands New Testament ethics as fragmentary.
210
 Still, Schrage 
believes that New Testament ethics is generally prescriptive rather than descriptive with 
respect to practice.
211
 
Since New Testament ethics is concrete, situational and fragmentary, he thus 
perceives that the proper methodology in New Testament ethics as ―to see that each 
individual voice is heard, so that the various early Christian models are not forced into a 
single mold or submerged in an imaginary New Testament ethics.‖212 Consequently, 
Schrage discusses in detail the ethical material found in individual books and insists that 
the plurality of ethical concepts found in individual biblical writings needs to be 
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addressed.
213
  He basically focuses on the issue of ―how the ethical teachings fit in and 
flow from the various theological positions.‖214 And the exegetical method employed is 
primarily one of historical criticism. 
Since Schrage perceives his work as an historical study rather than ―a guidebook 
for contemporary life,‖215 he attends to ―the traditional, cultural, social, and religio-
historical background together with the ethical theory and practice of the ancient world 
[such as Judaism and the Hellenist culture].‖216 But he does deal with concrete precepts 
and commands (such as issues of marriage and wealth) and offers his own hermeneutics 
occasionally. 
The presentation as a whole follows the order of the New Testament canon. 
However, Schrage explores first the eschatological ethics of Jesus and the ethics of the 
earliest congregations and only then discusses each of the major New Testament writings 
with corresponding themes. In other words, the way of proceeding is a combination of 
various styles though it is predominantly sequential.  
The ethics of Jesus covers one-third of the book. Schrage begins with the problem 
of ethics and eschatology and argues that ethics and eschatology are closely related to 
each other and the eschatological message is a crucial motive for human conduct.
217
 In 
the ethics of Jesus, its foundation and horizon is the imminent coming of the kingdom of 
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God.
218
 On the one hand, Jesus‘ invitation to the kingdom of God implies a responsibility 
and a demand: The new commandment of love that replaces the law.
219
 On the other hand, 
Jesus does not simply preach personal ethics; rather, his teaching impinges on various 
social and political areas.
220
 
The next two treatments, namely the ethics developed during the early Church 
and the writing of the Synoptics, are actually an expansion of the ethics of Jesus.
221
 The 
Law was crucial to this expansion and development.
222
 Still there is no coherent picture 
during the early church period since even the Synoptics are concerned with various 
themes—such as the theme of discipleship in Mark and better righteousness in 
Matthew.
223
  
For Schrage the latter theme is rooted in the Sermon on the Mount (5:20):
224
 To 
be superior in righteousness means doing God‘s will (and not merely hearing it), loving 
our enemies, and reconciling with one another. In addition, he understands the Beatitudes 
functions not only as ‗entrance requirements‘ but also ―a recollection of the promise, 
intended to comfort and encourage the community.‖225 He further claims that the 
Matthaean additions to the Beatitudes tradition indicate that the Beatitudes is not a 
catalog of virtues or an exponent of spirituality. Rather, it refers to those ―who hunger 
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and thirst for the realization of God‘s righteousness and justice throughout all the 
earth.‖226 
The second major treatment of the work is the ethics of Paul. James McDonald 
describes this section as the most substantial part of the book.
227
 Schrage highlights that 
Pauline ethics is so integrated into his theology and hence perceives Paul‘s ethics as 
Christological which permeates in his indicative-imperative structure and 
pneumatology.
228
 However, Schrage identifies a shift of this twofold structure in Paul‘s 
writing: ―…there is a move from the imperative being shaped by the indicative of 
salvation to the imperative focusing on external dynamics.‖229 For instance, he points out 
that the love defined through Christ needs to be expressed via specific conduct and way 
of life (e.g., respect for institutions in Romans 13:1-7).
230
 
In the remaining one-third of the book Schrage tries to treat the rest of the New 
Testament texts in five sections according to the themes emerged: The ethics of 
responsibility of those deutero-Pauline materials; the parenesis of the Epistle of James; 
the commandment of brotherly love within the Johannine school; the exhortation to live 
as pilgrims in the Letter to the Hebrews and the eschatological exhortation in book of 
Revelation.  
In sum, these findings reconfirm Schrage‘s claim that New Testament ethics is 
theological, historical, and diverse. Yet a central criterion is foundational for each of 
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these diverse approaches: Christologically defined love as expressed in ―God‘s saving act 
in Jesus Christ.‖231  
Schrage‘s Ethik des Neuen Testaments was widely welcomed as one of the 
important works in this discipline.
232
 For our purposes I want to consider two of his 
contributions, namely, methodology and content.   
First, Schrage is careful in presenting the theological and historical factors that 
influence the ethics of the New Testament writings.
233
 In so doing he adopts ―the 
[historical] critical approach to texts while seeking indispensable norms [for Christian 
conduct].‖234 Knowing that the work is still primarily exegetical in orientation and not so 
much a study of ethics, Schrage‘s use of conventional methods is understandable.235 
However, a couple of scholars comment that though he promised otherwise, there is no 
real discussion of hermeneutics connecting the exegetical to the ethics. Moreover, he 
omits sociological and anthropological inquiry/reflection that is needed to put his 
discovery into a larger context.
236
 While I think Schrage does open up some 
hermeneutical questions to our contemporary readers in his discussion of concrete 
precepts/issues, he does not work them out at the end.
237
 
With regard to the use of resources, his work also gives mixed impressions. 
Schrage uses extensive resources, both biblical and modern extra-biblical literature.
238
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Yet, he makes little reference to the methodological shift of his time and its related 
studies (e.g., the employment of socio-historical methods).
239
 As some scholars rightly 
point out, Schrage‘s resources are overwhelmingly European with a First World voice; he 
makes no reference to scholarship of different perspectives, such as liberation 
theology.
240
 Though certain ethical concepts such as virtue and casuistry are mentioned 
occasionally, there is no direct sustained reference to any ethical theory.
241
 
Second, I would agree with most of the commentators that Ethik des Neuen 
Testaments is a comprehensive survey of New Testament ethics, both in terms of breadth 
and depth.
242
 However, he treats certain New Testament writings (e.g., 2 Peter and Jude) 
in a disproportionately brief manner.
243
 One wonders if these writings are of no or little 
ethical significance. Finally, aside from the Christological love, Schrage does not propose 
―a unity of New Testament ethics.‖244  
Nevertheless, I agree that Schrage‘s exegetical presentation is a balanced one and 
can be described as a kind of ―middle road position.‖245 While some commentators 
criticized it as unoriginal and uncreative,
246
 I believe that Schrage‘s comprehensive 
treatment of ‗the ethics developed during the early church‘ is uncommon among other 
similar works.  
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In short, Schrage‘s Ethik des Neuen Testaments is, as Schnackenburg rightly notes, 
a ‗standard work‘ done in a conventional manner.247 It is a careful analysis of the ethics 
of the New Testament in general and in particular, and has been foundational in the study 
of New Testament ethics among biblical scholars. 
 
2.2 Richard B. Hays 
 
Richard Hays, a Methodist and currently a professor of New Testament at Duke 
University Divinity School, is noted for his contributions in the field of New Testament 
ethics, particularly Paul.
248
 His The Moral Vision of New Testament has been a widely 
discussed work among biblical scholars and Christian ethicists. In fact, since the early 
eighties, Hays has been writing on New Testament ethics focusing on particular Pauline 
writings with relevant ethical issues. For instance, in Christology and Ethics in Galatians: 
The Law of Christ, Hays, by careful exegesis of the texts, demonstrates that Paul‘s ethical 
exhortations to the Galatians (Galatians 5 and 6) have a Christological ground in that the 
law of Christ is a paradigm for the life of individual believers and the Christian 
community.
249
 
However, throughout the whole decade of the nineties, Hays has shifted his 
interest to the methodological discussion of New Testament ethics itself. Two related 
essays of this period are particularly noteworthy for they reveal Hays‘s own conviction 
                                                 
247
 Daly, 172. 
248
 Richard A. Burridge, ―A New Testament Ethics for South Africa,‖ Journal of Theology for Southern 
Africa 102 (November 1998): 72. 
249
 Richard Hays, ―Christology and Ethics in Galatians: The Law of Christ,‖ Catholic Biblical Quarterly 49 
(April 1987): 272-73. 
 59 
regarding New Testament ethics, namely, that New Testament ethics as a normative 
theological discipline.
250
 And based on this conviction Hays proposes a multi-task 
framework in doing New Testament ethics. In the first essay, ―Scripture-Shaped 
Community: The Problem of Method in New Testament Ethics,‖ Hays suggests a 
threefold task in New Testament ethics that applies to the interpretation of texts, namely, 
the descriptive, synthetic, and hermeneutical tasks.
251
 The need for a multifold task, Hays 
observes, is the fact that ―critical exegesis exacerbates the hermeneutical problem rather 
than solving it‖ for it heightens both ―our awareness of the theological diversity within 
Scripture and our historical distance from the original communities.‖252  
The first of the threefold task is the descriptive task—basically exegesis. However, 
Hays emphasizes the need of a thick description (by means of historical criticism, for 
example) for the moral teachings of the New Testament are found not only in those 
explicit teachings but also ―in the stories, symbols, social structures, and practices that 
shape the community‘s ethos.‖253  
The synthetic task aims at seeking possible coherence and unity of ethical 
perspective within the diverse New Testament writings. Hays explains that this task is a 
necessity if one has theological concerns in view in the pursuit of New Testament 
ethics.
254
 While he insists that we must confront the full range of canonical witnesses and 
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let the tensions stand, still he acknowledges that a cluster of images emerges.
255
 These 
images are ―capable of providing an interpretive framework that links and illumines the 
individual writings‖ and are needed to handle tensions among the diverse canon and to 
ground unity for New Testament‘s moral vision.256 As a result, he proposes three 
governing images for guiding synthetic reflection: the church as a counter-cultural 
community of discipleship; Jesus‘ death on the cross as a paradigm for being faithfulness 
to God in this world; and the proleptical presence of the new creation.
257
 
The task of hermeneutics, in bridging the gap between the text and ourselves 
requires ―an integrative act of the imagination‖258—to place ourselves imaginatively 
within the text‘s own world. 
However, five years after the publication of this essay, in his address to the 
Society of Christian ethics Hays added a fourth task: the theological task. This addition 
was based on two beliefs. First, ―Christian ethics is fundamentally a hermeneutical 
enterprise: [It] must begin and end in the interpretation and application of Scripture for 
the life of the community of faith.‖259 Second, the telos of New Testament ethics is ―the 
formation of communities seeking to live under the Word,‖260 that is, the formation of an 
eschatological community that serves as a sign of God‘s kingdom.261  
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The theological task is thus a pragmatic task that aims at shaping the Christian 
community into ―living embodiments of the meaning of the NT texts.‖262 It also serves as 
tests for the capacity of the other three tasks in producing ‗good fruit‘—individuals and 
communities whose character corresponds to Jesus Christ.
263
  
Hays brings the fourfold task for New Testament ethics together with the three 
governing images in his significant book The Moral Vision of New Testament.
264
 As the 
title of the book may suggest, Hays focuses on the ‗ethical vision‘ of the New Testament 
and illustrates how it ought to shape the values and practices of Christian community 
today.
265
 The book is thus divided into four inter-related parts corresponding to the 
fourfold task. In Part One, the descriptive task surveys the major New Testament writings 
that are chosen because of their substance and historic significance.
266
 For Hays, although 
exegesis itself does not offer concrete answers to our contemporary moral issues, when 
rightly interpreted, Scripture can provide authoritative guidance for moral decision-
making:
267
 ―The Bible‘s perspective on moral issues is privileged and offers the best 
guidance in Christian decision-making.‖268 
Hays sketches ―the distinctive moral visions embodied in each of these texts.‖269 
Among the Pauline writings, Hays identifies three theological motifs—eschatology, the 
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cross, and the new community in Christ—that provide the cosmic, apocalyptic 
framework for Paul‘s moral vision of ―koinōnia of Christ‘s sufferings.‖270  
With regard to the gospels, he focuses on their Christology, ecclesiology and 
eschatological expectation: In the case of Matthew‘s version of Sermon on the Mount 
(and the Beatitudes in particular), Hays points out that the Sermon portrays Jesus as an 
authoritative teacher whose authority goes beyond that of the Law.
271
 These texts are 
Jesus‘ basic training on discipleship and ―call for a life of uncompromising rigor in 
discipleship…[through which] the character of community is sketched…[This 
community] is a contrast society…lives now in anticipation of ultimate restoration by 
God...[and] seeks to embody this eschatological vision of God‘s righteousness.‖272 
The book of Revelation is identified as a political resistance document similar to 
that of the book of Daniel. Hays understands its moral vision of resistance as shaped by 
the apocalyptic eschatology that offers hope, consolation and warrants for obedience.
273
 
In each treatment, Hays concludes with illustrations of ―how these particular visions had 
concrete implications for the behavior and life of the early Church.‖274  
Regarding the approach used in this exegetical descriptive task, although Hays 
acknowledges the need to attend to the developmental history of moral teaching traditions, 
he defines his approach as predominantly literary—a method that emphasizes the shape 
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of the whole work, as in his treatment of the Gospel of Mark.
275
 And the order of 
discussion is primarily historical rather than canonical: It begins with Pauline writings 
and then moves onto the evangelists‘ narratives and other epistles. 
The second part of the book focuses on the discussion of the plausibility of a 
coherent normative New Testament ethics.
276
 He tries to identify the single moral vision 
of the New Testament which becomes a framework within which moral judgment takes 
place.
277
 Although Hays admits that a single unifying notion is inadequate, he is 
convinced that synthesis is possible and thus aims at articulating wherein the unity of 
moral visions lies.
278
 His approach is basically one of induction—by means of trial and 
error various metaphors and images are tested to see if they illuminate the whole New 
Testament.
279
 Hays restates those three governing images he identified earlier, namely, 
community, cross and new creation, as focal images and lenses in the discernment of 
what is fundamental in the ethical vision of New Testament as a whole.
280
 With regards 
to the use of images, Hays basically holds that ―the unity and sense of Scripture can be 
grasped only through an act of metaphorical imagination that focuses the diverse contents 
of the texts in terms of a particular ‗imaginative characterization.‘‖281 
In Part Three, Hays offers hermeneutical proposals based on his examination of 
how selected theological ethicists (e.g., Karl Barth and Stanley Hauerwas) have used 
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Scripture. He first discusses four modes of moral discourse, i.e., rules, principles, 
paradigms, and symbolic worlds, in which contemporary ethicists appeal to Scripture as a 
basis for moral reflection.
282
 He evaluates how Scripture is employed by those ethicists 
and how it is related to other sources.
283
  
The last part of the book is a concrete elaboration of what Hays means by 
theological task. In it he applies his methodological framework onto some specific ethical 
issues, including violence and abortion, and offers plan of action. The issues chosen are 
based on the presumption that they require different ways of drawing upon the New 
Testament.
284
 In doing so, he follows the sequence of the fourfold task: 1) Reads the 
relevant texts carefully; 2) evaluates them in light of the three focal images; 3) reflects on 
the modes used in these texts; and 4) draws normative conclusions for each of these 
issues.
285
 For example, Hays selects parts of the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5-7 as 
the key text in his discussion of using violence in defense of justice:
286
 He first concludes 
from exegetical investigation that the normative teaching of the selected text (5:38-48) is 
nonviolent love of enemies. He then reads the text through the lenses of community, 
cross, and new creation, and concludes that Christian community is called to be a one of 
reconciliation that determines to suffer for its witness and yet will be vindicated by the 
resurrection of the dead. By reflecting upon various modes of appropriation he claims 
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that all testify against the use of violence. Finally, he draws a normative conclusion that 
the Church is called to be a community of peace. 
As a whole, Hays‘s project has been well received by both theological ethicists 
and biblical scholars as a significant resource for New Testament ethics.
287
 The work is 
applauded for its comprehensiveness and for being extra-ordinary: With the insertion of 
Part Three and Four, the book is able to take on the whole task from the descriptive to the 
normative, and from theory to practice.
288
 As Harrington succinctly points out, Hays goes 
beyond the level of description as other conventional biblical scholars did, such as 
Wolfgang Schrage.
289
  
Unfortunately, some are concerned with the adequacy of Hays‘s discussion on the 
overarching content issues of Scripture and ethics themselves.
290
 For example, Johnson 
points out that there is no discussion of the relation of ethics to moral formation within 
the community, and that the approach remains act-oriented.
291
 Above all the criticisms 
fell on Part One and Two.  
With regards to the order of his exegetical descriptive task, Hays believes that 
New Testament ethics is contained not in a historical reconstruction of Jesus‘ teaching 
but in its canonical writings,
 292
 but the decision to treat the historical Jesus only briefly is 
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somehow unconvincing. Second, I agree with the criticism that the content of the 
descriptive treatment itself is rather imbalanced or incomprehensive.
293
 For instance, 
Richard Burridge points out that many of the later/deutero Pauline writings (such as 
Colossians) and non-Pauline epistles are barely mentioned.
294
 James McDonald argues 
that the epistle of James, being the most ‗moral‘ of all epistles with a moral tradition 
different from Pauline tradition should not be neglected.
295
  
While scholars consider Part Two a unique contribution, some are concerned that 
the attempt to seek synthesis has the danger of neglecting voices that either do not fit the 
agenda or are already comprehended within the agenda.
296
 They perceive what is 
problematic is the fact that it ―disrupts the narrative structure of the New Testament and 
may leave out essential elements.‖297  
For many the main concern seems to be the three proposed focal images. On the 
one hand, they question the adequacy of these three images—and in particular the image 
of ‗new community‘—for embracing the diverse images in the New Testament.298 For 
instance, Burridge points out that since the lens of love is crucial in relation to Jesus‘ 
ethics and is used far more often than ‗cross‘ or ‗community‘, he doubts ―whether these 
images will serve his purpose.‖ 299 Frank Matera argues that the three images are so 
similar to the categories Hays employs in his discussion of Pauline writings, he wonders 
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whether Paul‘s writing is the ultimate determination of Hays‘s understanding of the New 
Testament‘s moral vision.300 Richard Young thus suggests that Hays ―is already engaged 
in synthesis during the descriptive task.‖301 
Harrington and Keenan‘s criticism deserves our attention. They comment that 
unlike feminists and liberation theologians, Hays fails to take into account ―the social 
location of the one using these master lenses.‖302 They argue that the discussion of the 
exegete‘s own social location is crucial for the agent‘s own understanding of Scripture.303 
Keenan further claims that the ability to recognize the good in Scripture does not depend 
on ‗impersonal‘ images/lenses. He counter proposes fundamental internal character traits 
needed for the individual and the community to understand Scripture.
304
 However, both 
Harrington and Keenan suggest that Hays‘s insight of searching for focal images is in 
tune with their own virtue ethics model in that those lenses correlate with certain virtues 
and both ―serve to guide us more accurately in our biblical evaluations and syntheses.‖305 
Not surprisingly, we can name the second part ―the most creative and controversial 
aspect‖ of Hays‘s whole framework.306  
Finally, regarding Hays‘s treatment of the last two tasks, that is, the analysis on 
how some ethicists have used Scripture and the application of the framework in ethical 
issues, some Catholic commentators are somehow disappointed that the choice of these 
ethicists lacks Catholic representation that may challenge Hays‘s perception of how 
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Scripture is the privileged source.
307
 Others are disappointed that Hays‘s work still asserts 
that non-biblical sources—tradition, reason and experience—as subordinate to 
Scripture.
308
 However, some Catholics like Spohn praise Hays for ―moving from text to 
life by appealing to metaphor, which is the creative coupling of unrelated terms that 
provokes new insight.‖309 He adds that what stands out most is ―the sophistication of 
Hays‘s method in moving from text to world.‖310 
In sum, Hays‘s project is highly valuable in informing and shaping our ongoing 
discussion of the role of Scripture in ethics as well as the unity of New Testament ethics. 
Furthermore, the overall methodology of Hays‘s work can be applicable to Old 
Testament ethics.
311
  
 
2.3 Frank J. Matera 
 
Among those factors that invite commentators to compare the works of Hays and 
Matera is the fact that Matera‘s New Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul 
was published in the same year as was Hays‘s work.312 Matera, a Catholic priest, is a 
professor of New Testament at Catholic University of America. He was trained in both 
Europe and America with a concentration on Pauline letters and New Testament 
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theology.
313
 He is the author of not a few books, including Galatians in the Sacra Pagina 
series.
314
 However, since the time of teaching in St. John Seminary in Boston (1982-87), 
Matera has published a number of exegetical articles with special interest on the Passion 
and Death of Jesus as recorded by the evangelists.
315
  Like Hays, Matera also published 
an article on New Testament ethics—Ethics for the Kingdom of God: The Gospel 
according to Mark
316—prior to the publication of his New Testament Ethics. To a certain 
extent, as seen in the role played by Hays‘s own articles, this article anticipates the kind 
of New Testament ethics to be found in the book. In it, Matera claims that narrative has 
an ethical dimension—it creates ―a moral universe within which characters choose good 
and evil.‖317 And in the case of Mark‘s narrative, it is the kingdom of God that structures 
its moral universe. The corresponding ethical response includes repentance and faith.
318
 
As a result, Matera argues that ―a careful study of the narrative theology in Mark‘s gospel 
can enrich Catholic moral theology by refocusing attention upon the kingdom of God as 
the essential foundation for Christian ethics.‖319 A fuller discussion of the ethics 
prescribed in each of the New Testament writings, however, is found in his New 
Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul that is published in 1996. 
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New Testament Ethics is the second of his trilogy of New Testament studies.
320
 
The goal of his second work is ―to describe as accurately as possible the moral and 
ethical vision that a given writing proposes.‖321 This is based on the observation that New 
Testament writings are diverse, historically and culturally conditioned.
322
 Matera is thus 
concerned that the traditional diachronic and synchronic methods used in New Testament 
ethics are inadequate in one way or another in handling the texts: Diachronic method, by 
focusing upon chronological development within New Testament ethics and digging 
through the layers of traditions to Jesus‘ moral teaching, ―fragments the New Testament 
witness and tends to devalue later New Testament writings;‖ while the synchronic 
approach, though preserving the integrity of the New Testament, ―often mutes the 
individual voices.‖323 Consequently, he proposes an approach that aims at revealing 
certain ethical principles that are consistently applied in the texts Matera examines.
324
 
This approach is founded on the assumption that ―the primary object of New 
Testament ethics should be the writings of the New Testament …and [its] primary 
subject is the ethical teachings of these writings.‖325 In other words, what is decisive in 
shaping the moral life of the Church is the New Testament writings themselves; and the 
approach to New Testament ethics should not be a historical reconstruction or theological 
                                                 
320
 Chris McMahon, review of New Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul, by Frank J. Matera, 
Living Light 36 (January, 2001): 71. The other two works of his trilogy are: Passion Narratives and Gospel 
Theologies (1986) and New Testament Christology (1999). In 2007, he publishes New Testament Theology 
that offers a better treatment of the Kingdom of God theme. 
321
 McMahon, 71. 
322
 Stephen Pattee, review of New Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul, by Frank J. Matera, 
Catholic Biblical Quarterly 60, no. 2 (April 1998): 370. 
323
 Richard Alan Young, review of New Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul, by Frank J. 
Matera, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 42, no. 2 (June 1999): 343; Matera, New Testament 
Ethics, 5. 
324
 Pattee, 370. 
325
 Matera, New Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul, 7. 
 71 
synthesis of the ethical teachings of Jesus and Paul.
326
 Rather, it should focus on the 
moral teaching ascribed to them.
327
 For this and other reasons, Matera does not provide a 
comprehensive study of New Testament ethics or recover the ethics of the historical Jesus 
but limits it only to the ethical ‗legacies‘ of Jesus and Paul—the ethics of Jesus and Paul 
as portrayed or represented by relevant writings.
328
 He focuses on the literary, theological, 
and rhetorical character of individual writings and hence primarily employs literary and 
rhetorical methods in order to trace those major themes common to these writings.
329
 
While he is aware of the historical and sociological aspects of these writings, such as the 
question of dating and sources, Matera‘s work is basically descriptive rather than 
hermeneutical.
330
 
Matera presents his findings in two parts, namely, the legacies of Jesus and Paul. 
The part on the legacy of Jesus is drawn from the Synoptic gospels as well as the 
Johannine writings. The order of discussion generally follows the canonical order.  
Among the Synoptic gospels, Matera argues that they are focused on the 
proclamation of the coming of the kingdom and so the moral norm is one‘s response to 
the coming for the kingdom. The Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5-7, for instance, is 
perceived as a presentation of an ethics of the kingdom of God, namely, doing the greater 
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righteousness.
331
 The Beatitudes, specifically, is an introduction to the Sermon and 
identifies who the righteous ones are—they are the disciples who live in light of the 
coming kingdom of God.
332
 
And in the Gospel of John, ethics becomes Christology and the subsequent moral 
norm is instead one‘s response to Jesus‘ commandment to love one another. Still, the 
distinctive themes identified in each gospel tradition converge back to Jesus. Thus, the 
common moral themes traced in the legacy of Jesus include the kingdom of God, 
repentance, faith, love, discipleship and judgment.
333
  
Although each writing has a different emphasis and the interpretation of these 
themes varies,
334
 Matera points out that they all manifest a common origin—they are 
derived from Jesus‘ own teaching and hence reflect certain commonalities among 
them.
335
 The above-mentioned Matthaean Sermon and Beatitudes, therefore, is 
understood as Jesus‘ outstanding ethical teaching. 
Regarding the moral teachings from the legacy of Paul, although it consists of the 
ethical instruction found especially in Galatians and Romans,
336
 Matera points out that no 
single Pauline writing can ―represent a systematic development of ethical theory or a 
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compendium of Paul‘s moral teaching.‖337 Hence Matera ―relates each [Pauline and 
Deutero-Pauline] letter to its own background and shows the importance of themes such 
as election, the necessity to recognize and build up the church community by works of 
love, Paul as a trustworthy model of Christian living, justification by faith and the 
churches‘ needs of reliable teachers and sound teachings.‖338 He points out that these 
recurring themes are also manifested in the Pastorals despite their eschatological and 
ecclesiological orientations.
339
 
What follows is a concluding chapter that offers a synthesis of the ethical legacies 
of Jesus and Paul. Although Matera does not offer any theological themes or focal images 
as Hays does, he identifies several general conclusions (or theses) about the shape of 
New Testament ethics:
340
 1) The moral life of believers is a response to God‘s offer of 
salvation; 2) it is lived within a community of disciples; 3) their moral life is guided by 
the examples of Jesus and Paul; 4) it is directed towards God and towards the fulfillment 
of God‘s will; 5) it is manifested in our worship and our love towards others; and 6) our 
moral life is an ultimate expression of faith. Matera thus concludes that the overall ethical 
teaching of the New Testament ―is inextricably bound up with the message of 
salvation,‖341  and the whole project is actually a first attempt toward a systematic 
presentation of New Testament ethics.
342
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Matera‘s work on New Testament ethics draws broad scholarly attention. 
Concrete evidence of this is the number of reviews written since the book is published.
343
 
The general comment is positive, and the work is praised for the good amount of useful 
information and materials offered, as well as the provision of a concise, up-to-date 
analysis of the materials
 
.
344
  In fact, the work is often compared with Hays‘s The Moral 
Vision of the New Testament. For example, with regards to the quantitative aspect of 
Matera‘s work, one commentator writes: ―Hays‘s first section covers similar ground to 
Matera‘s monograph…but in the material they have in common, Matera, not surprising, 
is frequently the more comprehensive…Matera provides a valuable alternative or 
supplement to Hays.‖345  
Unfortunately, many commentators are concerned with the quality of the contents. 
Not a few scholars comment that the work reads more like a New Testament 
‗introduction‘ with ethical questions in the foreground than a volume that significantly 
advances our understanding of New Testament ethics.
346
 Moreover, the ethical claims of 
the study are rather modest and hence are ―not exactly what one might expect from a 
study on ethics.‖347 They call for a more probing and critical analysis.348 For instance, 
apart from repentance and faith, what kind of relationships, values, and practices does the 
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kingdom of God demand?
349
 On the other hand, even though Matera makes it clear that 
his task is purely descriptive, not a few commentators still hope that he can move beyond 
mere description.
350
 
Nevertheless, what is encouraging in Matera‘s work is his methodological 
orientation. He attempts to transcend the limitations of the historical-critical method in 
New Testament studies.
351
 And his attempt toward a systematic presentation of New 
Testament ethics further demonstrates his effort to reconcile the two traditional 
(diachronic and synchronic) approaches.
352
 Matera‘s new approach is not without puzzles, 
though, at least on the practical level. In the first place, how does he select and categorize 
the ethical contents of the writings? For instance, his chapter headings disclose his own 
biases: One may ask why ‗election‘, instead of ‗suffering‘ is highlighted in the treatment 
of the Letters to the Thessalonians.
353
 Second, some scholars wonder on what grounds 
Matera omits the Letter to the Hebrews, Philemon and the book of Revelation.
354
 Third 
and last, there is a fundamental issue of the connection between the legacy of Jesus and 
that of Paul.
355
 Matera seems to take this connection for granted. 
Moreover, although Matera insists that his work is purely descriptive, a trace of a 
hermeneutic stance can be found. For example, one reviewer notes that in his treatment of 
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homosexuality in Romans 1 Matera adds a footnote saying, ―Paul, I suspect, would find 
the contemporary understanding of homosexuality as an orientation quite puzzling.‖356  
All in all, New Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul and its new, 
‗middle course‘ approach provide valuable insight for methodological discussion of New 
Testament ethics.
357
 The Catholic perspective which Matera brings in offers additional 
contribution to this discussion. Now I turn to another biblical scholar who offers a 
different perspective, namely, the feminist perspective, in her discussion of New 
Testament studies. 
 
2.4 Sandra M. Schneiders 
 
Sandra Schneiders, I.H.M., a member of a Roman Catholic women‘s religious 
order,
358
 has been Professor of New Testament and Spirituality at Jesuit School of 
Theology at Berkeley
359
 and the Graduate Theological Union for over thirty years. 
Schneiders acknowledges that since the time of writing her dissertation, her real interest 
in New Testament has been rooted in spirituality—the lived faith experience—and her 
feminist consciousness began to emerge at the same time.
360
 As she began her teaching 
career Schneiders started to pay special attention to the task of hermeneutics as well, for 
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she was convinced that an interpretation that ―adequately takes into account the complex 
nature and multiple dimensions of the text and the reader‖361—is crucial to biblical 
scholarship. All these personal reflections have led her to attempt to construct ―an 
interdisciplinary theory of biblical hermeneutics that can ground a coherent 
methodological pluralism.‖362 Schneiders thus has written quite a number of scholarly 
essays to bring these issues—hermeneutics, spirituality and feminist perspective—to the 
biblical enterprise. For instance, in a series of articles
363
 she carefully discusses the task 
of hermeneutics in order to reconcile the unnecessary antagonism between scholars and 
believers and to advocate a model of biblical interpretation that is ―at once intellectually 
responsible and spiritually fruitful.‖364 
In these articles, Schneiders notes the growing awareness among biblical 
scholars—the recognition that there is no pure objectivity in exegesis and the importance 
of treating the Bible as literature first and only secondly history.
365
 She also points out the 
developments of biblical-theology movement and of redaction criticism that led to the 
view that the literal sense of the text does not only contain historical but also 
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theological—as well as spiritual and moral—concerns.366 These developments further 
lead to the rise of ‗theological exegesis‘, that tends to expand the understanding of a 
text‘s literal sense to include the intention of the divine author as recognized by the faith 
community.
367
 
Around the same period, according to Schneiders, Roman Catholic biblical 
scholarship has gone through two important and related phases of renewal: Pius XII‘s 
encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu (1943) gave approval for the ―unhampered use of 
modern methods of biblical criticism [such as historical and literary criticisms] by Roman 
Catholic exegetes.‖368 Vatican II‘s dogmatic constitution on divine revelation, Dei 
Verbum (1965) emphasized the Bible‘s central role in church life. These developments 
brought about certain academic and pastoral consequences to Catholic biblical studies:
369
 
1) A division of labor within theology that implies that exegetes need not deal with the 
theological and pastoral implications emerged from their findings; 2) the challenge of 
academic world that calls for multi- and inter-disciplinary interpretation of biblical texts; 
and 3) the growing role of the Bible as a theological source book that informs other 
theological disciplines, especially spirituality and pastoral morality.  
Therefore, Schneiders is concerned about ―how modern biblical scholarship can 
be responsibly incorporated into the thought and life of a Church,‖ especially in dealing 
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with pastoral moral issues such as homosexuality, divorce, and remarriage.
370
  She argues 
that Catholic biblical scholars can ―no longer [be] immune from the theological and 
pastoral consequences of [their] work.‖371 This is very important. Earlier exegesis, unlike 
hermeneutics, was considered as objective, non-interpretive science. Anyone with 
training could exegete the same text as another and the exegesis would presumably be the 
same. The social location of the exegete was not important as it was for those in 
hermeneutics. But Schneiders contends against this position. 
The exegetical task of biblical scholarship, as Schneiders understands, is 
important but not enough for it ―does not produce a full and mature understanding of the 
text.‖372 Hence, based on the insights of contemporary philosophical hermeneutical 
theory such as Paul Ricoeur‘s notion of ‗text‘, Schneiders advocates for a hermeneutical 
model for biblical studies—one that would ―include both the philosophical and the 
literary dimensions and within which historical-critical exegesis would be properly seen 
as an indispensible moment in the full interpretive process.‖373 She notes,  
The text becomes semantically independent of the intention of its 
author…[The] literary genre is not simply a useful device for classifying 
texts but is actually a code which shapes the material in a certain way and 
also determines in certain ways the interpretive activity of the reader…[A 
text] once written is no longer determined by the understanding of the 
original audience [but] open to whoever can read it…[and it] transcends 
what it says and is contemporaneous with every reader involved in the 
existential complexities of the human condition.
374
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For Schneiders, the ultimate object of biblical scholarship is the contemporary 
meaning of the text.
375
 Thus, she calls for greater responsibilities on the part of Catholic 
biblical scholars to go beyond seeking what the text meant alone. 
A more mature and comprehensive presentation of her insights is found in her two 
rather recent books, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Sacred 
Scripture and Written that You May Believe: Encountering Jesus in the Fourth Gospel.
376
 
The Revelatory Text is basically a study in hermeneutics. Schneiders notes that 
contemporary New Testament scholarship lacks a developed hermeneutical theory.
377
 
Thus she hopes ―to elaborate a theory of interpretation that can ground a reading of the 
text that is unreservedly critical, on the one hand, and that interacts meaningfully with the 
personal and communal spiritual life of the believing reader…on the other.‖378  For 
Schneiders a text is not simply a collection of words that has only a single meaning but 
―an experience which has the power to transform us in the encounter between the text and 
the interpreter.‖379 She thus identifies such hermeneutical theory of biblical interpretation 
as the ‗integral‘ or ‗transformative‘ interpretation. 
In so doing Schneiders begins with the discussion of the text itself: As Sacred 
Scripture the New Testament is a symbolic revelatory text and the Word of God. The 
Word in turn is a metaphorical concept and symbolic witness whose central symbol is 
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Jesus Christ and its truth as transcendent.
380
 The Tradition canonizes the New Testament 
―as its authentic and normative self-expression, and constitutes its integral and 
authoritative context of interpretation.‖381 Faith is therefore a necessity for interpreting 
the New Testament as Sacred Scripture.  
Schneiders draws upon the hermeneutical insights of Hans-Georg Gadamer and 
Paul Ricoeur in her discussion and construction of a threefold schema: ‗The world behind 
the text‘, ‗the world of the text‘, and ‗the world before the text‘. The first of this threefold 
schema is concerned ―with what gave rise to the text and with the relationship of these 
facts to the text itself.‖382  Historical criticism is normally employed in this phase. Yet, 
Schneiders exposes the limitations of employing historical criticism alone and points out 
that biblical exegesis is only a phase within the interpretive project.
383
  
‗The world of the text‘ focuses on the Bible as witness. It sees the text as a 
linguistic entity and hence uses literary critical methods to study the text itself. The last of 
the threefold schema tries to invite the reader to enter its world and thus leads to a 
transformative experience for the reader. As one commentator succinctly puts it, this 
schema ―reflect ways of understanding the text in relation to the originating experience, 
to the dynamics within the written text, and, then, to the activity of the reader in the 
circumstances of today.‖384 
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In her discussion of methodology Schneiders claims that since the content and 
form of the text are historical-theological and literary-historical respectively, a plurality 
of approaches and methods must be employed in the process.
385
 By referring to the 
‗historical Jesus‘ research as an example, Schneiders points out that ‗historical Jesus‘ is 
only a symbolic medium while the ‗proclaimed Jesus‘ (which is the ‗real Jesus‘ and the 
object of our Christian faith) is ―the construct of the Christian theological and spiritual 
imagination.‖386 Thus, while historical criticism is essential, it is insufficient and hence 
other methodological approaches such as literary, sociological/psychological, and 
ideological criticisms are needed so as to probe into the theological, religious, and 
spiritual dimensions of the text.
387
 In particular, Schneiders highlights the importance of 
ideology criticism in forming an integral interpretation: Ideology criticism points out that 
there is an ideology in both the text and the interpreter. Schneiders uses it to criticize 
those ideologies ―in respect to the oppressive distortion of reality…[and] to protect the 
text from a premature appropriation by the reader.‖ 388 Schneiders then concludes this 
work with an application of this integral or transformative interpretation to her feminist 
analysis of a particular Johannine story (Jesus‘ conversation with a Samaritan woman in 
John 4:1-42). Rightly she is praised for her investigations about ―the nature of exegesis 
and the role of theological commitments in interpretation.‖389  
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Written that You May Believe is published in the same year as The Revelatory 
Text is. The main section of this book is actually a collection of articles that Schneiders 
had written on the fourth gospel. However, as Schneiders points out, they represent a 
single, particular, and original approach to New Testament writings that she has been 
advocating elsewhere:
390
 An approach that ―engage[s] the spirituality of the biblical text 
through rigorously critical study…[with an objective] to contribute both to the faith life 
of readers…and to the ongoing enterprise of biblical scholarship.‖391 Therefore, the book 
can be seen as an application (and continuation) of what Schneiders has attempted in The 
Revelatory Text by setting it in the context of the Fourth gospel: An integral or 
transformative hermeneutical methodology with a feminist perspective.
392
  
Still, Schneiders restates clearly that the use of critical methods of biblical 
scholarship is needed for the sake of allowing the message and method of the biblical text 
to influence its readers.
393
 She explains that these methods, though not a primary or 
sufficient approach, help clarify what is unclear in the text for texts are historical artifacts 
in the first place.
394
 This emphasis reminds us that the hermeneutical task is by no means 
a substitute of the descriptive task in New Testament ethics. Rather, what is needed is an 
integration of historical questions and methods with contemporary concerns and methods. 
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It echoes with Hays‘s argument for a multi-task in biblical interpretation that we 
reviewed in The Moral Vision of New Testament. 
Schneiders‘s overall treatment of the Fourth gospel, therefore, involves the 
following four necessary (but of varying importance) operations.
395
 The first is the use of 
historical criticism to correctly investigate the historical world behind the Johannine text. 
The second is the use of literary criticism to construe the meaning of the text in all its 
literary specificity so as to be the ‗script‘ that governs the interaction between the author 
and the reader. The third operation makes use of redaction criticism to analyze the 
theological content of the text that helps us to grasp its transformative meaning. The 
fourth and last operation is to engage the transformative potential of the text. 
 However, what adds to her insightful integral interpretation is that it is written 
from a feminist perspective. She notes that feminist criticism helps to ―detect and expose 
gender bias in the text and/or the history of interpretation and to highlight the liberating 
potential of the text, especially when it has been blunted or veiled by patriarchal 
interpretation.‖396  The feminist ‗suspicion‘ also ―alerts the interpreter to the ignoring, 
neutralizing, distorting, or suppressing of women‘s experience and all that relates to 
it.‖397 Thus, from a feminist standpoint Schneiders concludes that women in John‘s 
gospel played unconventional roles, held remarkable original relationships with Jesus, 
and took extraordinary initiative within the community:
398
 They officially represent the 
community in confessing its faith, accepting salvation, witnessing the gospel. In other 
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words, they hold important apostleship as the male disciples do. Or, as in the 
interpretation of John 3:1-15, a feminist perspective allows her to recognize in the 
Nicodemus episode the femininity of God that has long been suppressed by the male 
religious establishment.
399
  
In fact, according to Schneiders, the beginning of feminist biblical criticism can 
be traced back to the 19
th
 century scholars like Elizabeth Cady Stanton before its revival 
in the 1970s.
400
 Biblical scholars realized that many of the problems were integral to the 
biblical text itself—that is, the text is ideologically biased against women—and this 
realization raised a fundamental question that underlies feminist criticism, namely, 
whether the biblical text can continue to function as revelatory text once a reader‘s 
feminist consciousness has been raised?
401
 While the basic assumption within feminist 
biblical criticism is that the text is never neutral and/or the interpreter ideologically 
unbiased, there are different reactions toward this question.
402
 For Schneiders she objects 
to the elimination of all those biblical texts that abound with materials that can be 
perceived as morally reprehensible to women.
403
  She believes that a text can develop and 
come to mean something different from what it was originally intended.
404
 In other words, 
texts have a surplus of meaning that interacts with the historical consciousness of the 
people.
405
 Therefore, the meaning intended by New Testament authors is not the only 
                                                 
399
 Ibid., 122-25. 
400
 Ibid., 127. 
401
 Ibid., 127-28. 
402
 Ibid., 130. 
403
 Odozor, 144. 
404
 Ibid.. 
405
 Ibid.,  145. 
 86 
meaning; and the presence of certain immoral material ―is not sufficient ground for 
repudiating Scripture as revelatory text‖ or for discounting its authority.406 
Schneiders believes that a hermeneutics of retrieval—that moves beyond 
suspicion—is possible for feminist criticism.407 By using the story of the Samaritan 
woman in John 4:1-42 as an example, she illustrates some of the common feminist 
exegetical critical strategies employed in the hermeneutics of retrieval:
408
 1) Challenging 
the translations (of Greek terms like hoi huioi in vv12-14 which was earlier understood as 
‗his sons‘) ; 2) focusing on ‗woman material‘ found in the text (such as the fact that Jesus 
talks to a woman in v27); 3) making women visible and constitutive of terms like ‗the 
world‘ in verse 2; 4) revealing what is overlooked in the text such as the fact that the 
main character is a woman; and 5) challenging possible misinterpretations (that the 
Samaritan woman is consistently perceived as a whore.) From this Schneiders concludes 
that the story of the Samaritan woman in John 4:1-42 is a case of inclusive discipleship.  
As a whole, Schneiders‘s works on hermeneutics are praised for going beyond 
biblical criticism (e.g., historical criticism and literary criticism, etc.) which concerns 
only the text. She guides us to see how the text leads us to the transformation of the 
reader and the understanding of the New Testament as revelatory text.
409
 Her integral use 
of different biblical approaches in exegesis as well as her demonstration with concrete 
examples also lead many to applaud her for being innovative and thorough, inclusive and 
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dialogical.
410
 However, one commentator is concerned with the appropriateness of using 
ideology criticism to rid the Bible of all its ideologies for the sake of preserving its 
sacredness.
411
  In short, he thinks that her presuppositions from her faith are guiding her 
more than the texts are. Biblical scholar Donald Senior also comments that Schneiders 
has overstated biblical scholarship‘s emphasis on textual objectivity, while excluding the 
relevance of the audience in reading the text.
412
 Nonetheless, Schneiders‘s attempt to 
develop an updated hermeneutical theory is recognized as courageous, admirable and 
inspiring to those who are committed to biblical interpretation.
413
  
In addition, although Schneiders is not writing on New Testament ethics per se 
and her integral/transformative interpretation is only a preliminary sketch focusing on 
bridging ―a historical-critical approach to the biblical text and the stance of the believing 
Christian who turns to the biblical text for spiritual sustenance,‖414 her works give light to 
the possibility and importance of formulating a kind of biblical interpretation that is 
helpful in bridging biblical scholarship and other theological disciplines, like theological 
ethics in our own quest here. In fact, as seen earlier, Schneiders‘s construction of an 
integral or transformative interpretation is also out of a deep pastoral ethical concern. 
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Finally, she has actually applied the integral interpretation in her reflection on the 
question of peace and nuclear arms, where she interprets certain relevant New Testament 
visions of discipleship like Christian vocation to peace, Jesus‘ love commandment, and 
the ministry of reconciliation.
415
 
Last but not least, Schneiders‘s works have demonstrated to us the importance of 
searching for the meaning for the contemporary interpreter, especially from a feminist 
perspective, in addition to the meaning for the original audience. As one commentator 
rightly notes, this feminist approach complements and even challenges the traditional 
biblical scholarship by male authors like John Meier.
416
 Thus, I now turn to another 
biblical scholar who employs a perspective in biblical hermeneutics that in some ways 
coincides with feminist perspective—their mutual resistance to any form of oppression.  
 
2.5 Rasiah S. Sugirtharajah 
 
The fifth and last biblical scholar to be reviewed is Rasiah Sugirtharajah, a native 
Indian who lives in England and is currently a professor of biblical hermeneutics at the 
University of Birmingham, England. Like Schneiders, Sugirtharajah is not writing on 
biblical ethics per se; still, he has offered an alternative perspective in biblical 
interpretation that can be illuminating for engaging scriptural ethics.  
As a whole, Sugirtharajah‘s writings and projects are predominantly focused on 
biblical interpretation and hermeneutics from a particular perspective—a postcolonial, 
                                                 
415
 See Schneiders, ―New Testament Reflections on Peace and Nuclear Arms,‖ 91-105. 
416
 Boys, 250. 
 89 
Asian/Third world
417
 perspective. The specific interest in the postcolonial Asia, apart 
from his own postcolonial Asian background, can be understood from the following 
explanation:
418
 Sugirtharajah is concerned with the lack of a genuine, distinctive Asian 
mode of reading the Bible and hence attempts to work out an alternative indigenous 
Asian biblical hermeneutical theory. In concrete terms, Sugirtharajah hopes to search for 
a hermeneutical practice that makes use of Asia‘s cultural and social experiences to 
illuminate the biblical texts.
419
 He laments that ―when it comes to biblical interpretation 
and evolving reading practices, [Asian interpreters] are so unoriginal.‖420  
According to Sugirtharajah, current Asian biblical interpretations can be divided 
into two basic types. The first, dominating, metropolitan type basically refers to the 
western hermeneutics that has attained general universality. He explains that though 
Asian interpreters come from diverse cultures, they share this collective hermeneutical 
experience—they are ―introduced to standard exegetical procedures which include 
alleged objectivity, and the use of a wide variety of [methods].‖421 Even among some 
recent Asian exegetes, he continues, ―in a very subtle manner they are based on and re-
work western models…[Western] methodological and theoretical approaches are 
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creatively put to use to meet Asian needs…[they] have not felt the need to transform 
them in a distinctively Asian direction.‖422  
The other and less advocated type of hermeneutics is the vernacular reading of the 
Bible that borrows its practice from Asia‘s indigenous past. This is the first step to an 
inculturated biblical criticism. However, these hermeneutical attempts are likely to be 
dismissed for not conforming to western academics and for lacking in methodological 
rigor.
423
  
Two particular attempts of biblical interpretation that belong to the first type are 
the ‗Orientalist‘ mode that is promoted by Westerners and functions to awake the 
colony‘s past which in turn enables the Christians to express Christianity in their native 
form and recasts their social identity;
424
 and the ‗Anglicist‘ mode that emphasizes the 
total replacement of indigenous way of learning with Western modes of biblical 
investigation/techniques and theological themes.
425
 The third, ‗Nativist‘ mode is an 
attempt by the natives who are under the burden of Western and native influences to 
animate their vernacular tradition. They insist that biblical hermeneutics must take place 
in specific culture and language which helps promote the awareness of often neglected 
native traditions and the use of native metaphors.
426
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As colonial methods, however, all these modes/attempts have certain negative 
consequences:
427
 First, apart from the issues of origin, content and execution, they are 
used to reshape Asian minds. Second, they insist that the proper use of Western 
exegetical methods alone can yield a right reading of the Bible. Third, they try to 
convince the readers that their findings are universally valid and significant and can cover 
Asian concerns. Although Orientalist and Nativist modes help regain Asia‘s lost memory 
erased by Western discourse, they are still inadequate for a postcolonial Asian society 
that is multi-religious and situated within a complex web of relationships between global 
and local contexts. 
Taking into account Asia‘s cultural and religious pluralistic contexts, 
Sugirtharajah further identifies two challenges faced by Asian Christian interpreters:
428
 
First, they need to learn to appreciate and identify the differences within their multi-
religious texts context. Second, Asian interpreters need to be aware of their identity and 
role in relation to the marginalized, the church, and the academy.
429
 
Therefore, in discussing the proper methodology needed for Asian biblical 
interpretation, Sugirtharajah advocates the use of postcolonial criticism—a discourse 
generated by postcolonial critical theory.
430
 Historically speaking, the term ‗postcolonial‘ 
was first used in 1959 by an English newspaper in reference to the independent India.
431
 
Since the 1960s ‗postcolonialism‘ became a popular term to describe the period after the 
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formal departure of European colonialists following the people‘s struggle for 
independence.
432
 The advent of the corresponding critical theory or hermeneutics, as 
Sugirtharajah recalls, was triggered by three events in the 1980s:
433
 The failure of the 
socialist experiment, the rise of global capitalism, and the loss of political momentum 
among the Third World countries. Not unlike liberation hermeneutics this postcolonial 
criticism claims to represent minority voices.
434
 
Yet, its introduction and use in the field of biblical/religious studies is rather 
recent—in the 1990s—mainly through the works of ‗diasporan‘ Third World intellectuals 
like Kwok Pui-lan, Fernando Segovia, and even Sugirtharajah who lives outside Asia.
435
 
According to Segovia, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a process of ‗liberation‘ and 
‗decolonization‘ was developed in which  
the universal, objective reader is gradually replaced by the interested, local, 
and perspectival reader...the field of biblical studies is no longer the 
monopoly of white, middle-class men. The addition of Western women, 
men and women from outside the West, as well as non-Western minorities 
in the West has resulted in a diversity of method and theory, an expansion 
of scope of inquiry, and an explosion of interpretive voices.
436
  
 
Since then postcolonial criticism was advocated by its proponents as an 
alternative to traditional historical criticism in biblical interpretation, though its advocates 
do not reject the insights and contributions of the latter.
437
 Sugirtharajah, being one of the 
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foremost proponents of postcolonial criticism, has advocated the use of postcolonial 
criticism in biblical interpretation in many of his writings, among which are The Bible 
and the Third World: The Precolonial, Colonial and Postcolonial Encounters, 
Postcolonial Criticism and Biblical Interpretation, and Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and 
Postcolonialism: Contesting the Interpretations, that discuss the hermeneutical theory in 
general and its application in biblical interpretation in the postcolonial Asia/Third World 
in particular. Some of the key findings are as follows. 
First of all, as a discipline, postcolonial criticism is diverse in nature due to the 
lack of a monolithic foundation and the various sources (such as cultural studies) from 
which it draws. Yet, there exists a consensus in that it is ―essentially a style of enquiry, an 
insight or a perspective, a catalyst, and a new way of life.‖438 In particular, postcolonial 
criticism ―introduces power and politics into the world of literary criticism in such a way 
as to expose how some literature, art, and drama were implicitly linked to European 
colonialism.‖439 The Bible is no exception. In fact, when the European colonial period 
began, the Bible also arrived at the same time and was used as a colonial tool in that its 
interpretation was to inculcate European values and customs.
 440
 However, in time the 
Bible emerged as an instrument to criticize and condemn colonial violence and other 
inhumane practices by the colonists.
441
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Second, the subsequent discipline of biblical interpretation during the colonial, 
missionary period has gone through several stages of hermeneutical development:
442
 1) 
Dissident readings by sympathetic colonial reformers to ameliorate colonialism; 2) 
resistant readings by colonized reformers to turn the Bible against the colonizers; 3) 
heritagist readings by the colonized to retrieve their indigenous cultures/traditions; 4) 
nationalistic readings by the colonized after gaining their independence to highlight 
economic development; 5) liberationist readings, resulting from the failure of national 
development programs, turn to the ethical perspective in order to seek creation of new 
person and new society; and 6) dissentient readings by minorities left out of the earlier 
independence movements. However, while the scenario in the Western biblical 
interpretation has changed, the situation in the Third World since then remains the same 
where missionary influence in interpretation continues in the aftermath of colonialism. 
Thus, a different critical reading that places biblical studies in a less apologetical context 
is demanded.
443
  
Third, although postcolonial criticism and biblical interpretation are two separate 
disciplines, postcolonial biblical criticism helps situate the former‘s concern (i.e. 
colonialism) at the centre of the latter.
444
 In turn, the two disciplines are able to cooperate 
and address various issues such as identity related topics (like slavery).
 445
 As such, 
postcolonial biblical criticism has two fundamental interpretive tasks: ―One is to 
interrogate the biblical narratives and the interpretations which legitimize and reinscribe 
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colonial interests. The other is to engage in an emancipatory reading of the texts, 
informed by a hermeneutics yoked to postcolonial concerns.‖446  
These tasks can further be elaborated as follows:
447
 1) It unveils those ideological 
and cultural assumptions of Bible critics by reconsidering the biblical narratives as 
emanating from colonial contacts. For instance, while historical critical method 
recognizes Esther was an advocate for the Jewish people, postcolonial criticism would 
consider Esther a Persian woman of a specific social class and interpret the book as one 
that encourages assimilation and conformity to the foreign power. 2) It engages in 
reconstructive readings of biblical texts. The story of Elijah‘s confrontation with the 
Canaanite priests in 1 Kings 18, for example, is not to be read any longer as a theological 
conflict between two deities but a complex issue of intermingling communities. 3) It 
examines colonial and metropolitan interpretations, especially those found in 
commentaries. A postcolonial critical reading of the question of giving tribute-money in 
Mark 12:13-17, thus, challenges the usual understanding presented by Western 
interpreters that paying tax is unquestionable.  
In concrete terms, postcolonial biblical criticism reads biblical texts via four 
different lenses:
448
 A hegemonic lens reveals those internal structures within biblical 
narratives that support colonialism (as in the throne-succession narrative in 2 Samuel 9-
20 and 1 Kings 1-2). A professional lens focuses on what contributes to hegemonic 
authority (such as rules in the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy and household codes 
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in the New Testament). A negotiated lens pays attention to those acknowledged 
hegemonic elements that has adapted itself for new context (e.g., the Synoptic gospels 
that are written to meet different needs). An oppositional lens discerns the voice of the 
opposition or marginalized (e.g., the Israelite midwives‘ explanation given to Pharaoh in 
Exodus 1:15-19 is not an act of deception but of defiance by the subordinated). 
Furthermore, such biblical criticism does not only read the text but also pays 
attention to the contemporary translation of the text for translation practices often are 
heavily biased and pay undue attention to what the translator thinks.
449
 In order to 
demonstrate this reality, Sugirtharajah turns to the Beatitudes in Matthew 5. He points out 
that in a world of oppression, postcolonial biblical criticism would insist that Hebrew 
words like ‘ani (5:3) and/or and English words like meek (5:5) need to be translated into 
‗the poor and the vulnerable‘ and ‗gentleness with strength‘ respectively.450 
Fourth, in the case of New Testament studies, postcolonial biblical criticism bears 
in mind that both Jesus and Paul have experienced colonialism and reads the New 
Testament with certain characteristics:
451
 Postcolonial criticism brings the marginal and 
oppositional voices to the front (through the fourth lens mentioned above) and reads the 
parable from their viewpoint—for instance, in contrast to the classic interpretation of the 
parable of the tenants in Luke 20:9-18 that focuses on the people‘s rejection of Jesus, 
postcolonial criticism pays attention to the reaction of the people (whose response is 
―God forbids‖) and reveals their concerns that they will be at the mercy of the new owner 
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once the land is taken away from them. Moreover, a postcolonial reading will not 
romanticize or idealize the poor but reveals the system of domination, as in the 
interpretation of the widow‘s generous offering in Mark 12:41-44. The traditional view 
tends to portray the widow as an example of piety/generosity. Postcolonial criticism, 
however, views her as a woman manipulated by the political system. Finally, postcolonial 
biblical criticism will advocate for a broader hermeneutical agenda that interprets the 
texts within the intersecting histories which constitute them (such as Christian-Hindu) 
and within an inter- and multi-textual perspective. 
Fifth, within a postcolonial Asian context, Sugirtharajah is convinced that 
postcolonial biblical criticism is a viable alternative to the other existing colonial modes 
of biblical interpretation that we saw earlier.  
In order to illustrate these five points I turn to Sugirtharajah‘s own commentary 
on the three Letters of John. He basically uses a rhetorical approach to reconstruct the 
original recipients‘ situation and concerns. In so doing Sugirtharajah first identifies 
certain colonial discourses in the epistles:
452
 1) The author‘s intolerance of theological 
dissidence and the subsequent use of harsh language and tone such as ‗antichrist‘ to 
denounce the opponents (1 John 2:18);  2)  his appeal to one‘s own credibility to maintain 
hegemony (1 John 1:1-3); 3) the stress on the authenticity of his message for the fear of 
unscripted improvisations (2 John 9-11); 4) the legitimization of his power by conferring 
on those who are on his side the identity of God‘s elected people (1 John 4:6); 5) his 
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projection of an ‗imperial‘ Christ that tends to suppress other cultures and even religions  
(1 John 4:14); 6) the provision of hospitality and generosity only to those who agree with 
his position as a way to eliminate opponents (2 John 10); and 7) the use of threat and 
flattery to divide the community (1 John 4:4).  
Then, he further points out two colonial frameworks within these epistles:
453
 The 
first is the use of ethical dualism (e.g., light/darkness in 1 John 2:7-11) to discredit the 
opponents and hence justify control and conversion. Another framework identified is the 
introduction of father-child relationship that promotes domination, discipline, inequality 
and conformity (1 John 2:18, 28). Finally, a postcolonial reading does not only identity 
those colonial discourses or frameworks but also offers new perceptions:
454
 It allows us 
to see connections and complementary theological influences with religions/cultures 
other than the Jewish/Greek milieu claimed by some Western scholars, such as the 
possible influence of Buddhism on the concept of God (1 John 4:8, 16) and the doctrine 
of indwelling (1 John 4:4, 15-16). Postcolonial criticism also calls for religious activism 
that has communitarian and ethical implications (1 John 2:29). Moreover, postcolonial 
reading of the epistles acknowledges the presence of postcolonial traits within the texts, 
such as textual coalitions and the author‘s equal emphasis on theorizing/exhortation and 
ethical engagement. 
As a whole, Sugirtharajah is praised for making connection between 
religious/cultural imperialism and economic colonization.
455
 His works are salutary for 
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offering an alternative framework to the predominant hegemonic biblical scholarship—a 
framework that attends to the impact of colonialism upon our interpretation.
456
 In 
particular, just as what liberation theology did to Latin America theology, Sugirtharajah‘s 
framework challenges our Asian readers and scholars to reconsider their reading of the 
Bible.
457
 Moreover, his works have offered a concrete response to those who insist that 
postcolonial biblical criticism ―should not be satisfied with simply exposing imperial 
tendencies in canonical texts and deconstructing them, but should go further to construct 
interpretations which have decolonizing effects in the contemporary world.‖458  
However, Sugirtharajah admits that one cannot simply employ postcolonial 
biblical criticism to any context, including Asian context, without caution or suspicion. In 
fact, Yeo Khiok-khng wonders if such a postcolonial criticism can really help Asian 
biblical scholars to know their identity and questions if it is only a transitional term.
459
 
Other theologians also question if postcolonial hermeneutics is capable of offering 
remedies or even better solution than the hermeneutics of liberation theology.
460
  
Nonetheless, Sugirtharajah and his postcolonial biblical criticism, not unlike the 
case of feminist theology and its hermeneutics, have raised serious methodological 
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questions that have a strong impact on the whole enterprise of biblical studies, including 
the area of New Testament ethics.  In particular, as Sugirtharajah himself claims, the 
purpose of postcolonial biblical criticism is not to rediscover the Bible as an alternative 
for a better world but ―to puncture the Christian Bible‘s Western protection and 
pretensions, and to help reposition it in relation to its oriental roots and Eastern 
heritage.‖461 In our own quest of New Testament ethics, it provides a ―location for other 
voices, histories and experiences to be heard‖ so that new insights and methodology to 
the ethical teachings of the Bible may emerge.
462
  
 
2.6 Where are We Now? 
 
So far I have surveyed how Scripture scholars try to construct a methodological 
framework for scriptural ethics that is built upon their particular perspectives. Each of 
them has provided certain specific methodological insights in their dealing with New 
Testament ethics. Schrage points out that New Testament ethics is not simply a historical 
quest but a theological study. He reminds us of the necessity of attending to the voice of 
individual authors/writings without forcing upon us a unified and reductive view. Though 
conventional, his approach demonstrates what a comprehensive and careful analysis of 
the scriptural content is, and has laid down a good foundation for treating the scriptural 
text seriously. However, Schrage‘s attempt remains on the exegetical and descriptive 
level and even the historical criticism that he employs identifies with a First World 
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perspective. The ethical contents thus tend to be general and standard. Moreover, there is 
no significant involvement of hermeneutics or direct, sustained reference to ethical theory. 
Hays‘s work adds to our understanding of New Testament ethics that this 
theological discipline is normative as well. Therefore, obtaining unifying visions are 
possible through synthesis. What is very insightful in Hays‘s approach is that he goes two 
steps further then Schrage and others. The introduction of a synthetic task signals the 
need to go beyond exegesis in dealing with the text. Then there is the call for a 
hermeneutical task that connects exegetical to ethical. Unfortunately, in doing so he 
sacrifices the need for a comprehensive treatment of the texts and fails to pay attention to 
location/context of the interpreter. 
Matera‘s attempt shows us the possibility of balancing between respecting 
individual voices and seeking unity of New Testament ethics. Like Schrage he also 
reminds us of the importance of dealing with the text comprehensively and carefully 
although he employs different critical methods (like literary and rhetorical criticisms) in 
his treatment. In a subtle way his Catholic background also offers us a perspective 
different from the other two scholars. However, like Schrage his approach remains 
descriptive and lacks hermeneutics or reference to any ethical framework/theory, which 
resulted in producing modest and general ethical claims. 
Schneiders, in contrast, attends to the importance of hermeneutics and advocates a 
theory of hermeneutics that takes into account the multiple dimensions of the text. By 
calling for an integration and employment of various critical methods like ideological 
criticism, she reveals to us the existence of ideology and presupposition behind the text 
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and the interpreter. More insightful in her approach, still, is the claim that exegesis is not 
a pure objective science for we each bring to the text our own historical selves. 
Furthermore, there is a dynamics within the text, and the text has the power to transform 
the reader. Therefore, Schneiders‘s approach, while confirming with Schrage and Hays 
that the discipline is a theological one, further highlights the relation with spirituality. 
Finally, she goes beyond Matera in emphasizing and employing her feminist perspective 
in a straightforward manner. Thus, she demonstrates to us the importance of attending to 
one‘s unique social location in the process.  
Sugirtharajah, like Schneiders, brings forth the unique social location of the 
interpreter. He also emphasizes the need of a more culturally sensitive hermeneutics in 
the study of the Bible. Yet, his approach differs and advances from Schneiders‘s 
approach in two ways: 1) Sugirtharajah hints that one‘s social location and cultural 
context is the starting point of hermeneutics: that is, more than even Schneiders, as a 
postcolonial scholar, he appreciates the originality of our point of departure. 2) The 
subsequent method employed is a direct product of one‘s context, and it breaks away 
from those traditional, First World methods completely. However, his unique 
postcolonial biblical criticism risks the danger of being too contextual.  
Although these specific insights are found sometimes in more than one author, as 
a whole they constitute the actual developments toward a more integrated scriptural 
ethics. Their contributions can be summarized as follows. First, in constructing a 
Scripture-based ethics, we need to take the texts seriously. In other words, the scriptural 
text is important to our overall construction. Subsequently, we need to keep a balance 
 103 
between seeking unified themes among the texts and respecting their diversity so as to be 
truthful to the texts. Likewise, the exegetical task needs both to go beyond traditional 
critical methods and to employ different approaches that attend to the social, cultural and 
religious background of the text and even the philosophical/ethical theory behind the text.  
Second, scriptural ethics requires not just exegesis but more importantly an 
appropriate hermeneutics. In other words, it is concerned with the meaning of the text for 
the reader today. Hermeneutics is important for bringing about the interaction between 
the text and the reader so much so that the reader is transformed. The subsequent task of 
hermeneutics needs to acknowledge and be attentive to the interpreter‘s social location; 
hence, alternative hermeneutical methods relevant to one‘s perspective are needed.  
 Despite the recognition of their insights and contributions, we also see certain 
limitations in the attempts of these scholars that continue to challenge us to seek further 
development in constructing a more integrated Scripture-based ethics. I identify three 
related criticisms. The first criticism is that the ethical claims identified in their writings 
are, broadly speaking, rather modest, general and at times inconsistent or over-subjective. 
For instance, both Hays‘s focal images and Matera‘s theses on New Testament ethics are 
only general statements and sound more theological than ethical. There is also a lack of 
critical analysis of these claims.  
A second criticism is the fact that there is almost no reference or consultation to 
the works of theological ethicists (ancient, medieval or contemporary) when making 
those ethical claims. For instance, when Schneiders adopts the insights of other scholars, 
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she was narrowly focusing on their contribution to philosophical or feminist discussion 
alone. 
Following from this, the last and most foundational criticism is a methodological 
one: Their ethical claims either have no direct and sustained reference to or are not built 
upon major ethical theories like natural law theory. One wonders on what bases do their 
ethical claims ground? While they rightly call for the need of hermeneutics to bridge the 
text and today‘s readers, they fail to demonstrate this task on solid ground. As a result, it 
raises concerns about the overall accuracy of their ethical claims and the effectiveness of 
their overall methodological attempts.  
In short, Scripture is still perceived by them more as ‗scripted‘ than ‗script‘. 
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Chapter Three: The Attempt by Theological Ethicists 
 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed some of the biblical scholars‘ attempts in the 
past two decades to develop a methodology in doing New Testament ethics. Their 
contributions and efforts, both individually and as a whole, confirm the actual 
development to construct a more adequate methodology in doing a Scripture-based ethics. 
In particular, they call for seriousness in dealing with the biblical texts and the use of 
relevant hermeneutics. However, the evaluation of their efforts and limitations also 
confirm that further development is really needed—in terms of discussing the ethical 
contents, dialoguing with Christian ethicists, and especially grounding their ethical claims 
on sustaining, sound ethical theories—if a more integrated Scripture-based ethics is to be 
constructed. 
How about contemporary theological ethicists in their use of Scripture for ethical 
reflection? Have they also shown similar efforts and methodological development within 
their discipline in constructing an ethics that is integrated with Scripture? What could be 
their contributions and limitations? Based on the same criteria—in terms of the selection 
of ethicists and areas of evaluation—set out in the previous chapter, I will review the 
following Catholic theological ethicists in their use of Scripture in Christian ethics: 
Bernard Häring, Gustavo Gutierrez, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and William Spohn.
463
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As said in the Introduction of this work, Delhaye called for a Scripture and 
Tradition-based moral theology in 1953. In fact, this was the same year when German 
Catholic moral theologian Fritz Tillmann, the pioneer in developing a Christian ethics 
based on Scripture, died. Tillmann, who was first a New Testament scholar by training, 
has been identified as one of the influential ‗moral theologians‘ within the Roman 
Catholic Church in the twentieth century.
464
 Johannes Reiter, for instance, comments that 
the Christological accent in moral theology from 1933 to the Second Vatican Council, 
evidenced and exemplified in the work of Tillmann, influenced a series of subsequent 
German authors such as Johannes Steinberger and Bernard Häring.
465
 According to Pope 
Benedict XVI, writing in 2003 as the then Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, when Tillmann‘s 
scientific career as a Scripture scholar was brought to an end, he was ―given the option of 
changing theological disciplines… and later became a top German moral theologian.‖466 
Since then, more and more moral theologians, such as Edward LeRoy Long and 
David Kelsey, began to advocate the use of Scripture and have written important articles 
on the use of the Bible in Christian ethics.
467
 When Pope John Paul II published his 
encyclical on moral theology, Veritatis Splendor, in 1993, he too employed Scripture in a 
major way and made it clear that ―Scripture remains the living and fruitful source of the 
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Church‘s moral doctrine.‖468 Avery Dulles even commented that ―previous popes and 
councils have not been inclined to have so much recourse to the Bible for their moral and 
social doctrine [as John Paul II did].‖469 
But this chapter is on contemporary moral theologians; still, I first turn to the 
works of Häring who has been very influential in the development of Catholic moral 
theology since the beginning of the Second Vatican Council. 
 
3.1 Bernard Häring 
 
Bernard Häring (1912-1998), a Tübingen trained German Redemptorist priest, is 
remembered by many as one of the most influential moral theologians of the twentieth 
century, especially in the reshaping of Catholic moral theology.
470
 His interest in moral 
theology, as one commentator points out, is greatly due to his personal experiences 
during World War II that ―led him to question the moral theology he had learned as a 
seminary student.‖471 Together with his post war pastoral and ecumenical experiences 
they provided the materials for his later contributions to the reform of Catholic moral 
theology. 
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Since the 1950s, Häring advocated for renewal and reform within the Roman 
Catholic Church. Although he was identified as a moral ‗manualist‘, he brought many 
new ideas to Catholic moral theology prior to and during the Second Vatican Council 
through his writings and active participation in those conciliar commissions.
472
 Among 
these new insights is the integration of Scriptural references into moral discussion and 
present human experiences, for Häring was convinced that the Bible is the central source 
of moral theology and that moral theologians are mediators of biblical messages and 
tradition.
473
 For instance, in the ‗Foreward‘ to his multi-volume The Law of Christ (Das 
Gesetz Christi) that was published in 1954,
474
 Häring stated, ―The present work attempts 
to expound the most central truths in the light of the inspired word of the Bible.‖475 
Elsewhere he also wrote that the presentation of the content and specific characteristics of 
New Testament law is ―the task of moral theology as a whole.‖476 As mediator of the 
biblical message moral theologians should be nourished by the word of God and learn 
from the work of biblical scholars so as to discern what helps us to know Christ and 
God‘s salvific plan better.477 He said, ―Moral theology, as I understand it…its basic task 
and purpose is to gain the right vision…we can gain the necessary vision of wholeness 
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only by listening to the word of God.‖478 Siker who writes on the biblical contributions of 
many theologians comments that this work ―initiated changes that Vatican II sought to 
bring about a decade later.‖479 Another instance was the important role Häring played 
during the Second Vatican Council in the drafting of earlier quoted Optatam totius as 
well as the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. He was even 
referred to as ―the quasi-father of Gaudium et Spes.‖480  
In fact, Häring‘s insights continued to influence Catholic moral theology even 
after the Second Vatican Council, especially through his writings such as the three-
volume Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity written twenty 
five years after the publication of The Law of Christ. 
Although Häring advocated the integration of Scripture into moral theology, his 
more mature view of biblical authority in moral reflection grew only slowly over his 
career. For instance, in his earlier writings Häring made great distinction between the 
authority of the Old Testament and that of the New Testament, so much so that he 
perceived the former makes almost no claim in moral theology at all: For him the 
authority of the Old Testament—moral law or natural law—is completely transcended by 
the New Testament law and hence biblical authority is found solely in the new law of 
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Christ as manifested in the New Testament.
481
 Only much later did he assign a greater 
authority to the Old Testament as found in the creation stories and call narratives.
482
  
Nevertheless, Häring claimed that normative statements (such as the theological 
virtues) alone are authoritative and binding although those concrete, time-bound passages 
(such as Paul‘s statements about women‘s veil in 1 Corinthians 11:33-36) can still be 
helpful as ‗models‘ for dealing with particular traditions in our present time.483 In 
particular, he highlighted the normative and authoritative character of the Sermon on the 
Mount in Matthew 5-7, for it is ―an ethics of attitude…the absolutely binding and 
liberating directive of the New Covenant.‖484 In other words, he perceived the Sermon as 
the new normative covenant law through which the concrete ideals of the inner law 
stressed by Jesus are expressed. 
Moreover, what makes Christian morality distinctively Christian is the normative 
nature of the Bible. He said,  
A moral theology of creative liberty and fidelity finds its distinctively 
Christian quality in the light of the dynamic dimensions and perspectives 
which we find in the Bible. Their normative value is quite different from 
any kind of norms fitting external controls. They are, however, binding—
and at the same time liberating—guidelines, norms in a very broad but real 
sense. They depend thoroughly on faith and thus are distinctively 
Christian. This does not exclude that generous people not professing 
Christian faith might, in one way or the other, be guided by the same 
dynamics.
485
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Later on, he was convinced that Scripture does not only inform but also forms the 
community into one of a particular character, and it is in this sense that Scripture is 
authoritative.
486
 The Bible contains reflections and internal thought patterns (such as 
virtues) that can shed light upon our Christian life.
487
 Consequently, Häring perceived 
Scripture‘s significance for moral theology and Christian ethics as ―providing a holistic 
vision of Christian life that gives general normative guidelines and examples of how faith 
is lived out in the world.‖488 He wrote, ―We can gain the necessary vision of wholeness 
only by listening to the word of God and, in light of his word, searching the signs of the 
times.‖489 Such a perception allows freedom in the biblical witness and flexibility in how 
Christians pursue those commands in the Scriptures. It also has a strong impact on his 
subsequent use of Scripture.
490
 
Siker believes that Häring has three fundamental uses of Scripture. In the first 
place, unity rather than diversity of the Bible is emphasized for a unified approach has the 
capacity to draw out dynamic responses of creative liberty and fidelity from the 
faithful.
491
 Second, as noted earlier, he emphasized a great deal the authority of the New 
Testament (and the law of Christ in particular). This Christocentric approach explains his 
relatively little use of the Old Testament. Häring claimed, ―Reader of the text needs 
scarcely be reminded that the point of departure in our study is not the decalog, but the 
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life of Christ.‖492 Still, he did draw materials from the creation story, Exodus, wisdom 
literature, and a few prophetic writings (such as the Second Isaiah). Third, as for the New 
Testament, it is noted that in general the Gospel of John is mostly used. In specific, the 
farewell discourse and the high-priestly prayer in John 13-17 (as well as the Sermon on 
the Mount in Matthew 5-7) are core to his works while certain Pauline writings (like 
Romans 5-8) and 1 John 1-5 are also frequently cited. However, Häring rarely referred to 
those synoptic narratives of Jesus although he understood that the life/death and ministry 
of Jesus are crucial to the understanding of Jesus‘ moral teachings.493 
Regarding how these biblical texts are actually treated by Häring, four basic ways 
are further identified. First, Häring did use the Bible for proof texting. For instance, 
Vincent MacNamara notes that Häring used Genesis 2:24 (―Therefore a man leaves his 
father and his mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh‖494) to backup his 
argument for the indissolubility of marriage.
495
 Siker suggests that it is because of his 
identification with the manualist tradition that tends to employ Scripture to support 
conclusions that had been arrived at in the natural law tradition.
496
 In fact, Häring himself 
acknowledged the considerate use of proof texting in The Law of Christ and thus decided 
to use Scripture in a more responsible way in his later writings.
497
 
Indeed, several Christian ethicists have recognized his insistence to go beyond 
this approach that is commonly used by pre-Vatican manualists: They note that Häring 
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was aware that Scripture contains many key themes and images that can be used for 
theological elaboration and development.
498
 Bretzke, for example, thus comments that 
Häring, like Gérard Gillemann, belongs to the model that seeks to find in their moral 
manuals key biblical themes that would help their moral approach stay focused.
499
 
This leads to the second use of Scripture that was similar to those word studies 
employed among biblical scholars of the 1950s: One discusses certain theological themes 
or concepts such as sin and virtues by simply searching for relevant biblical texts.
500
 For 
example, in both The Law of Christ and Free and Faithful in Christ Häring studied the 
biblical concept of conscience under the titles of ―Conscience in Holy Scripture‖ and 
―The Biblical Vision of Conscience‖ respectively.501 
A third and related use is to treat the Bible as a source of textual examples so as to 
illustrate certain principles or as an analogy to interpret contemporary issues. For instance, 
he referred to the story of a Pharisee and a tax collector going up to pray (Luke 18) in 
order to illustrate the general principle of humility for genuine repentance.
502
 In another 
occasion, Häring claimed that African polygamists could be temporarily tolerated based 
on the analogy of levirate marriage in Genesis 38. He explained, ―[It] should not be 
excluded that the text might be a challenge to the Church when she prohibits the 
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fulfillment of the levirate duty to African tribes who are, as much as were the sons of 
Abraham, convinced that this is their duty.‖503 
The fourth use of Scripture is called by Siker as the ‗illuminative‘ use in that the 
cited texts appear to add insight to an argument. Siker notes that Häring often used them 
in clusters to ‗season‘ his discussion.  
Regarding the task of hermeneutics, it is noted that not until the publication of 
Free and Faithful in Christ did Häring discuss the issue.
504
 Yet, he talked only briefly 
about his hermeneutical principles: 
Hermeneutics requires knowledge both of that time and our time, sharp 
awareness of the biblical horizon for understanding, including the time-
bound worldview of the inspired writers, and of our own culturally 
conditioned way of approaching the problems.
505
 
 
In other words, careful exegesis that takes the historical, social, and cultural contexts and 
literary forms of Scripture seriously is crucial to and a priori to applying what the Bible 
says to our contemporary moral issues. Still, Häring added that the Holy Spirit plays an 
important role in hermeneutics: ―The Spirit introduces us not only to an understanding of 
the Bible but…to an understanding of ‗things that are coming.‘‖506 
As a whole, Häring‘s works are applauded for highlighting the importance of the 
Bible in Christian moral life and integrating Scripture into moral reflection. He has also 
rightly argued for an active role of Scripture in moral theology. His use of biblical texts is 
impressive in terms of quantity. In addition, he has demonstrated to us some of the 
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various uses of Scripture in moral theology. In short, Häring was an exemplar for the 
post-Vatican II theological ethicists in constructing a Scripture-based ethics. 
Among the critical evaluations offered by Siker I find a couple of them 
noteworthy for our methodological reflection:
507
 First, against his own call for sensitivity 
Häring did not pay enough attention to those historical, social, or the literary contexts of 
the texts he employed. In fact, both his overly selective use of biblical texts and the lack 
of discussion of the various contexts in which the texts developed are recognized as ―his 
way of ignoring those aspects of Scripture that are problematic [e.g., historical 
problems].‖508 This raises the concerns regarding his exegetical work.  
Therefore, the second criticism of Siker is that Häring rarely engaged in actual 
exegesis of the selected texts and did not incorporate the findings of biblical scholars into 
his discussion. Third, he was over-concerned about constructing a unified biblical vision 
of wholeness so much so that he ignored the diversity of approaches (such as prophetic 
approach) within Scripture. This double avoidance of the problematic texts and of the 
diverse approaches, as well as the lack of exegesis, reveal his inability or disinterest to 
confront those texts (e.g., those cruel acts found in the Old Testament and done in the 
name of the Decalogue) that may condone (or even exhort) behaviors that are against the 
kind of free and responsive loving act he identified in Christ.  
Siker also finds his illuminative use slippery as Häring did not develop or 
comment on those cited texts at all but simply used them to ‗season‘ his argument. Siker 
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hence understands this seemingly different use as simply homiletical and ornamental use 
of Scripture.
 509
  
However, what needs our recognition as theological ethicists is the fact that he 
was aware of the presence of text proofing in his earlier works and was open to seek 
more responsible ways of using Scripture in moral theology in his later works. 
 
3.2 Gustavo Gutiérrez 
 
Gustavo Gutiérrez is a Roman Catholic priest and theologian from Peru. His 
scholarship embraces diverse academic traditions from Europe, North America, and 
South America.
510
 He has played an important role in the evolution of liberation theology 
through his writings and activities, especially through his active participation at the 
historical Medellín meeting in Columbia in 1968.
511
 
Although Gutiérrez is not an ethicist or a moral theologian per se, his theological 
enquiry always has ethical implications.  His seminal work, A Theology of Liberation
512
 
(first published in 1973 as Teología de la Liberación), for example, does not only 
articulate many of the concerns of his contemporary Latin American theologians (such as 
the emphasis on history as a process of God‘s interaction with humanity) but also reveals 
                                                 
509
 Ibid., 67. 
510
 Pierre Hegy, review of A Theology of Liberation, by Gustavo Gutiérrez,  Journal for the Scientific Study 
of Religion 13, no. 2 (June 1974): 243. 
511
 William B. Duncan, The Political Philosophy of Peruvian Theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez, Toronto 
Studies in Theology Vol. 85 (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), 1, 71. 
512
 Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 2
nd
 ed., trans. and ed. Sister Caridad Inda and John 
Eagelson (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988). 
 117 
his ethical concerns:
513
 One commentator notes that ―on the theological level, he wants to 
show how God is present in the world, especially in human relationships. On the moral 
level, he seeks greater clarity on how God‘s presence motivates the human heart and 
converts unjust social structures.‖514 
Still, Gutiérrez‘s theology is not only related to ethics but to Scripture as well. He 
says, ―In my writings I try to do theology with a strong biblical basis…I have always 
thought it very important to be attentive to the role of challenger that [S]cripture plays 
when read in the church…‖515 As one researcher notes, although his earlier works made 
use of social sciences (such as critical theory) his later works (especially on politics) are 
guided by biblical exegesis.
516
 One representative work is his On Job, a commentary on 
the book of Job.
517
 
In fact, Scripture scholar John Meier once commented that liberation theology is a 
concrete example in the contemporary world that ―best exemplifies the promises and 
pitfalls of using the Scriptures as a source for theological reflection,‖518 for liberation 
theologians focus on the historical Jesus as the basis of their theology even though their 
use is not without flaws.
519
 
Nevertheless, his emphasis on Scripture is closely tied to his understanding of the 
task of theology: He insists that theology is ―the critical reflection on the Christian praxis 
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in light of the word of God.‖520 Gutiérrez perceives the Bible as basically this word of 
God which ―provides a fundamental orientation for all Christian action and reflection‖ 
and has social and political significance.
521
 The Bible is also ―[a] collection of narratives 
that represents an ongoing process, unfinished, still a future possibility…[and] a spiritual 
history, a record of the historic evolution of the ‗people of God‘, conscious of their status 
and committed to the realization of a truly human life for all.‖522 Thus, for Gutiérrez 
Scripture is an indispensible source revealing not just God but also humanity. In 
particular, it ―mirrors God‘s predilection for the weak and abused of human history.‖523 It 
also ―gives the whole process of liberation its deepest meaning and its complete and 
unforeseeable fulfillment.‖524 
For Gutiérrez Scripture as a source needs to be linked to other non-biblical 
sources in a complementary way, especially with Christian praxis and social analysis. He 
explains, ―People engaged in a praxis confer an added meaning to the text, and a faithful 
reading of the text gives new meaning and direction to the praxis…[one reads] Scripture 
from within the context of [one‘s] own praxis, but Scripture also reads [the person] by 
effecting change in [that person].‖525 However, Gutiérrez is convinced that ―the Bible 
speaks with the highest authority in theological and moral matters.‖526 This conviction is 
built upon the presupposition that justice is rooted in God‘s revelation that is 
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authoritatively articulated in the Bible.
527
 Therefore, biblical authority is understood as 
challenging the oppressive authority (including ecclesial authority) and pointing toward a 
liberating authority—it authorizes the formation of a community that seeks to enact 
God‘s preferential option for the oppressed.528 In other words, he regards the authority of 
the Bible as one from below. 
Regarding his approach toward Scripture, Siker notes that Gutiérrez‘s overall 
approach is a reaction to the pre-Vatican II European training he underwent that 
contradicted to his concrete experience in his home country in the 1960s.
529
 In particular, 
he is very suspicious and critical of the kind of exegesis, such as historical criticism, that 
is First World and Western oriented and unconsciously reinforces the status quo:
530
 ―We 
cannot forget that in reality, the Bible was read and communicated from the dominating 
sectors and classes. This is what happens to a great deal of the exegesis considered to be 
scientific.‖531 Elsewhere Gutiérrez says, ―Exegesis in the Christian churches of today is 
so closely tied in with [Western culture]…We have to remember that its purpose is the 
proclamation of the good news to the poor.‖532  
Thus, in general, his approach to Scripture is one that does not only pay attention 
to the biblical experts but also to what the community of faith says in light of its situation. 
In other words, he takes into account the authority of the interpreters (not just exegetes) 
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seriously. In the arena of politics, he further advocates the use of other sources such as 
critical reason and creative imagination as key resources for relating Scripture to political 
matters; yet, he cautions against the direct application of biblical norms to these issues for 
it ―fails to respect the complexities of politics and the nature of the Bible.‖533 
Gutiérrez uses both the Old Testament and the New Testament rather equally: 
Within the Old Testament canon, Exodus, Deuteronomy, the Psalms, Second Isaiah, Job, 
and passages that speak about the oppressed/poor (e.g., Jeremiah 20:7, 13) are frequently 
cited. In the New Testament, the gospels of Matthew and Luke are mostly used. And the 
single most important and frequently cited text is the parable of the Last Judgment in 
Matthew 25:31-46. Together with other similar passages (e.g., the reversal motifs in Luke 
4:16-30) they highlight God‘s preferential option for the poor and emphasize the need for 
concrete and material actions. Furthermore, Siker observes that the Passion narrative and 
Jesus‘ death are not used much. He argues that for Gutiérrez the Passion and the cross 
symbolize God‘s identification with human suffering rather than humanity‘s 
identification with Jesus‘ suffering—a view held by traditional exegetes who reinforce 
the status quo.
534
 
Before we turn to the question of how he actually uses these texts, it is noteworthy 
to recall the specific role of Exodus in Gutiérrez‘s theology. Many would agree that his 
theology is inspired by the biblical paradigm of Exodus. However, Gutiérrez himself 
claims that he makes only limited use of the Exodus story for he perceives other themes 
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such as poverty as more important than the theme of the exodus in the theology of 
liberation.
535
 
Siker identifies four aspects of usage by Gutiérrez:
536
 First, Scripture is used in 
conjunction with human experiences—our ever-changing, communal experiences in 
particular—that shape our identity and self-understanding as believers. A concrete 
example is Gutiérrez‘s use of and commentary on the book of Job: He first perceives the 
book as all about Job‘s personal experience through which Job‘s understanding of God 
and faith in God is reformulated and transformed. He then connects Job‘s experience with 
his own experience among the poor. 
Second, biblical texts are used to illustrate two guiding themes presented in the 
Bible, namely, creation/salvation and eschatology. In particular, he turns to the parable of 
the Last Judgment in Matthew 25 and the Exodus experience to emphasize that the theme 
of eschatology ―points to the consummation of the salvation already begun in 
creation…and is thus…the very key to understand the Christian faith.‖537 He further 
employs these and other texts (such as Luke 4:21) to claim that the eschatological 
promises are not mere spiritual promises but also what is found in human history. Other 
related themes include the kingdom of God, resurrection, the transcendence of God, and 
the problem of evil and human suffering, that manifest the message that God‘s mystery 
unfolds in human consciousness.
538
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Third, Scripture is used as a primary source to discern the genuine meaning(s) of 
poverty. He dedicates the last chapter of A Theology of Liberation to the discussion of 
poverty and solidarity and points out that it is in the Bible that the poor find their own 
story. Two types of poverty are revealed: A scandalous material poverty and spiritual 
poverty. The former is condemned by Scripture that also speaks about preventive 
measures. The latter type calls for complete availability to the Lord and joins Christ in 
protesting against poverty and expressing solidarity with the poor. Biblical texts 
subsequently employed include prophetic literature and the Beatitudes in Matthew 5.  
Here, Gutiérrez uses the text only in light of Matthew 25 (the Last Judgment): He 
points out that the teachings of Jesus ―begin with the blessing of the poor (Matt. 5); they 
end with the assertion that we meet Christ himself when we go out to the poor with 
concrete acts (Matt. 25).‖539 Hence, blessed are the disciples who work for justice by love 
and life, and the so-called spiritual poverty in the Beatitudes must be interpreted as to be 
at the disposition of the Lord completely.
540
  Therefore, the Matthaean Beatitudes is used 
to frame the context of Jesus‘ teachings. 
Finally, the Bible is used to initiate a dialogue between the biblical writers‘ 
foundational communities and those of the readers, so that new and unexpected 
experience/questions can be formed, which in turn lead to further dialogues. He says, 
To read the Bible is to begin a dialogue between faith and faith, between 
the believers of the past and the believers of today…when believers read 
Scripture, they know that the Scriptures also challenge them…When the 
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reading of the Bible is done as a community, as a church, it is always an 
unexpected experience.
541
 
 
While Siker‘s categories come from a Scripture scholar, within the discipline of 
ethics, Thomas Schubeck summarizes Gutiérrrez‘s uses of the Bible as follows:542 He 
first employs Scripture (e.g., the parable of the Last Judgment) to call for transformation 
of the moral agent into one who opts for the poor in concrete acts as an expression of the 
love for God. Gutiérrez also uses the same biblical text to provide criteria for ethical 
judgment. Another use of Scripture in ethics is found in his commentary On Job in which 
Gutiérrez uses the text to ―criticize a theological-ethical system, and…to give a 
theological grounding to human goods.‖543 The complaints of Job analogously become 
the protesting word of Latin Americans against unjust systems (such as the doctrine of 
retribution). A fourth use is the employment of Scripture in the provision of theological 
basis for certain moral virtues. For instance, the transformed Job is an exemplar to 
demonstrate the virtues of love and justice. 
Gutiérrez basically employs a kind of hermeneutical circle that constantly 
reinterprets the Bible based on social analysis of one‘s concrete life situation and 
historical praxis so as to construct new praxis. On the level of faith, he emphasizes that 
the point of departure for this hermeneutical circle is the historical person of Jesus who 
was born as a poor person among the oppressed people and hence is ‗God become poor‘. 
In other words, biblical hermeneutics is primarily Christological. Siker, however, 
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understands Gutiérrez‘s hermeneutics as also communitarian, historical and militant:544 
As communitarian Gutiérrez emphasizes the need to interpret the Bible in the context of 
faith communities; as historical he finds within biblical interpretation an interaction 
between the historical experiences of both the author and the reader; as militant he 
understands interpretation as starting with the struggles of the poor and calling for active 
commitment to the concrete service to the poor. 
In short, he calls for a radical approach towards the interpretation of the Bible: It 
begins from the viewpoint of the contemporary world and one‘s personal experience, and 
then ―goes to the roots of what the Bible actually is…to the essence of God‘s revelation 
in history and of God‘ judgment on it.‖545 
As a whole, several commentators have praised him for his ability and skill as 
biblical scholar and interpreter for today‘s world, as demonstrated in his commentary on 
the book of Job.
546
 They find his use of Scripture appropriate and effective, especially in 
developing the principle of preferential option for the poor.
547
 In particular, he is noted 
for taking the scriptural text seriously and exegeting it with sensitivity. For instance, he is 
commended for offering a good treatment of chapters 16 and 19 regarding Job‘s desire 
for a witness and a redeemer.
548
 Indeed, he does not only use the Bible but also engages 
in actual exegesis occasionally in his other writings as well. For instance, in his 
discussion of the meaning of poverty in A Theology of Liberation, he examines the 
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various meanings found in the Old Testament and from which he concludes that poverty 
is an evil and a scandalous condition.
549
 
Schubeck further praises him for integrating the Old Testament with the New 
Testament (such as relating the Psalms and Exodus to the death and resurrection of Jesus) 
smoothly, as well as seeking coherence in using Scripture, as in the case of reconciling 
‗the just avenger‘ image of God and ‗the merciful defender‘ image of God in the book of 
Job.
550
 Moreover, he is in dialogue with contemporary biblical scholarship in his 
exegetical task. In the interpretation of the meaning of go’el (avenger) in the book of Job, 
for example, he first consults and then adopts the position of Robert Gordis that God is 
the defender for Job.
551
 
However, his use of Scripture also receives critics. The Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, in particular, criticized him for selective re-reading of Scripture:
552
  
He emphasizes the theme of Yahweh as the God of the poor as well as the 
theme of Matthew 25, but does not consider all the dimensions of 
evangelical poverty. He then proceeds to form a unity between the poor of 
the Bible and the exploited victims of the capitalist system. From this 
follows his justification of revolutionary commitment on behalf of the 
poor. This same selective reading highlights certain texts, which are given 
an exclusively political meaning. The exodus, considered as a political 
event, becomes a paradigm: liberation means political liberation. The 
Magnificat of Mary (Luke 2:46ff) is interpreted in the same way. Genesis 
is taken to mean a promethean glorification of liberating work. 
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They also charged him for not examining the true meaning of the Beatitudes.
553
 In other 
words, Gutiérrez is criticized for insisting an over-political reading of the Bible (even 
though some readings are indeed more political than others). Although Siker disagrees 
with the Vatican‘s critics, he too is concerned that Gutiérrez wrongfully used the Exodus 
story to advocate a political paradigm that does not lead to conquest of others, for the 
common usage of Exodus leads to the conquest tradition that follows in Joshua.
554
 
Both criticisms lead to the questions about his exegetical skill, his awareness of and 
dealing with problematic or ‗bad‘ texts and narratives in the Bible such as those that 
promote violence. In the case of the conquest tradition in Exodus, for instance, Siker 
believes that Gutiérrez is aware of the problem (of conquest and violence) for he does not 
use them to advocate any conquest of others. However, like Häring he seems avoid any 
confrontation with these texts. 
Finally, Gutiérrez is applauded for dialectically relating Scripture with Christian 
praxis and hence makes the Bible ‗a book of life‘ for all. Yet, Siker notes a fundamental 
problem in Gutiérrez‘s approaches to Scripture: He seems to hold two contradictory 
approaches. On the one hand Gutiérrez‘s emphasis on the interpreter‘s experience or 
perspective implies relative subjectivity in the reading of the Bible; on the other hand, he 
seems to seek and use objective language of interpretation (such as the view that material 
poverty is evil) to evaluate other interpretations.
555
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Despite the criticism by the hierarchy, Gutiérrez‘s overall emphasis on the 
interpreter‘s experience and the experience of the faith community in particular, could 
offer opportunities for seeking more truthful readings of the Bible. And his actual 
engagement with the texts and biblical scholarship reflects a development beyond the 
manualists‘ approach. 
 
3.3 Rosemary Radford Ruether 
 
Rosemary Radford Ruether is a Roman Catholic feminist theologian from the 
United States of America. She has been recognized as one of the founders of the modern 
feminist movement in religion along with Beverly Harrison and Letty Russell.
556
 She 
recalls that her feminist critique
557
 began when she was part of the Civil Rights 
Movement in the 1960s; and yet it was only when she was on sabbatical at Harvard 
University (1972-73) that her feminist theology really began to develop.
558
 Ruether aims 
at searching for a feminist religious revolution that ―reaches forward to an alternative that 
can heal the splits between ‗masculine‘ and ‗feminine,‘ between mind and body, between 
males and females as gender groups, between society and nature, and between races and 
classes.‖559 Her subsequent feminist critical principle, like that of liberation theologians, 
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is anthropocentric in focus: It is ―the promotion of the full humanity of women.‖560 
However, her feminist vision is sometimes perceived as radical, particularly by those who 
attended the American Academy of Religion annual meeting in 1984 during which she 
claimed that feminist theology is ―contending, not simply for a part of the pie, but for a 
new way of baking the pie itself, even to rewriting the basic recipe.‖561 
Apart from being a well known feminist theologian, Ruether is also recognized as 
a prolific writer.
562
 Her writings cover a wide range of inter-related subjects, from 
liberation theology to Roman Catholicism to contemporary Palestinian-Israeli relations to 
environmental ethics.
563
 Among them Sexism and God-Talk is seen as one of her most 
important books and is praised for offering a comprehensive critique of systematic 
theology from a feminist viewpoint.
564
  
Strictly speaking, Ruether is not an ethicist. Yet, her ethical standpoint can be 
found among her many writings, such as her ethical analysis of socialist feminism in 
Sexism and God-Talk.
565
 Another and more detailed work on ethics is Gaia and God in 
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which she searches for an ethics of ‗eco-justice‘.566 Likewise, although Ruether is not a 
biblical scholar, she understands Christianity as (at least partially) a ‗biblical religion‘567 
and thus turns to the Bible and offers a feminist critique of it. Elsewhere she also attempts 
a feminist interpretation of the Bible. Therefore, it is worthwhile to revisit her use of 
Scripture in feminist theology and in relation to Christian ethics.
568
 
Due to the emphasis of historical criticism in biblical scholarship during her 
theological formation, Ruether has perceived the Bible from the start as ―a product of 
human history, the record of various human experiences seeking to articulate visions of 
faithfulness to God.‖569 In concrete terms, the Bible is thus a collection of writings 
―moved through many different stages and contexts…shaped by, dependent on, and yet 
responding to, the religious world around it.‖570 However, Ruether‘s feminist perspective 
leads her to recognize the incompleteness of the Scripture—that is, ―what we know about 
women is sharply limited by what patriarchal men want us to know.‖571 And by means of 
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ideological critique of the Bible she identifies two types of religions/traditions in 
Scripture that are in constant tension and dialectic relationship.
572
  
The first type of biblical religion is one of sacred canopy/status quo within which 
social and ideological superstructures of patriarchy are maintained. A typical example is 
the sacralization of male domination and female subordination found in the creation/fall 
stories in Genesis 1-3, especially the idea of imago dei in Genesis 1:27-28:  
The definition of God as patriarchal male is presumed to be a projection 
by patriarchal males of their own self-image and roles, in relation to 
women and lower nature, upon God. Thus it is not ‗man‘ who is made in 
God‘s image, but God who has been made in man‘s image.573 
 
Ruether claims that the ideologies that are found in religion and society and have been 
developed in biblical interpretation traditions conceal the liberating content of the 
Bible.
574
 They are destructive and need to be denounced. 
The second type of religion is a constructive, dynamic prophetic faith through 
which those patriarchal ideologies can be constantly critiqued and discerned according to 
the contexts of the faithful. The corresponding critique is thus one of internal self-critique 
of the status quo.
575
 Ruether identifies this biblical self-critique as the ‗prophetic critique‘ 
for it is rooted in the prophetic-liberating tradition. 
Consequently, she perceives the Bible as containing both ―religious 
sanctifications of a patriarchal social order…[and] resources for the critique of both 
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patriarchy and the religious sanctifications of patriarchy.‖576 She further perceives the 
prophetic-liberating tradition as the central tradition of the Bible, arguing that this claim 
is grounded in the general acceptance by biblical scholarship.
577
 Only that which is rooted 
in this tradition is normative for biblical faith.
578
 She identifies several themes within this 
prophetic-liberating tradition, among which is the perception of biblical interpretation as 
a critique of the dominant systems.
579
  
Ruether then argues that the Bible is a source for feminist theology if and only if 
the prophetic principle ―[implies] a rejection of every elevation of one social group 
against others as image and agent of God, [and] every use of God to justify social 
domination and subjugation.‖580 In other words, many aspects of the Bible have to be set 
aside or rejected.
581
 Subsequently, the Bible is authoritative to feminist theology only to 
the extent that its texts reflect this normative critical prophetic principle.
582
 Still, Siker 
notes that for several other reasons Ruether finds no final authority within Scripture:
583
 
First, it is human experience that provides the ultimate norm for biblical authority (while 
the Bible is only a codified collection of human experience). From the feminist 
perspective, women‘s experience in particular is normative. Ruether writes, ―It is often 
said that feminist hermeneutics starts with ‗experience,‘ but what is left unsaid in this 
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formula is that the experience that is assumed here is feminist experience.‖584 Second, in 
order to make women‘s experience visible, non-canonical texts are needed (since the 
canonized Scripture in its present form is designed to silence or erase women‘s voice). 
Third, the Bible contains oppressive patriarchal texts that need rejection. Fourth, 
Scripture is only one of the sources among several.  
Therefore, Ruether seems to suggest that we should not bind ourselves 
exclusively to the canonized Scriptures and that the Bible‘s prophetic principle must 
operate with historical, religious, philosophical and traditional-theological principles 
found in other sources. They are used in conjunction with one another and offer critiques 
of the others. Ruether‘s view on how these principles are used can be succinctly 
summarized as was by Reverend Angela Askew. 
Ruether proposes useable feminist history and tradition in the 
marginalized, countercultural movements [e.g., Gnosticism] throughout 
the history of Christianity and recommends using traditional categories of 
classical theology [e.g., Orthodox tradition], interpreted to correct their 
androcentric (‗masculinist‘) bias. From non-Christian religion and 
philosophy she seeks insights into divine-human relations which promote 
the full humanity of women. Finally, Ruether suggests drawing on the 
philosophies and ideologies of the post-Enlightenment Western world [e.g., 
liberalism, romanticism, and socialism].
585
 
 
When Ruether cites Old Testament texts, they can be categorized into several 
groups, such as the creation/fall stories (in Genesis 1-3), and the prophetic literature (such 
as Isaiah 24, Amos 5, and Hosea 2).
586
 In the New Testament, those frequently used 
biblical texts are similarly categorized into different groups, including those traditions 
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that show women‘s subordination to men (e.g., Ephesians 5) and the sayings of Jesus that 
stress servanthood and anti-establishment  (e.g., Matthew 20 and 23). 
With regards to how these texts are actually used, Ruether acknowledges that 
feminists face the dilemma of using Scripture to ―critique tradition and suggest an 
alternative way of relating experience and tradition, including [S]cripture.‖587 Yet, she 
emphasizes that feminist theology is not repudiating the tradition but simply working to 
liberate it from patriarchy.
588
 Thus, Ruether makes use of several biblical traditions 
emerged from those selected texts to portray a renewable and liberating prophetic 
Christian faith that contains ethical responsibilities.
589
  
The first is the covenant tradition in the Old Testament. She turns to the narratives 
of God‘s covenant with Abraham, sabbatical legislation, as well as prophetic literature to 
emphasize the call to reciprocity, partnership, justice, and mutuality. She then applies this 
tradition to the formation of faith communities for women and to the shaping of our 
relation with nature in terms of ethical (and legal) responsibilities. Together with two 
other Old Testament traditions that follow, they help the building and renewal of 
authentic human communities in which all live in loving relationships with God and with 
others. 
The second is the exodus tradition. The Exodus experience of Israelites is used as 
a liberation model for women and the transformation of the institutional church 
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community. In concrete terms, this tradition encourages people to depart from exploitive 
and oppressive situations with the faith that God calls them to act so. 
The third, jubilee tradition is grounded in the book of Leviticus. It calls for the 
renewal of covenant faithfulness and envisions the kind of redeemed society/nature 
intended by God. It thus reminds and provides a model for the contemporary world to 
continue to restore righteous and just relationships that empowers the powerless. 
The fourth is the Marian tradition. Ruether claims that ―Lucan Mariology suggests 
a real co-creatorship between God and humanity.‖590 In other words, Mary the mother of 
Jesus represents what pure humanity is—one in its original goodness and anticipates the 
eschatological humanity—and symbolizes those independent and active agents who 
choose to cooperate with God freely. We are likewise called to have hope in God and 
cooperate with God actively and freely. 
The fifth is the historical Jesus tradition in which Jesus is portrayed as an 
iconoclastic teacher and healer whose ministry is the climax of the prophetic critique of 
religion in the Old Testament—such as its triumphalistic messianism and the status quo 
of domination. Typical stances include Jesus‘ emphasis on servanthood in Matthew 
20:25-28 and his treatment of women as equals in Luke 10:38-42. Moreover, Jesus is 
seen as one who preaches on a this-worldly kingdom that undoes oppression, and whose 
praxis is paradigmatic and exemplary of God‘s prophetic and redemptive act, as revealed 
in the Synoptic gospels. As a whole, in our Christian and moral life, Jesus is the model 
for rejecting domination and power, as well as identifying with and serving the poor.  
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Specifically, Ruether employs the Lukan Beatitudes (Luke 6:20-26) to highlight 
the socio-economic dimension of redemption and to discount the overly spiritualized 
meaning found in Matthew‘s version of the Beatitudes: ―Luke does not minimize the 
socioeconomic dimension of redemption, as does Matthew with his spiritualization of the 
Beatitudes; in fact, he emphasizes it by adding the negative judgmental side of God‘s 
redemption as judgment on the rich.‖591 
The sixth is the Pauline tradition that bears both radical theology of Christ and 
social conservatism. By referring to the Christological hymn in Philippians 2:6-11 
Ruether first highlights God‘s self-emptying (kenosis) that manifests the ―kenosis of 
patriarchy.‖592 Then she points to the baptismal formula in Galatians 3:28 to undermine 
the justification of domination. However, Ruther also reveals the social conservatism in 
Paul (as in 1 Corinthians 11:2-16), especially in the subordination of women. 
Nevertheless, the ethical implication of Pauline tradition is that when the powerful empty 
themselves of power in the service of the poor, reconciliation may take place. 
The last tradition regards Mary Magdalene as portrayed in the empty tomb 
narrative in John 20:11-18. Ruether claims that Mary, being an unconventional woman, is 
a role model for faithful discipleship and for women.
593
 Thus, she finds in this tradition a 
call to challenge the Church‘s conventional perception of women and its deformation of 
Jesus‘ prophetic and liberating message into a new status quo of hierarchy. 
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Finally, all the above uses are by definition finite as the texts are historically 
conditioned while the reader also operates within finite cultural contexts.
594
 
The task of hermeneutics is understood by Ruether as a dialectical process 
through which the people of the historical past converse with those who seek to speak 
about God in present time.
595
 It is a circular task with human experience as its starting 
point and ending point. And human experience itself is in an interacting dialectic—it 
includes ―experience of the divine and of one self, in relationship to society and the 
world.‖596 From the feminist perspective, this experience refers particularly to women‘s 
experiences as created by a male dominated society and culture. The awareness of this 
unique experience, as well as the self-affirmation as autonomous persons capable of self-
determination in all relations, is crucial to a feminist hermeneutical method.
597
 
Regarding feminist hermeneutics, she suggests that there is a correlation between 
the feminist critical principle and the biblical critical/prophetic principle.
598
 This 
correlation lies in several stances. First, use of both critical principles ―examines 
structures of injustice toward women, unmasks and denounces their cultural and religious 
sanctifications, and points toward an alternative humanity, an alternative society, capable 
of affirming the personhood of women.‖599 Second, feminist critical principle is an 
expansion and thus a continuity of biblical critical principle in a new context. Third, both 
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critical principles contain and acknowledge their limitations (such as insensitivity to other 
groups) and the process of deformation (in which the present criticism may become 
authoritative for a new establishment in another context). 
She thus concludes that feminist hermeneutics is basically ―the feminist 
radicalizing of the prophetic tradition,‖600 ―the feminist interpretation of prophetic 
critique [of Scripture]…in the context of new communities of critical consciousness.‖601 
What is innovative in feminist hermeneutics, as she understands it, is  
not the prophetic norm but rather feminist‘s appropriation of this norm for 
women…By including women in the prophetic form, feminism sees what 
male prophetic thought generally had not seen: that once the prophetic 
norm is asserted to be central to Biblical faith, then patriarchy can no 
longer be maintained as authoritative.
602
 
 
Last but not least, she points out that feminist hermeneutics differs from Catholic 
magisterial and classical Protestant views in that it perceives ―all human constructs of 
thought [as] relative and fallible.‖603 Even the feminist formulations ―must be constantly 
tested by the ethical results of the appropriated theories for [their] experience.‖604 
This self-critique leads us to a critical evaluation of her use of Scripture.
605
 It can 
be divided into three areas: Selection of text, interpretation, and methodology. First, some 
find her selectivity with respect to Scripture well grounded in history.
606
 Others, however, 
find her use at times too selective. In the above discussion of the Pauline tradition where 
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Ruether employs the Christological hymn in Philippians 2:5-11, for instance, she only 
appeals to the process of kenosis in the first half of the hymn and totally omits the second 
half that, in her perception, might suggest certain triumphalism.
607
 They also note that her 
suggestion that new texts need to be selected for a working canon so that women‘s 
experience could be visible is problematic: What are, for example, the criteria for the 
selection of these new texts? Or, how likely will one choose texts that are challenging 
―with the result that even new working canons will probably tend to sacralize the 
particular experiences and understandings of those choosing the texts.‖608 
Second, with regards to the task of interpretation, many commend her for 
appropriating the prophetic tradition for women in particular. A concrete stance is the 
praise of her interpretation of the biblical condemnation of idolatry in Sexism and God-
Talk: ―For a definitively male God to declare ‗Thou shalt have no other God before Me‘ 
is the very epitome of idolatry in that it takes literally an image of the divine, setting it up 
in place of reality. She has coined the term God/ess for divinity…as a term…to express 
the appropriation of female imagery for the divine…as another way of referring to the 
same God.‖609 Siker, however, gives contrary comments, especially concerning Ruether‘s 
portrayal of Jesus: He wonders if Ruether‘s interpretation of Jesus as an iconoclastic 
teacher/healer is shaped by her own iconoclastic self?
610
 
Third, two major concerns about Ruether‘s methodological construction in the 
prophetic-liberating tradition in the Bible are noted. The first concerns her claim that the 
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prophetic tradition is central to the Bible. It leads to a threefold question:
611
 1) On what 
grounds does she reject other traditions such as covenant as the central tradition? 2) 
Though her claim of prophetic tradition is grounded on biblical scholarship, do most 
Scripture scholars take to mean the tradition in the same way as she does? 3) What would 
be the possible problems of making such a claim? 
The second concern is raised by several feminist theologians who are concerned 
about the prophetic-liberating tradition itself. New Testament scholar Elisabeth Schüssler 
Fiorenza criticizes her for idealizing the prophetic tradition and failing to identify the 
androcentric elements within the tradition.
612
 She thus concludes that Ruether has taken a 
‗neo-orthodox‘ approach to Scripture that ―serves more to rescue biblical religion from its 
feminist critics than to develop a feminist historical hermeneutics that could 
incorporate…[a] feminist spiritual quest for women‘s power.‖613  
Theologian Carol Christ echoes Fiorenza‘s criticism and points out some 
problematic natures of prophetic traditions:  
[They reflect] a relatively comfortable, urban (and it should be added 
misogynist) priestly class…Though I too find some of the ethical 
injunctions of the prophets inspiring, I find them embedded in a 
patriarchal ‗Yahweh alone‘ theology, which I find problematic…even the 
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traditions Ruether cites as liberating are themselves part of an oppressive 
patriarchal theology and not themselves adequate models for feminist 
theology and spirituality.
614
 
 
Biblical scholar Elizabeth Achtemeier also comments that, 
while Ruether finds biblical authority only in the critical judgment and 
transformation that lie at the base of the Jewish and Christian prophetic 
tradition…[she] ―cannot deny that [feminist theology] learned this pattern 
of thought from biblical religion and that biblical religion taught this 
tradition to modern liberation movements. Thus while it repudiates the 
patriarchy of biblical religion, it nevertheless claims this underlying 
prophetic base of biblical religion.‖615 
 
Rebecca Chopp, a former student of Ruether, further notes that the prophetic-
liberating tradition lacks historical accuracy and the ability to identify practices of 
subversion and transformation that already exist.
616
 She is concerned that it may 
―overlook the pleasure as well as pain that women have had in the daily practices of 
Christianity.‖617 
Critics thus wonder if Ruether has elevated the prophetic principle into an 
ideology itself. In concrete terms, who criticizes the prophets and how do we know what 
the authentic voice is? I find these criticisms and questions both challenging and yet 
necessary. 
As a whole, we can draw upon these concerns raised by her feminist colleagues 
and comment that Ruether, while overtly trying to counteract patriarchy in the Bible—
both by showing it is not the core message of Jesus, and by bringing in the criterion of 
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women‘s experience—still misses recognizing those androcentric elements in the texts 
she employed and the problem of the prophetic tradition she proposed. Methodologically 
speaking, it points to the question of her exegetical accuracy and how well she has 
achieved in her reading of the prophetic texts. 
However, we still have to acknowledge that her feminist interpretation is rather 
impressive, partly because at times she turns to the expertise of biblical scholars for 
insight, as in the case of Gutiérrez. In the interpretation of Genesis 1:27 (―imago‖), for 
instance, Ruether first consults Hebrew Scripture scholars before making the claim that 
―dominion over creation is the essential meaning of the term ‗image‘ in this text,‖618 and 
that ―the expression ‗male and female‘ is not intended to modify the phrase ‗image of 
God.‘‖619 
In conclusion, although there are mixed comments regarding her approach to and 
use of Scripture, Siker rightly points out that Ruether‘s attempt uncovers those ‗fossilized 
texts‘ and ‗fossilized interpretations‘ in the Bible and hence calls for honest reflection on 
how and why the Bible is used as it is in the Church.
620
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3.4 William C. Spohn 
 
William Spohn (1944-2005) was a former member of the Society of Jesus and 
student of James Gustafson. He had been a professor of theological ethics since the late 
1970s. As a Christian ethicist his approach towards ethics was basically one of virtue 
ethics. He believed that ―virtue ethics provides the most comprehensive account of moral 
experience and that it stands closer to the issues of moral life. As such, it is superior to 
the other common ethical approaches, an ethics that focuses on obligation and one that 
emphasizes consequences.‖621 In particular, he paid special attention to character, 
narratives and the paradigmatic feature of virtue ethics. 
However, as his former colleague and New Testament scholar John R. Donahue 
recalls, Spohn took the Second Vatican Council‘s call to renew moral theology with 
Scripture seriously and thus perceived Scripture as an apt metaphor for his work.
622
 One 
concrete demonstration of his commitment to Vatican II‘s call is his great interest in 
engaging Scripture with ethics, both academically and religiously: As a Jesuit scholastic 
he was actively engaged with biblically based prayer groups.
623
 And since the publication 
of What are They Saying about Scripture and Ethics? in 1984, Spohn continued to write 
articles and present papers on Scripture and ethics, among them including the often cited 
―The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology.‖624 
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This commitment, unsurprisingly, also leads to his disagreement with those who 
advocated an ethics of autonomy (like Josef Fuchs and Bruno Schüller) for he perceived 
this moral autonomy school ―limited the role of Scripture to offering paraenesis and 
motivation for an ethical system based primarily on the natural law, seasoned with 
systematic theology.‖625 In contrast, he was convinced that virtue ethics provides the 
most appropriate avenue for engaging Scripture, especially the story of Jesus in the New 
Testament.
626
  
In his later academic life, he further integrated spirituality into his ethical quest 
and published several articles on spirituality and ethics, such as ―The Need for Roots and 
Wings: Spirituality and Christian Ethics‖ and ―Will Spirituality Take the Place of 
Ethics?‖627 He noted that both virtue ethics and spirituality ―share common ground in 
appreciating the formative role of habitual behavior‖ and the notion of practices is a key 
to linking the two disciplines.
628
 From there he proposed in his second major book, Go 
and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics, that the New Testament, virtue ethics and spirituality 
complement each other as sources for critical reflection of discipleship.
629
 He pointed out 
that ―Jesus Christ is the paradigm for Christian moral life…[and makes the case 
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that]…the story of Jesus shapes Christian ethics through the convergence of…the New 
Testament, virtue ethics, and spirituality [whose practices are mandated by the New 
Testament].‖630 
In fact, his integration of Scripture, ethics, and spirituality is closely related to his 
own faith journey. Christian ethicist Martha Stortz, Spohn‘s wife, succinctly recalls, ―The 
combination of the Charismatic Renewal and Jesuit spirituality drew him deeply into 
questions of Christian discipleship. Scripture and the life of Jesus anchored that 
journey.‖631 
Although Spohn is not as prolific as Ruether, the two above-mentioned books on 
Scripture and ethics have been well known to many in both fields. In particular, What are 
They Saying about Scripture and Ethics was fully revised and expanded ten years later. 
This new edition, Spohn claimed, ―focuses on the problem of hermeneutics which has 
become central to the use of Scripture.‖632  
Nevertheless, Donahue notes that Scripture animated Spohn‘s work ―from the 
inside to external expression.‖633 Therefore, our discussion will focus on his engagement 
with Scripture in ethics (rather than solely on the use of Scripture) and will largely be 
based on these two books and some of his related writings. 
Scripture as a whole was perceived by Spohn as the story of a people called and 
led by God to be a distinctive community and a particular sort of person.
634
 It presents a 
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new way of life for God‘s people to follow which is inseparable from the history that has 
revealed God.
635
 Thus, the use of Scripture in Christian ethics must be rooted in this 
history. With regards to its authority, he claimed that ―unless the person perceives some 
resonance between the stories of Scripture and personal experience, it is unlikely that the 
stories will speak with authority.‖636 Elsewhere when he talked about Christian identity 
he claimed that ―Scripture has authority over discernment but not the final word.‖637 In 
other words, he adopted the common view that Scripture is one of the four sources of 
Christian ethics. Still, he claimed that the other three indispensible sources ―at least must 
be compatible with the basic patterns inherent in the story of Jesus‖ even if the story of 
Jesus is not the only norm.
638
 This stress is due to the fact that the story of Jesus 
emphasizes certain moral dispositions that other sources neglect, like the forgiveness of 
enemies.
639
 That said, he acknowledged that any coherent ethical argument must draw on 
these other sources in an integrated way. He thus said, ―Our selection of biblical material 
must be justified by the other sources we use: Theological validity in the tradition, 
consistency with the normative portrait of the human person in ethics, and relevance to 
the factual situation as determined by the best empirical analysis available.‖640 
Regarding what scriptural texts are used, Donahue notes that ―Go and do 
likewise‖ (Luke 10:37) and ―Only live your life in a manner worthy of the Gospel‖ 
(Philippians 1:27) are the two most crucial biblical texts in guiding Spohn‘s constructive 
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work.
641
 Still, Spohn employed other texts from the New Testament witness, with special 
attention to the story of Jesus as found in the gospels. For instance, in Go and Do 
Likewise, one half of the cited texts are from the four gospels and two thirds of the 
remaining half are from the Pauline letters (and the book of Revelation). And among the 
Old Testament writings he mainly quoted the Psalms and Isaiah in his discussion of 
emotions and dispositions. 
His particular focus on Jesus is partly because of the trend within the field. He 
himself commented, ―Major recent works on New Testament ethics anchor these 
teachings in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. The 1994 convention of the CTSA [Catholic 
Theological Society of America] addressed the theme of Jesus for the first time in its 
fifty-year history.‖642 This comment gives us a hint to his use of the name ‗Jesus‘ in some 
of his subsequent writings, such as ―Jesus and Ethics.‖643  
A second reason is based on his perception of the New Testament. For Spohn the 
New Testament presents a way of life—i.e., pattern of discipleship—through the story of 
Jesus.
644
 He understood Jesus‘ parables, teaching and table fellowship (as manifested in 
the gospel narratives) as revealing the characteristics of the reign of God and hence 
setting the path for discipleship.
645
 In particular, he gave primacy to ―the Synoptic 
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[g]ospels‘ portrayal of discipleship as configured by the Cross and Resurrection of Jesus, 
in order to shape the character of Christians and their communities.‖646 
A third and subsequent reason is his perception of the entire story of Jesus: He 
was aware of the dilemma (among ethicists) regarding the significance of Jesus‘ teaching 
for moral life and thus sought a middle road, proposing that Jesus is ―normative for 
Christian ethics as its concrete universal.‖647 As concrete universal he meant that the 
particular life story of Jesus has a universal meaning and is morally relevant in every 
situation of the Christian life.
648
 In other words, Jesus is ―the paradigm that normatively 
guides Christian living.‖649 
His overall engagement with Scripture, as Donahue observes, takes various 
forms.
650
 First, he paid attention to literary genre and the contexts of the texts in order to 
advocate for a narrative theology. In doing so, he first moved away from the traditional 
emphasis on history. Spohn wrote: ―There are many forms of literature in the Bible 
besides history: poetry…parable, wisdom, legal codes, exemplary fiction…etc. In fact, 
history in the modern sense is not the primary intention of the texts.‖651  
He then focused particularly on biblical narratives and pointed out that they guide 
moral reflection and action more directly than other literary forms in several ways:
652
 1) 
Our Judeo-Christian faith responds to the depiction of God and other creations in the 
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form of narratives; 2) they serve as ‗lenses‘ for interpreting our own experiences as 
analogous to those biblical paradigms and hence point to an analogous response; 3) 
biblical narratives interpreted in faith communities can inform and inspire moral 
dispositions/virtues (e.g., the narrative of the woman caught in adultery in John 8:1-11 
informs us the call for both justice and mercy); and 4) ‗pictorial‘ commands in narratives 
(such as turning the other cheek) offer guides to imagination and emotion. He was 
convinced that narrative theology ―operates closer to the fabric of Christian moral 
experience than most speculative theologies…[and] can support a broader definition of 
ethics that recognizes the normative guidance that symbolic material brings to disposition 
and character.‖653  
Second, Spohn engaged Scripture in highlighting of ―the paradigmatic role of 
certain themes and texts, such as the Exodus, the teaching of non-violence in the Sermon 
on the Mount, hospitality to the stranger and the vulnerable in the parable of the Good 
Samaritan, and the enacted proclamation by Jesus at the Lord‘s Supper.‖654 In concrete 
terms, he employed various biblical texts to illustrate the transformation of character with 
respect to perception, dispositions, and identity.
655
  
One particular text used by Spohn to illustrate this is the Sermon on the Mount in 
Matthew 5-7:
656
 He first turned to Matthew 6 to show that the Bible corrects and sharpens 
our perception regarding fairness/justice and intercessory prayer. He then discussed how 
the Lord‘s Prayer in 6:9-13 can ―‗tutor the emotions‘ to form deeper dispositions that 
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enable us to conform our lives to the pattern of Jesus‘ life.‖657 Finally, he turned to 
Matthew 5 and 6 to illustrate that our Christian identity is one of a forgiving community. 
For Spohn the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew is the major collection of Jesus‘ explicit 
moral teaching in the New Testament in transforming our character and communal 
identity.
658
 
Third, he engaged in the provision of directives for using Scripture for moral 
discourse. By comparing the Exodus narrative and the story of the holy war in the book 
of Judges, for example, Spohn demonstrated the following criteria: 1) The Exodus 
narrative is central to the canon and continues to serve as a source of revelation; 2) it 
conveys a theologically sound image of God as Redeemer; 3) it is in consistency with 
Jesus Christ of the New Testament who is the new Moses in liberating the people; 4) its 
image of God as healing judge (rather than dispenser of retributive justice) is appropriate 
to our situation and sheds light upon it; and 5) the corresponding action concurs with the 
standards of human morality.
659
 
With regards to the task of hermeneutics, as mentioned earlier, Spohn dealt with 
the problem in his What are They Saying about Scripture and Ethics.
660
 He realized that 
hermeneutics has become central to the use of Scripture and thus proposes a three-step 
analytical framework—namely, the selection, interpretation and application of the 
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selected texts—that analyzes ethical arguments that appeal to Scripture.661 The 
framework basically deals with three corresponding questions: What biblical material is 
used or focused upon? Why is it interpreted in a particular fashion? How may it, so 
interpreted, be practically applied to contemporary life?  
Famously, he identified five different ways/models of using Scripture emerging 
from various contemporary theological positions.
662
 Among them he perceived the 
‗responding love‘ model as a more constructive approach: It supplements other 
approaches and ―builds on the work of the narrative theologians but broadens the 
selection beyond story to include biblical symbols, mandates, and terms of address for 
God.‖663 It understands that one is called not just to imitate the master but to participate 
in the life and mission of Jesus Christ. By focusing on the story of Jesus and his new 
commandment of love, Spohn was convinced that our responsive love is the reason for 
morality. 
In addition, his hermeneutical approach is also one of ‗appreciation‘—he argued 
that it is through ‗generosity‘ rather than suspicion that the gap between Scripture‘s world 
and ours can be bridged. Such generosity points to the cultivation of ‗analogical 
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imagination‘.664 Specifically, he argued that in our interpretation of the gospels analogical 
imagination
665
 helps bridge the moral reflection of Christians and the words and deeds of 
Jesus.
666
  
Within the context of Christian moral reflection on Scripture, analogy points to 
the relationship between ―the biblical text in relation to its world and today‘s Christian 
community in relation to its world.‖667 Spohn claimed that the story of Jesus is the prime 
‗analogate‘ for Christian moral life.668 Together with other analogies found in Scripture 
they guide our Christian imagination.
669
 This analogical imagination, as Spohn 
interpreted, 
moves analogically from the classic patterns of his story to discover how 
to act faithfully in new situations. The basic command that Jesus gives at 
the end of the Good Samaritan story invites Christians to think 
analogically: ―Go and do likewise‖ (Luke 10:37). The mandate is not ―Go 
and do whatever you want.‖ The term ―likewise‖ implies that Christians 
should be faithful to the story of Jesus yet creative in applying it to their 
context.
670
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That means, it discerns those paradigms and guiding images that connect the biblical 
story with our own situation so that they shape our action in such a way that we ‗go and 
do likewise‘ what Jesus said and did.671 For example, in the case of ‗turning the other 
cheek‘, such imagination reveals that this pictorial ideal calls us not only to non-
retaliation but also to seek a congruent response.
672
 
Moreover, through faithful imagination the story of Jesus can become 
―paradigmatic for moral perception, disposition, and identity…[for] it enables us to 
recognize which features of experience are significant, guides how we act, and forms who 
we are in the community of faith.‖673 Thus, for Spohn analogical imagination is ―one of 
the most important ways in which the gospel influences action faithful to it.‖674 He 
demonstrated how the analogical imagination is exercised by presenting expositions of 
several biblical narratives. In the story of Zacchaeus (Luke 19:1-10), for instance, he 
pointed out that the story captures ―the pattern of the Christian moral life as a response to 
the surprising and undeserved gift of God‘s acceptance of us.‖675 Creative imagination 
then allows us to identify in Zacchaeus our own experience of lacking the power to do 
what is right. In the Johannine account of Jesus washing the disciples‘ feet (John 13), he 
pointed out that the new commandment of love as expressed in verse 34 (―Just as I have 
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loved you, you also should love one another‖) echoes ―go and do likewise‖ and hence our 
corresponding rituals should reenact rather than merely repeat
 
the action.
676
 
In short, analogical imagination reveals to each of us in a unique way what 
Christ‘s invitation to discipleship is.677 And for Spohn the challenge of Christian ethics 
today is to think analogically—to be faithful and creative at the same time.  
As a whole, Spohn‘s effort in proposing a synthetic task for a Christian ethics 
informed by Scripture has drawn positive attention from both areas of theology. As Stortz 
recalls, she was impressed by his attempt to bring Scripture ―to bear on issues [such as 
immigration and homosexuality] that had previously been treated within the narrow 
scope of moral norms and casuistry.‖678 Another professor also commended him for 
challenging Christian ethicists to go beyond the descriptive results found in biblical 
scholarship to explain the moral and spiritual meaning of imitating Jesus.
679
 In addition, 
Spohn was also remembered for being sensitive to the flawed use of Scripture by others, 
such as Pope John Paul II‘s Veritatis Splendor where Spohn faulted the encyclical on its 
selection, interpretation, and application of the biblical texts used.
680
  
On the other hand, his Go and Do Likewise, though an exploratory work by nature, 
is particularly praised for correlating various disciplines in a constructive manner—the 
reconnection of the spiritual and moral life of the New Testament.
681
 What is distinctive 
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in this work is the focus on ―the formation of the character of the moral agent through 
practices of spirituality.‖682 His methodological approach, namely, the analogical 
imagination, also received warm welcome. One ethicist even comments that the use of 
the concept of analogy is the most appropriate way to engage the reader and Scripture.
683
  
Regarding his use of Scripture, two of the above reviewed biblical scholars, Hays 
and Matera, praise Spohn for highlighting the importance of biblical narratives for the 
moral life of believers.
 684
 Yet they also express their concerns about his actual use of 
Scripture. First, they comment that he did not deal more fully with the gospel 
narratives.
685
 Second, Hays wonders whether Spohn had sufficiently taken into account 
the apocalyptic element of the gospels and the diversity of the New Testament writings in 
general.
686
 Third, it is further pointed out that Spohn could use and discuss the Pauline 
and pastoral epistles more for it is in them that much of our spiritual and moral tradition 
is rooted.
687
 For example, while he rightly quoted Ephesians 5:21 to challenge the male-
dominated structure of marriage and suggests that one should ―continue to push beyond 
patriarchal definitions of marriage relations,‖ he did not take this opportunity to deal with 
or confront those other Pauline texts that may condone a male-dominated structure of 
marriage.
688
 Therefore, like the other above-surveyed ethicists, he seemed remain silent 
to those problematic texts and/or unable to confront them even though he interpreted the 
Bible as a whole as opposing oppression and hierarchy. 
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Nevertheless, these biblical scholars praise Spohn‘s work for being well informed 
by contemporary biblical studies.
689
 For example, they point out that his discussion of 
Jesus‘ kingdom message is noticeably influenced by the work of New Testament scholar 
N. T. Wright.
690
 
In sum, I think Spohn‘s commitment and contribution to Scripture and ethics can 
be best summarized in Donahue‘s remarks after his death: ―Bill provided a guide to 
Catholic theology for the then largely unexplored territory of Scripture and moral 
theology.‖691 
 
3.5 Where are We Now? 
 
In this chapter I have surveyed how certain Catholic/Christian ethicists integrate 
Scripture in their ethical framework that is built upon their particular perspectives. Like 
the situation we have seen among the biblical scholars, each of these examined ethicists 
has offered certain specific methodological insights into the use of Scripture in ethics. 
Häring, though a manualist, has contributed to the integration of Scripture and ethics by 
stressing the importance of Scripture in Christian moral life, and by being a pioneer in 
and advocate for employing Scripture in the field of moral theology during the Vatican II 
era. He has demonstrated to us this vision by his frequent use of biblical texts in his moral 
reflection and by his various ways of using Scripture. However, his theological formation 
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as a manualist also has certain negative impacts on his overall use of the Bible. His 
uses—both text-proofing and other attempts like word studies— remain superficial and 
immature and do not generate real engagement between the texts and the ethical 
reflection built upon his ethical framework. Also, he has failed to recognize the particular 
contexts and diversity of the texts used. The biblical texts employed are rather one sided 
with over-emphasis on the New Testament witness. There is no real exegetical task 
conducted or interaction with biblical scholarship, and hermeneutics is lacking. All these 
make his overall Scripture-based ethics at times unconvincing. 
In the case of Gutiérrez, we note a positive development. Like Häring he 
recognizes the close bond between Scripture and theology, especially the important role 
played by Scripture in his liberation theology framework. Though he insists on the 
interpreter‘s experience and authority in reading Scripture, he does not reject the 
authority of the Bible. Also, he seems to take into consideration the expertise of biblical 
scholars in his understanding of the meanings of the texts. Moreover, he attempts to 
engage in the exegetical task prior to interpreting the text through his hermeneutical 
circle. Thus he goes beyond Häring by interacting with the texts and biblical scholarship. 
Unfortunately, the biblical texts employed in his works tend to be selective, and their uses 
are also rather narrow and limited. Although he turns to both the Old Testament and New 
Testament witnesses, certain texts such as the parable of the Last Judgment in Matthew 
25, the Exodus account and the story of Job seem to be used repeatedly for his various 
arguments, such as the preferential option for the poor. In specific, they are chosen and 
used in a way that fits into his univocal, liberation (and partial socio-political) 
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agenda/framework. Such way of proceeding tends to ignore other possible meanings of 
these texts and the core themes of the Bible as a whole. 
Ruether likewise has set her own feminist agenda at the beginning. Yet, her use of 
Scripture reveals further advancement from that of Gutiérrez and Häring. In dealing with 
the biblical texts, for instance, she takes into account the historical aspect of the texts and 
hence puts her approach somewhat in line with that of the traditional biblical scholarship. 
Moreover, unlike Gutiérrez, Ruether recognizes those diverse traditions within the Bible 
other than the one she perceives as central. She is also able to correlate these various 
traditions with her feminist reflection. As a whole she demonstrates a better 
understanding of Scripture than the other two theologians. In addition, by correlating 
feminist critical principles and prophetic critical principles in the construction of a 
feminist hermeneutics, she demonstrates a certain degree of integration between two 
different disciplines. Finally, as in the case of Gutiérrez, she engages in dialogue with 
biblical scholarship through her exegetical attempts on certain biblical texts, which makes 
her interpretation more convincing. However, her use of Scripture also shares certain 
limitations found in Gutiérrez‘s case. Like Gutiérrez she is somehow bound by her 
theological agenda so much so that she over-focuses on a particular tradition (prophetic-
liberating tradition) without sound justification. This only weakens her overall 
hermeneutical argument. Furthermore, her use of the Bible is also rather selective in that 
the texts are chosen to support her agenda and hence distort the original meanings of the 
texts. 
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Spohn‘s commitment to the call to integrate Scripture into moral theology 
exemplifies what Häring has advocated. Like Gutiérrez and Ruether he attempts to 
integrate Scripture into a solid ethical framework. He also searches for themes in his use 
of the Bible. All three of them also engage in dialogue with biblical scholarship. Yet he 
differs from Ruether in that his attention goes beyond the historical aspect of the texts to 
the literary genres and contexts of the texts. In addition, his affirmative hermeneutical 
approach contrasts to the feminist perspective and thus makes the Bible more compatible 
with the reader‘s ethical framework. Finally, he advances Gutiérrez and Ruether‘s use of 
Scripture in that he engages in the synthetic task although he involves himself much less 
in the exegetical task. However, as in the case of Häring, the attempt to seek a 
unity/synthesis of biblical texts risks the danger of neglecting the diversity within 
Scripture.  Moreover, his over-emphasis on the story of Jesus seems to ignore other 
biblical traditions that are equally important for moral reflection. The over-reliance on the 
role of narratives is similarly narrow and contradicts his claims to be attentive to other 
literary genres. 
Thus, as a whole, the advances and insights by these ethicists contribute to the 
development of a more integrated Scripture-based ethics in the following ways. First, 
they have demonstrated that there is a real need to interact with both the texts and biblical 
scholarship in order to produce a sound Scripture-based ethics. Second, the task of 
hermeneutics is necessary for not only bridging the two disciplines but also in the actual 
use of Scripture. In particular, one‘s ethical framework is crucial to how the biblical texts 
are used and interpreted. Thus, the attempts of these ethicists somehow reveal a stronger 
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interest in integrating Scripture into their ethical framework than biblical scholars show 
about the ethical theory by ethicists. Last but not least, their employment of Scripture in 
ethics confirms the development and shift from concern with norms and biblical authority 
to the role of Scripture in forming vision/values and practices of communities of 
discipleship and its relevance in equality and social justice. 
In sum, since the time when Tillmann began to systematically employ Scripture in 
moral reflection, we witness a slow but positive development among theological ethicists 
in their use of Scripture. In the beginning, they were focusing on the advocacy of using 
Scripture in moral theology. Then they began to demonstrate the actual employment of 
the Bible within their own contexts and ethical perspectives such as liberation and 
feminist theologies. Various ways of using Scripture were identified. At the same time, 
Christian ethicists became aware of the role of hermeneutics in bridging the two 
disciplines. Until now, some of these ethicists like Spohn began to note that scriptural 
texts need to be employed properly should a genuine Scripture-based ethics be 
constructed. 
However, their interest, commitment and contributions do not mean that they 
have achieved a more integrated Scripture-based ethics. Certain issues regarding the 
selection, textual interpretation, and methodology emerged. In the first place, the biblical 
texts employed are in general selective. The criteria of choosing the texts seem to depend 
on one‘s own agenda. The texts selected also tend to be limited to certain traditions or 
themes perceived by ethicists as helpful in advocating their particular agenda. In short, 
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these ethicists‘ use of Scripture, though goes beyond the text-proofing model, remains 
problematic. 
Second, when some of these ethicists interact with biblical scholarship and even 
attempt to engage in the task of exegesis, the overall performance is unsatisfactory, either 
in terms of quantity or quality. They have either focused on certain selected texts or 
interacted with biblical scholars in a minimal, selective manner. Even in the case of 
Gutiérrez who seems to engage with biblical scholars more broadly, as mentioned earlier, 
Meier comments that, being a liberation theologian, his exegetical work is not without 
flaws.  
These two points (selective use and insufficient exegesis) lead to a related and yet 
important issue—the approach towards problematic or ‗bad‘ texts in the Bible. All these 
four ethicists somehow fail to deal with these texts either by avoidance during the process 
of selection or by not engaging them exegetically (and carefully). This issue, I think, 
deserves some attention here.  
On the one hand, some ethicists have shown us that it is not impossible to handle 
and confront these problematic texts. Schüssler Fiorenza, for example, notes that certain 
arguments are often employed for the justification of patriarchal submission (like 
necessary adaptation, goodness of creation, and subversive subordination) in the 
Haustafel (household codes) trajectory in Colossians 3:18-4:1 and Ephesians 5:22-6:9 (as 
well as other related texts).
692
 She thus confronts the texts by employing a feminist 
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critical evaluative hermeneutics that challenges androcentric constructions in the texts 
and critically analyzes androcentric texts: ―[This critical evaluative hermeneutics] call[s] 
patriarchal Biblical religion to personal and structural metanoia of feminist praxis…[and] 
highlight[s] that its patriarchal ethics was asserted over and against an ‗egalitarian‘ 
Christian ethos.‖693 She concludes that the early Christian ethos of co-equal discipleship 
in community can equally claim scriptural authority and canonicity as the patriarchal 
pattern of submission has done.
694
 
On the other hand, biblical scholars also show us that it is through careful 
exegesis alone can we know whether a text is problematic, say anti-Semitism or 
supercessionism. For instance, Harrington and George Smiga treat in detail those possible 
problematic passages in the four gospels that seem anti-Jewish (e.g., Matthew 23:13-36, 
John 8:44). They show us that by placing the gospels in their original Jewish contexts, 
one will understand that the gospels are not anti-Jewish and those seemingly problematic 
texts may only have an anti-Jewish potential.
695
 
Third, as a whole, when these scholars employ Scripture in their ethical reflection, 
they are still concerned more about interpreting the text‘s meaning for contemporary 
world (i.e., hermeneutics) than with first examining its original meaning to see if the text 
can be rightly employed. In other words, they are more still more interested in the 
performance of the ‗script‘ rather understanding the scripted text. 
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In these two reviews of the development of an integrated Scripture-based ethics, 
we note that both biblical scholars and theological ethicists have either stressed the 
importance of the scriptural text or the importance of ethical hermeneutics. In other 
words, they see Scripture as either ‗script‘ (to be performed/interpreted) or ‗scripted‘ (to 
be exegeted). This observation struck me as revealing: A balanced view of Scripture as 
‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘ seems to be the right direction toward constructing a more 
integrated scriptural ethics. 
 163 
Chapter Four: The Importance of the Scriptural Text and of Ethical Hermeneutics, 
or the Scripture as ‘Scripted’ and ‘Script’ 
 
We note from the previous two chapters that in the past twenty years there have 
been positive developments within the two disciplines to construct an integrated 
Scripture-based ethics. Biblical scholars begin to go beyond the exegetical task to engage 
in hermeneutics; theological ethicists, similarly, start to pay attention to their use of 
Scripture in ethical reflection. These developments, however, reveal to us two contrasting 
realities. On the one hand, a more integrated Scripture-based ethics has not been achieved, 
for both biblical scholars and theological ethicists have either stressed the importance of 
the scriptural text or the importance of ethical hermeneutics. In other words, there is a 
lack of balance among these scholars in their corresponding approaches. On the part of 
biblical scholarship, such imbalance is manifested in their lack of ethical theories as a 
platform for ethical analysis. For theological ethicists, the sign of imbalance is the fact 
that Scripture is still not properly employed (and/or fully understood) but used in a way 
that simply perceives the Bible as a secondary support. 
On the other hand, they point to us what the right direction toward constructing a 
more integrated scriptural ethics can be: It takes the Bible seriously and builds its 
findings upon a sound ethical theory or hermeneutics. That means, perceiving the 
Scripture as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘ is a necessary step toward our goal. 
Among the most recent scholars who have committed to this goal I note that New 
Testament scholar Richard Burridge and Christian ethicist Allen Verhey have tried to 
 164 
maintain such a balance in their writings. I now turn to their works to seek a better 
understanding of what a balanced approach means. 
 
4.1 Richard A. Burridge 
 
Reverend Richard Burridge is an Anglican priest from England and is currently 
the Dean of King‘s College, University of London. He has been a professor of New 
Testament and biblical interpretation for over twenty years during which he taught 
courses on the gospels as well as New Testament ethics.
696
 Throughout his teaching 
career he has written a number of books on the relationship between the gospels and 
Jesus, such as What are the Gospels? A Comparison with Graeco-Roman Biography and 
Four Gospels, One Jesus?
697
 Because of his former academic training in the Classics, he 
is particularly interested in exploring the literary genre of the gospels. Specifically, he is 
known for advocating the view that literary genre of the gospels is one of ancient 
biography, as discussed in What are the Gospels?
698
  
In this book Burridge examines certain ancient biographies as well as the four 
gospels in light of those features that serve as methodological criteria for examining 
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ancient biographies.
699
 He corrects and builds upon the earlier attempts to understand the 
gospels as biography,
700
 and emphasizes that, as a genre, biography or biographical 
narrative (βíος) is a flexible, diverse genre that ―nestles among neighboring genres such 
as historiography, rhetoric…and the novel.‖701 As a result, he is convinced that the four 
gospels have many features in common with βíοι and thus belong to the overall genre of 
ancient Graeco-Roman βíοι, counter to the mainstream view that the gospels are sui 
generis.
702
 
Commentators in general agree that Burridge has made his case in defending the 
biographical character of the gospels. However, I find its subsequent implications for 
New Testament studies equally significant:
703
 The first one concerns the issue of 
hermeneutics. Burridge insists that genre plays a significant role in the interpretation of 
the texts. Thus, the diverse, flexible nature of βíος implies a flexible interpretation of the 
gospels in which one finds various materials such as didactic, apologetic, and polemic 
purposes/materials.  
A second and subsequent implication is that the key to the interpretation of the 
text is the subject of the narrative. It is because a biographical interpretation of the texts 
invites us to focus on the subject: Jesus of Nazareth becomes the key to interpretation. 
Hence, a flexible interpretation of the narratives of Jesus would imply that it is not 
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limited to an interpretation of the historical facts of Jesus of Nazareth but also open to a 
theological interpretation of the subject. Therefore, the gospels are ―Christology in 
narrative form.‖704  
A third implication of the biographical hypothesis concerns the social setting and 
function of the gospels. Burridge points out that the biographical approach offers ―a 
critique of too much community-based sociological analysis of the gospel audiences:‖705 
As βíοι the gospels are not written specifically for the hypothetical community that 
produced them but for a more general audience and with diverse social functions (like 
apologetic and polemic purposes). Their publication and delivery is likewise set for other 
groups across a broad geographical area.
706
 As a result, viewing the gospels as βíοι can 
―liberate us from the circularity of deducing the communities from the text and then 
interpreting the text in light of these (deduced) communities.‖707 
Last but not least, according to Burridge, ancient biographies ―held together both 
words and deeds in portraying their central subject.‖708 In other words, central to this 
genre is the emphasis that the words and deeds of the subject are inseparable. One cannot 
attend to the words alone or vice versa. Thus, a biographical approach to the gospels does 
not perceive the texts as merely a collection of sayings by Jesus but that Jesus‘ narrated 
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teachings are inseparable from his narrated deeds. Specifically, both his words and deeds 
are part of his proclamation of the kingdom of God.
709
  
In fact, all these implications are applicable to the study of New Testament ethics 
as well. Still, a comprehensive and systematic study of New Testament ethics that is 
rooted in the biographical hypothesis is found his recent major book Imitating Jesus: An 
Inclusive Approach to New Testament Ethics and a related article written in the same 
year.
710
 This major work is generally perceived as an implication of what he pursued in 
What are the Gospels? for the understanding of New Testament ethics.
711
 It ―looks at 
how New Testament ethics should be interpreted in the light of [the] argument that the 
gospels are essentially biographies of Jesus, using South African apartheid as a case 
study.‖712 
The overall aim of this work is to offer an alternative approach to New Testament 
ethics that is grounded on his earlier findings. He is concerned that New Testament ethics 
today is still done in a way that either emphasizes the rigorous ethical teachings of Jesus 
or the open acceptance of all people found in Jesus‘ deeds. In particular, Burridge 
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laments that the example of Jesus is either ignored or treated as tentative by scholars.
713
 
Thus, his proposal challenges the false dichotomy between being ‗biblical‘ and being 
‗inclusive‘ and counter-proposes that ―to be truly biblical is to be inclusive.‖714 Moreover, 
he is concerned that ―the vast majority of works on New Testament ethics concentrate 
almost exclusively on the ethical material within the New Testament; any attempt to 
relate it to today may include a brief consideration of the problems in so doing and 
possible methodologies, but little by way of actual content or application.‖715 Thus, he 
also aims at promoting the theological/pragmatic task as Hays has done. 
The approach to New Testament ethics, therefore, is biographical. As said earlier, 
the decision is rooted in his conviction that the literary genre is crucial to the 
interpretation of the texts. He claims, ―In order to be [b]iblical, we have to interpret the 
gospels according to this [ancient biographical] genre.‖716 This methodological claim has 
certain implications for our study of New Testament ethics. First, as mentioned above, a 
biographical reading of the texts would emphasize that the subject‘s words are 
inseparable from one‘s actual deeds, for the narrative of the subject‘s deeds provides the 
context for the sayings. In the context of New Testament ethics, therefore, it means that 
focusing on the sayings of Jesus alone is inadequate. Rather, ―we must set Jesus‘ rigorous 
ethical teaching in the context of the narrative of his deeds.‖717 For instance, the rigorous 
and demanding Sermon on the Mount must be interpreted in the context of Jesus‘ radical 
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loving acceptance of others. Though the process of interpreting Jesus‘ words and deeds is 
a complex one, it should be the starting point.
718
 
Second, ancient biographies were often written to offer a portrait of the subject:
719
 
The ancients wanted to depict the subject‘s character with a portrait of 
them through a combination of their deeds and words, through anecdotes 
and stories as much as their sayings or speeches…often it will also reveal 
something further about the person‘s life, or bring the author‘s major 
themes to a climax.
720
 
 
Thus, within the context of New Testament ethics, it points to the person of Jesus as the 
locus and the starting point of our ethical reflection. For Burridge the New Testament is 
―not an ethical manual, nor is it just about providing moral instructions; instead, it 
challenges the reader with its central Christological claim and the consequent call to 
follow Jesus in discipleship.‖721 In other words, Christology is the key to ethical 
hermeneutics. Therefore, the study of New Testament ethics should focus on and begin 
with the ethics of Jesus. 
The depiction of the subject‘s character by means of biographical narratives leads 
us to a third ethical proposition: Mimesis—the practice of imitation and of following the 
subject‘s virtues. Burridge notes that ancient biographies were written to provide an 
example for others to follow. This idea of imitation is not unlike the Jewish ma’aseh 
(precedence) where ―the disciple is expected to observe and imitate his master as a way 
of imitating Torah and ultimately becoming holy as God is holy.‖722 Therefore, the New 
Testament canon should be interpreted accordingly: ―[They are] biographical narratives 
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which include ethics to help people follow and imitate Jesus.‖723 In other words, 
‗imitating Jesus‘ is the core theme of the New Testament ethics. 
The fourth proposition is built around all the previous three outcomes: The New 
Testament canon invites us to imitate Jesus‘ radical loving acceptance of all people 
within an open and inclusive community.
724
 That means, the New Testament needs to be 
interpreted within an inclusive community. In fact, this inclusive approach is already 
hinted in the subtitle of his book. 
With regards to the structure of this work, Burridge presents and discusses the 
ethical contents and themes of the New Testament in less common manner: Although he 
begins the major part of his work with the ethics of the historical Jesus as Schrage did, he 
basically treats the rest of the New Testament canon in a chronological order (vis-à-vis 
Schrage‘s canonical order). That means, he continues with Paul and then the writings of 
the four evangelists. What follows this major part of his work is the application of his 
inclusive approach to New Testament ethics—he discusses the debate of apartheid in 
South Africa and interprets the Bible through the lenses of ‗the imitation of Jesus‘ and 
‗an open, inclusive community‘.725 
In each of the discussions, Burridge basically follows a particular structure that 
focuses on the above-mentioned propositions: He begins with certain Christological 
claims, followed by a discussion of the Law and love, and then identifies the ethical 
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issues presented in the texts and concludes with reflections on the meaning of imitating 
Jesus. I will follow his order in the following pages. 
In the exploration of the ethics of Jesus,
726
 Burridge first examines the words of 
the historical Jesus and clarifies that ―the gospels do not portray Jesus as just a teacher of 
morality.‖727 Rather, the proclamation of the kingdom of God is crucial to Jesus‘ ethical 
teaching (Mark 1:14). Also, Jesus‘ ethics is one of response—he calls us to repentance 
and discipleship (Mark 1:15-20; Matthew 4:18-22). In other words, Jesus‘ ethical 
teaching is ―not a separate body of moral instructions, but rather part of his preaching of 
the eschatological in-breaking of the reign of God, which demands a total and immediate 
response from his hearers.‖728 Moreover, although those specific ethical teachings are 
rigorous and all-demanding, they aim at intensifying ―the demands of the Law with an 
ethics of renunciation and self-denial.‖729 The heart of Jesus‘ teaching is still the double 
commandment of love.  
Burridge later examines the real meaning of sinners, and Jesus‘ attitude and 
actions towards them (as in his encounter with Zacchaeus in Luke 19:1-10), and 
concludes that Jesus‘ deeds and examples of open acceptance of all are coherent with his 
strenuous commands. Finally, he understands that we are called to imitate Jesus‘ merciful 
and loving acceptance of all. And our individual responses must be situated in the context 
of a new community of disciples. 
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Regarding the ethics of Paul,
730
 Burridge points out that even though the genre of 
Pauline letters is not biographical narrative per se, the letters can still be interpreted in a 
similar manner, for Paul bases everything on the ‗Jesus event‘.731 Thus, by examining 
Paul‘s theology and those contextual ethical imperatives (such as household codes), he 
claims that Paul‘s ethics ―is still supremely an ethics of response, even though the 
preaching of the kingdom has become the event of the King, with Christology being 
absolutely central for both Paul‘s own new life and for his theology and ethics.‖732 
Burridge also notes that the theme of imitation of Jesus‘ inclusive love is found in Paul‘s 
writings. Paul constantly appeals to his readers to imitate him as he imitated Christ (1 
Corinthians 11:1). Specifically, they are not just to be humble and self-giving but also to 
bear the failings of the weak and to welcome them into the community (Romans 15:1-
7).
733
 Thus, Paul‘s ethics shares the same basic outline as that of Jesus, and one should 
read Paul ―as following the creative complementarity of Jesus‘ rigorous and demanding 
ethics together with his acceptance of sinners within his community.‖734 
In the case of the ethics found in the four gospels (and the rest of the New 
Testament), he basically argues that each of the four evangelists attempts to tell the story 
of Jesus ―in such a way that readers will imitate his life in response.‖735 Still, he 
recognizes the different ethical emphases by each of the gospel writers.  
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A biographical interpretation of Mark‘s gospel reveals a wealth of ethical 
possibilities:
736
 Both his Christology and understanding of the law and love points to the 
interim eschatological ethic in suffering. Also, Jesus‘ words and deeds as (especially) 
reported in chapter 10 touch many concrete ethical issues (e.g., the questions of divorce 
in vv2-12, of money/possessions in vv17-31, and of power/leadership in vv35-45) and are 
situated in his preaching of the kingdom of God. Moreover, the ethics of discipleship 
emphasized by Mark means following Jesus wholeheartedly, forming an open and 
inclusive community, and imitating Jesus to be friend of sinners (as depicted in his call of 
the disciples and the appointment of the Twelve in 1:16-20 and 3:13-19 respectively).  
In the Gospel according to Matthew, Burridge points out that while it is true that 
Matthew narrates much more specific ethical teachings of Jesus than Mark does, the 
biographical approach challenges us not to miss the overall picture.
737
 First, Jesus is the 
new Moses and true righteous interpreter of the Law (chapter 23). Second, Jesus‘ words 
reveal that righteousness within the kingdom of God is central to his ethical teachings (as 
manifested in those parables of the kingdom in chapter 13). Third, the deeds of Jesus, 
such as healing (and plucking grain) on the Sabbath (12:1-14), also confirm that Jesus is 
the true interpreter of righteousness. Fourth, imitating the Matthean Jesus means learning 
to be teachers of the new righteousness (that is not based on the Law but on Jesus Christ) 
within an inclusive community of forgiving love.  
Still, what is noteworthy is Burridge‘s unique understanding of the Sermon on the 
Mount (and the Beatitudes) through the lens of biographical interpretation. In various 
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places he reminds us that a biographical approach would read Matthew 5-7 as the first of 
the five balancing discourses (the other four are discourses on mission (10), the kingdom 
(13), the new community (18), and eschatology (24-25)). It should not be singled out as 
the essence of the Matthean Jesus‘ ethics.738 One reviewer thus comments that Burridge 
is very concerned that the Sermon ―is frequently privileged as the epitome of Jesus‘ 
ethics to the neglect of the ethics demonstrated by his deeds.‖739 For Burridge, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer‘s conclusion best depicts the proper way of treating the Sermon: ―The only 
proper response to this word which Jesus brings with him from eternity is simply to do it. 
Jesus has spoken: his is the word, ours the obedience.‖740 
With regards to the Gospel of Luke, Burridge notes that Jesus‘ universal mission 
is for all people, with special concerns for the disadvantaged.
741
 As a result, both the 
words and deeds of Jesus as narrated by Luke focus not on ―providing ethical teaching 
for the church while waiting for the eschaton‖ as some biblical scholars perceive.742 
Rather, they point to the concrete needs to care for the marginalized, as found in Jesus‘ 
inaugural speech in Nazareth (4:16-21), his encounter with women (7:36-50; 10:38-42), 
his cure of the possessed or the paralyzed (4:31-37; 5:17-26), and especially his 
association with sinners (7:33-34). Therefore, imitating the Lukan Jesus means being 
friends of the marginalized and sinners, and forming an inclusive community that 
embraces people of all paths. 
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Despite the fact that John‘s gospel presents a high theology, Burridge states that it 
is still a biographical narrative in which Jesus continues to be the subject in the scene or 
in the discussion by others (e.g., after healing the man born blind in 9:1-12).
743
 By 
examining the ‗book of signs‘ in 1:19-12:50 (that tells Jesus‘ deeds) and the ‗book of 
glory‘ in 13:1-19:42 (that narrates his final words and Passion) he points out that Jesus is 
depicted as ―the love of God, coming to dwell among human beings to bring them his 
divine truth.‖744 He also points out that, contrary to the common view, John‘s rich 
narrative of Jesus ―has many ethical implications about how best to follow his 
example.‖745 The absence of specific ethical command is simply because ―everything is 
now subordinated under the ‗new commandment‘ to love one another as he has loved 
us.‖746 Finally, the call to imitate Jesus refers to following his self-sacrificial love within 
a mixed inclusive community. 
In the final chapter Burridge applies his biographical approach to analyze how the 
New Testament should be interpreted in the debate of apartheid in South Africa. In other 
words, he engages in ethical hermeneutics on a particular local and specific practice. 
Here, he first analyzes the use of Scripture by both sides of the apartheid debate (i.e., the 
proponents and the critics) to support (or to critique) apartheid. Studying their use of four 
particular modes of ethical material (or types of literary genres from the perspective of 
biblical scholarship), he examines how they looked for rules/commands, 
principles/universal values, paradigms/examples, and symbolic worldview in the biblical 
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texts to justify their claims.
747
 He notes that both sides have used Scripture incorrectly in 
their search of ethical material from each aspect, especially those who tried to justify 
apartheid. He then concludes that none of these approaches could avoid abuse by either 
side and hence proposes the use of the biographical approach of which the imitation of 
Jesus is the ethical hermeneutical key.
748
 Only by imitating Jesus‘ words and deeds, and 
reading Scripture together within the context of an open and inclusive community, are we 
able to apply the moral teaching of the New Testament to the case of apartheid. Here, 
then, a contextual reading would emphasize the inclusion of the dissident voices of the 
South Africans by the community but not with their previous tendencies to abuse. 
Consequently, such a reading would judge that the pro-apartheid theology fails to imitate 
Jesus by not hearing and responding to the voice of South Africa‘s oppressed. Therefore, 
they need to listen to the voice(s) of protest and open up the community to include those 
who suffered under it. Moreover, the voice(s) of the ordinary people (such as the poor 
and the marginalized) need to be heard by the interpreting community. 
As a whole, Burridge identifies a consistent pattern among the New Testament 
writings: ―Jesus offers extraordinary rigorous moral teaching about important matters of 
everyday life, grounding all teachings in the love command; but he creates a mixed, 
inclusive community of quite flawed followers who respond as best they are able to this 
man and his demanding teachings.‖749 Our understanding of the New Testament ethics 
through the lens of biography must consider the overall depiction of Jesus‘ life, teaching 
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and practices. And the unity of New Testament ethics subsequently lies on the core theme 
of imitation. In specific, the disciples are to imitate Jesus by forming open and inclusive 
communities that accept all people. 
Burridge‘s Imitating Jesus is welcomed by many as a constructive, 
comprehensive, unique and important book about New Testament studies and New 
Testament ethics.
750
 He is praised for engaging in dialogue with New Testament 
scholarship (of both the past and the current) and other perspectives such as feminism and 
Judaism in his enquiry.
751
 He is also noted for engaging in literature normally employed 
by ethicists (especially in his case study of apartheid).
752
 In addition, he is commended 
for presenting the materials in a non-technical way that can benefit theological ethicists 
who are interested in Scripture-based ethics.
753
 However, many note that the work does 
not contain enough exegetical materials (as would be expected from a biblical scholar) 
and thus not a few scholars comment that it is basically a presentation of mainstream 
biblical scholarship.
754
 In other words, he does not engage in direct interpretation of the 
texts but simply summarizes the views of other scholars. 
Regarding the content of his work, it is obvious that Burridge does not treat all the 
New Testament writings, such as the Catholic epistles and the book of Revelation. 
Several commentators are thus concerned that he does not present the entire New 
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Testament ethics but only the ethics of the four gospels.
755
 Moreover, he does not seem to 
offer concrete answers except some general exhortations to the contemporary ethical 
questions he raised. It gives the impression that while he rightly urges us to interpret the 
biblical text in a biographical and inclusive approach, he does not state clearly enough 
how to achieve the goal.
756
 One reviewer further notes that he does not clarify the issue of 
diversity within a unified New Testament ethics either.
757
 In addition, he often takes the 
positions of his colleagues for his own and hence does not offer much new insights in 
terms of ethical contents. For instance, he basically follows the general understanding 
among scholars (like Schrage, Hays and Matera) that Paul‘s ethics is grounded in his 
Christology.
758
 The idea that Jesus is a model for moral response is likewise already 
discussed by Matera and Hays.
759
 The only difference is that he sees New Testament 
ethics grounded in Christology more than other previously discussed biblical scholars do. 
Despite these particular concerns by commentators regarding the content of his 
work, Burridge‘s methodology and approach to the interpretation of the texts has drawn 
positive comments. One commentator notes that the inclusive approach is similar to and 
hence can benefit from those who advocate for a contextual reading of the texts in that it 
attends to the cultural circumstances of the communities.
760
 Such an inclusive approach 
also avoids the limitations charged to feminist and liberation theologians (such as 
Schneiders) whose approaches risk the exclusion of certain groups.  
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Furthermore, his approach challenges those who find ethical import from the 
words of Jesus only.
761
 And Burridge not only demonstrates the ‗how to‘ (as Hays does) 
but also challenges biblical scholars to go beyond exegetical task to consider 
contemporary applications.
762
 In his case study of the apartheid situation in South Africa, 
he is further commended for turning to the literature of Christian ethics (especially the 
use of Scripture in ethics) in order to offer guidance in constructive application of 
Scripture to the problem.
763
  
Still, some scholars find his approach too narrow, one that leads to a 
reductionistic treatment of the genre of the gospels into biography alone.
764
 They 
comment that although the gospels share many features with ancient Graeco-Roman βíοι, 
there are also certain features unique to the New Testament that are not explored or 
integrated into the argument. In addition, the emphasis on inclusiveness has several 
practical obstacles. A good number of scholars are concerned about whether there should 
be limits to such an inclusive community; and if yes, they need to know when and how to 
exclude.
765
 Also, they note that although Burridge acknowledges the existence and 
challenges of these limits (such as accepting sinners and those who hold different views), 
he does not provide much practical information on how the community could be 
maintained and how its ‗inclusive selection‘ is determined.766 One Christian ethicist 
further raises the concern that ―even inclusive communities will find ways to mess up the 
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reading of scripture.‖767 Thus, one wonders if such emphasis is too loose a category for 
theological ethics. 
Despite these criticisms and concerns, Burridge‘s work as a whole demonstrates 
that a biographical genre could make a difference in the interpretation of the New 
Testament canon, especially in the area of New Testament ethics. The ethical 
implications emerging from a biographical reading of the texts reveal to us that such an 
approach is not simply a method/genre within literary criticisms. Its emphases on the 
person of Jesus (both his words and deeds) / Christology as the key to ethical 
hermeneutics, imitating Jesus, and forming open, inclusive communities converge to the 
point that such an approach is itself a solid platform for ethical analysis—as a concrete 
platform for ethical analysis it goes beyond narrative ethics or character ethics that 
focuses either on narratives or the community‘s formation alone.768 In fact, a biographical, 
inclusive approach can be seen as a sum of these ethical theories and bears a trait of 
virtue ethics. As will be explored in the next part of this work, these emphases—
especially the focus on the person, the call on imitation, the insistence on the community 
and its formation, and the goal of becoming an inclusive faith community—are closely 
related to the structure of virtue ethics and yields of virtues which entail practices, 
character, exemplar, and communal identity. 
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Therefore, Burridge‘s work gives us the hint, from the perspective of biblical 
scholarship, what a more balanced and integrated Scripture-based ethics can be: It 
embraces the importance of ethical hermeneutics while paying attention to the 
importance of the text. And in doing so, one builds her/his findings upon a sound 
platform of ethical analysis or ethical theory/hermeneutics. To conclude my description 
of his contribution in constructing a more integrated Scripture-based ethics, I quote 
Matera‘s words that I think appropriate: ―[It is] one of those rare studies that moves the 
discipline forward.‖769 
 
4.2 Allen Verhey 
 
Allen Verhey is a Dutch Reformed (Calvinism) Christian ethicist. He was the 
director of the Institute of Religion at the Texas Medical Center and served as the 
Biekkink professor of religion at Hope College, Holland, Michigan for over a decade 
before going to Duke Divinity School.
770
 He is known as a prolific writer and has 
regularly published articles, essays and books since the late 1970s. Although many of his 
publications are focused on medical ethics (and bioethics)
771
 Verhey has written on a 
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variety of topics ranging from anthropology to moral virtues/practices, from sexuality to 
communal discernment, from Calvinism to Scripture and ethics.
772
 
However, there is a common feature among these writings: The employment of 
Scripture in theological reflections, especially on the applications of Christian ethics.
773
 
Verhey explains that the interest in Scripture is rooted in his evangelical and Dutch 
Reformed formation since childhood.
774
 And his main academic interest is the relation of 
Scripture and Christian ethics.
775
 He recalls that his initial attempts at combining the two 
disciplines began during the theological training, first in Calvin Theological Seminary 
and then in Yale University.
776
 His first major work in exploring the relation between 
Scripture and ethics is his own dissertation which analyzed Walter Rauschenbusch‘s use 
of Scripture as a case for understanding the reasons for the diversity of uses.
777
 In 
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subsequent years he continued to survey contemporary methodological resources for 
relating Scripture and ethics.
778
   
At the same time, under the influence of certain important people, Verhey 
extended (and applied) his academic interest to ethical issues specifically related to 
medical practice.
779
 For instance, in his discussion of assisted suicide and euthanasia, he 
does not only explore the issues from his particular tradition but also from a biblical 
perspective (by interpreting Judas‘s suicide in Matthew 27:3-10).780 Later in his book 
Reading the Bible in the Strange World of Medicine, he demonstrates his use of Scripture 
to other medical, bioethical issues such as abortion and genetic interventions. As Andrew 
Lustig comments, Verhey ―rejects simplistic readings of either Scripture or these difficult 
issues and instead explores, with a rich blend of insight, analysis, and exhortation, how 
attending to Scripture can challenge the ‗strange‘ ethos of modern medicine.‖781 
Nevertheless, his knowledge of Scripture and its interpretation has been well 
received by Scripture scholars and biblical theologians, and some even recognize him as 
a New Testament scholar.
782
 Concrete evidence of this is his widely read earlier work on 
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New Testament ethics, The Great Reversal: Ethics of the New Testament (1984) within 
the Protestant circles.
783
 Even Catholic scholars like Donald Senior and Lisa Sowle Cahill 
both are amazed by his command of biblical materials and exegetical skill.
784
 Still, his 
more recent work, Remembering Jesus: Christian Community, Scripture, and the Moral 
Life, has drawn fuller attention from the academia (especially within the Roman Catholic 
tradition). Some commentators perceive this work as a development and fulfillment of 
the insights of Verhey‘s 1984 study.785 
Furthermore, between the publications of these two books Verhey developed a 
specific approach of doing Scripture-based ethics. This approach emphasizes the need of 
remembering Jesus, the role of the community, as well as the importance of practices and 
performances. Last but not least, Verhey sees Scripture as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. 
This unique perception, I believe, concretely discloses to Christian ethicists what a more 
integrated Scripture-based ethics can be. 
In the following pages, I turn to these and other writings in order to understand his 
model of Scripture-based theological ethics. It consists of three steps: First, I will look at 
his work as a biblical theologian in doing New Testament ethics. Second, I explore his 
work as an ethicist, that is, his use of Scripture in Christian ethics. Third, I conclude by 
exploring his perception of Scripture as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. 
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Verhey as a Biblical Theologian 
As just mentioned above, Verhey‘s talent as a biblical theologian is best 
demonstrated in his The Great Reversal. In this work, he aims at bridging the gulf that 
separates New Testament studies and Christian ethics from each other and from the life 
of the Christian community.
786
 He is convinced that only when the gulf is bridged will 
New Testament ethics be able to address the issues concerning the continuing church.
787
 
In so doing he constructs the bridge from the side of the New Testament—that is, from 
the perspective of biblical scholarship. Therefore, in the first three chapters of this book 
he presents a standard, chronological, descriptive study of the moral teachings of the New 
Testament. He begins with the ethics of the historical Jesus, then moves on to the ethics 
of the early church remembering Jesus, and finally to the ethics of the New Testament 
writers (in canonical sequence). He then surveys certain methodological problems and 
resources for relating Scripture and contemporary ethics in the last chapter and offers his 
own proposal for the use of Scripture in Christian ethics. 
With regards to the subsequent ethical contents, he notes that the ethics of Jesus 
(which seems to be centered on Mark) is grounded in Jesus‘ turning of the apocalyptic 
expectation of a ‗great reversal‘ into one that brings transformation of values and good 
news to the poor. These reversed values include humility, confidence in God, generosity, 
non-judgmentalism, etc.
788
 The ethics of the early church in remembering Jesus and 
expecting his return, on the other hand, result from ―the tradition that preserved and 
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shaped the memory of Jesus‘ words and deeds‖ and the paraenetic tradition developed 
and handed down alongside.
789
 Verhey notes that there are diverse ethical emphases 
among the various forms of traditions. He thus concludes that the purpose of these 
different traditions is not merely for moral education but ―to encourage and exhort 
Christians to the new life given and demanded by what God has done in Jesus Christ.‖790  
In his probe of the ethics of the New Testament, he is aware of the diverse ethical 
contents among the New Testament writings addressing various communities and diverse 
moral problems:
791
 For instance, Mark presents a heroic morality; Matthew calls for a 
surpassing righteousness; Luke presents an ethics of care and respect; and Paul urges 
Christians to discern a life that is appropriate to the new age. Despite this diversity of 
ethical contents he points out that they all converge into ‗loyalty to the risen Lord‘—who 
is remembered, whose words and deeds are taken as to be normative, and who continues 
to guide and speak to his faithful followers.
792
 
In addition, his redactional understanding of the Sermon on the Mount in 
Matthew 5-7, especially his view on the Beatitudes, is noteworthy for it gives hints to the 
kind of ethical approach he has in mind for his own proposal—one that emphasizes 
character formation and virtues: He first argues that the Sermon depends on but is not 
identified with the ethics of Jesus; rather, it is the quintessence of the ethics of Matthew 
made for instructing catechumans.
793
 He then points out that 
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The beatitudes in Q source were an eschatological wisdom announcing the 
prudence of conforming to principles operating in the world…Matthew 
‗ethicizes‘ the tradition so that the emphasis falls on the exhortation to 
develop certain character traits in response to Jesus‘ proclamation of the 
kingdom…With the beatitudes that Matthew adds, these constitute a 
catalogue of virtues. The additional beatitudes are, moreover, formulated 
with Matthew‘s Scripture (our Old Testament) always in view…The reign 
of God that Jesus is announcing and already manifesting [further] shapes 
and requires certain character traits.
794
 
 
After surveying certain methodological problems and resources for relating 
Scripture and contemporary ethics, he turns to his ‗modest‘ proposal: 
We should refuse to license the movement in argument from the New 
Testament to either an autonomous principle or a moral rule. We should 
rather license the movement from the New Testament to claims about the 
reality within which we must respond, to claims about our moral identity 
as people loyal to God, and to claims about the dispositions and intentions 
that mark truthfulness to that reality and integrity with that identity.
795
 
 
This proposal further makes clear to us the kind of ethical model Verhey 
undertakes: One that attends to the context, moral identity, and subsequent practices and 
dispositions. For instance, when he interprets the commandment of giving up one‘s 
possessions (Mark 10:29), he claims that it is ―[a] statement of a moral posture that is 
freed from bondage to possessions for the practice of generosity and hospitality.‖796 
Moreover, it is noted that the use of Scripture is valid only when one ―acknowledges the 
authority of the risen Christ continuing to reveal God‘s word to the Christian community 
in its discernment of moral choices.‖797  
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The work as a whole is praised for combining the knowledge of New Testament 
criticism and contemporary methods of moral theology and moral philosophy.
798
 He pays 
close attention to the biblical texts and deals with them in detail and judiciously.
799
 The 
order of investigation is very close to that of Schrage‘s work. His description of the New 
Testament‘s ethics, however, is not without critics. One commentator judges his overall 
exegetical work as pedestrian:
800
 There is inadequate engagement with current biblical 
scholarship and he scarcely resolves exegetical impasses.  
Despite this criticism I identify two related insights of Verhey‘s effort that can be 
helpful to our search for a more integrated Scripture-based ethics. First, Verhey reveals to 
us that even as Christian ethicists we have to take the biblical texts seriously and pay 
attention to the original meanings of these texts prior to employing them in our ethical 
reflections. Second, Verhey demonstrates to us that such a task is possible. While it is 
important to listen to what Scripture scholars say regarding the texts, Christian ethicists 
also need to take courage to step out from their own field into the biblical world. Verhey 
leads us—Christian ethicists in particular—to understand the importance of Scripture as 
‗scripted‘ for Scripture-based ethics by his very own example. 
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Verhey as a Christian Ethicist 
As seen from his writings Verhey generally adapts MacIntyre‘s seminal notion of 
practice as a core element of his ethical framework.
801
 For instance, in his treatment of 
the problem of scarcity of medical resources he identifies truthfulness, humility, justice, 
gratitude, compassion, and care as important standards of excellence, practices and 
virtues for the formation of good policy.
802
 Some ethicists thus perceive him as a virtue 
ethicist and put him with Hauerwas and Yoder for building a virtue model of Christian 
ethics for mainstream Protestant (and Catholic) faith communities.
803
 Although others 
point out that he puts more emphasis on practice than virtue itself and understands 
Christian ethics as primarily a matter of communal practice,
804
 I would understand him as 
a virtue ethicist at least in a broad sense. It is because, as will be discussed in Part Two, 
both practices and communal identity are important yields of virtues. Moreover, when he 
claims that practices rather than choices characterize the community, his understanding of 
what Scripture is bears a trait of character ethics: The Bible is both the Word of God and 
the words of human writers.
805
 As the Word of God, Scripture does not only play the role 
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of revealer but of sanctifier as well: Through Scripture God ―renews life, transforms 
identities, and recreates and resurrects humankind.‖806  
Regarding the authority of Scripture, although there are various problems of 
Scripture, namely, its silence, strangeness, diversity, unfamiliarity, and abuse by the 
readers, Verhey is convinced that Scripture is still an authority for the Church‘s faith and 
life, especially for its moral discourse and judgment.
807
 His Dutch Reformed tradition 
further leads him to point out that Scripture has authority in the very notion of church, for 
it is ―the confession of the believing community and of the members of that community 
that their submission to God and to the cause of God will be guided and tested by 
attention to these writings.‖808 One particular way that the Bible exercises its authority is 
through the practice of reading Scripture in a community. This understanding has certain 
related ethical implications: Practice, community, and the effects of reading the texts. 
First, by retrieving Gustafson‘s understanding of the church as a community of 
interpretation and action, Verhey underscores the importance of practices and 
performances of Scripture—which include praying, reading Scripture, and the practice of 
moral discourse—by particular communities.809 Second, it calls for greater attention 
given to community and context.
810
 How Scripture is used in ethical reflection depends 
on the context of the religious community within which the authority of Scripture is 
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experienced.
811
 Within the church community, Scripture and the church are understood as 
correlative concepts: Scripture is the book of the church and thus would not exist if 
without the church, while the church preserves its identity and character and reforms its 
common life with the help of Scripture.
812
 Third, the practice of reading Scripture in 
Christian community helps remembering the Lord and cultivates certain standards of 
excellence: Holiness and sanctification; fidelity and creativity; discipline and 
discernment.
813
  From an evangelical perspective, reading Scripture is also a practice of 
piety.
814
 And reading Scripture within the church community implies that it must be read 
in light of the whole and as a continuing story.
815
 
This Reformed view thus understands Scripture as the best resource for the 
constant renewal of the church‘s life.816 However, although Scripture exercises its 
authority within the church community, Verhey notes that the use of sources other than 
Scripture—such as natural science, natural morality, and human experiences—is 
necessary in Christian ethics even though at times one risks making Scripture a secondary 
source.
817
 
Another significant influence of his evangelical training is that he understands 
that Christian ethics takes on its task (of renewing the community) ‗by way of reminder‘ 
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(Romans 15:15).
818
 In simple terms, it means remembering and telling the gospel of God. 
It is upon this understanding that Verhey constructs his hermeneutic of remembering and 
use of Scripture. Yet, Verhey points out that he is also motivated by the concerns that we 
risk forgetfulness in our contemporary world—when God is marginalized and one loses 
one‘s identity—in both our public and personal lives due to over-emphasis on science 
and self-centeredness.
819
 Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the use of remembrance is 
hardly remarkable: It has been found and used in Greek and Hebrew writings with terms 
like anamnēsis and zākhar respectively.820 And his emphasis on remembering is indebted 
to Hauerwas‘s work, and can be traced back to one of Gustafson‘s four aspects of 
internalization of Scripture emerging from a communal hermeneutic:
821
 
The third aspect of internalization is ‗memory,‘ and Christian churches are 
communities of memory. The Bible tells the story of Israel, Christ, and the 
church, and that story is internalized, owned as ‗our‘ story, in the 
continuing church…[It] is not the only ‗object‘ to bear the possibilities of 
a common memory in the Christian community, and it does not bear the 
possibilities alone, but it is surely the critical document for church‘s 
remembering.
822
 
 
For Verhey, to remember means ―to own a past as our own past in the continuing 
church, and to own it as constitutive of identity and determinative for discernment.‖823 It 
often involves story-telling that has the shape of obedience. For example, in 
remembrance of the story of manna we are asked not to accumulate riches/lands but leave 
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some for the poor (Leviticus 19:9-10).
824
 When John Burgess challenges and insists that 
Scripture is something more than story—it is a sacramental word and poetry that engages 
imagination and invites one to construe the world—and that the risen Christ is not just 
remembered by the Church, Verhey defends that remembering is ―itself more than 
recollection… [and] the real presence of Christ is mediated by our remembering Jesus, by 
attending to the story.‖825 
Specifically, Jesus of Nazareth who reveals God‘s good nature to us and sanctifies 
us is for Verhey the center of the Gospel, and his resurrection is the key to Scripture.
826
 
The memory of Jesus is thus ―central to what the Church understands when it understands 
Scripture.‖827 And reading the stories of Jesus is the starting point for using Scripture in 
ethics.
828
 Other stories of the New Testament are only parts of the whole story the 
evangelists tell in memory of Jesus.
829
 Consequently, remembering Jesus is crucial to 
Christian ethics. This whole hermeneutic of remembering Jesus is best demonstrated in 
his Remembering Jesus: Christian Community, Scripture, and the Moral Life, as well as 
two subsequent essays on hospitality and healing.
830
 
In the first part of this work, Verhey further develops his hermeneutical 
framework by highlighting the relationship among Christian community, Scripture, and 
the moral life. He begins with clarifying the tradition and vocation of early church 
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communities found in the New Testament: They are communities of moral discourse, 
deliberation, and discernment by being communities of memory. In remembrance the 
early church preserves its identity and sustains a common life worthy of the Gospel. And 
our contemporary faith community is one that continues this tradition and vocation by 
remembering the early church remembering Jesus.
831
 Based on specific texts found in 
certain  New Testament writings—like the narrative of the empty tomb in Luke 24:6-8; 
the farewell discourse in John 14:26; and later epistles such as 2 Timothy 2:8—Verhey is 
convinced that the preservation and forming of a Christian community relies on 
remembering Jesus.
832
 Actually, Verhey perceives each gospel as ―a remembrance, a 
literary commemoration of the crucified and risen Lord, forming character and shaping 
conduct into something worthy of the gospel.‖833 In order to remember him, Christians 
must ―read and understand Scripture, where the memory of Jesus is found.‖834 
However, Verhey, as he did elsewhere, points out the problems encountered when 
turning to Scripture for moral instruction; hence, he insists that our remembrance ―must 
also entail a reflection on the interpretation of Jesus‘ teaching…in the counsel of the 
Church community today‖835 and the use of Scripture must be tested and qualified by a 
communal discernment.
836
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As a whole, this important introductory section provides a unique perspective for 
the rest of his discussion. The four remaining parts are subsequent applications of the 
hermeneutics of remembering in various moral contexts—sickness, sexuality, economy, 
and politics. Each of them is explored ‗by way of reminder‘ and follows a similar pattern: 
1) The contemporary situation is defined and reflected. 2) The life and teachings of Jesus 
regarding the topic is ‗remembered‘. 3) The teaching of the early church remembering 
Jesus is ‗remembered‘. 4) The insights emerging ‗by way of reminder‘ are applied to the 
corresponding ethical issue faced by the Christian community today. 
This particular pattern is also found in his later essay on hospitality where he first 
posts the challenge of being hospitable to strangers. He then turns to remember Jesus who 
shows hospitality and becomes a stranger himself. Next he looks at the early church 
community that remembers Jesus and practices hospitality to others (as recorded in Acts 
2:45-46, 4:32-34, and Galatians 2). Finally he concludes that ―in memory of Jesus and in 
hope for God‘s grace, we must continue to test our traditions and performances of 
hospitality including our accounts of acceptable unity and diversity.‖837 
Regarding the scriptural texts used throughout his work, Verhey basically uses the 
Bible broadly and frequently, though with preference to the New Testament writings.
838
 
He usually begins with Old Testament texts (such as Genesis) to highlight the 
contemporary issue/situation, then moves on to the teachings of Jesus, and finally that of 
the early church communities (related to Paul and other writers) that remember Jesus. 
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Again, we see a similar way of using scriptural texts in the essay Health and Healing in 
Memory of Jesus. He first employs texts from the Old Testament (e.g., 2 Chronicles 
16:12, Psalm 38:1-3, Job, and Sirach 38:1-2) to highlight the strange world of sickness. 
Then he turns to the story of Jesus who is remembered as one who heals, forgives sins, 
preaches the Good News, and suffers unto death.
839
 
As a whole, Verhey‘s approach is one that ―engages with biblical scholarship, the 
tradition of the Church and the realities of contemporary life.‖840 The study is praised for 
being substantial and informative.
841
 And it goes beyond the kind of descriptive, 
chronological approach found in other New Testament ethics writings. The scriptural 
texts employed are plenty and appropriate. However, some commentators rightly note 
that certain important exegetical studies are either missing or simplified (such as the 
Pauline imperative and indicative).
842
 And he seems fail to attend to certain 
methodological questions such as how to determine what the historical Jesus thought and 
did and how to identify the normative values of Jesus‘ life and teachings.843  
Despite these drawbacks, Verhey treats Scripture as what he calls ‗script‘ by 
building his work upon a hermeneutic of remembering and a sound ethical model that 
focuses on practices, community, character development and narrative.
844
 While he is 
interested in employing scriptural texts in his discussions, he does not forget the 
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importance of ethical hermeneutics. In each of the discussions he engages in descriptive, 
synthetic, hermeneutic and theological/pragmatic tasks. Remembering Jesus, as Spohn 
thus comments, complements Hays‘s work in the sense that it integrates Hays‘s four 
inter-related tasks into a whole.
845
  
 
Scripture as ‘Scripted’ and ‘Script’ 
What we have seen so far is Verhey‘s attempt and ambition to engage in both 
disciplines in his overall work on biblical ethics: On the one hand he takes seriously the 
meaning of the texts by his exegetical investigation of the New Testament texts; on the 
other hand, he carefully employs the texts for ethical reflection that is grounded in a solid 
ethical hermeneutics. Some thus suggest that Verhey‘s work ―represents the best of a 
biblical theologian and Christian ethicist at work.‖846 However, his contribution lies not 
only on the quality of these major works; more importantly, he offers us a unique insight 
that illuminates our construction of a more integrated Scripture-based ethics.  
As said in the introductory chapter, I cite Verhey‘s use of the terms ‗scripted‘ and 
‗script‘ to describe Scripture and to construct an integrated biblical ethics. His overall 
argument begins with the general meanings of these terms. The written text as ‗scripted‘ 
means that it was written at a particular time by certain authors.
847
 Today it is studied as 
such by scriptural exegetes. The text as ‗script‘, on the other hand, can be compared to 
the script of a play and hence needs to be performed by the actress/actor. And the 
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performance of any script is itself an interpretation of the script.
848
 It lays out the 
practices and performances that ethicists should convey. 
He further highlights the distinction between ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘ by adopting 
the distinction between ‗object‘ and ‗instrument‘.849 As ‗scripted‘ the text is ―an object to 
us, a given, the product of the activity of others.‖850 And as an object it needs to be 
examined textually or literally so as to know what sort of writing it is.
851
 As ‗script‘ the 
text is, however, an instrument for and a vocation to activity for the reader.
852
 These two 
terms cannot be separated: The written text is ―both the effect of the action of writing 
texts and the instrument that we use to perform certain other actions.‖853 
Verhey then adopts these notions in the context of biblical ethics in order to 
understand the different tasks of biblical scholarship and Christian ethics and to highlight 
the relationship between them. As ‗scripted‘ the biblical texts are studied by those 
exegetes within the church community who ―bring their knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, 
or their training in the tools of historical, literary, or social investigation, not just to the 
texts but to the community.‖854 As ‗script‘ the Bible is to be performed repeatedly ―in the 
rhetoric and practices of the churches, in their theology and in their worship, in their 
ethics and in their politics.‖855 Thus ethicists looking to the Bible for moral guidance 
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must look to Scripture for the ‗prompting‘ toward appropriate practices, virtues and 
actions. Although the task of exegesis is conventionally assigned to biblical scholarship 
while the task of interpretation is assigned to moral theologians, he points out that they 
are related for it is the church community that canonized the Scripture that interprets and 
performs Scripture.
856
 
Verhey developed these notions because of his conviction that the community of 
faith could not adequately understand the moral guidance of Scripture without the 
exegetes studying the texts as ‗scripted‘ and the ethicists using it as ‗script‘. He first 
introduced the notions and their distinction in his discussion of the relationship among 
Scripture, churches, and the moral life, especially in promoting the practice of reading 
Scripture as canon in Christian community.
857
 He urged the community to read Scripture 
with exegetical care and skill. Later in 2007 he dedicated an article to this conviction. 
There he further discussed the notions in greater detail and illustrated the relationship 
between ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘ by reading the Beatitudes, though briefly.858 
As a whole, this conviction points to the need to see Scripture as both ‗scripted‘ 
and ‗script‘. In other words, the two assignments are actually mutually related and 
required by anyone who engages in a Scripture-based ethics. He says, 
Attention to Scripture as scripted finally requires attention to Scripture as 
a text appropriately read when it is…performed. And attention to Scripture 
as script to be performed is surely enriched by attention to Scripture as 
scripted.
859
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He explains that when interpreting the text the interpreter has a responsibility ―to 
make judgments about the sort of text it is, about the whole of which it is a part…about 
the interest appropriate to it, and about the appropriate use of this object as instrument, 
the performance of this text.‖860 These judgments make a difference to how the text is 
read and used. For instance, shall we read the lament Psalm 22 as an ancient Near Eastern 
religious literature of complaint or part of the Christian canon? Subsequently, shall we 
use this same psalm for confirming/challenging certain generalizations about that 
literature or for revealing the complaint of pious Jews (especially Jesus) who made 
human cry his own cry.
861
 This responsibility is, however, not purely personal: Since it is 
the community which owns the Bible as canon, one‘s reading of the text is conditioned 
by (and therefore answerable to) the community to which one belongs.
862
 The community 
―exercises interpretative discernment by asking how each part of Scripture as scripted fits 
the whole.‖863 
On the other hand, the performance of the script by Christian ethicists can be 
improved when one carefully attends to what the biblical authors did with the texts at 
their disposal. It is because different performances may emerge and yet none of them can 
capture the true meaning of the text/script definitely. Attending to the text can therefore 
function as a test for and guide to performance.
864
  
Therefore, within our context of methodological enquiry, Verhey‘s emphasis on 
Scripture as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘ implies the need to pay equal attention to the 
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importance of the scriptural text and of ethical hermeneutics in doing Scripture-based 
Christian ethics. This implication points us to the right direction of constructing a more 
integrated Scripture-based Christian ethics. Indeed, since his introduction of the notions 
‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘ in understanding scriptural ethics, he continues to apply the 
proposal in subsequent writings—especially in his treatment of medical ethical (and 
bioethical) issues where both textual and performance interpretations of relevant biblical 
texts are offered
865—and his attempt has thus offered a worthy model to us what such an 
integrated Scripture-based ethics can be.  
 
4.3 Where are We now?  
 
In the previous two chapters, we have noted certain developments among biblical 
scholars and Christian ethicists in constructing a methodological framework for scriptural 
ethics that is built upon their specific perspectives. We have also identified some 
limitations in their attempts. Among the biblical scholars that we have surveyed, they 
informed us about the importance of the text as well as the need of hermeneutics for our 
overall construction. Yet, the major criticism is that they fail to carry out the task of 
hermeneutics based on a solid ethical foundation. They still perceive Scripture more as 
‗scripted‘ than ‗script‘.  
Theological ethicists, on the other hand, contribute to our construction by 
demonstrating the need to interact with biblical scholars and to integrate Scripture into 
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their ethical framework. However, their contribution is greatly limited by their immature 
use and handling of the texts employed. Moreover, they are unaware of the necessity to 
first understand the original meaning of the texts prior to using them. They are more 
interested in the performance of Scripture as ‗script‘. 
As a result, we may conclude that these scholars have either stressed the 
importance of the scriptural text or the importance of ethical hermeneutics in doing 
biblical ethics. It seems that an equal emphasis on both the text and ethical hermeneutics 
may be the right direction toward constructing a more integrated scriptural ethics. 
In this final chapter of survey on contemporary attempts, we note how a biblical 
scholar and a Christian ethicist have made further contributions through their works. 
They take the courage to move beyond what have been achieved by earlier attempts. 
Burridge, who comes from the discipline of biblical scholarship, does so by proposing a 
biographical reading of the scriptural texts. Such a biographical reading focuses on the 
person of Jesus as well as his role as exemplar, and emphasizes the need to interpret the 
text within an inclusive communal setting. A significant advantage of this approach is 
that it serves not just as a tool of exegetical (literary) criticism but also a sound 
hermeneutical lens for ethical analysis—one that attends to character, narrative, and 
community formation. It also surpasses the hermeneutics of narrative or character ethics 
alone by combining their strengths. Within the area of New Testament ethics, it gives 
priority to the person of Jesus and understands Christology as the key to ethical 
hermeneutics. As a result, Burridge‘s biographical approach allows him to attend to the 
original meaning of the text and engage in sound ethical interpretation of the text for 
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contemporary issues at the same time, and hence makes the integration of the two 
disciplines smoother. Burridge has demonstrated to us that a more integrated scriptural 
ethics, from the perspective of biblical scholarship, is possible and can be achieved by 
employing a sound ethical framework for hermeneutics. 
Within the discipline of Christian ethics, Verhey, on the other hand, advances 
from a different direction. He not only employs Scripture as much and as broadly as other 
ethicists do, but is also able to overcome the limitations identified above. First, he takes 
the Bible seriously and makes great effort to acquire the knowledge of Scripture. He even 
attempts textual interpretation of the text in his New Testament ethics book just as his 
biblical counterparts do, though criticism regarding the quality of his exegetical skill is 
inevitable. All these efforts have demonstrated his awareness of the importance of the 
text in doing a Scripture-based ethics, as well as the possibility of achieving such a goal 
on the part of an ethicist. Second, along the line is the need to first establish the meaning 
of the texts prior to using them in contemporary ethical reflection. In fact, both the 
order/structure of The Great Reversal and the sequential publications of Remembering 
Jesus and Reading the Bible in the Strange World of Medicine, as well as his actual use of 
Scripture in these and other writings, reflect this particular line of thought. Third, he 
makes it clear that Scripture needs to be welcomed as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘, that is, 
as text to be understood and at the same time to be performed. This equal emphasis sheds 
light on our search for a more integrated Scripture-based Christian ethics. Verhey, 
therefore, as in the case of Burridge, has demonstrated to us that a more integrated 
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scriptural ethics, from the perspective of Christian ethics, is possible and can be achieved 
by first taking the scriptural text seriously and interpreting the text carefully. 
 
In conclusion, this lengthy survey of current attempts by both disciplines at 
constructing a more integrated Scripture-based Christian ethics has revealed to us that 
such a methodological goal is attainable and concrete advancements are found within 
each discipline. In the remaining parts of this work, I will proceed to demonstrate how 
such a more integrated Scripture-based ethics can be worked out in concrete. In doing so, 
I first employ virtue ethics as the framework for ethical hermeneutics. Then in Part Three, 
I focus on the Beatitudes in Matthew 5 which will be treated as both ‗scripted‘ and 
‗script‘ by careful exegesis and interpretation through the hermeneutics of virtue ethics. 
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Part Two: The Hermeneutics of Virtue Ethics 
  
I have surveyed in Part One current attempts at constructing a more integrated 
Scripture-based Christian ethics and concluded that both disciplines need to understand 
the scriptural texts as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. On the level of methodological quest, it 
means that biblical scholars and Christian ethicists, when doing scriptural ethics, need to 
read the written text with careful exegesis and at the same time interpret the text with the 
help of a sound ethical framework. Recent works by a biblical scholar and a Christian 
ethicist have shown us that it is a possible task. In the remaining parts of this work, I will 
demonstrate how such an integrated Scripture-based ethics works out in concrete by first 
suggesting a particular hermeneutics for our construction. I take virtue ethics as a worthy 
hermeneutical tool.
866
 
There are several reasons for choosing virtue ethics. As said in the introductory 
chapter, it is a matter of necessity to select one form of ethics, for it is not possible to 
explore Christian moral life without it being built upon some form of moral 
philosophy.
867
 By comparison with other approaches to ethics, virtue ethics is one of the 
oldest approaches. Moreover, in the past few decades, virtue ethics began to resurge and 
has become a prominent alternative to principle-based ethics.
868
 It departs from principle-
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based ethics in that it deals with the character of individuals and their communities, and 
the practices that both develop those characteristics and in turn express them.
869
 William 
Mattison argues that a virtue ethics ―provides a lens through which to examine the moral 
life in a richer way than approaches that concentrate solely on actions, rules, and 
contentious cases.‖870  
Within the context of biblical ethics, both Harrington and Keenan point out that 
virtue ethics is ―true to both the New Testament emphasis on the human response to 
God‘s gracious activity in Jesus Christ and to the ethical needs and desires of 
Christians.‖871 It is a comprehensive approach that goes beyond character formation 
alone.
872
 In addition, as will be discussed later, the yields of virtue have certain 
advantages over other act or principle-based ethics in approaching biblical texts. 
Harrington and Keenan thus comment that virtue ethics can be a promising starting point 
―toward opening conversations at even deeper levels between specialists in biblical 
studies and moral theology.‖873 
Furthermore, I note that among the above-surveyed scholars who have attempted 
to build upon an ethical framework, not a few turn to virtues and practices for insights on 
hermeneutics, such as Spohn—and especially Burridge and Verhey who have made 
further advancement in our search. Burridge, for example, points out that the depiction of 
character is often implied within a biographical narrative.  Although ethical instruction 
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may not be the primary concern of ancient biography, the idea of imitation in which one 
observes, follows and practices the subject‘s virtues, is common to much such 
literature.
874
 The case of Verhey, on the other hand, is rather self-evident. Apart from 
advocating certain virtues for Christian moral life, such as hospitality and justice, he 
perceives the notion of practice as a core element of Christian ethical framework and 
emphasizes that remembering Jesus requires participation in the practices of the church 
community (especially in reading Scripture and discernment).  
In short, this brief description shows that virtue ethics is a very appropriate 
avenue for doing hermeneutics. In the following two chapters, I explore the hermeneutics 
of virtue ethics in constructing a more integrated Scripture-based Christian ethics. 
Chapter Five deals with this moral philosophy in general. It begins with an overview of 
the historical development of virtue ethics and then explores its recent resurgence among 
philosophical and theological ethicists. A discussion of the contemporary understanding 
of virtue ethics follows. In particular, the yields of virtues—namely, practices, character, 
exemplar, and community—will be probed. Within the theological context, such moral 
formation is effected by grace. We rely on God‘s grace so as to make our effort and 
moral growth possible.
875
 Therefore, the role of the Holy Spirit and grace in relation to 
virtue will also be discussed briefly. 
Chapter Six focuses on relating Scripture with virtue ethics from the perspective 
of theological ethics. In doing so, I will look at how two virtue ethicists read the biblical 
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texts through the lens of virtue. The first is Mennonite Joseph Kotva who is known for 
making a Christian case for virtue ethics. He establishes a link between the New 
Testament and virtue theory by pointing out that a virtue perspective allows us to ―see the 
Bible‘s collections of rules as encapsulating the guidance and wisdom of some who went 
before us in faith.‖876 The second ethicist to be explored is William Spohn who, as 
surveyed earlier, has attempted to integrate Scripture and ethics through a hermeneutic of 
virtue ethics. He points out that the New Testament ―gives content to the formal patterns 
of virtue ethics‖ by spelling out concrete transformative habits.877 
 In fact, by relating Scripture to the ethics of virtue, both Kotva and Spohn have 
contributed to the revival of virtue ethics and advocacy for a Christian model of virtue 
ethics within their own traditions. I now turn to the historical development of this 
particular moral theory and review its resurgence in the past two decades or so. 
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Chapter Five: A Hermeneutic of Virtue Ethics 
 
This chapter is about the hermeneutics of virtue ethics. In order to understand its 
appropriateness as a hermeneutical tool for my work here, I first provide an overview of 
its historical development and retrieval. More specifically, I explore its actual 
philosophical and theological revival. The views of some contemporary figures from 
theological ethics on virtue ethics are also presented. I then give the yields of virtue that 
help bring virtue into connection with some of the other reference points of ethics. I 
conclude with how Christian grace and the virtuous life are related. 
However, prior to entering into detailed discussion of these areas, I need to briefly 
outline here several basic issues central to virtue theory that will emerge throughout the 
discussion. There are four of them, namely, the nature of virtue ethics, the issue of 
methodology, the question of cultural contextualization, and the question of theological 
relevance. 
 
5.1 Some Basic Issues 
 
Nature of Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics is one of the oldest moral philosophies that has gone through 
development, decline, and revival in the past two millenniums. Its proponents from both 
philosophy and theology may offer various readings and emphases of the theory. This is 
true among contemporary virtue ethicists. Some like MacIntyre and Hauerwas would 
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argue for a community-dependent virtue ethics. Others like Jean Porter would claim a 
Thomistic reading of virtue and yet argues for a ‗thick‘, local understanding of virtues. 
For her, virtues are culturally bound and so different cultures will have different 
meanings of virtues. Still, others like Spohn examined the virtues as having more 
universal relevance. Despite these divergences, I identify certain fundamental nature of 
virtue ethics that deserve special attention. 
First and foremost, virtue ethics is the kind of moral theory that claims ‗being‘ 
precedes ‗doing‘. In other words, it does not solely focus on ‗being‘ as some non-virtue 
ethicists would comment. As will be seen below, the three basic questions rooted in 
MacIntyre‘s tripolar structure of virtue ethics—namely, ‗Who am I?‘ ‗Who ought I 
become?‘ and ‗What ought I to do?‘—do not only ask about the moral agent‘s being but 
also the kind of action the moral agent needs to do. Subsequently, virtue ethics also 
attends to the human action and answers the third question by first ask who we should 
become. Moreover, virtues as practices point to human actions. Therefore, being a 
teleological ethics does not diminish its concerns for human action.  
A second and related nature of virtue theory is that it is person-oriented rather 
than act-oriented. Again, we need to bear in mind that virtue ethics is not individualistic 
as some critics would suggest. As will be discussed later, for virtue ethicists the exercise 
of virtues and the formation of the moral agent are closely related to the life of the 
community as well. Virtues exist to form and improve the community and thus have 
social ramifications. However, certain proponents‘ emphasis on the community as 
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‗closed‘ draws concerns and challenges from non-virtue ethicists, especially those from 
the common good tradition.  
 
Issue of Methodology 
The second issue to be outlined here is about methodology. We see from both the 
historical development of virtue theory and its subsequent revival that, at the beginning of 
the revival of virtue ethics, some of its proponents tend to be aggressive in proving the 
superiority of virtue theory over and even rejecting other ethical theories like Kantian 
ethics of duty or consequence-based ethics. However, we also note that more and more 
virtue ethicists today are not interested in this aggressive task. Rather, they acknowledge 
the limitations of virtue theory and perceive virtue theory and other kinds of ethics as not 
mutually exclusive.  All these forms of moral philosophy do not have to be separate. 
Some, like Porter, claim that the moralities of both rules and virtues need to be taken up 
by the virtue theory. Others, like Keenan, are convinced that virtue ethics is capable of 
generating principles and norms.
878
 The role of virtue ethics is therefore at least one of 
complementarity and inclusiveness and not competition. It provides needed correctives to 
what had been an excessive act-oriented, principle-oriented, and a decontextualization of 
ethics via Kant-type duty-oriented ethics. My choice of virtue ethics as the hermeneutical 
tool for this work likewise is grounded in this conviction.  
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Question of Cultural Contextualization 
Virtue ethicists‘ emphasis on the local community raises the concerns about 
cultural relativism. Indeed, proponents of virtue ethics generally believe that every 
culture has a class of virtues to help/guide its people to answer the question of who they 
should become as a community. Among them a few believe that each class of virtues is 
specific only to that particular culture. Many, however, believe that virtues from one 
culture can be analogously compared. That means, there are trans-cultural affinities 
between virtues of different cultures. Some even go so far as to argue that there are 
universal virtues or at least ‗thin‘ virtues in all cultures. Therefore, there seems to be a 
spectrum of views, ranging from those who believe in cultural contextualization to those 
who want to transcend the boundary of local culture. I am more inclined to follow the 
more progressive side here—that means, though virtues are context sensitive, they are not 
ultimately relative to a limited context but remain open to revision in light of new 
circumstances.
879
 And it is based on this view that the later task of bringing a virtue-based 
reading of the Beatitudes into the Confucian society becomes possible. However, such a 
task further leads to a theological question that I now treat. 
 
Question of Theological Relevance 
 The last issue to be brought up prior to entering into detailed discussion of virtue 
theory is the question of theological relevance. As will be brought up in the historical 
development of virtue ethics and the discussion of the relationship between virtue and 
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grace, Aquinas categorizes virtues into two basic types, namely, theological virtues and 
cardinal virtues. Theological virtues are basically infused by God. Cardinal virtues, on 
the other hand, can be acquired by both Christians and non-believers. They have a certain 
naturalness about them. Still, the kind of inner-worldly virtuous acts done by Christians 
are sometimes distinguished from those by non-believers by relating the former‘s goal 
with the supernatural destiny and by the source of their virtue, grace. 
 However, are graced virtues outside the Church community possible? In other 
words, is it possible to find comparable infused theological virtues in non-Christian 
communities such as the Confucian society? Here we face the same issue that is found in 
the question of cultural contextualization: Are infused theological virtues specific only to 
the Christian community or can they be analogously compared? It is noted that, according 
to Karl Rahner, graced virtue is possible outside the Church community. Again, I follow 
the progressive side in approaching this issue: Although the virtues emerged from the 
Beatitudes are the result of Christian faith and have God‘s assistance as their source, they 
can still be engaged cross-culturally with the non-Christian Confucian society. A classical 
example is the virtue of hope. 
 Finally, as we shall see, virtue ethics is particularly relevant in finding the moral 
message in classic religious texts. These texts—usually narrative in from—find in virtue 
ethics a hermeneutical method that allows us not only to appreciate the text in itself but 
also see its relevance both for us today in our own culture as well as for others in theirs. 
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5.2 Historical Development 
 
An Overview 
According to Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, who trace the history of 
virtue in moral thought, ―the classical quest of ethics was to find, and teach, the good life 
and how to live it;‖ and was a common task among philosophers (such as Plato, Aristotle 
and even Confucius) although their reasoning might be different.
880
 One particular 
approach aims at the quest of the good person (and the good society) and develops an 
ethics that defines the kind of person one ought to be: The virtuous person who 
―habitually incline[s] to do the right and the good thing, no matter what the circumstances 
might be.‖881  
The idea of virtue, in other words, has a long history.
882
 In fact, by the end of the 
fifth century BCE, the Greeks had already discussed certain virtues (such as justice) that 
were significant to them.
883
 For instance, Socrates (as portrayed by his pupil Plato) tried 
to seek a more adequate conception of virtue by challenging the ideals of virtue cherished 
by his fellow-citizens: He held that ―virtue is a kind of wisdom or 
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knowledge…possession of which is the only genuine human happiness…all the virtues 
are forms of this wisdom…[and] expressions of one quality.‖884 
Nevertheless, most scholars would agree that Plato was the first to utilize virtues 
in order to identify the highest good that an individual (and the state) can attain.
885
 He 
also enunciated the classical list of cardinal virtues and asserted that virtue as knowledge 
or insight can be attained only through the perception of the ‗form‘ of Beauty, Goodness, 
Justice and other ‗forms‘.886 Still, when Glaucon replied (in the Republic) that a truly just 
person would be one ―of true simplicity of character who…wants to be and not to seem 
good,‖887 he implied that for Plato virtue is also a quality or excellence of character, and 
an attribute of a person‘s very being.888  
However, it was Aristotle who gave us the classic formulation of the ethics of 
virtue.
889
 He rejected Plato‘s notion of ‗forms‘ and rather classified virtue as ―an activity 
of the soul in accordance with, or implying, a rational principle [or practical wisdom].‖890 
As an activity it requires correct judgments and involves appropriate human emotional 
responses to a specific situation.
891
  Moreover, virtue is a disposition that ―makes [a 
                                                 
884
 Porter, ―Virtue Ethics,‖ 97. 
885
 Farley, 11. 
886
 Porter, ―Virtue Ethics,‖ 97. 
887
 Birch and Rasmussen, 43. Birch and Rasmussen quotes Plato, The Republic, 2
nd
 rev. ed. (Baltimore, MD: 
Penguin Books, 1974), 107-8. 
888
 Ibid., 44. 
889
 Ibid., 42; Farley, 12. According to Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle employed his account of the virtues as a 
basis for criticizing existing social forms that neglect or hinder the development of certain important human 
virtues. See Martha C. Nussbaum, ―Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,‖ in French, Midwest 
Studies, 33. 
890
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 75-76. 
891
 Porter, ―Virtue Ethics,‖ 98. 
 216 
person] good and causes [the person] to perform [her/his] function well.‖892And all 
virtues are directed toward an end or telos—happiness in this life. 
Later on, Aristotle added that one performs her/his function well only when the 
mean is observed. Based on this claim he developed the doctrine of the mean: 
The equal part between excess and deficiency…in relation to the thing 
whatever is equidistant from the extremes, which is one and the same for 
everybody…[or] in relation to us that which is neither excessive nor 
deficient, and this is not one and the same for all.
893
 
 
Thus, virtue is defined as ―a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us 
and determined by a rational principle, and by which a prudent man would use to 
determine it.‖894 For instance, a truly courageous person would make reasoned judgments 
regarding the kinds of risks which one should undertake while the rash person and the 
coward would not.
895
 Aristotle further placed virtue in the genus of habit—―a durable 
characteristic of the agent inclining to certain kinds of actions and emotional reactions, 
not the actions and reactions themselves. Acquired over time, habits grow to be ‗second 
nature‘ for the individual.‖896  
In short, early Greek philosophical reflections on virtues ―focused on those traits 
of character that are praiseworthy and not simply valuable.‖897 They are concerned about 
not just the good of the individual but of the society as well. 
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During the patristic period, Augustine of Hippo, though he followed the claims of 
Plato and the Stoics, offered a different reflection on the virtues.
898
  It has been noted that 
he seemed even to define virtue in different ways in his various writings.
899
 On the one 
hand, he insisted that ―the seemingly virtues of the pagans cannot be true virtues, because 
they are not informed by knowledge and love of God, the only source of true 
goodness.‖900 That means, all true virtues are basically different forms of charity and they 
point to happiness in the afterlife.
901
 And charity is the ordering virtue for Christian life. 
On the other hand, he recognized the significant resemblance between pagan and true 
virtues and even encouraged one to imitate those pagan virtuous people. 
This ambiguity of the language of the virtues, as Porter notes, had a great impact 
on subsequent Christian virtue ethics in that it has become an opportunity for Augustine 
later on to formulate the theological ambiguity between human goodness and the infinite 
Goodness, God.
902
 
On the other hand, Joseph Woodhill notes that all the three major Eastern Church 
Fathers—namely, Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and John Chrysostom—perceived the 
acquisition of virtue as central and fundamental to the believer‘s life.903 The Ladder of 
Divine Ascent, a widely studied work in Eastern Christendom by John Climacus of the 
seventh century, further influenced the Greek tradition‘s understanding and emphasis of 
virtue by offering a complementary view of virtue and practical guidelines in acquiring 
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virtues.
904
 It sees God as the supreme good for humanity and Christian virtues complete 
the Greek counterparts by moving us toward that telos.
905
 Still, Climacus continued to 
follow the classical view that ―virtue is an excellence that is peculiar to our being‖ and 
habit is the path to acquire virtue.
906
 
During the medieval time, Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologiae
907
 (I.II. 55-
70), offered his theory of virtue and addressed the earlier problem of ambiguity that 
emerged in Augustine‘s understanding of virtue. He first followed Aristotle‘s view that 
virtues are dispositions that incline one to act in particular ways (I.II. 55.1). These 
dispositions are necessary for any rational creature to be capable of action (I.II. 49.4). 
They are discovered by human reason and perfected by practice.  
Yet, he accepted Peter Lombard‘s definition that is approved by Augustine: 
―Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live rightly, of which no one makes 
bad use, which God works in us without us‖ (I.II 55.4).908 From this Aquinas stretched 
the ancient concept of habit ―to cover God-given dispositions and described all habits as 
principally related to the will.‖909 As Klaus Demmer puts, Aquinas has framed his 
discussion theologically.
910
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According to Aquinas, there are both intellectual and moral virtues. Intellectual 
virtues, such as knowledge and prudence, perfect the speculative intellect while moral 
virtues, like temperance, perfect the appetitive powers (that is, the passions and the will) 
(I.II. 57, 58). He followed Aristotle‘s view that the virtue of prudence is ―the sole 
intellectual virtue inseparable from moral virtue‖ 911 and that all virtues are connected 
(I.II. 58.4-5, 65.1). Aquinas further structured his theory around a twofold complex 
distinction ―between infused and acquired virtues, on the one hand, and between virtues 
directed to God and those directed to the rational good, on the other.‖912 In other words, 
Aquinas understood that humankind has two ends (i.e., happiness in this life and the 
eternal life) and hence two types of virtues are needed, namely, theological and natural 
virtues. 
From there he identified three theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) and 
four cardinal (prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance) virtues (I.II. 61-62). They 
differ from each other in that theological virtues have God as their object while the 
cardinal virtues are directed to certain human goods as grasped by reason (I.II. 62.2). 
However, Aquinas‘s infused virtues do not only include the theological virtues but also 
infused cardinal virtues (I.II. 63.3&4).
913
 They differ from their acquired counterparts in 
that they are, though indirectly, aimed at the attainment of supernatural happiness, and 
that their objects are transformed accordingly (I.II. 63.4 ad1). In this sense, Aquinas 
would agree with Augustine that acquired virtues are virtues only in a qualified sense and 
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are insufficient for full human happiness (II.II. 23.7). Still, he did not imply that these 
virtues are tainted or corrupt as Augustine did.
914
 In fact, Aquinas said that the acquired 
moral virtues are virtues though not perfect (they are made perfect by charity).
915
  
As a whole, although it is accustomed to regard Aquinas‘s theory as a restatement 
of that of Aristotle, Porter rightly claims that Aquinas‘s theory ―was developed in a 
context of ongoing theological speculation on the virtues, within which Aristotelian and 
Augustinian elements had already been synthesized in complex ways.
916
  
However, for various reasons, interest in the virtues began to decline at the start of 
the modern period in the fifteenth century.
917
 One commentator succinctly recalls some 
of the possible reasons: ―A religiously motivated uneasiness about attributing goodness to 
human beings was augmented by another culturally dominant idea, the philosophical 
pursuit of objective truth, a pursuit for which the counsels of virtue are much too vague. 
Thus the topic of virtue was pushed to the margins of most discussions of morality.‖918 
Within the Catholic tradition, for instance, the manualists of the seventeenth century 
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began to treat Aquinas‘s theological and moral virtues as ―source of obligations rather 
than as the dynamics of moral living.‖919  
The general lack of interest in the virtues went on through the first half of the 
twentieth century. The natural law tradition continued to dominate Catholic moral 
theology while the critiques of Karl Barth and his contemporary orthodox theologians 
also challenged the emphasis on virtue in theology.
920
  
However, a small number of Christian scholars during the first half of the 
twentieth century worked hard to rediscover the virtue tradition in their writings. Catholic 
philosophers and theologians such as Josef Pieper and our earlier surveyed manualist 
Bernard Häring, drew on Aquinas‘s theological virtues in their vision of Christian moral 
life: Pieper offered a contemporary understanding of the four cardinal virtues and noted 
that virtues are not mere character traits but point to the not-yet-attained fullness of 
human being.
921
 Häring, grounding on the notion of fundamental option, perceived 
Christian virtues as part of the development of human fullness.
922
 He further made his 
contribution distinctive by emphasizing on eschatological virtues rather than the four 
traditional cardinal virtues.
923
 
In any event, the major effort to retrieve virtue ethics began only in the second 
half of the twentieth century, first with the discipline of philosophy, followed by 
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enquiries within theological and public sectors.
924
 In the pages that follow, I turn to the 
contribution of these philosophers and theological ethicists briefly. But prior to that, let‘s 
look at what leads to the revival of virtue theory. 
 
Reasons for Returning to Virtue 
Why then return to virtue? Gilbert Meilaender offers a straightforward answer: 
―This return suggests a widespread dissatisfaction with an understanding of the moral life 
which focuses primarily on duties, obligations, troubling moral dilemmas, and borderline 
cases.‖925 Other ethicists likewise assert that virtue ethics is not an alternative theory but 
―a protest against certain modern assumptions concerning what ethical theory should look 
like as well as an attempt to return us to more realistic avenues of moral reflection.‖926 
Philosopher David Solomon, however, suggests that the revival is promoted by 
two positive views:
927
 1) Virtue is a necessary component of any ethical theory; 2) the 
assessment of human character is more fundamental than that of the action (and/or its 
consequence) in a normative theory. Gregory Velazco y Trianosky, in a similar tone, 
claims that ―no theory of the right can constitute a complete guide to action without being 
supplemented by a theory of virtue…[for] the rules themselves do not tell us how to 
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apply them in specific situations, let alone how to apply them well…[also,] much of right 
conduct cannot be codified in rules or principles.‖928 
Nevertheless, virtue ethics is perceived by most of its proponents as offering a 
more comprehensive picture of moral experience and standing closer to ordinary life 
issues than other moral philosophies such as utilitarianism or neo-Kantianism.
929
 Keenan 
elaborates this point by comparing it with act-oriented ethics and duty-oriented ethics: 
An act-oriented ethics considers only the value-bearing quality of 
particular acts…a duty ethics expands the calculus and requires 
consideration of the agent‘s state in life, and…a virtue ethics further 
extends the area of concern to embrace the whole agent as an historical 
person… 
In an act-oriented ethics, most moral actions are rather grave…a 
duty ethics entertains matter for moral consideration to the extent that 
one‘s particular duties include them. But virtue ethics holds the Thomistic 
insight that every human act is a moral act.
930
 
 
He further points out that virtue theory‘s stress for establishing a telos has a 
unique significance for our society. He says, ―Only in a virtue ethics, with its telos, can 
moral idealism can be found and maintained. Only in virtue ethics is a telos constitutive 
of the method; no other ethical system can make that claim.‖931 
Keenan thus concludes that in the real world, only virtue ethics offers a complete 
vision—rather than a partial insight as act-oriented and duty-oriented ethics do—into the 
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complexity of moral and upright living.
932
 Trianosky comments that this is ―perhaps the 
most persuasive argument in favor of studying the virtues.‖933 
Mattison further explains the comprehensiveness of virtue ethics in terms of 
‗habit‘:934 The development of habits is a result of repeatedly acting on certain intentions. 
They represent one‘s moral character, reflect who one is inside out, and are more than 
performing a good act frequently. 
In sum, both the limitations of duty-oriented and consequence-oriented ethics and 
the unique offerings by virtue ethics have led to the resurgence of virtue theory in the 
second half of the twentieth century. 
 
5.3 The Revival of Virtue Ethics 
 
Attempts from Philosophical and Theological Sectors 
As Gregory Pence notes, two decades prior to the publishing of MacIntyre‘s After 
Virtue in 1981, the revival of virtue theory had already begun when an efflorescence of 
works on virtues were witnessed.
935
 In fact, many philosophers trace the beginning of the 
revival to the well known article of Elizabeth Anscombe (―Modern Moral Philosophy‖) 
in 1958 that called for ―the restoration of Aristotelian notions of goodness, character, and 
virtue as central concerns of moral philosophy.‖936 She challenged the Kantian claim that 
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basic moral judgments are categorical imperatives and suggested to live a life informed 
by virtue as held by Aristotle.
937
 
Later throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, we saw an ever growing number of 
philosophers (such as William Frankena, Philippa Foot, James Wallace and Lester Hunt) 
discuss virtue theory in general as well as specific genera of virtues (like courage and 
sympathy).
938
 Two basic trends of revival can be identified: Those aiming at a religious- 
based theory (e.g. Thomism) and those looking for an alternative to deontology.
939
  
Among the latter is Alasdair MacIntyre who (joined by other writers) claims that 
traditional deontological theory can be replaced by a good virtue theory.
940
 MacIntyre has 
been recognized as the most prominent advocate of virtue theory and his works have been 
frequently cited by virtue ethicists who explore recent work on virtues.
941
 According to 
Pence, MacIntyre, in his much earlier work, has already criticized the Kantian deontology 
for leading to an individualistic morality and society that is overwhelmed with an 
unchecked moral pluralism.
942
 
In After Virtue he continues this earlier theme and perceives the resurgence of 
virtue theory as a reaction against the salient post-World War II moral philosophy that 
focuses almost exclusively on moral rules that are universally binding and impersonal, 
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and emphasizes what is right rather than what is good.
943
 He laments that the idea of 
human good disappeared and our current morality is in a state of crisis:
944
 On the one 
hand, rational justification for morality became impossible (for such justification relies on 
the acceptance of certain presuppositions about good that are beyond mere social 
construction.)
945
 On the other hand, the coherent relation to the human nature it guides is 
lost. What is left is an ethics of liberalism that stresses individuality and personal 
freedom.
946
 What needs to be done is thus ―a new vision of the human good supporting a 
new conception of human virtues.‖947 
He is convinced that some kind of Aristotelian virtue theory alone can restore 
such rationality and intelligibility to our moral and social attitudes.
948
 He thus proposes a 
virtue theory that is within the Aristotelian tradition and emphasizes the unity of theory 
and practice.
949
 Basically MacIntyre‘s theory focuses on a multi-stage logical 
development of the concept of virtue. He claims that each stage requires a corresponding 
background account—namely, practice, narrative unity, and tradition—through which the 
complex conception of virtue can be understood.
950
  
Subsequently, virtue at the first stage is referred to as ―an acquired human quality 
the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are 
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internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any 
such goods.‖951 Virtue at the next stage, in contrast, is set in the background of ―the 
narrative order of a single human life‖ which concerns the unity of one‘s whole life.952 
Virtues in a whole life refer to ―those dispositions which will not only sustain practices 
and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in 
the relevant kind of quest for the good.‖953 
In the third and last stage, virtues relate one‘s individual life to that of the 
community. MacIntyre explains, ―I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the 
virtues only qua individual…the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those 
communities from which I derive my identity….the possession of an historical identity 
and the possession of a social identity coincide.‖954 Hence, virtues at this stage are traits 
that sustain ―those traditions which provide both practices and individual lives with their 
necessary historical context.‖955 
As a whole, MacIntyre is praised for providing a modern, detailed conception of 
virtue and opening up the space needed for ongoing discussion of virtue ethics in 
subsequent decades.
956
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Among their theological counterparts, a similar growing reception and discussion 
to virtue ethics is observed. Keenan notes that, for instance, the very first issue of The 
Journal of Religious Ethics was focusing on the debate over virtue theory.
957
 Porter 
further notes that one particular occasion for the revival of virtue ethics among 
theologians is the growing interest in the recovering of Aquinas‘s theology, and his moral 
thought in particular.
958
  
Nevertheless, various types of approaches are adopted by theologians.
959
 Among 
contemporary Protestant theological ethicists, Stanley Hauerwas‘s pioneer role in 
rediscovering virtues through his ethics of character is widely recognized. He is 
convinced that the concepts of character and virtue provide the most appropriate 
framework for Christians to reflect on their moral life.
960
 He first defines character as 
―the qualifications of man‘s self-agency through his beliefs, intentions, and actions, by 
which a man acquires a moral history befitting his nature as a self-determining being.‖961 
In other words, character is inseparable from one‘s self-determination and is the decisive 
factor behind one‘s doing and becoming.962  It is ―not just the sum of all that we do as 
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agents, but rather…the particular direction our agency acquires by choosing to act in 
some ways rather than others.‖963 Thus, the notion of character is fundamental to 
Hauerwas; still, he insists on focusing on virtues that enable one to live a truly Christian 
life.
964
  
In addition, Hauerwas is well-known for arguing for the primacy and 
interrelatedness of community and narrative in any moral tradition.
965
 He transforms 
MacIntyre‘s demand for tradition into the need of a believing community in which one 
cultivates the virtues—for ―the community as the historical place…has a tradition which 
offers to the dynamic structure of virtue some rooted continuity.‖966 In other words, the 
believing community as a moral community is a community of virtue; and virtues are 
acquired through involvement in ―the embodiment of the story in the communities in 
which we are born.‖967 
As a whole, although Hauerwas returns to Aristotle and Aquinas for insights, his 
overall understanding of virtue within the notions of character and community is 
perceived by some as representing a different tradition of virtue theory.
968
 
Other proponents of virtue ethics within Protestantism include Gilbert Meilaender 
and Joseph Kotva.
969
 Kotva is especially known for making a Christian case for virtue 
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ethics. And his use of Scripture in constructing a Christian account of virtue ethics is 
equally noteworthy.
970
  Therefore, I will return to him in our discussion of relating 
Scripture with virtue. For now, I turn to the resurgence of virtue within the Catholic 
tradition. 
Jean Porter and James Keenan are two of the proponents of virtue ethics from the 
Catholic circle. In her earlier work The Recovery of Virtue, Porter claims that her 
approach to virtue is one of Thomistic. She points out that despite fragmentation there is 
a common indebtedness to the Thomistic tradition among contemporary Christian 
ethicists, it is appropriate to return to Aquinas for constructive insights.
971
 She basically 
claims that the moral theory of Aquinas is grounded in the general theory of goodness 
(and the theory of human good in particular) which forms the basis of a unified theory of 
virtues.
972
 However, she also claims that Aquinas‘s approach to virtue theory is not one 
of dichotomy—that is, a theory of virtue vis-à-vis a theory of rules—but one that takes up 
the moralities of both rules and virtues. She explains,  
Morally good kinds of actions are conceptually linked to the virtues, in 
that certain determinate kinds of actions are characteristic of particular 
virtues and tend to promote them in the individual…For this reason, we 
cannot form concepts of particular virtues without some idea of the kinds 
of actions that correspond to those virtues, even though it is also true that a 
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―the influence of the evolving legacy of Augustine‘s critique of the pagan virtues, and asserts the 
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virtue cannot adequately be understood only as the tendency or capacity to 
perform a certain kind of action.
973
 
 
Therefore, in the discussion of the order of love, she claims that ―[while] true moral 
rectitude is necessarily grounded in the orientation of the whole personality that charity 
creates; and yet, charity cannot be exercised, or even exist, unless the moral rules 
generated by right reason are observed.‖974  
Like Porter, Keenan also follows the Thomistic approach to virtue although his 
view differs from that of Porter. He sees virtue ethics as a comprehensive system in that 
in the pursuit of virtues we generate norms: Virtue ethics offers guidelines and directives 
for acquiring the virtues we need although the kind of direction they give is heuristic and 
thus needs further definition.
975
 He thus argues that ―a virtue based ethics that generates 
its own norms and principles is more capable of guiding us in action than a simple 
normative ethics.‖976 Along this line he further argues that all normative ethics inevitably 
find their origins in a virtue ethics and concludes that ―virtues promote not only virtues 
themselves but also the rules that we need.‖977 
Elsewhere Keenan points out that while the discussion of controversial actions 
(like abortion and gene therapy) has dominated contemporary ethics, virtue ethicists are 
simply interested in persons.
978
 In particular, he emphasizes that virtue theory is 
interested in ordinary Christian living. He shares, ―I wanted to communicate with 
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somebody interested…in what could be foundational for our family and community lives. 
In theology today, there is a constant criticism that the virtues are soft, inexact, and lofty. 
Against that challenge I wanted to present them as concrete, practical, useful and 
necessary.‖979 Thus, apart from writing on the traditional theological and cardinal virtues, 
he also proposes certain virtues important for Christians and helps them see these virtues 
as ―the stuff that we should practice in order to realize [Christian] charity…[and] a new 
opportunity to strive to become fully alive human beings.‖980 
In particular, he points out that both contemporary challenges of espousing 
cardinal virtues—that is, the claims of culture and the uniqueness of individuals—and the 
inadequacy
981
 of the traditional cardinal virtues demand a new set of cardinal virtues. He 
notes that individuals in every culture have similar fundamental relationships—toward 
the self, others, and the society—that are guided by the virtue of practical wisdom. He 
therefore proposes the virtues of justice, fidelity, self-care, and prudence that are based on 
these three levels of relationship, namely, general, specific, and unique relationship.
982
 He 
then applies his proposal to other areas of ethics like sexual ethics and bioethics.
983
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Last but not least, by taking the abortion debate in the United States as an 
example Keenan urges that we are in need of virtue ethics today. He says, ―In our liberal 
society where individual rights have replaced the common good we need to rediscover 
community. That discovery is increasingly urgent.‖984 
On the other hand, Keenan also attempts to bring virtue ethics in dialogue not just 
with specific ethical areas but with other theological disciplines as well. He notes, 
―Christian ethicists are discovering, then, that virtue ethics can offer more resources than 
we ever imagined. It provides bridges between moral theology and a variety of other 
fields, such as spirituality, worship, church life and Scripture. In this way, virtue ethics 
unites fields of theology that have long been isolated from each other.‖985 Among the 
Catholic ethicists who interact virtue ethics with other theological disciplines is William 
Spohn who attempts to bridge virtue ethics with Scripture and spirituality in particular. I 
will later return to his understanding of using virtue to read Scripture.  
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So far I have highlighted some of the recent revival of virtue ethics among 
philosophers and theologians. Yearley, however, reminds us that should such revival to 
be convincing certain central issues need to be addressed.
986
 While Yearley‘s reminder 
encourages the proponents of virtue ethics to further reflect on their agenda, there are 
scholars, however, who are rather critical of the theory of virtue.  
 
Limitations and Criticism of Virtue Theory 
Philosopher Robert Louden expresses two basic concerns regarding virtue 
ethics:
987
 First, the motivation of the revival seems more to criticize other approaches 
than to state clearly the content of its own alternative. Second, with regards to its strategy, 
virtue ethics bears a trait of ‗conceptual reductionism‘ as its deontological competitors do 
and hence is not unique at all.
988
 From this he points out that conceptual commitment to 
the moral agent leads to several shortcomings, especially regarding the place of 
actions.
989
 In simple terms, he is concerned that virtue ethics is structurally incapable of 
saying much about what one ought to do—since virtue is concerned with persons, it 
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cannot adequately deal with human action.
990
 Trianosky comments that this criticism is 
perhaps the most frequently heard objection.
991
  
Opponents further charge that such commitment to and focusing on the agent too 
much could lead to self-centeredness.
992
 They also highlight the epistemological problem 
of identifying the virtuous person as well as the presence of a kind of over-optimism 
within virtue ethics regarding changing the complex society and overcoming social 
evils.
993
 Sarah Conly, in addition, challenges the use of the broad account of flourishing 
to construct a theory of virtue.
994
  
Others make claims from a different perspective:
995
 Since virtue ethics relies on 
feelings that cannot be called upon at will they are irrelevant to morality that attends to 
voluntary moral acts. The term ‗disposition‘ remains vague and impractical and thus 
needs to be guided by clear moral instructions. When compared to actions, it also lacks 
public accountability that morality demands. They also charge that the presence of such 
feelings or dispositions implies that one‘s moral goodness is simply a matter of luck and 
contingency and hence moral character of a person will be outside one‘s control at the 
moment of action.
996
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Solomon attempts to respond to some of these charges:
997
 First, he points out that 
virtue ethics is not exclusively concerned with one‘s own well-being but also that of 
others, as in the virtue of justice. Second, with regard to those act-related charges, he 
claims that virtue theories do provide guidance for action through virtues.  
Still, these concerns, charges, and objections have led Louden to conclude that 
virtue ethics alone is inadequate for our complex society; rather, we need to acquire and 
coordinate both agent-oriented and act-oriented theories.
998
 Trianosky who seeks a 
middle way also claims that virtue theory is not a complete alternative to moral principles; 
rather, both are needed should ethics be practical: In the case of complementing moral 
principles, virtue can provide standards to the over-general moral principles and help 
determine what to do when rules cannot be applied.
999
  
A similar conclusion is also drawn by Gregory Jones and Richard Vance:
1000
 
Virtue theory cannot simply be ‗another‘ approach to rule-oriented ethics. On the 
contrary, obligations and virtues are correlative, compatible and mutually reinforcing. 
Therefore, what is needed is to articulate how they are interrelated in a particular 
tradition‘s conception of (a medical) ethics.   
Criticisms are raised not only from philosophers alone but from theologians as 
well:
1001
 First, they charge that virtue ethics is inherently egoistic which does not coincide 
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with Christian‘s call to certain moral obligations like self-sacrifice. Also, virtue theory‘s 
interest in human flourishing seems to undermine the call of duty. Second, others are 
concerned that the latent perfectionism in virtue ethics contradicts Christian obedience to 
God‘s commands. Third, virtue theory‘s understanding of human desires upon which it 
relies is distorted. It is thus doubtful if they can be dependable resources for morality. 
Consequently, a divine command ethics is preferred for our fallen state. Within the 
Protestant circles, a case is further made against a Christian virtue ethics: ―Such approach 
encourages a false sense of one‘s own good and a reliance on that goodness rather than 
on God‘s grace.‖1002 Kotva further notes those criticisms regarding the lack of social 
aspect of virtue ethics.
1003
 
Finally, natural law theorists from the Catholic tradition, though for a different 
reason, also object the use of virtue ethics in Catholic moral theology:
1004
 They perceive 
virtues as simply dispositions to observe the moral law. Strictly speaking, virtues as a 
whole should belong to the discipline of spirituality or mysticism rather than of morality. 
In sum, Meilaender cautions us that while one might imagine return to virtue is a 
turn toward simplicity, the opposite may be the case in some ways.
1005
 Interesting though, 
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despite these criticisms reflections on the role of virtue ethics continue to flourish within 
contemporary Christianity.
1006
 I now turn to the contemporary understanding of the 
theory of virtue itself. 
 
5.4 Contemporary Understanding of Virtue Ethics 
 
The Plurality of Virtue Ethics 
Before we explore the contemporary understanding of virtue theory and the yield 
of virtue, we need to, as Justin Oakley rightly points out, be mindful of the fact that the 
revival of virtue ethics has produced a bewildering variety of claims made in the name of 
virtue ethics by philosophers.
1007
 A pure virtue ethic, for example, would claim that ―at 
least some judgments about virtue can be validated independently of any appeal to 
judgments about the rightness of actions…[and] it is this antecedent goodness of traits 
which ultimately makes any right act right.‖1008 In other words, the moral goodness of 
character traits does not depend on the rightness of actions but rather is the origin of 
it.
1009
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In the case of Christian virtue ethics, Porter similarly reminds us that we cannot 
simply assume that Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition is the only options for developing a 
Christian virtue ethics: 
Christian virtue ethics comprises many different approaches. Similarly, 
theologians today are turning to virtue ethics out of a variety of different 
concerns. For this reason, it would be a mistake to assume that there is one 
definitive form of virtue ethics, or even that all virtue ethicists would 
agree about the meaning and implications of the concept of virtue.
1010
 
 
Nevertheless, there are certain essential features shared by many proponents of 
virtue ethics. They differ from one another depending on which of these features they 
emphasize.
1011
 Oakley, for instance, identifies six central features common to all forms of 
virtue theories:
1012
 These features include the primacy of character, the priority of 
goodness over rightness, plurality of virtues, and the obligation to strive for excellence of 
the good relative to the norms which govern it. With these common features in mind I 
now acquire a contemporary understanding of virtue ethics. 
 
Contemporary Understanding  
In general, the ethics of virtue that is based on Aristotelian and Thomistic 
understanding of virtue is ―an ethic premised on the notion of a true human nature with a 
determinate human good or end or telos.‖1013 This telos or good is originally defined as 
―performing well whatever function or purpose or role is characteristic of X.‖1014 Its 
evaluation thus lies on the function, purpose, or role played by X. When applied to 
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human person it implies that who we are and what we do can be evaluated against ―our 
true nature or telos, against the excellent performance of the functions and purposes 
characteristics of human.‖1015  Aristotle, for example, proposed that the ultimate human 
end is eudaimonia (happiness) in this life.
1016
  
However, Kotva adds that in the case of human telos one needs also to know the 
sort of capacities, traits, and interests the person has that allows one to pursue the 
good.
1017
 He also points out that the human telos is not a narrowly defined or restrictive 
one but rather a comprehensive and inclusive one. While specific telos are needed for the 
provision of guidance for acquiring virtues, Kotva claims, it does not mean that one is 
guided by certain narrow visions of the human good only.
1018
 
An ethical theory as such is concerned with not just who we are but also who we 
could become, and is thus a teleological ethics with a particular structure.
1019
 Keenan 
refines MacIntyre‘s tri-polar structure of virtue ethics into three fundamental 
questions:
1020
 First is the question of who one is—‗Who am I?‘ In the language of virtue 
ethics, this question is equivalent to asking oneself how virtuous one is. The answer to 
this question lies in the standards of measurement as well as the fairness of such 
measurement. The former refers to the naming of the basic virtues (as Aristotle and 
Aquinas did) while the latter implies critical self-knowledge of one‘s spontaneous actions. 
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The second question asks who one ought to become—‗Who ought I become?‘ It 
points us to one‘s vision and hence invites us to set our personal goals and articulate our 
telos by means of speculative reason. The key insight here is that one has to pursue them 
and seek improvement.  
The third and last question asks what actions will move one from present self to 
future self—‗What ought I to do?‘ In other words, it focuses on both the contrast/tension 
between ‗who we are‘ and ‗who we could be‘ and how we move from the former state to 
the latter.
1021
 It points to those transformative virtuous acts, i.e., practices, whose 
effectiveness depends on the virtue of prudence through which one not just articulates 
one‘s realistic ends but also sets to attain them. Prudence, being a practical and realistic 
virtue, guides one to seek the mean to accomplish that end.  
Furthermore, based on the important presupposition that ―one becomes the agent 
of the actions one performs‖—that is, the kind of person one will become tomorrow is 
shaped by one‘s act today—Keenan argues that virtue ethics is historically dependent and 
has a dynamic structure.
1022
 He also insists that the real world one lives is a necessity for 
this tri-polar structure because ―without it virtue ethics leads to narcissism: The ethical 
choice is to make one‘s future no more than a reflection of oneself.‖1023  
 On the other hand, although different ethicists propose different understandings 
of the qualities of the human telos, it is noted that all agree that it is largely constituted by 
the exercise and practice of various virtues.
1024
 However, virtues are not simply means or 
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instruments to but also constituted elements and essential components of the human 
good.
1025
 This twofold view of virtue can be understood as follows. A virtue is ―an 
acquired human quality the possession of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods 
which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from 
achieving any such goods.‖1026  It is thus an instrument and means to the human good.1027 
Yet, it is also a constitutive element of the human telos because the values one seeks 
would characterize the way that one pursues them.
1028
 Virtues, then, are human goods in 
themselves. We act hospitably, for instance, because it leads to the human good and is 
virtuous itself.  
Moreover, virtues are acquired dispositions that include both ―tendencies to react 
in characteristic ways in similar and related settings…[and] all those states of character or 
character traits that influence how we act and choose.‖1029 This understanding is drawn 
upon Aristotle‘s eudaimonistic view:1030 Virtues are character traits that are needed to 
live humanly flourishing lives. Certain virtues such as benevolence and justice feature 
among those intrinsic goods without which one cannot have a flourishing life. And the 
agent needs not only to act in a certain way but also to act out of certain dispositions and 
motives so as to attain right action (though not sufficiently
1031
). Subsequently, virtues are 
states of character that have long ranging impact in us. Virtue ethics, apart from giving 
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primacy to character, actually attends to the development of character and practices of the 
person and the community. 
As seen in its tri-polar structure, virtue ethics is concerned with ‗who we ought to 
become‘. However, it is important to remember that, virtue ethics, like any ethics 
recommends action, but first recommends the kind of persons we should become and 
then informs the choices and actions. Aristotle elsewhere taught, virtue makes persons 
good and causes them to act well.
1032
 In this sense virtue ethics gives priority of being 
over doing. Still, we become a more virtuous person only by performing intended 
virtuous actions.  In other words, one‘s being is formed in and through ‗doing‘. Thus, 
Kotva comments that ―‗being‘ precedes ‗doing‘, but ‗doing‘ shapes ‗being‘.‖1033 
Kotva offers a good summary of the nature of the virtues.
1034
 First, they need to 
be understood in relation to the human telos—they enable and contribute to the 
realization of the human good. Second, as a group the virtues include tendencies to react 
in certain characteristic ways, dispositions that seek certain ends, and capacities. Third, 
they imply stability and continuity with regards to one‘s actions. Fourth, their 
corresponding actions are done because of their own values. 
With regards to virtue theory‘s moral reasoning, Keenan is convinced that the 
kind of taxonomical, practical reasoning found in casuistry—which finds comparative 
cases and derives guides through taxonomies—can be well translated into an ethics of 
virtue to provide a new way of understanding how virtues gives specific guidance.
1035
 He 
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points out that while it is true that virtues bear different meanings in different 
societies/cultures, a taxonomical moral reasoning helps overcome the risk of cultural 
relativism:
1036
 It locates the common concepts of virtues by demonstrating the trans-
cultural similarities between what distinguishes one virtue from another. For instance, 
although hospitality in a Confucian society like Japan differs from hospitality in the 
United States of America, each culture distinguishes hospitality from any other virtue and 
hence the particular anthropological function of hospitality in the respective 
culture/society can be found. 
Finally, virtue ethics‘s priority of ‗being‘ over ‗doing‘ involves a kind of 
perfectionism in the sense of ―viewing all aspects of life as morally relevant and in 
calling everyone to growth in every area of life.‖1037 Some thus claim that virtue ethics is 
a pro-active ethical system and encompasses one‘s entire life for each knowingly 
performed moral action affects the kind of moral person one becomes.
1038
 Therefore, it 
engages the commonplace and concerns what is ordinary rather than those moral 
dilemmas. Keenan further points out that since virtues are teleological by nature, they are 
heuristic as well—they collectively aim for the right realization of human identity.1039 
 Indeed, these characters of virtue make virtue theory attractive in being a 
hermeneutical tool. Still, we note that the yield of virtues can further be reference points 
to the task of hermeneutics. Moreover, it helps reject the earlier charge of being 
conceptual reductionism. It is because virtue ethics moves out from virtue to other 
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reference points of ethics. For instance, virtue as ‗practices‘ points to concrete actions 
and thus is quite capable of dealing with human action despite the claims of opponents. I 
now explore these yields in the pages that follow. 
 
5.5 The Yield of Virtue 
 
Four important yields of virtues can be identified based on our contemporary 
understanding of virtue theory and characters of virtues. They are ‗practices‘, ‗character‘, 
‗exemplar‘, and ‗community‘.  
The use of the term ‗yield‘ refers then to the various goods that virtue produces so 
as to understand better the moral life. For instance, from among the four yields communal 
identity and exemplar are goods that prompt us to ask, do the virtues help us to appreciate 
better the fullness of the moral life? Do the virtues help us to look beyond the self to the 
community and to the saints and heroes? I say yes precisely because virtue ethics gives us 
these important yields—communal identity, exemplar, practices, and character formation. 
These four yields are the goods we receive by appropriating the hermeneutics of virtue 
ethics.  
 
Practices and Habits 
As said earlier, virtue ethics is interested in what is ordinary rather than only in 
those moral dilemmas or grave actions, and is concerned about what one ought to do in 
moving from ‗who I am‘ to ‗what I ought to become‘. These concerns and the 
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complexities of ordinary human life can best be handled by developing practices. The 
concept of ‗practice‘ can be understood in light of MacIntyre‘s definition: 
By a ‗practice‘ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended.
1040
 
 
In other words, a practice is ―[a] regular activity that shapes us in such a way that we 
develop dispositions to act in particular ways.‖1041 Thus, MacIntyre claims that virtue 
belongs to the concept of practice.
1042
 
In ordinary life we are continuously adopting practices that later form habits 
which ―in turn become deeply ingrained in and constitute particular dimensions of our 
lives...and make us who we are.‖1043 As Bonnie Kent notes, the term ‗habit‘ and its Greek 
origin hexis (and Latin habitus), as quoted earlier, refer to ―a durable characteristic of the 
agent inclining to certain kinds of actions and reactions themselves…[that] over 
time...grow to be ‗second nature‘ for the individual.‖1044 Aquinas adopts this basic view 
and perceives habits as qualities or principles of action that employ the will and are in 
relation to the definition of virtue.
1045
 In this sense, Aquinas seems to understand virtue as 
a habit (I.II. 55.4). Based on MacIntyre‘s definition of practice, Spohn, however, argues 
that by treating virtues as practices rather than habit, one is able to ―appreciate the social 
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formation of the virtues and enable [one] to consider the regulative internal norms [such 
as motive, roles and other virtues] of the virtues.‖1046 
In any case, we acquire virtues by habitually acting virtuously. For example, if we 
want to become hospitable as a person and as a community, we have to act hospitably.  
At some point we so condition ourselves to this way of acting that we become hospitable.  
Once we acquire hospitality then, like a second nature, we act hospitably easily and 
almost naturally whenever we meet someone new.  With the virtue of hospitality, we will 
more likely react positively to the stranger than one who has not practiced hospitality. 
This interpretation, in one way or another, helps us understand Verhey‘s emphasis 
on the notion of practice as a core element of Christian ethical framework, and that 
remembering Jesus requires participation in the practices of the church community. 
Indeed, practices both develop the characters of the moral agent and in turn express 
them.
1047
 This function of practices points to a second yield of virtue—the formation of 
character. 
 
Disposition and Character 
Because of its primacy being given to character, virtue ethics at times is refined 
by some of its proponents as an ‗ethics of character‘. They claim that character ethics 
―does not altogether neglect rules, but subordinates them to the development of moral 
character and view them instrumentally with reference to the end.‖1048 Rather, it simply 
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refers to ―a way of thinking about and interpreting the moral life in terms of a particular 
vision of and a passion for life that is rooted in the nurture, formation, and socialization 
of a particular self-conscious community.‖1049  
Among them is Stanley Hauerwas whom I have already mentioned. He 
rediscovers virtues through his ethics of character. For him character is inseparable from 
one‘s self-determination and is the decisive factor behind our doing and becoming.1050 A 
virtuous person, therefore, is formed by ―repeated acts of deliberative decisions.‖1051 
He further claims that ―character is not just the sum of all that we do as agents, 
but rather it is the particular direction our agency acquires by choosing to act in some 
ways rather than others.‖1052 It is thus noted that for Hauerwas character is fundamental 
and to which virtue is subordinate.
1053
 Interestingly, this emphasis on character can be 
found in Burridge‘s own thinking: He points out that the depiction of character is often 
implied within a biographical narrative. In the case of the Bible, the gospels as 
biographical narrative aim to characterize Jesus by looking at his authority, integrity, and 
service of others.
1054
 
Nevertheless, for many virtue ethicists character formation is a yield of virtue. 
David Norton explains that in the case of classical virtue theory, the question of the good 
life leads directly to the development of moral character, because ―any adequate 
description of a good human life will necessarily include attributes that are not manifest 
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in persons in the beginning of their lives, but are developmental outcomes.‖1055 He notes 
that virtues are ―excellences of character that are objective goods, of worth to others [and 
the self],‖ and their manifestation is the actualization of qualities that are originally 
potentialities within a person.
1056
 In addition, since the ethics of virtue is concerned about 
‗who we could become‘ and the transition from ‗who we are‘ to ‗who we could become‘ 
(that is, the movement toward the human telos), it thus calls for continual growth in our 
character.  
Kotva further points out that the acquisition and development of virtue demands 
our understanding of the self as a self-forming and determining agent as well as a means 
of shaping character:
1057
 Our choices and actions help form our tendencies and 
dispositions (which, in turn help inform and direct our subsequent choices and actions) 
and hence one plays a role in the formation of one‘s character. For example, the practice 
of hospitality makes us hospitable persons which in turn direct us to act hospitably. 
Norton adds that what is central to the development of moral character is the achievement 
of integrity—by which all the dimensions of a person, such as faculties, desires, 
dispositions, and roles contribute to the chosen end.
1058
 Spohn thus comments that virtue 
ethics is all about moral formation.
1059
  
On the other hand, since a person‘s character is ―the integration of [one‘s] life into 
a relatively coherent unity‖ and the identity of a person is formed when this integrated 
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self is conscious, virtue ethics thus, as Spohn claims, inevitably considers identity.
1060
 In 
line with Spohn‘s view Keenan further notes that there is interplay between virtues and 
anthropological vision of human identity: Virtues provide practical guides to the right 
realization of identity while the anthropological vision of human identity guides us in our 
pursuit of the virtues.
1061
 
 
Exemplar 
While attending to character, virtue theory also appreciates the role exemplary 
figures play in the development of virtue and formation of character. This appreciation is 
built upon the fundamental presupposition that virtue is teachable. Historically, as 
Meilaender notes, the Athenians did not seek technical expertise when pursuing their 
goals.
1062
 Socrates himself originally also claimed that virtue cannot be knowledge and 
thus cannot be taught: ―There are no teachers of it—that is to say, none who can prove 
successful in transmitting moral excellence.‖1063 However, it is noted that Socrates later 
on changed his mind and argued that virtue is knowledge and therefore must be teachable. 
For Plato such knowledge refers to the knowledge of the good itself—Meilaender 
simply calls it the knowledge-that-is-virtue. As a result, Plato makes it clear that virtue 
could not be ‗transmitted‘ by precept or example; rather it is only through ―the telling of 
stories which transmit images and examples of moral virtue and in doing so begin to 
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shape character by awakening a love for what is good.‖1064 In other words, story-telling 
provides an ‗inborn affinity‘ for the knowledge of the good (but not the knowledge itself). 
The only exception is the rare case of ‗divine dispensation‘. This view explains the aim of 
his Republic: Outlining the education needed for cultivating true virtue. What is equally 
noteworthy of Plato‘s educational scheme, however, is that the teaching of virtue can also 
be achieved by ―the study not of ethics but of other disciplines in which a reasonable 
certitude seems possible and in which disinterestedness is necessary.‖1065 Meilaender 
understands this training in other disciplines as attention to the claims of goodness with 
one‘s whole being. 
Nevertheless, fourth century Eastern Church Father Athanasius claimed that ―the 
practice of imitating the exemplars of the faith is fundamental to the acquisition of 
Christian virtue…[and] transformation by way of the imitation of the mentor‘s life of 
virtue may result in communion, in a sharing of vision.‖1066 In his discussion of the genre 
of ancient biography, Burridge likewise points out that although ethical instruction may 
not be the primary concern of ancient biography, the idea of imitation in which one 
imitates, follows and practices the good example‘s virtues, is common to much such 
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literature.
1067
 In the context of New Testament ethics, he thus concludes that we are 
called to follow and imitate Jesus.
1068
 
In fact, the idea of imitation and the need and role of a mentor are closely related. 
Climacus pointed out in The Ladder of Divine Ascent that a guide or a mentor who has 
struggled on the ladder of virtue and hence has the vision and critical discernment is 
needed even though virtue is within human reach.
1069
 These mentors and guides are 
needed in two ways. First, they teach us by their own examples. Second, the virtues as 
skills need examples to show what they mean practically.
1070
 Spohn explains,  
[Virtues] have to be displayed concretely to convey their tactical meaning. 
In order to grasp, [for example,] how courage and integrity operate, we 
need accounts of persons who have shown these virtues in the tangle of 
circumstances. We are more likely to learn these lessons from literature 
than philosophy.
1071
 
 
In the Old Testament, Judith, for example, has been viewed as a model for liberation and 
the virtue of courage; or the plot of Ruth and Naomi illustrates the values of loyalty and 
love of family.
1072
  
In our contemporary society, who are these exemplary, virtuous models? Andrew 
Flescher discusses two types of people found within the community that are exemplar in 
virtues.
1073
 The first type is heroes such as rescuers. According to Flescher, heroes are 
―not mere moral paragons but exemplars, demonstrations of human beings living the best 
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kind of moral life.‖1074 Though they distinguish themselves by excelling, heroes represent 
and are (already) how we should become; and the life to which they have inhabited is ―in 
principle accessible to anyone who becomes sufficiently virtuous.‖1075 And though they 
are ordinary persons, they are extraordinarily virtuous and we need to act as they do.
1076
 
Saints—the second type of exemplar, on the contrary, are extraordinary persons 
and thus differ from heroes in many ways, especially in that they ―transcend their 
‗exemplar‘ status and come to embody a higher law.‖1077 Typical saints are distinctive 
moral agents who are extraordinarily virtuous, have no limits regarding what is morally 
required of them, see altruistic actions as part of their vocation, perform these altruistic 
actions without counting the cost or discarding their own self-fulfillment, visionary, and 
embody ―an ideal of character that is not fully realizable by ordinary agents in the course 
of a life.‖1078 
The difference between heroes and saints further highlights the two different 
senses of ‗exemplar‘. According to John Stratton Hawley, the example of heroes 
―instantiates and thus clarifies general principles of morality and qualities of character 
that can be articulated as meaningful and understood as possible for all participants in a 
society or community.‖1079 The morality of saints is, in contrast, above ordinary morality 
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and hence it is exemplary in the sense that it ―motivates us from afar, as a future ideal 
that impinges on us in the present.‖1080 
Susan Wolf, from a different perspective, defines a moral saint as someone whose 
every action is as morally good and worthy as possible, and one who commits to 
improving the welfare of others or the whole society.
1081
 She then differentiates two kinds 
of moral saints based on one‘s commitment even though their difference is not obvious in 
public: Being a saint ‗out of love for others‘ or ‗out of duty‘.1082 For Wolf the ‗loving 
saint‘ is not capable of loving certain things (other than the welfare of others) and hence 
lacks individuality, while the ‗rational saint‘ is suspicious of having a pathological fear of 
damnation.
1083
 Although both models of moral saints are unattractive, she points out that 
they may not be unsuitable ideals.
1084
 All moral saints ―will have the standard moral 
virtues to a non-standard degree‖1085 and will acquire all the moral virtues to an extreme 
degree. Still, she argues that ―the ideal of moral sainthood should not be held as a 
standard against which any other ideal must be judged or justified…[and there is] reason 
not to aspire this ideal.‖1086 She claims, ―A person may be perfectly wonderful without 
being perfectly moral.‖1087 
Robert Adams, on the contrary, defends the concrete existence of sainthood—
such as Gandhi and Mother Teresa—although they are not quite the same as moral 
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sainthood in Wolf‘s sense.1088 He notes that the problem comes from Wolf‘s threefold 
conception of moral sainthood—one who does only morally good acts, whose perfection 
is dependent of the maximization of one‘s every single action, and one who exclusively 
focuses on others‘ good.1089 For him saintliness is not perfectionism and sainthood is ―an 
essentially religious phenomenon‖ in which moral concerns are only one form of human 
excellence interested by the deity.
1090
 The religious character allows the saint to be self-
giving without neglecting one‘s own condition.1091  
On the other hand, though not all should aspire to be a particular saint, Adams 
claims that one should aspire to sainthood in general. It is because particular saints 
exemplify ―only certain types of sainthood, and that other types may be compatible with 
quite different human excellences.‖1092 In other words, Adams‘s understanding points to 
a broader sense of sainthood; and not unlike Flescher, Adams would perceive Martin 
Luther King and Dorothy Day as saints of our contemporary time.
1093
 
By looking at those great saints and heroes, however, Keenan notes that ―no 
single portrait of a moral saint or hero has ever provided a definitive expression of what a 
human person ought to be.‖1094 Rather, one becomes a morally excellent person by being 
themselves; hence, a saint has always been an original and never an imitation.
1095
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Nevertheless, Spohn rightly concludes that ―we learn how to be virtuous by the 
example of others in the community when their witness inspires us to be virtuous.‖1096 
We need such models in our society, who give us not just concrete guidance in the 
process of formation but at times ―challenge us toward the telos, and toward fuller 
embodiment of the virtues.‖1097 In other words, it challenges us toward appreciating a 
neglected virtue or a forgotten way of being. 
 
Community and Communal Identity  
As mentioned earlier, virtue ethics has often been criticized as self-centered and 
virtues are simply subjective dispositions. However, many proponents of virtue ethics 
argue that there are important arguments for a communal aspect within virtue theory. 
One group of arguments focuses on the roles of community in relation to virtues. 
First, as John Woodhill points out, other than mentors and guides, narratives and 
community facilitate the practice of virtue.
1098
 Second, community plays an important 
role in the understanding of the virtues: It is the local community that determines our 
understanding of the virtues.
1099
 In other words, the same virtue can be expressed 
differently in different places. As cited before, for example, hospitality in a Confucian 
society differs from hospitality in the United States of America. Third, Hauerwas, who 
builds upon MacIntyre‘s emphasis on the need of a tradition, claims that the community, 
being a historical place that has a tradition, is the proper place that provides the context 
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for the tri-polar structure of virtue ethics: It is in the community that the people can 
understand themselves and hear the telos revealed to the community, and articulate the 
virtues they need to develop.
1100
 
Fourth, as said earlier, virtue ethics considers identity and there is interplay 
between virtues and anthropological vision of human identity. However, this identity is 
not just personal but also communal. It is because our human identity needs a story, a 
temporal framework that ―synthesizes our diverse moments of experience into a coherent 
whole.‖1101 Personal identity ―comes through a process of identification with [this] larger 
narrative framework—a story—and with a community that tries to live out this story.‖1102 
In other words, our personal identity is shaped by certain narratives of community that 
define, set limits and configure personal identity through the ideals they present to us.
1103
 
Thus, the individual finds her/his moral identity in and through her/his membership in a 
community.
1104
 Keenan warns us, however, that the community must be vigilant against 
becoming ‗closed‘, for that will only lead to sectarianism.1105 
The other group of arguments, on the other hand, lies on the nature of virtue itself. 
According to MacIntyre, virtue is a social quality and ―always requires for its application 
the acceptance…of certain features of social and moral life.‖1106 As a quality virtue is 
needed not only for the good that is internal to practices or for the good of a whole life 
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but also for ―the pursuit of a good for human beings the conception of which is elaborated 
and possessed within an ongoing social tradition.‖1107  
Subsequently, some virtue ethicists would understand the human telos as 
flourishment of a social rather than solely individualistic nature.
1108
 This understanding 
somehow highlights that the nature of a human good is also corporate.
1109
 There are two 
major claims here. First, human good is not conceived singularly in individual terms:
1110
 
Moral education and improvement need the presence of others such as mentors and role 
models; we depend on each other for moral development; and the community provides 
important resource for moral growth of each of us. Second, the human telos and the 
journey toward this end are found in shared activities and relationships.
1111
 For Aristotle 
the good of a man is one and the same good as that of those others with whom one is 
bound in human community.
1112
 Therefore, a community is ―a common project that 
brings about some good recognized as their shared good by all those engaging the 
project.‖1113 In other words, the central bond of a community is ―the shared vision of and 
understanding of goods.‖1114  
Moreover, the significance of certain virtues depends on social connections within 
a community:
1115
 These social connections provide the ‗form and mode‘ in which the 
human good is realized; that means, they give ‗point and purpose‘ to these virtues. 
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Aristotle, thus, insists that virtues also find their place in the life of the polis (the city).
1116
 
And the virtue of friendship, for example, ―arises within a relationship defined in terms of 
a common allegiance to and a common pursuit of goods.‖1117 Thomas Aquinas‘s 
understanding of the virtue of justice is similarly social: General justice has the common 
good of the community as its object.
1118
 Similarly, Pohl comments that the context of 
hospitality must be the community.
1119
 Keenan likewise points out that the theological 
virtues and his own proposal of cardinal virtues (namely, justice, fidelity, and self-care) 
have enormous social ramifications—they perfect us in the different forms of social 
relationships that distinguish us.
1120
  
Here we note that the relationship between virtue and community is not one-sided. 
Within the context of Christian community, for example, Hauerwas rightly points out that 
certain virtues are necessary should the faith community to sustain its existence.
1121
 In 
particular, he highlights the virtues of patience, courage, hope and charity. He explains, 
For without patience the church may be tempted to apocalyptic fantasy; 
without courage the church would fail to hold fast to the traditions from 
which it draws its life; without hope the church risks losing sight of its 
tasks; and without charity the church would not manifest the kind of life 
made possible by God. Each of these virtues, and there are others equally 
important, draws its meaning and form from the biblical narrative, is 
necessary if we are to continue to remember and to live faithful to that 
narrative.
1122
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Keenan further recalls that since the time of Plato and Aristotle virtues ―exist not 
primarily for private purpose, but to form and improve our communities.‖1123 Insofar as 
our identity is not just personal but also communal and this communal aspect is a yield of 
virtues, our moral and character formation is equally communal. Thus, Kotva comments 
that we ―seek not only to become virtuous individuals, but also to become a certain kind 
of community.‖1124  
By way of conclusion, Verhey‘s advocacy of practices within the faith community 
illuminates us regarding the relationship of the community with Christian ethical life in 
general and virtue ethics in particular: 
People facing choices and longing for wisdom and virtue are more likely 
to find help in such a community than in a book on Christian ethics. 
Precisely as a practical discipline Christian ethics depends upon such a 
community, relies upon its ‗goodness‘ and ‗knowledge,‘ and points to it to 
help people think and talk about their choices. The task of Christian ethics 
is to serve such communities and their moral discourse and discernment, 
not to attempt to be a substitute for them.
1125
 
 
 
5.6 Virtue and Grace 
 
As pointed out earlier, moral goodness conveys the agent as striving to realize 
right living; still, the degree of striving in one‘s life depends not on oneself but the gifts 
one receives.
1126
 From a Christian point of view, it points to the gifts God gives each of 
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us. Within the Catholic tradition, the impact of the gifts of the Holy Spirit has been 
highlighted even if the Spirit was not directly mentioned.
1127
 
Ronald Mercier thus argues that while theological ethicists rightly retrieved the 
Christological dimension of ethics in response to the emergence of modernity, a 
pneumatological dimension of ethics (that particularly deals with moral personhood) is 
needed in the current post-modern era.
1128
 He joins other theologians like Servais 
Pinckaers to claim that the Holy Spirit ―remains always our fundamental resource for 
moral life.‖1129 He also points out that although the focus upon the third person of the 
Trinity has developed slowly, the commonly employed language of grace is simply a 
short-hand for speaking of the Spirit.
1130
 
In fact, Christian virtue ethicists would remind us that moral formation and 
transformation of character is effected by grace. We rely on God‘s grace so as to make 
our effort and moral growth possible.
1131
 Therefore, I turn to the notion of grace and other 
related ideas to see how they are relevant to virtues. 
When proposing a Christian case for virtue ethics, Kotva begins his enterprise by 
exploring certain potential theological links between virtue theory and Christian 
convictions. First and foremost he turns to the notion of sanctification as Hauerwas 
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did.
1132
 He points out that many scholars would agree that sanctification is a teleological 
concept and a process that has ‗conformity with Christ‘ as its goal, and requires 
transformation of one‘s character and the development of certain virtues.1133 
Subsequently, the notion of virtue is a concept tied to grace, for the whole process 
of sanctification, from its beginning to continuation, depends on, and is empowered by 
God‘s grace (and yet does not negate one‘s participation and responsibility for 
growth).
1134
 When grace ―conspires with human development, so the believer becomes 
disposed, has a readiness, to see situations as calling for virtuous ways of acting.‖1135 
Burridge further points out that it is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit that 
produces the fruit of ‗conformity with Christ‘ in our lives.1136  In other words, virtue as 
grace is a fruit of the Holy Spirit. 
Last but not least, Mattison argues that the notion of grace helps us understand the 
meaning, role, and importance of ‗infused cardinal virtues‘ introduced by Thomas 
Aquinas:
1137
 Infused cardinal virtues have the goal of ‗supernatural destiny‘. Therefore, 
one needs God‘s assistance—grace—for achieving the overall goal (I.II. 63.3&4). And it 
is the presence of grace as source that distinguishes infused cardinal virtue from its 
counterpart, acquired cardinal virtue.   
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In fact, in his Summa Theologiae Thomas Aquinas has already offered a 
systematic view of how the Holy Spirit, virtues, and grace are related. He begins with a 
discussion of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (e.g., understanding, fear, counsel, and 
piety) in light of habit and in relation to virtue (I.II. 68-70). Certain characteristics of the 
gifts of the Holy Spirit are identified.  
First, as ‗gifts‘ it means that they are ‗unreturnable giving‘ and are infused by 
God (I.II. 68.1 ad3). Second, they are ―perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as 
to be amenable to the promptings of God‖ (I.II. 68.2). Therefore, they are related to 
virtues and are virtues in this particular sense. Third, they are not simply perfections but 
―habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost‖ 
(I.II. 68.3, II.II. 121.1). And they dispose not certain powers (such as appetitive power) 
but all the powers of the soul to the Divine (I.II. 68.8). Fourth, therefore, they are more 
perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues (that perfect reason itself, or other powers 
in relation to reason) and yet regulated and preceded by theological virtues (I.II. 68.8). In 
other words, they seem to link natural virtues with theological virtues and elevate them. 
Later in Secunda Secundae, when discussing each of the (theological and cardinal) 
virtues, Aquinas further points out that each has its own corresponding gifts. For instance, 
the virtue of faith contains the corresponding gifts of knowledge and understanding (II.II. 
8, 9). 
What is equally noteworthy is that Aquinas brings the Beatitudes into his 
discussion and points out that the beatitudes are perfect and excellent deeds and are 
assigned to the gifts rather than to the virtues (I.II. 70.2). Still, they differ from gifts (and 
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virtues) as act from habit (I.II. 69.1). The twelve fruits of the Holy Spirit (such as joy, 
peace, patience, and endurance), on the contrary, are virtuous acts in which one delights 
(I.II. 70.1, 2). Although they are acts as the beatitudes are, they are inferior to the 
beatitudes which are perfect acts.   
Aquinas then examines the notion of grace (I.II. 109-114) and points out that 
grace is a gift bestowed on humankind by God to not just heal our corrupted nature but 
also perfect our nature so that we can carry out those meritorious works of supernatural 
virtue and to participate in the Divine good (I.II. 109.4, 110.1). Therefore, grace is 
supernatural, infused by God, and has a teleological dimension. Moreover, grace is 
gratuitous and produces certain effects: It elevates, justifies, sanctifies, and allows us to 
be moved by God to act virtuously. It is therefore prior to virtues (I.II. 110.4). However, 
grace differs from infused virtues in that the former is the participation of the Divine 
nature while the latter are derived from and are ordained to this light of grace (I.II. 110.3). 
In the very last part of Secunda Secundae (II.II. 171-178) Aquinas further 
discusses grace as particular gifts (like the gift of tongues) of the Holy Spirit as pertain to 
certain people: Graces are given to certain people for the sake of the community and 
manifested within the communal context. For instance, the grace of prophecy is profitable 
to the faith community as through which the Church is edified and the unbelievers are 
convinced (II.II. 176.2). 
In sum, we note that for Aquinas, virtue and grace are closely related and both are 
gifts of the Holy Spirit. Still, we are also reminded that our dependence on God‘s grace 
and the priority of God‘s grace in our transformation does not mean a passive dependence; 
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rather, God‘s grace calls for our responsibility and active participation with God in the 
process of transformation.
1138
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
I have proposed the use of virtue ethics as a hermeneutical tool. In so doing, I 
have presented the case by exploring four related areas in this fifth chapter. 
First, the historical development of virtue theory highlights that virtue ethics has 
been one of the oldest approaches: Since the time of ancient Greece, the notion of virtue 
has already been suggested and employed in the society. Philosophers like Plato and 
Aristotle tried to seek a more adequate conception of virtue and to formulate an ethics of 
virtue, especially by developing the doctrine of the mean. Later during the patristic period, 
both Western and Eastern Church Fathers like Augustine and Athanasius offered their 
understandings of virtues and highlighted God as the ultimate telos for humanity. Thomas 
Aquinas then combined the insights of Aristotle and Augustine to formulate his own view 
of virtue. In particular, he presented to us a systematic classification of virtues from 
which theological, cardinal, infused, and acquired virtues are defined. Unfortunately, for 
various reasons—including the pursuit of objective truth and theological reasons—virtue 
theories were slowly replaced by principle and rule-oriented ethics in the centuries to 
come. It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that the retrieval of virtue 
ethics began to emerge from both the philosophical, theological, and public sectors. 
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Second, the revival of virtue ethics recalls the advantages of virtue ethics over 
other ethical theories that have dominated the field in the past few centuries. Although 
virtue ethics may not be an alternative to those dissatisfactory moral theories, it has the 
advantages of being comprehensive, focusing on the telos, providing a vision for moral 
life, and considering what is more stable and consistent. Within the discipline of 
philosophy, we note that MacIntyre‘s work has been most influential in the retrieval of 
virtue ethics. He has constructed a three-stage framework for the concept of virtue—
practice, narrative unity, and tradition—and a tri-polar structure of the theory of virtue 
that leads to the foundational questions of ‗Who am I?‘ ‗What ought I become?‘ and 
‗What ought I to do?‘  
Theologians, likewise, engage themselves in the discussion of virtue theory and 
various schools of virtue theory emerged based on different traditions and emphases. 
Among the Protestant ethicists, Hauerwas is known for focusing on the notion of 
character and the role of community in moral formation. The Catholic counterparts are 
represented by Spohn, Porter and Keenan. Keenan, in particular, is noted for engaging 
virtue ethics with other areas of morality such as bio-medical ethics, and proposing a 
contemporary list of cardinal virtues for ordinary life. And with Spohn he also tries to 
bridge moral theology and other theological disciplines through virtue ethics. 
However, reviewing the revival of virtue ethics also discloses this moral theory‘s 
limitations and criticisms—like being egoistic, perfectionism, impractical, and 
downplaying God‘s role—from its various opponents. Despite these drawbacks, 
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dialogues with opponents allow virtue ethicists to further reflect on what virtue ethics 
means in contemporary world. 
Third, by reflecting on the contemporary understanding of virtue ethics I am able 
to locate those key features of virtue and the theory itself. In the first place, virtue theory 
is a teleological ethics that seeks to achieve certain human goods/ends. Second, it has a 
specific structure that concerns one‘s self-understanding, goals, and how one moves from 
the former state to the latter. It is thus a dynamic and historically dependent framework. 
Third, subsequently, virtue, being an acquired human quality with particular dispositions, 
is not simply a means but a constitutive element and essential component of the human 
good. It includes those character traits that influence how we act and choose. Therefore, 
virtue ethics as such pays attention to character and gives priority of being over doing. 
Fourth, it encompasses one‘s entire life and engages what is ordinary. 
As a result, certain yields of virtue that can be helpful in the task of hermeneutics 
are extracted. First, the notion of virtue considers practices and habits which develop the 
characters of the moral agent and in turn express them. Second, it attends to the moral 
agent‘s character formation, which subsequently considers one‘s identity. Third, it 
recognizes the necessity and role of exemplary models in the community. Fourth, there is 
a communal aspect in our virtuous life. On the one hand, the community plays an 
important role in understanding and acquiring virtue; on the other hand, virtue has a 
social quality and is needed for the good and formation of the community. 
Fourth and finally, within the context of Christianity, we note that traditionally, 
the concept of virtue has had a place in theology: It is relevant to the language of grace by 
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which moral formation and transformation of character is effected. Like grace, virtue can 
be understood as a gift bestowed on humankind by God for our perfection. Both virtue 
and grace are teleological in nature and for the good of the community. This perception 
of virtue contributes to making a Christian case for virtue ethics. 
In short, even though it is not a necessary alternative to principle-based ethics and 
has its own limitations, the role of virtue ethics is at least one of complementarity and 
inclusiveness and not competition. It provides needed correctives to what had been an 
excessive act-oriented, principle-oriented, and a decontextualization of ethics via Kant-
type duty-oriented ethics. I do agree with Kotva that virtue ethics is a promising way of 
understanding and guiding the moral life.
1139
 And it is encouraging to note that some 
ethicists have proposed a Christian adoption of virtue theory.
1140
 One specific area of 
adoption that concerns Christian ethicists is the relationship between Scripture and virtue 
ethics. In the next chapter, therefore, I survey how two contemporary Christian virtue 
ethicists construct such adoption by reading the Scriptures through the lens of virtue. 
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Chapter Six: Reading Scripture through the Lens of Virtue 
 
In the previous chapter, I have presented an account of the hermeneutics of virtue 
ethics in its historical and philosophical dimensions. We note that our contemporary 
understanding of virtue ethics is grounded in its development throughout history 
promoted by both philosophers and theologians. This contemporary understanding of 
virtue theory has the following characteristics: It is a teleological ethics that is concerned 
about human good. It is interested in moral character and thus gives priority of being over 
doing. It also bears a kind of perfectionism that sees all aspects of life as morally relevant 
and urges one to moral growth. Subsequently, these characteristics pose three basic 
questions for the moral agent: ‗Who am I?‘ ‗Who ought I to become?‘ and ‗How do I get 
there?‘ Four important yields of virtue—practices and habits, character and dispositions, 
exemplar, and communal identity—that help bring virtue into connection with some of 
the other reference points of ethics are then identified. 
 The chapter ends with a discussion of the relationship between virtue and grace 
that had been brought up by theologians of the past. This discussion, though brief, 
highlights the need to translate the philosophical language to a theological one, should 
this moral philosophy be employed as a hermeneutical tool for interpreting Scripture. In 
other words, we need to seek certain theological links at the outset.  
 Therefore, prior to relating Scripture with virtue ethics and exploring how two 
Christian ethicists read Scripture through the lens of virtue, and instead of assuming that 
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a philosophical language fits naturally into a theological enterprise, I briefly outline how 
the philosophical and theological settings can be bridged. 
 Kotva suggests three fundamental points of references for bridging the moral 
philosophy of ethics and theology.
1141
 The first point of reference is the notion of 
Christian anthropology. It is noted that there are similarities between Christian 
anthropology and virtue theory‘s understanding of human agency and communal nature. 
Regarding human agency, both Christian accounts of human freedom and virtue ethics 
hold the view that ―we are neither totally determined nor totally free.‖1142 A virtue 
framework, as seen earlier, understands that ‗being‘ informs ‗doing‘ and ‗doing‘ shapes 
‗being‘. In other words, our choices and actions shape our character and play an 
important role in our character formation. Virtue theory therefore rejects both 
determinism and voluntarism. A Christian anthropological perspective, in a similar way, 
understands that human freedom is capable of choosing and intending the kind of person 
one becomes. Still, Christian anthropology would further understand that our freedom is 
limited as a result of our finiteness and ‗sin‘, and hence grace is needed for our liberation. 
On the other hand, Christian anthropology would affirm the importance of 
relationships and fellowships with (and service to) God and others. Our Christian journey 
and goal always involves shared activity and close relationships. This affirmation is in 
tune with virtue ethics‘s own interest and emphasis on community and communal identity. 
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With regards to the second point of reference, that is, the notion of sanctification, 
I have actually, though in a very brief manner, brought it up in the earlier discussion of 
the relationship between virtue and grace. Kotva basically points out that sanctification, 
like virtue itself, is a teleological process that involves ―[the] transformation of the self 
and one‘s character toward a partially determinate picture of the human good or end.‖1143 
In the theological enterprise, the Christian telos is one‘s conformity with Christ. Its 
beginning, continuation, and completion radically depend on God‘s grace. Therefore, the 
concept of virtue within a theological setting is tied to the notion of grace. In addition, the 
telos as an ideal and perfection is, in both settings, a goal beyond this world: Although we 
strive for a fuller realization of the human good, its completion is beyond this life. 
The third point of reference, Christology, basically considers the Christian idea of 
Christ as the telos. It highlights that Jesus is the paradigmatic human person who 
embodies the true human telos. It is because Jesus‘ humanity realizes our full human 
potential. Therefore, the historical Jesus offers us the content of our human telos and 
hence one is able to know something of one‘s true end by turning to the person of Jesus. 
Subsequently, it implies that Jesus is the norm of humanity and thus is relevant to our 
construction of ethics. Moreover, a virtue framework affirms Jesus as normative 
humanity and challenges those who reduce this norm to principles and rules. On the other 
hand, Jesus‘ call to discipleship finds similarities with the yield of virtue, especially the 
need and role of exemplary figures. 
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Finally, although there are certain areas of the virtue framework (such as the 
notions of grace and hope) need to be altered or reformulated were it to be properly 
Christian or theological, these points of reference help bridge the linguistic and 
epistemological gap between virtue theory and theology. It provides a foundation for a 
theological virtue ethics that inevitably involves Scripture. Grounded in this 
understanding I turn to the issue of relating Scripture with virtue ethics. 
6.1 Relating Scripture and Virtue Ethics 
 
The concept of virtue can be found in Scripture, especially in those Hebrew 
wisdom literatures such as Proverbs and the book of Sirach.
1144
 For example, many see 
the following biblical text as a teaching on the virtue of justice: ―If you pursue justice, 
you will attain it and wear it like a glorious robe. Birds roost with their own kind, so 
honesty comes home to those who practice it‖ (Sirach 27:8-9). Some further point out 
that the early church Father Athanasius had already announced that ―the entire Holy 
Scripture is a teacher of virtues.‖1145 Keenan thus claims that the moral agenda found in 
Scripture is written in terms of virtue.
1146
 
Some scholars like Old Testament scholar John Barton think otherwise. They are 
reluctant to claim that Scripture supports virtue ethics (or vice versa). For instance, John 
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Crossin notes that the term virtue is not prominent in the Old and New Testaments:
1147
 
Although the Old Testament is aware of human virtues, it does not have any specific term 
to express the general idea of virtue. Even in the New Testament, the term appears only a 
few times despite those instances occur in the lists of varied vices and virtues (e.g., 
Galatians 5:22-23). Barton, though focusing on the Old Testament, further argues that 
virtue theory is ―not what the Bible is primarily about.‖1148 In particular, he turns to the 
notion of ‗formation‘—a key yield of virtue—to ground his argument: He argues that the 
term is a post-biblical concept and that there are good reasons to dismiss the presence of 
explicit idea of moral character formation in Scripture.
1149
 He claims that the Old 
Testament‘s emphasis ―lies on the divine lawgiver rather than on human moral 
character.‖1150 The Old Testament‘s ethical approach is thus at best described as 
deontological or consequential. 
Most scholars who entertain the question of Scripture and ethics are, however, 
inclined to virtue. Calvinist biblical scholar Benjamin Farley insists that the entire Bible 
contains and commends virtues and character-building motifs.
1151
 He even attempts to 
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offer a comprehensive exploration of virtues, claiming that ―no one has identified the full 
range of biblical virtues that support such an interest [in virtue ethics].‖1152 In so doing, 
Farley first offers his understanding of virtue in Scripture: 
[It] involves a positive response to God, and to what God has set in 
motion…It is an activity of the whole being in conformity with its highest 
end, which is to glorify God…[It] include[s] all those positive responses, 
attitudes, and moral habits that flow from a life that is open to the 
redemptive presence of God.
1153
 
 
He is convinced that Scripture encourages believers to venture a biblical ethics of 
virtue. Based on this conviction he explores those virtues and character-building motifs 
that Scripture commends. In the Hebrew Bible, he notes that no definitive list of virtues is 
provided. Still, he identifies diverse, particular virtues among certain Hebrew figures of 
different historical periods:
1154
 For instance, Jacob‘s determination and resoluteness 
(Genesis 32:26-28), Gideon‘s virtue of sobriety (Judges 8:23), and Zechariah‘s 
recommitment (Zechariah 1:3). Regarding the wisdom literatures that are characterized 
with the provision of numerous virtues, Farley particularly highlights those virtues that 
flow from cherishing the wisdom of the Torah, especially ―industry, diligence, honesty, 
integrity, moral probity, faithfulness... civility, kindness, gentleness, honor, and above all 
loyalty to spouse and family.‖1155 
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In the case of the New Testament, he notes that the opposite is true—there are 
extensive lists of virtues and character-molding motifs in the texts:
1156
 The Beatitudes in 
the Gospel of Matthew, for instance, extols eight corresponding virtues that include 
meekness, mercy, and courage. The parables of the Synoptic gospels also point to a 
variety of virtues, like vigilance, accountability, and social consciousness (e.g., Mark 
13:32-37). John‘s gospel, on the other hand, highlights the virtues of constancy, 
perseverance, and endurance (e.g., 15:4-5). For Paul, all virtues are set within the context 
of salvation by grace through faith which frees us for a life indwelled by the Holy 
Spirit:
1157
Apart from the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, Paul also 
calls for various virtues based on different communal contexts, such as self-control for 
the Galatians (5:22), renewal and humility for the Romans (12:2-3), reconciliation for the 
Corinthians (5:18-20), and mutual subordination/love for the Ephesians (5:21-32). 
In sum, Farley has done us a favor by succinctly presenting to us an overview of 
the virtues found in the entire Scripture. However, Birch and Rasmussen point out that 
Scripture does not only reveal to us moral virtue, value, and vision, it actually promotes 
them. In particular, Scripture ―helps form and name virtues…and creates and renews 
moral vision.‖1158 This conclusion suggests that Scripture can be relevant to the yields of 
virtue. 
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Scripture and Moral Character 
How, then, is Scripture relevant to moral character and its formation in concrete 
terms? Crossin answers that both the Old and New Testaments‘ concrete list and 
discussion of virtues provides ―a touchstone and a point of reference for theological 
discussions of virtues and Christian character.‖1159 It is because, as Cahill explains, 
Scripture orients the believers (on both individual and communal levels) around certain 
values, principles, and virtues—such as repentance, forgiveness, and compassion—that 
reflect God‘s self-revelation in Christ.1160  
Moreover, Scripture is the witness of the early church (and of Israel) to their 
struggles to be God‘s faithful people (and community) and to their responses to God‘s 
revelation in concrete life experience. When individuals and the faith community reflect 
on these life experiences recorded in Scripture, their basic character is shaped.
1161
 In 
simple terms, Scripture shapes the reader‘s character as well as the character of the 
reader‘s community. For example, those biblical stories that narrate Jesus‘ associations 
with the outcasts and sinners shape the followers of Christ and their faith community into 
an inclusive, renewing community.
1162
  
Still, Scripture and its corresponding virtues do not only shape our character but 
also our character as distinctively Christian.
1163
 In fact, Scripture defines first the 
Christian virtues and thereby shapes one‘s character. The Judeo-Christian story provides 
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what is needed (such as metaphors and concepts) for the shaping of Judeo-Christian 
character. Some thus claim that ―the use of the Bible in character-formation will be more 
important than its function in explicitly ethical discourse.‖1164 
In fact, Scripture also acts as a shaper of Christian identity in that it is the ―prime 
source of the self-conscious identity of the community of faith, and…of those individuals 
who choose to identify themselves with the church and its faith tradition.‖1165 Thus, Birch 
and Rasmussen rightly point out that ―it is in relation to the Bible that moral agency 
becomes distinctively Christian.‖1166 
  
Scripture and Exemplar 
During the exploration of the yields of virtue, I cited three Old Testament figures, 
namely, Judith, Ruth, and Naomi, as examples of role models for the virtues of courage, 
loyalty, and love of family respectively. Indeed, Scripture contains many ‗characters‘ that 
play the role of modeling us to certain moral characters. Barton, though he hesitates to 
claim that Scripture has any explicit idea of virtue ethics, similarly acknowledges that 
biblical stories (and their characters) have exemplary moral value in presenting 
humankinds in all their singularity.
1167
 The story of David, for instance, presents to us not 
just a flawed life but also an examined life that ―manifests a concern for how one ought 
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to live even when this runs clearly counter to the character‘s own moral insight.‖1168 As a 
result, Scripture contributes to moral formation by telling the stories of those exemplary 
figures and of the community. 
Sometimes the role of the biblical figures as exemplar for virtues is rather 
straightforward. For instance, in James 5:11 the author explicitly calls us to imitate Job in 
his virtue of patience and endurance in hard times.
1169
 Other times it is not. German New 
Testament scholar Jens Herzer defends that ―the lack of explicit quotations does not 
necessarily mean that a certain Scripture passage or a religious idea is not relevant.‖1170 
In other words, the biblical figures can play the exemplary role in an implicit manner. 
One particular example is virtue of hospitality exemplified in the Bible. 
In the Hebrew Bible one can find detailed accounts of welcome (such as the 
welcoming of the three heavenly visitors by Abraham in Genesis 18 and of Elisha by a 
wealthy Shunammite woman in 2 Kings 4) and inhospitality (such as the stories of the 
men of Sodom in Genesis 19 and of Gibeah in Judges 19) from certain key figures.
1171
 In 
the New Testament, similarly we note that both the Good Samaritan in Luke 10:25-37 
and the person of Jesus are vivid models for practicing hospitality. However, I argue 
elsewhere that Old Testament figure Boaz—the husband of Ruth—in the book of Ruth is 
also an exemplary figure in cultivating the virtue of hospitality: Through his unusual and 
exemplary words and deeds of hospitality both the land and Ruth the Moabite are 
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redeemed.
1172
 I conclude that the writer of Ruth is not simply describing a fictional, 
hospitable character; in creating such a character during the restoration period the 
postexilic writer seems to have a deeper motivation: The person of Boaz is a model of the 
virtue of hospitality not just for individual Israelites but also for a reformed postexilic 
Israelite community whose telos is being a hospitable community. Moreover, hospitality 
is being raised as an explicitly Israelite virtue and as an important one in the midst of a 
few. 
 In short, Scripture is a rich source for providing exemplary models—either 
explicitly or implicitly—for the cultivation of virtues and our moral formation as 
individuals and a faith community. 
 
Scripture and Community 
Since character is ―a process of communal formation of individual identity,‖1173 
Scripture thus is not just relevant to individual character formation but also to another 
yield of virtue—community and communal identity. In fact, many would agree that 
―Scripture forms community as much as community informs the reading of 
Scripture.‖1174 
Old Testament scholar Patrick Miller, however, points out that the biblical texts 
―do not speak about a general understanding of community but of the formation of a 
particular community whose identity as a people is evoked by their inextricable 
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relationship to the Lord.‖1175 Cahill adds that these particular communities formed by 
Scripture are also diverse and historical over time.
1176
 
Still, Scripture does not simply form particular, historical, and diverse 
communities but, more importantly, moral communities, for moral character are 
―inherent, constitutive of its being a community.‖1177 Rasmussen thus comments that 
Scripture plays the role of generating and sustaining not just the community but its 
spiritual-moral formation as well.
1178
  
For example, as I have just pointed out, the writer of Ruth, in creating the 
character Boaz during the restoration period, aims at reforming and rebuilding the 
Israelite community into a hospitable community. Biblical scholars agree that the main 
characters of this postexilic period were ―dedicated to the task of reforming Israel…that 
she might become…nothing less than the covenant people of God.‖1179 As a result, the 
narratives found in the books of the postexilic period are not meant merely to describe 
but to change the society to which the returnees belong.
1180
 The gospels, as Hauerwas 
notes, likewise ―are not just the depiction of a man, but…are manuals for the training 
necessary to be part of the new community.‖1181  
In sum, Scripture as narrative does not only describe the character (of God) but 
also ―render[s] a community capable of ordering its existence [in a way] appropriate to 
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such stories.‖1182 In other words, the narratives portray the kind of moral community to 
be formed and are addressed to the community.
1183
 They call for moral re-formation on 
the communal level. And this community becomes formative. 
Last but not least, Cahill notes that by forming communities that are consistent 
with God‘s revelation, Scripture gains its authority in morality.1184 The more faithful we 
are to the Bible, the more we recognize its authority. 
 
In conclusion, this brief account reaffirms that Scripture supports the notion of 
virtue and offers a general view on how Scripture is related to virtue theory. Scripture 
exposes us to and advocates for certain virtues, forms virtues, shapes moral character and 
identity, provides exemplary models, and reforms the faith community. Based on this 
affirmation, I now proceed to see how two Christian virtue ethicists read Scripture 
through the lens of virtue. In order to recognize the diversity of traditions within 
Christianity, I look at the works of a Protestant and a Catholic ethicist. The ethicist 
representing the Protestant traditions is Joseph Kotva and the one representing the 
Catholic tradition is William Spohn. They are chosen because both of them are pioneers 
in and well known for advocating a Christian virtue ethics within their own traditions. 
Hence, I am convinced that they may offer better insights on reading Scripture through 
the lens of virtue.  Furthermore, I begin with Kotva for he lays the ground for making 
such a reading possible and desirable. I then turn to Spohn who further demonstrates a 
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unique, practical way of reading Scripture through the lens of virtue that engages the 
reader and the biblical texts on the level of ethical practice. 
 
6.2 Joseph Kotva, Jr. 
 
Joseph Kotva is an Anabaptist Mennonite from the United States. Currently he is 
a faculty member of the Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminary in Indiana and the 
executive director for Anabaptist Center for Health Care Ethics.
1185
 He anchors himself to 
the neo-Aristotelian (and Thomistic) tradition of virtue and proposes a Christian version 
of the theoretical ethics of virtue.
1186
 He has since then become known as a proponent of 
virtue ethics.
1187
 
In order to understand how Kotva relates Scripture to virtue ethics, I turn to his 
The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics.
1188
 The motivation behind this work, as Kotva 
himself admits, is that ―nobody has taken the time to argue why Christians as Christians 
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ought to become virtue ethicists.‖1189 This work, as a whole, is seen by some as the best 
attempt to construct a Christian version of virtue theory.
1190
 And many believe that Kotva 
basically has made his case successfully.
1191
  
His main thesis is that the teleological approach to ethical enquiry offers a very 
adequate framework for Christian ethics: It is ―compatible with, readily amended to, and 
useful in expressing Christian convictions and modes of moral reasoning.‖1192 Other 
ethical theories like consequentialism are ―inadequate for the rich moral vision suggested 
by theology and Scripture.‖1193 Interestingly, one Mennonite scholar notes that this thesis 
―contrasts the predominant Mennonite deontological approach, which has emphasized the 
authoritative rules handed down by God.‖1194 
After justifying the need for a specifically Christian case for virtue theory, he then 
moves onto the theological and biblical arguments that form the major part of his work. 
He tries to show that both the Christian doctrines and biblical texts have important 
―points of similarity, contact and correlation‖ with virtue theory.1195 It is important to 
note here that for Kotva correlation does not mean merging theological elements into 
theoretical virtue theory but that the philosophical and theological insights correct each 
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other, bear in mind that there is common ground between the two.
1196
 Thus, he rightly 
reminds us that we should not simply presume a fit between Christian convictions and 
virtue theory.  
What is particularly important to our own enquiry here is his dealing with the 
biblical materials throughout this argument. He shows us in concrete terms how Scripture 
and virtue ethics can be compatible and connected. Kotva first looks at the notion of 
human telos. He argues that, on the one hand, ―the telos governs the main concerns of 
biblical theology;‖1197 on the other hand, there are biblical convictions about the human 
good.
1198
 For instance, Mark 10:13-16 and Luke 14:12-14 can be helpful to grasp a 
particular aspect of the vision of human good, namely, ‗welcoming‘ the least among us.  
He then focuses on correlating concretely and specifically the ethics of Matthew 
and Paul with virtue theory. Kotva cites two reasons for this choice:
1199
 First, they are 
representatives of the two main genres (namely, gospels and epistles) in the New 
Testament. Second, they both seem to be incompatible with virtue ethics at the first 
glance. He believes that a successful case with these two texts will make the overall case 
more convincing. As a whole, he argues that ―their concerns, themes, patterns of moral 
reasoning, and uses of language fit well with the basic virtue framework.‖1200  
With regards to the Gospel of Matthew, Kotva notes that the gospel is usually 
read as ―supporting either a law-based ethics (5:17-18) or an ethic based on the principle 
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of love (22:36-40).‖1201 Still, he systematically shows us that reading the gospel through 
the lens of virtue is not just possible but also compatible.
1202
 
First, Matthew is concerned with not just external actions but also the internal 
qualities of human actions (like feelings and dispositions) as virtue theory is. Kotva is 
especially interested in highlighting this connection. One significant example is the 
Sermon on the Mount—in particular, the Beatitudes (5:3-10) and the antitheses (5:21-48). 
These blessings do not only depict the kind of action but also the kind of people that will 
be received into God‘s kingdom. That means, the beatitudes are concerned with not only 
what they do but also who they are. They also ―commend a posture reflecting certain 
attitudes and feelings [such as mercy and integrity].‖1203 Similarly, some of the antitheses 
focus on internal feelings (such as anger and lust) rather than acts. Kotva then turns to 
two non-virtue ethicists to support his argument: He notes that they both reject the 
language of law and favor terms like character and attitudes when examining the ethics of 
Jesus.
1204
  
Moreover, by referring to the parables of good and evil fruits (e.g., 3:8, 10; 7:16-
20; 12:33) as well as Jesus‘ compassionate acts (e.g., 14:14; 15:32), he notes that 
Matthew ―presumes a connection between the internal and the external…[and] one‘s 
conduct (the external) flows from and reflects one‘s inner character (the internal).‖1205 He 
then claims that both the connection and priority of the internal over the external are 
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found in virtue theory‘s near circular relationship between being and doing, and between 
character states and action. 
Second, Matthew manifests a particular kind of perfectionist thrust: Both the 
rigorous teaching of the Sermon on the Mount and Jesus‘ teaching on discipleship (e.g., 
5:48; 10:35-39; 28:20) summon us to have righteousness that exceeds that of the scribes 
and Pharisees and seek perfection. However, Kotva insists that Matthew is not thinking 
of the kind of unrealistically idealistic perfection. Rather, Matthew‘s perfectionism/ideal 
is to be understood as the norm and guide for discipleship. Moreover, the gospel writer is 
aware of the difficulties in achieving the ideal and therefore never idealizes the 
disciples—they are portrayed as men of little faith instead (8:26). It is thus in this sense 
that the ethics of Matthew is a perfectionist ethic as virtue ethics is. However, although 
Matthew is not expecting a full realization of such ideal here and now, it does not mean 
that one needs not to strive for the ideal.
1206
 
Third, Matthew‘s portrayal of master-disciple, instructive relationship between 
Jesus and his disciples (e.g., 10:24-25) is comparable to the kind of exemplary model 
suggested by virtue ethics.
1207
 Both of them imply ―a relationship that shapes not only 
through explicit teaching but also through the associations and activities of daily life.‖1208 
The only difference, as Kotva notes, is that the relationship between Jesus and his 
disciples is deeper and more demanding than the relationship between the exemplar and 
the imitator within the virtue framework. 
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Fourth, the kind of communal/corporate nature found in virtue theory is also 
present in the ethics of Matthew. Matthew‘s ethics involves both relationships (like the 
above-mentioned master-disciple relationship) and corporate activities. In particular, 
Matthew‘s concerns for community life in chapter 18 (e.g., issues of status-seeking and 
scandal) parallel virtue ethics‘s emphasis that the individual‘s moral life is found in the 
communal context and that virtues have a social quality. One significant incidence is the 
process for church discipline. Here both the wrongdoings (‗sins‘) and their moral 
discernment are never simply personal matters. They affect the community and are of 
concern to the community (vv15-17). Furthermore, the underlying qualities/virtues of 
humility and forgiveness (vv4, 21-35)—that are crucial to the community‘s unity and 
maintenance—point to the fact that both Matthean ethics and virtue ethics assume a link 
between relationships and virtues: As said earlier, the importance of certain virtues is 
only found in relationships and communal activities. Still, the concern for individuals is 
obvious in Matthew, such as Jesus‘ call to specific, concrete individuals. 
Fifth, Matthew does not only portray Jesus as a master; he also depicts and 
discusses those character traits through the portrayal of Jesus and various characters in 
his narratives, such as the centurion in 8:5-13. This mechanism of focusing on character 
and character traits provides another connection with virtue theory. 
By far Kotva has shown us that both the moral reasoning and yields of virtue—
like priority of being over doing, perfectionistic, exemplar, community, and character—
are also found in the ethics of Matthew. Still, he skillfully turns the common view that 
Matthean ethics is one of law-based or love-centered into another potential link: While 
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not denying the important role played by the law of love in the first gospel, Kotva 
challenges the kind of reductionistic view that the ethics of Matthew can be reduced to 
this law of love alone.
1209
  
He first turns to the claim that love is the key. He notes that there are many types 
of ethical material in Matthew other than the command to love, such as eschatological 
warnings, parables, and the call to discipleship. Thus, the ethics of Matthew is also one of 
mercy (9:13), cross-bearing (10:38), and justice (12:18), and cannot be adequately or 
solely summarized by the command to love. Kotva then points out the problems 
regarding the form and content of love: Love understood by Matthew has diverse 
meanings—such as praying for one‘s enemies (5:44)—and can be known clearly only 
within particular contexts/narratives. In addition, he turns to the law language employed 
by Matthew and argues that Matthean ethics is not simply an affirmation/fulfillment of 
the Mosaic Law; rather, the authority depends on Jesus who is the norm.  
On the other hand, Kotva insists that while rules and laws play a vital role in the 
gospel, they are not a comprehensive set of commands but ―exemplar[s]…pointers to the 
kind of life expected in the community…paradigms…descriptions of behavior suitable to 
the coming kingdom…[and] specifications of who we are to become.‖1210 Therefore, the 
laws have an educative value in that they are not an end in itself but ―a language that 
educates us to the ways of Christ, which are centered on the virtues.‖1211 He concludes 
that this view is comparable to virtue theory‘s perception of rules as ―guides in shaping 
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character for those who do not yet possess practical wisdom.‖1212 Furthermore, both 
Matthew‘s ethics and virtue ethics call for discernment in applying rules (for some 
commands are greater than others (e.g., 22:37-40)). In the language of virtue theory, it 
points to the virtue of practical wisdom or prudence. 
As a whole, Kotva is convinced that the ethics of Matthew is compatible to and 
therefore served by virtue ethics in many significant aspects. 
Regarding the ethics of Paul, Kotva is aware of the general understanding that 
Paul is ―preoccupied with grace and faith [and] leaves little room for ethics, let alone an 
ethic focusing on the formation of virtuous people.‖1213 Nevertheless, he demonstrates to 
us that those compatible links between Matthew‘s ethics and virtue ethics are also present 
in Paul‘s ethics.1214 
First, Paul‘s appropriation of those ‗virtue‘ and ‗vice‘ lists1215 (e.g., Galatians 
5:22-23 and Romans 1:29-31) reveals his concerns for internal qualities as Matthew does: 
He ―depicts or portrays both the kind of people Christians are called to be and the kinds 
of actions appropriate to those people.‖1216 Moreover, his desire for our inner conversion 
and transformation (e.g., 2 Corinthians 7:1 and Galatians 4:6) further manifests the 
concerns for certain internal qualities like attitudes. 
Second, although Paul does not portray particular characters in detail as Matthew 
does, his frequent call to imitate him who imitates Christ (e.g., 1 Corinthians 4:16; 11:1) 
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or other worthy examples (like the Macedonians in 2 Corinthians 8:1-15) is equally 
comparable to virtue ethics‘s demand of exemplary models.  
Third, like Matthew, Paul also envisions the Christian life in terms of individual 
and communal identity. Apart from explicit instructions on unity and mutual concern 
within the community (1 Corinthians 11:17-34), Paul‘s use of the body image (1 
Corinthians 12:12-31) as well as teachings on excommunication and supporting the weak 
(e.g., 1 Corinthians 5:1-8 and 1 Thessalonians 5:14) reflect his emphasis on corporation 
and interdependence. Still, Paul does not neglect individual efforts and responsibilities—
he often reminds the people that they will be judged by God according to their works 
(Romans 2:6). 
Fourth, Paul too highlights the need for discernment and practical wisdom as 
Matthew does. For instance, the communities are challenged to test and discern 
everything together (e.g., 1 Thessalonians 5:21 and 1 Corinthians 14:29). In particular, 
Paul himself exercises prudence when dealing with concrete pastoral situations, such as 
divorce (1 Corinthians 7:10-16) and conflict between the weak and the strong (Romans 
14:1-15:13). 
Apart from these identifiable links, Kotva remarkably notes two additional, 
unique aspects of Paul‘s ethics that are potentially compatible to virtue theory. The first 
one is his rather frequent employment of images of moral growth and progress, such as 
‗walking‘, ‗race‘, ‗goal‘, and ‗transforming‘ (in Romans 6:4; 1 Corinthians 9:24-27; 
Philippians 3:12-16; and 2 Corinthians 3:18 respectively). In other words, Paul‘s overall 
vision on Christian life is not one of a static state but of progress and increase (in areas 
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like faith, love, and spiritual maturity). This vision of moral progression—or let us call it, 
‗moral growth‘, together with the emphasis on continuity and patterns of behavior, can 
become a connection point with virtue ethics. 
The second one is the famous indicative-imperative modes found in Paul‘s many 
writings. Kotva suggests that, on the one hand, their relationship assumes a link between 
being and doing—the indicative mode signifies ‗who we are as Christians‘ and the 
imperative mode signifies the kind of actions that follow naturally from what Paul says in 
the indicative mode. Like virtue theory‘s priority of being over doing, Paul also seems to 
assume the priority of what is said in the indicative statement. On the other hand, within 
Paul‘s eschatological framework they are comparable to the tri-polar structure of virtue 
theory—the indicative mode signifies both ‗who we are‘ and ‗who we ought to become‘ 
while the imperative mode signifies those habits and actions that respond to the question 
of how to get there.
1217
 Kotva further claims that Paul‘s encouragement and advice 
implies resemblance with virtue theory‘s structure—the imperative is derived from the 
difference between ‗who we are now‘ and ‗who we ought to become‘ in the indicative. 
For Paul, ‗who we are now‘ is ‗redeemed by Christ‘. Still, being redeemed does not mean 
that every dimension of our personality has been rightly realized. For redeemed 
Christians we can always grow. Kotva thus explains that we do not fully embrace our call 
yet; we need to strive forward on the road of sanctification. 
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These characteristics of Paul‘s ethics, as Kotva concludes, allow us to make 
connections with virtue ethics. Yet, like the case of Matthew, these similarities, 
compatibilities, and links with virtue ethics do not imply that the two are equivalent. 
By far Kotva has shown us that Scripture (although he looks into the New 
Testament alone) and virtue ethics are compatible with each other in many aspects: Both 
are interested in ‗internal‘ qualities, appealing to exemplary models, and individual and 
corporate. In addition, the ethics of particular New Testament writings have specific areas 
of concerns and patterns that are similar to that of virtue theory, such as perfection and 
moral growth in Matthew and Paul respectively. Still, Kotva insightfully suggests that 
Scripture and virtue ethics can complement and mutually edify each other as well:
1218
 
Virtue ethics explores concerns and themes (e.g., the moral role of friendship
1219
) that are 
not fully treated in Scripture and hence enrich (and expand) our Christian moral vision. In 
particular, a virtue framework informs our reading and use of Scripture in morality—such 
as the understanding of biblical laws as guides in our discernment.  
Scripture, in return, can help illustrate the human good and shape our 
understanding of particular virtues by means of its narratives. In sum, Scripture offers 
―vital resources for correcting, refining, and developing a virtue framework,‖ such as the 
centrality of the person of Jesus and the need of grace.
1220
 
Kotva‘s groundbreaking attempt to seek links between Scripture and virtue theory, 
however, is not without technical criticism. Some, for example, find his interpretation of 
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virtue and law language in Matthew unconvincing:
1221
 They argue that Kotva seems fail 
to show why and how a virtue ethics interpretation of the law language is better than the 
Kantian one. Spohn, on the contrary, finds his treatments of these biblical texts 
particularly insightful in that they ―display the advantages of a virtue interpretation and 
the points where they correct and advance the framework.‖1222 In any case, we have to 
bear in mind that Kotva‘s work is only an introductory attempt to make a Christian model 
of virtue ethics sensible to Christians. I now turn to Spohn‘s own reading of Scripture 
through the lens of virtue for additional insights. 
 
6.3 William C. Spohn 
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, William Spohn is an ethicist from the Catholic 
tradition. He has shown great interest in engaging Scripture with ethics, both 
academically and religiously. In particular, he proposes the use of virtue theory as the 
hermeneutical tool for reading Scripture. For instance, in his earlier work What are They 
Saying about Scripture and Ethics, when he claims that the model of ‗responsive love‘ 
best represents his view (in comparison to other approaches) of using and reading 
Scripture, he explains that this model ―spells out the implications of character and virtue 
ethics.‖1223 It focuses on the moral agent and guides the agent to respond to the question 
of ‗What ought I to do?‘ Virtue ethics, he adds, is capable of raising ―the imaginative and 
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affective dimensions of moral experience to critical reflection to show how rich the moral 
life is and how pervasive the guidance of Scripture can be in the mature Christian and the 
authentic Christian community.‖1224 
Later in Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics, Spohn further presents three 
arguments for the appropriateness of virtue ethics in reading Scripture:
1225
 First and 
foremost, he turns to the comprehensive moral category of character and narrative. He 
points out that since virtue ethics attends to one‘s character while Scripture discloses the 
character of God, virtue theory is an appropriate way to approach Scripture. Moreover, 
since narrative sets the structure of the Bible and characters are defined over the course of 
the story, the use of the moral category of character helps us to grasp the ethical import of 
scriptural texts that relate to a person‘s life story. In the case of the New Testament, we 
note that it is the character of Jesus that is revealed through the story of his life.  
Second, both virtue ethics and Scripture are concerned about the ‗heart‘ of the 
matter: Biblical writers emphasize the ‗heart‘—―the personal center that infuses acts with 
meaning‖—and ―probe the motivations and intentions behind action and the basic 
orientation of life.‖1226 In the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5, for instance, Jesus 
―seeks a more radical ‗righteousness‘ in the heart [rather than] offer[s] a detailed code of 
conduct.‖1227 Virtue theory, likewise, focuses on those inner dynamics of dispositions, 
habits and emotions that are the sources of one‘s personal moral life. In addition, virtue 
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theory‘s attention to moral psychology supports the biblical practice of moral 
discernment as well. 
Third, both virtue theory and Scripture (the gospels in particular) stress the 
importance of moral paradigms for guidance. Spohn takes on Hays‘s view that 
―paradigms are the most basic vehicle for moral teaching in the New Testament‖ through 
which the moral norms are specified.
1228
 That means, they exercise a normative role in 
moral reflection. For instance, the parable of Good Samaritan in Luke 10:25-37 
demonstrates to us the normative command to love. In particular, Spohn perceives the life 
of Jesus spelled out in the Christological hymn in Philippians 2:6-11 as the most 
fundamental paradigm for Christians. In a similar manner virtue ethics ―appreciates the 
role that paradigmatic stories and exemplary figures play in defining particular 
virtues.‖1229  
On the other hand, Spohn points out that when looking at the story of Jesus 
through the lens of virtue ethics (especially through faithful imagination), we become 
aware that Jesus as the fundamental paradigm challenges us to transform our perception, 
dispositions, and identity—the three phases of Christian moral experience.1230 In other 
words, virtue ethics challenges us to engage with the reality of Jesus on the levels of 
vision, emotion, and character.
1231
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In his later writings Spohn makes his claim in even stronger terms. He insists that 
an ethics of virtue and character that ―reshapes the fundamental identity and dynamics of 
the person‖ is the most appropriate approach to Scripture.1232 It is also the most adequate 
approach to Scripture since it captures the relationships to Christ, God, and others that 
constitute the Christian way of life.
1233
 
However, like Kotva, Spohn admits that Scripture plays a role in virtue ethics in 
return:
1234
 Scripture does not only exemplify the insights of virtue ethics but also brings 
out certain issues that are beyond the scope of philosophical ethics, which only deepens 
the significance of virtue ethics as a worthy hermeneutics. Thus, human sinfulness, the 
need of God‘s grace, and subsequent radical transformation (or conversion), illustrate not 
only the affinity between virtue ethics and Scripture but more importantly between a 
theologically based virtue ethics and Scripture. For example, the writers of the Synoptic 
gospels depict the long, gradual process of the disciple‘s transformation from resisting to 
accepting the radical call of Jesus. Paul, in addition, emphasizes the need of God‘s grace 
in the framework of sanctification for radical conversion and moral growth. In other 
words, the New Testament ―gives content to the formal patterns of virtue ethics‖ by 
spelling out concrete transformative habits.
1235
 Furthermore, Spohn claims that ―when the 
resources of character and virtue ethics are brought to bear on biblical material, it can 
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yield a more ethically sophisticated account of Christian experience than spirituality can 
offer by itself.‖1236 
After exploring Spohn‘s arguments for reading Scripture through the lens of 
virtue, I now turn to his reading of the New Testament through virtue ethics. In so doing, 
I first offer three methodological remarks. Then I illustrate how Spohn reads certain 
biblical texts.
1237
 
The first remark is that Spohn does not handle the biblical texts in the same way 
as Kotva does. Although Spohn, like Kotva, points out at times certain common grounds 
between the gospels and virtue ethics—for example, they share the concern for moral 
sight and blindness, he does not offer a comparative, cross-examination of the two to 
highlight their potential compatibility and connectedness.
1238
 And despite occasional 
identification of particular virtues from the texts—for instance, the parable of the unjust 
steward in Matthew 18:21-35 is perceived as an illustration of the virtue of gratitude and 
a link between grace received and service to others—he does not present to us a list of 
virtues either.
1239
 
The second remark is that his reading of Scripture by a hermeneutics of virtue 
ethics points to the employment of analogical imagination.
1240
 Spohn claims that 
analogical imagination helps bridge the moral reflection of Christians and the words and 
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deeds of Jesus especially by providing reasons and ideas (or what he calls ―cognitive 
content‖1241) for obeying Jesus‘ command to discover new ways of acting faithfully and 
creatively.  
Analogy, broadly speaking, is ―the repetition of the same fundamental pattern in 
two different contexts.‖1242 It implies actions and living patterns that are congruent to the 
prototype and hence has a normative value. In other words, the notion of analogy refers 
to ―[moving] from a familiar pattern to new experience [and] looking for similarities and 
dissimilarities [between the prototype and the problematic situation].‖1243 It thus requires 
the presence of various cases like the recognition case and problem case. Among them 
Spohn argues that the paradigm case is the most important for understanding analogy, for 
―it is not just an interesting comparison but a model for action.‖1244 Moreover, he is 
convinced that all biblical literature promotes analogical reflection—even biblical rules 
and principles have an analogical aspect. The Good Samaritan, for instance, is a classic 
paradigm of perception and blindness.
1245
 Still, he notes that without personal recognition 
(the recognition case) the story will not speak with authority.
1246
 
When one discerns what to do, one engages in imagination. Imagination ―spots 
patterns and discovers how they transfer to new contexts.‖1247 In particular, Spohn notes 
that those conjunctions like ‗likewise‘ and ‗just as‘ are the ‗copula of the imagination‘ 
that call for appropriate/fitting, imaginative actions. Again, he employs the story of the 
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Good Samaritan in which Jesus challenges his disciples to use their imagination to make 
his case.  
He finds evidence in Paul‘s words, too. In the Letter to the Romans (6:1-12), he 
notes that ―Paul urges the Romans to use their imaginations to recognize the analogy 
between the dying and rising of Christ and their dying to old ways and living the new 
moral existence.‖1248 Or, in the Second Letter to the Corinthians (8:9) he sees Paul‘s plea 
to the community to be generous in contribution by appealing to the generosity of Christ 
a demonstration of the kind of analogical reasoning needed. In short, imagination ―gives 
us access to Jesus as the concrete universal of Christian ethics.‖1249 
However, Spohn also notes that the New Testament provides the pattern—such as 
metaphorical frameworks, parables, and narratives of the historical Jesus—that grounds 
the analogical imagination.
1250
 As a whole, he is convinced that analogical imagination is 
important to Christian ethics because ―Christian discipleship is grounded in a particular 
person conveyed to us through the particular shape of the Gospel story.‖1251 
Consequently, he insists that contemporary disciples of Jesus ―must make use of the 
analogical imagination to discern the contemporary moral significance of the biblical 
text.‖1252  
The third remark is that Spohn focuses on the New Testament story of Jesus.  He 
points out that the gospels and some materials from Paul ―vividly present the story of 
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Jesus as the norm for Christian life.‖1253 In particular, he perceives Paul‘s Letter to the 
Philippians as offering us a glimpse of how the life of Jesus affects the Christian.
1254
 He 
further claims that the cross and resurrection of Jesus ―epitomizes [his] life and integrates 
the disparate sayings and happenings related to the gospels.‖1255 
These remarks ground his subsequent reading of certain New Testament texts that 
follows. 
In his discussion of the Johannine account of Jesus washing the disciples‘ feet 
(John 13:1-20) Spohn first reminds us that Jesus‘ act of washing cannot be taken merely 
literally.
1256
 Rather, Jesus‘ action is an example and a demonstration that points 
graphically to a distinctive way of loving service. The scene in the story acts as the prime 
‗analogate‘ while our action/response is the analogue. There are different degrees of 
analogical imagination in one‘s response—from simple reenactment of the narrative to 
focusing on one‘s responsibility to having solidarity with the poor—depending on the 
interpreter. And a rich constellation of aspects such as reversal of roles and humble 
service embodied in the account are reproduced. The image of foot-washing thus 
becomes a springboard and guide for appropriate dispositions and actions depending on 
the situation. However, Spohn reminds us that the image as a guide is not totally open-
ended to those incompatible actions such as domination or promoting privilege. 
                                                 
1253
 Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 23. 
1254
 Ibid.. 
1255
 Spohn, ―Scripture,‖ 103. 
1256
 See Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 51-56. 
 301 
Philippians 2 and Romans 6, on the other hand, are two Pauline texts that capture 
the overall life story of Jesus.
1257
 In particular, the cross and resurrection of Jesus 
highlighted in these two texts is seen as the paradigm for Christian life that shapes 
Christian discipleship and guides the practice of discernment.  
Subsequently, analogical imagination spots that the logic of Christian imitation 
stands out throughout the Letter to the Philippians: 1) The community imitates Paul who 
imitates Christ—out of deep emotions and affections (like loyalty and gratitude) for the 
other. 2) Imitating Christ is to be understood as the criterion for moral discernment. 3) 
And the call to imitation leads one to intimacy—one becomes more like Christ. On the 
other hand, since Paul‘s own journey is analogous to the paradigm of Christ‘s ‗descent-
ascent‘ pattern (i.e., death on the cross and resurrection as expressed in the Christological 
hymn) which is the standard for regaining unity, the community should look to Paul as 
well as others in the community who imitate the paradigm. 
In Romans 6, the same teaching to embrace the exemplary paradigm of Christ‘s 
death on the cross and resurrection is found. Paul specifically identifies the practice of 
baptism as the recapitulation of this paradigm: Baptism recurs in our daily Christian 
moral life (in other words, every moral act is for Paul a baptismal act). It connects sin and 
cross on the one side and morality and resurrection on the other. From there Spohn 
further notes that there is an analogy in the paradigm that graphs those indicative-
imperative tensions, such as: ―The death he died, he died to sin, once for all; but the life 
                                                 
1257
 Ibid., 142-52. 
 302 
he lives, he lives to God. So you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to 
God in Christ Jesus‖ (6:10-11).  
  In the story of Zacchaeus (Luke 19:1-10), Spohn notes that an exercise of 
analogical imagination will first identify the following cases needed for reflection:
1258
 
―Jesus‘ welcome to Zacchaeus‖ as the paradigm case; ―Jesus welcomes me‖ as the 
recognition case; and that ―I ought to welcome the outcasts accordingly‖ as the problem 
case. However, analogical reflection does not simply identify these theoretical cases in 
the story but also reveals how Christ takes initiative and calls us to recognize the pattern 
of gift and response, especially ―the pattern of the Christian moral life as a response to 
the surprising and undeserved gift of God‘s acceptance of us.‖1259 Analogical imagination 
further allows us to see the story as ―not just about the characters mentioned but also 
about us…[and to] discover something about our own experience.‖1260 In specific, it 
provides clues for recognizing Christ‘s work in our own lives and invites us to identify 
ourselves with the tax collector—as someone who lacks the power to do the right thing. It 
reveals to us what obstacles are in each of us in responding to Jesus‘ call and thus guides 
us to understand that the call to discipleship ―is tailored to each person as a unique 
individual with particular capacities and obstacles to responding.‖1261  
Finally, Spohn notes that an analogous imaginative reading of the story of Jesus 
as a whole points to the shaping of the character of individual Christians and their 
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communities.
1262
 On the level of shaping individual character, he points out that ―Jesus‘ 
characteristic virtues [such as compassion and fidelity] are ingredients in the gospel 
stories that define them.‖1263 When reading stories like Jesus and Zacchaeus or parables 
like the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-32) we do not just appreciate what Jesus did but also 
look into how he acted, and the attitude and stance he took toward others. Analogical 
discernment helps to seek ways of acting that harmonize with the story. Over time, these 
readings will enter into dispositional pattern of certain virtues (such as hospitality and 
compassion). One‘s action inspired by these stories then leads to habitual dispositions in 
the heart and hence defines one‘s character. Furthermore, the parables of Jesus ―are 
meant to evoke strong emotions‖—such as hope, courage, and mercy—which are 
qualities of character.
1264
 
On the level of shaping the character of the community, Spohn points out that 
―the New Testament‘s preferred location of moral reflection is the community of faith, 
not the isolated conscience; the subject of moral development is not the individual but the 
faithful community.‖1265 And New Testament practices—such as hospitality, forgiveness, 
and solidarity with the poor—form the normative basis for evaluating communal moral 
discernment, for they are meant to build up the Body of Christ. Though incomplete and 
are given different priorities, these virtues and practices are necessary for the faith 
community. 
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On the other hand, Spohn notes that reading the life of Jesus as depicted by Paul 
(as in the Letter to the Philippians) through the lens of virtue points to Paul‘s emphasis 
on the transformation of identity (the conscious dimension of character):
1266
 Paul‘s own 
radical change of identity in Damascus as recounted in Philippians 3, for example, has led 
him to have new perception of the self, such as ―seeing what counted as gain as loss,‖ and 
―dying to the old self and coming to life in Christ.‖ It also reveals that Paul‘s logic of 
argument runs along a chain of identity: The Philippians are commanded to be guided by 
the same call Paul received; to acquire the same mind of Christ that is in Christ; and to 
follow Paul‘s analogous example. In short, ―Christ has identified with our human 
condition, Christians can identify with him.‖1267 
In sum, reading the New Testament story of Jesus by means of analogical 
imagination invites us to take up the challenge to see the world as Jesus saw it; to look 
behind vision into the inner dynamics of the moral life (i.e., dispositions); and to attend to 
the Christian identity (both individual and communal) that is the root of Christian life. 
These challenges to one‘s moral psychology echo those yields of virtue that we identified 
earlier. Indeed, although Spohn did not seek to provide a list of virtues from Scripture or 
focus on those (potential) similarities or connections between Scripture and virtue theory, 
he has insightfully demonstrated a unique way of reading Scripture through the lens of 
virtue that engages the reader and the biblical texts on the level of ethical practice. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
This short chapter focuses on reading Scripture through the lens of virtue. I first 
reaffirm that Scripture supports the notion of virtue. In fact, Scripture does not only 
reveal to us these virtues but also advocates for their acquisition and formation. This 
further points to Scripture‘s relevance to those earlier identified yields of virtue.  
 I then succinctly surveyed how two representative Christian virtue ethicists read 
Scripture through the lens of virtue. In the case of Kotva, he attempts to seek similarities 
and potential links between Scripture and virtue theory within his larger project of 
making a Christian version of virtue ethics. In so doing, he turns to the Gospel of 
Matthew and certain Pauline letters as test cases.  
Subsequently, he finds in the Gospel of Matthew moral reasoning and qualities 
parallel to that of the virtue theory and the yields of virtue: Both Matthean ethics and 
virtue ethics are concerned with not just external action but also the internal qualities of 
human actions; they manifest a particular kind of perfectionist thrust; the kind of master-
disciple relationship is comparable (and even superior) to the exemplary model suggested 
by virtue ethics; their common concerns for both individuals and the community; and 
their interest in the formation of character and character traits. However, Kotva is able to 
find some unique potential connections between Matthean ethics and virtue ethics. In 
particular, he suggests that the laws and rules in Matthew also have an educative, 
formative value. 
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 Regarding the ethics of Paul, Kotva identifies similar parallels: Those ‗virtue‘ and 
‗vice‘ lists do not only depict the needed external actions but also the kind of Christians 
we are called to be; hence they are concerned with internal qualities. The call for 
imitation is comparable to virtue theory‘s demand of exemplary models. Moreover, 
Paul‘s instructions and writings care for both individual and communal growth as virtue 
theory does. Still, as in case of the Gospel of Matthew, Kotva also notes certain possible 
compatibilities unique to Pauline ethics: He finds that Paul‘s specific use of images 
points to a dynamic and progressive vision of Christian life that emphasizes continuity, 
patterns, and formation of the self. He also suggests that Paul‘s famous indicative-
imperative sayings can be interpreted by and compared to virtue theory‘s tri-polar 
structure. 
Kotva‘s overall conclusion is that there are within Scripture important points of 
similarity, contact and correlation with virtue theory. His reading of the selected New 
Testament writings through the lens of virtue has demonstrated to us that Scripture and 
virtue ethics are not just compatible but also complementary. In particular, he has shown 
us the advantages of a virtue-based interpretation of Scripture and the points where 
Scripture corrects and advances the framework. 
 Spohn, on the other hand, begins with the argument that virtue ethics is very 
appropriate and adequate for reading and interpreting Scripture. He then turns to the New 
Testament story of Jesus and points out that Jesus is the fundamental paradigm for the 
transformation of our moral psychology. 
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Analogical imagination is the proposed method through which Spohn offers a 
virtue-based reading of the story of Jesus. Subsequently, Spohn focuses on those New 
Testament passages that explicitly depict the life story of Jesus as test cases. In the 
Johannine account of washing the disciples‘ feet, analogical imagination would read the 
image of foot-washing as a springboard and guide for appropriate dispositions and 
actions depending on the situation. An analogical reading of the story of Zacchaeus 
would further invite us to identify ourselves with the tax collector, reveal to us what our 
obstacles are, and guide us to understand each one‘s specific call to discipleship. 
Moreover, an analogical imaginative reading of the Letter to the Philippians and the 
Letter to the Romans would perceive the cross and resurrection as the paradigm for 
Christian life, and that, among others, the practice of baptism is the recapitulation of this 
paradigm. 
Still, analogical imagination would further read the overall story of Jesus as 
shaping the character of individual Christians and their communities. New Testament 
practices identified in the texts are also seen as forming the normative basis for 
evaluating communal moral discernment. Furthermore, we become more aware of Paul‘s 
emphasis on the transformation of identity. 
In sum, reading the New Testament story of Jesus by means of analogical 
imagination invites us to take up the challenges that touch certain yields of virtue like 
dispositions and communal identity. And Spohn has further demonstrated to us a unique 
way of reading Scripture through the lens of virtue that engages the reader and the 
biblical texts. 
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In conclusion, these two virtue ethicists‘ readings of certain New Testament 
writings, on the one hand, have convinced us that the theory of virtue is compatible with 
Scripture and the hermeneutics of virtue ethics is appropriate for interpreting Scripture. 
Their test cases, however limited they are, on the other hand, have demonstrated what the 
interpretation of Scripture would look like in concrete from a virtue perspective. This 
conviction and demonstration has laid a solid ground for our treatment of Scripture as 
‗script‘.  
In the next part, I carry this conclusion over to the interpretation of the Beatitudes 
in Matthew 5. However, I have been arguing throughout this work that a more integrated 
Scripture-based ethics would perceive scriptural texts as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. 
Therefore, prior to carrying out the task of hermeneutics through the lens of virtue, we 
need first to treat the text as ‗scripted‘, that is, to interpret the text ‗textually‘ or 
‗exegetically‘. In other words, understanding what the Beatitudes meant to the original 
readers in Matthew‘s community is a crucial and necessary step to our appropriation of 
the texts in contemporary society. 
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Part Three: Exegeting and Interpreting the Text—The Beatitudes as Scripted Script  
 
In Part One I proposed a more integrated Scripture-based Christian ethics that 
treats the scriptural text as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. By surveying how contemporary 
biblical scholars and Christian ethicists construct their own Scripture-based theological 
ethics, I argued that concrete advancements are found within each discipline and that 
such a methodological goal is attainable. 
In Part Two, I then proceeded to demonstrate how such a proposal can be worked 
out in the concrete. In so doing, I proposed the employment of virtue ethics as a worthy 
hermeneutical tool for approaching Scripture. I pointed out that certain important yields 
of virtue can provide points of reference to the task of hermeneutics and bring virtue into 
connection with some of the other reference points of ethics. Christian virtue ethicists 
have demonstrated to us that the philosophical language of virtue theory can be translated 
into a theological one by identifying and establishing theological links. However, what is 
crucial to the employment of virtue ethics as a hermeneutical tool for interpreting 
Scripture is the presence of biblical links. A couple of Christian virtue ethics proponents, 
as we have seen, have done us a favor by searching for such links and relating Scripture 
and virtue ethics through reading scriptural texts through the lens of virtue. They have 
shown us that virtue ethics is an appropriate tool for the task of hermeneutics. 
After presenting the case for the use of virtue ethics as a hermeneutical tool, in 
this third part of my work, I continue to concretize what has been proposed in Part One 
by focusing on a particular biblical text, namely, the Beatitudes in Matthew 5. I first treat 
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the text as ‗scripted‘ by means of careful exegesis (Chapter 7) and then employ the 
hermeneutics of virtue ethics to interpret the exegeted text as ‗script‘ (Chapter 8). 
But why the Beatitudes in Matthew 5? As explained in the Introduction, the 
choice of the Beatitudes is based on several reasons. The first and immediate reason is its 
popularity (both as an individual text and as a part of the Sermon on the Mount) 
throughout history, including many ancient Christian works.
1268
 This popularity is partly 
related to the fact that it is part of the Matthean Sermon on the Mount which is widely 
recognized as the ―most celebrated discourse by Jesus of Nazareth.‖1269 Indeed, Matthew 
5-7 has been ―continually the subject of re-interpretation by Christians throughout the 
ages…[and] one can even speak of a ‗history of interpretation‘ of the Sermon.‖1270 Hans 
Dieter Betz even claims that neither a complete history of interpretation nor a complete 
bibliography on Matthew 5-7 is possible.
1271
 Harrington, in a similar way, comments that 
―the history of the sermon‘s interpretation is a miniature history of Christianity.‖1272 
Still, as far as the Beatitudes is concerned,
1273
 Betz points out that the Beatitudes 
is ―historically the best-known and most-valued portion of the Sermon.‖1274 And its 
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popularity is also found among contemporary Christian ethicists who turn to the Bible for 
ethical insights. It is observed, for example, that many theological ethicists from Richard 
Niebuhr to Stanley Hauerwas, from liberation theologians to feminist theologians, and 
from Catholic to Protestant theologians, have either employed the text in their writings or 
actually examined the ethical teaching of the text.
1275
 Indeed, almost all biblical scholars 
and theological ethicists surveyed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three also treat the 
Matthew‘s Beatitudes in one way or another. 
For example, Bernard Häring is convinced that Christian life is ―essentially a 
manifestation of the beatitudes.‖1276 Thus, he offers a meditation guide based on the 
Beatitudes and invites the readers to reflect on its personal and social implications. In fact, 
both Häring and Servais Pinckaers note that the Beatitudes has been employed by non-
Christians like Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi as a major source for spiritual renewal.
1277
 
Moreover, scholars also turn to the Beatitudes for inspiration in writings related to 
Christian spirituality.
1278
  
Secondly, the Matthean Beatitudes has long been an important text in both 
biblical theology and Christian ethics.
1279
 Many theologians have produced their own 
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commentaries on the text. For example, Gregory of Nyssa, who lived in Cappadocia in 
Asia Minor around 380 CE, is noted as one of the first to contemplate on the Beatitudes 
among the church Fathers.
1280
 He interpreted the eight beatitudes as ―stages in the ascent 
of the soul…constituting the steps of the mystical ladder.‖1281 Later, John Chrysostom, 
archbishop of Constantinople and a contemporary of Augustine from the East, produced 
an exposition of the Beatitudes as part of his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew.
1282
 
He understood the text (and the overall Sermon on the Mount) ―as the foundational 
speech…that constitutes the life of all Christians‖ and provides the building blocks for a 
life of virtue.
1283
 
Among the Scholastics Aquinas also perceived the Beatitudes as ―the touchstone 
of Christ‘s teaching in the Sermon on the Mount‖ just as the Decalogue contains ―the 
essence of the moral precepts of the Mosaic Law.‖1284 He wrote, ―Just as Moses first set 
down the commandments, and afterwards said many things which were all referred back 
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to the commandments he had set down, so Christ in His teaching sets out these beatitudes, 
to which all the other things are referred back.‖1285 
As far as virtue ethicists are concerned, the Beatitudes is likewise an important 
scriptural text in that it is a specific source for discussion of Christian virtues demanded 
by Jesus Christ. Benjamin Farley points out that the Beatitudes extols eight 
corresponding virtues for Christian moral life. Even the Pontifical Biblical Commission 
perceives the Beatitudes as a significant characteristic expression of biblical morality 
found in the New Testament and thus specifically stresses the fundamental dispositions 
and virtues found in them.
1286
  
The third and final reason for the employment of the Beatitudes for illustration is 
a cultural one. As shared in the beginning of this work, I am writing from a Christian 
ethics perspective. Still, being an Asian of a Confucian Chinese society, I note that the 
whole concept of ‗blessed‘ (or ‗happy‘) in these verses could be a platform for engaging 
cross-cultural dialogue between Christianity and Confucianism. While William Mattison 
argues that the Beatitudes can be appropriately understood in the context of classical 
Christian ethical reflection on happiness, prosperity (and happiness) is closely related to 
the moral values of Confucian society.
1287
 Moreover, Confucian ethics is more and more 
widely accepted as a virtue-based ethics ―because of its emphasis on cultivating the 
natural human capacity for virtue.‖1288 There exists a possible Confucian connection with 
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Christian virtue ethics. An interpretation of the Beatitudes through the hermeneutics of 
virtue ethics thus may broaden the platform for engaging the two traditions and bring the 
Beatitudes into conversation with the Confucian society.
1289
 
Before offering a reading of the text as ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘, I suggest that we 
take a quick look of how some theologians and ethicists (of the past and present) have 
actually approached the Beatitudes, in their own ways.
1290
 It is worthwhile to see if their 
particular approaches could add any insights to what I have been proposing here.  
 
Several Approaches 
Augustine‘s interpretation of the Beatitudes can be found in his commentary on 
The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount.1291 It was one of his very first pastoral and exegetical 
works as a priest—delivered as a homily to the people of Hippo—and had pastoral, 
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theological and exegetical dimensions.
1292
 In particular, he held fast to the biblical 
language, for Augustine was convinced that the biblical language is ―more resonant, more 
affective, more enduring….richer in spiritual and moral, content, and more edifying than 
any local idiom.‖1293 Moreover, Augustine is known for interpreting Scripture with 
Scripture; he almost never interpreted a text without citing another text.
1294
 For example, 
apart from appealing to the symbolism of the perfect number ‗seven‘, he turned to Isaiah 
11 to make it clear that there are seven beatitudes, just as there are seven gifts of the Holy 
Spirit.
1295
 Elsewhere, in the interpretation of the fourth beatitude, Augustine cited John 
4:14 to point out that the food/drink for which the inner self hungers/thirsts is Christ 
himself.  
Moreover, he evoked personal experience in his interpretation of the text, and 
perceived the Beatitudes as a description of his own journey of conversion.
1296
 Thereafter, 
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he understood the Beatitudes as the principal part of and keystone that governs and 
divides the entire Sermon, and the perfect answer to the question of happiness.
1297
  
In sum, although Augustine interpreted the text with the use of enormous biblical 
sources, his commentary was a mixture of exegetical, literary, and theological 
interpretations.
1298
 Thus, his approach does not exactly belong to the task of exegesis or 
hermeneutics in today‘s understanding. Nevertheless, his reading of the Beatitudes had a 
strong impact on future interpretation until the thirteenth century.
1299
 
A detailed interpretation of the Beatitudes by Thomas Aquinas is found in his 
Lectura in Matthaeum—a written collection of oral commentary Aquinas gave at the 
University of Paris in late 1260s.
1300
 He regarded his work as a task of exegesis that 
demands humility:
1301
 It is a word-to-word commentary that was accompanied by a lot of 
biblical citations. In fact he was considered as a ‗living concordance‘ in his mastery of 
Scripture. For instance, when commenting on the notion of ‗high mountain‘, he cited both 
Genesis 19:17 and Isaiah 2:2 to point out the link between the term and contemplation. 
He then divided the text based on the cumulative effects of virtue:
1302
 The first three 
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beatitudes are grouped together for they point out that virtue removes one from various 
evils like lust and cruelty. The fourth and fifth beatitudes, in contrast, reveal that virtue 
causes one to work for what is good.  
However, Aquinas was not exactly concerned about the exegetical meaning of the 
text: ―Aquinas‘s scholarly concerns seem more focused on appropriating the insights and 
arguments of earlier philosophers and theologians than on engaging in historical 
investigation of the biblical text.‖1303 In sum, his interpretation is a kind of monastic 
exegesis; he ―focused on the reality described rather than on the text describing it.‖1304 
Later, in the Prima Secundae of Summa Theologiae, Aquinas returned to the 
Beatitudes and offered a more mature interpretation of the text:
1305
 The first three 
beatitudes are aimed at correcting the view that happiness is sensual and found in a life of 
pleasure. The next two pairs of Beatitudes are understood as vita activa and vita 
contemplativa respectively. And the last one is a summary and confirmation of the 
previous ones.  
As a result, Aquinas seemed to agree with Augustine‘s view that in the Beatitudes 
is ―the culmination of a succession of human responses to the question of happiness.‖1306 
It became the primary source for his treatise on human happiness and our ultimate 
end.
1307
 And, as mentioned before, he associated each one with a virtue acquired through 
a corresponding gift, and connected the gifts of the Holy Spirit, virtues, and the 
Beatitudes in a systematic way. Here, he departed from the Augustinian view that the 
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seven beatitudes are gifts of the Holy Spirit and extensions of virtues (that indicate 
dispositions); rather, they are the subsequent actions of these gifts.
1308
 However, his 
overall examination of the text in Summa Theologiae lacks the kind of biblical learning 
and technical sophistication required of contemporary biblical studies.
1309
  
Martin Luther also produced a commentary on the Beatitudes as a series of 
sermons on the Sermon on the Mount delivered after 1530:
1310
 It was basically a biblical 
exegesis that had a polemical nature. Both the Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount 
had to be read in light of other scriptural texts.
1311
 However, Luther presupposed in his 
interpretation that ―the Bible spoke immediately to his own time.‖1312 Also, the text was 
to be interpreted as solely an application of his teaching on justification and the Law and 
treated as the Old Law.
1313
 
As a whole, Luther rejected the traditional interpretation of the Beatitudes—that 
the beatitudes are evangelical counsels for the perfection of the spiritual ‗elite‘—which 
leads to a two-level ethics of minimalism for most and perfection for a few.
1314
 Rather, he 
held the Augustinian view that the Beatitudes is a command for all Christians:
1315
 For 
instance, he interpreted the command to be ‗pure in heart‘ (the sixth Beatitude) as 
addressing ordinary loving husbands and wives and children. Or, in order to rid the 
Beatitudes of any allowance for merit Luther claimed that Christ was talking only about 
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―the works and fruit that no one can do unless he is already a Christian and in a state of 
grace.‖1316  
Taking all together, we note that the interpretations of the Beatitudes by 
Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther tend to be homiletical (and somehow hermeneutical) 
although one has to take into account that the exegetical and hermeneutical tasks of their 
times were not clearly divided. Still, they seemed to share the same approach that most 
contemporary ethicists employ, namely, to treat the Beatitudes more as ‗script‘ than 
‗scripted‘. 
Based on my position in Part One it is a surprise that many would approach the 
Beatitudes as ‗script‘. For instance, Häring‘s overall interpretation of the text in his 
meditation guidebook is clearly performance-oriented even though the text is interpreted 
in the context of the songs of the suffering servant in Isaiah.
1317
 Gutiérrez uses the text in 
light of the Last Judgment in Matthew 25:31-46. He is basically more concerned with the 
call for social transformation and social justice found in the text than the texts themselves.  
In reading the Gospel of Matthew through the lens of virtue,
1318
 Kotva also turns 
to the Sermon on the Mount and the Beatitudes for demonstration. Regarding the 
Beatitudes he writes, 
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1318
 In a recent annual meeting of the United States based Society of Christian Ethics, young virtue ethicist 
William Mattison III, offers a virtue perspective of the Beatitudes and suggests that the Beatitudes are 
appropriately understood in the context of classical ethical reflection on happiness. He further proposes that 
there is an ‗intrinsic‘ relationship—continuity of activity—between those ‗qualifying conditions‘ and 
‗rewards‘ in each of the Beatitudes. In so doing, he turns to the commentaries of the Fathers of the Church, 
medieval theologians and Reformers, and some contemporary scholars. However, throughout the 
presentation he does not attend to the original meaning of the text or the writer‘s original intention. Some 
ethicists from the forum thus comment that he simply presents a patristic view of the Beatitudes. Like 
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The Beatitudes depict[s] the kinds of people and actions that will receive a 
full share of God‘s coming Kingdom. In pronouncing blessings on the 
‗poor in spirit‘  (5:3), on those who ‗hunger and thirst for righteousness‘ 
(5:6), and those who are ‗pure of heart‘ (5:8), Matthew‘s Jesus promises 
God‘s reign to those who are humble before God, who yearn for and 
desire for God‘s justice, and who live from a position of genuineness and 
integrity.
1319
 
 
Unfortunately, Kotva is pre-occupied with seeking similarities and potential 
connections between the gospel and virtue theory. He too takes up the text without first 
exploring the original meaning of the text intended by the author.  
 
What, then, would the interpretation of the Beatitudes that is grounded in the 
approach I am proposing here be? I note that Verhey, whose works inspire the integrated 
approach that I am proposing, also turns to the Beatitudes for his own agenda. He first 
suggests the use of form criticism and source criticism to understand the Beatitudes.
1320
 
Verhey then highlights the practices of delivering sermons and praying as the outcomes 
of hermeneutics. He concludes that these practices express the virtues and values that 
form our character. 
Still, Verhey‘s illustration does not undertake a full scale treatment of what the 
textual and practical interpretations of the Beatitudes would be.
1321
 Therefore, in the next 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kotva he bypasses the task of exegeting the original meaning of the text. See Mattison III, ―The Beatitudes 
and Christian Ethics: A Virtue Perspective.‖ 
1319
 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 104. 
1320
 Verhey, ―Scripture as Script and as Scripted,‖ 28-32. He points out that form criticism informs us that 
the form of the Beatitudes is similar to that of wisdom literature. It is written by the sage to express certain 
principles founded in life experience. This form was then modified by Jesus and the author to speak ―to the 
present in view of the coming good future of God.‖ Thus, the Beatitudes is a kind of eschatological wisdom. 
Source criticism, in addition, reveals that Matthew‘s Beatitudes has various sources. 
1321
 In New Perspectives on the Beatitudes, a book edited by Francis A. Eigo, some of the contributors 
attempt to present exegetical findings prior to interpret the individual beatitudes for their contemporary 
readers. However, the diverse academic backgrounds of these contributors lead to a rather inconsistent and 
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chapter, I attempt to fill this gap by first offering a detailed exegesis of the Beatitudes. 
However, being an ethicist by training and being experimental in this work, I consult the 
works of some major Matthean scholars throughout the chapter in order to offer a more 
accurate exegesis of the text.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
unsystematic treatment of the beatitudes as ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. Although Capuchin Franciscan Michael 
Crosby‘s works on the Beatitudes present the case in a more consistent manner, his interpretation is 
spiritual-oriented rather than driven by ethical reflection. See Francis A. Eigo, ed., New Perspectives on the 
Beatitudes (Villanova, PA: The Villanova University Press, 1995); Crosby, Spirituality of the Beatitudes.  
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Chapter Seven: The Exegesis of the Text—The Beatitudes as ‘Scripted’ 
 
In this chapter I treat the Beatitudes as ‗scripted‘ by conducting an exegesis of the 
text. The Beatitudes is part of the Sermon on the Mount which is widely known as the 
first of the five major discourses of Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew. As many Matthean 
scholars have pointed out, neither the Beatitudes nor the Sermon on the Mount are 
intended to stand by themselves.
1322
 Therefore, in order to offer an exposition of the text 
that is faithful to the gospel, we need to look at both the Sermon and the gospel as a 
whole and attend to certain issues that may serve as exegetical guidelines.
1323
 For the 
sake of clarity, I begin with an exploration of some basic issues concerning the gospel 
itself.
1324
 Then I turn to the Sermon on the Mount and examine certain specific issues, 
such as its structure and themes. Finally, I explore some critical and immediate issues of 
the Beatitudes like its relation to the rest of the Sermon and the meaning of ‗beatitude‘ in 
Jewish and Christian contexts. The actual exegesis follows. 
 
 
                                                 
1322
 Davies, and Allison, Jr., ―Reflections on the Sermon on the Mount,‖ 299. 
1323
 For instance, in his enquiry of the settings that influence the composition of the Sermon on the Mount, 
William Davies identifies the following aspects of Matthew‘s situation, namely, the Gospel itself, Jewish 
Messianic expectation, contemporary Judaism, the Early Church, and Jesus‘ ministry. He emphasizes ―the 
Sermon‘s connection to the rest of Matthew‘s gospel highlighting the relationship of God‘s gift and 
demand, of law and grace.‖ See Warren Carter, What are They Saying about Matthew’s Sermon on the 
Mount? (New York: Paulist Press, 1994), 2-3. See also William D. Davies, The Setting of the Sermon on 
the Mount (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966). 
1324
 The major works consulted throughout this chapter are as follows: Betz, The Sermon on the Mount; 
William D. Davies, and Dale C. Allison, Jr., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel 
According to Saint Matthew, vol. 1 (New York: Continuum, 1988); Harrington, The Gospel of Matthew; 
and Ulrich Luz, Matthew 1-7: A Commentary, trans. James E. Crouch (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 2007).  
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7.1 The Gospel according to Matthew: Some Basic Issues 
 
Authorship, Date and Place of Composition 
Although the gospel is traditionally associated with Matthew the tax collector (9:9) 
who became one of the twelve disciples called by Jesus (10:3), more and more scholars 
are suspicious of identifying the evangelist with Matthew the apostle.
1325
 Despite 
ambiguity about the actual identity of the author, the linguistic structure, the style of 
writing and, particularly the evangelist‘s knowledge of (and interest in) the Hebrew 
Scripture (and subsequent frequent use of Hebrew texts) as well as his awareness of 
Jewish debates about certain legal issues (like divorce and Sabbath observance) has 
convinced many scholars that the evangelist was beyond doubt a member of the Jewish 
community writing for Jews.
1326
 The evangelist‘s audience (and community) was 
likewise Jewish Christians who ―were involved in an ideological and theological struggle 
over which movement best preserved and represented the heritage of Israel after the 
capture of Jerusalem and the destruction of its temple in 70 CE.‖1327 
With regards to the issue of dating, both patristic writings (such as Didache 8) and 
the evangelist‘s apparent references to the destruction of the Jerusalem in the texts (21:41, 
22:7 and 27:25) indicate that the gospel was written after 70 CE and before the turn of the 
                                                 
1325
 For convenience‘s sake and in deference to convention, I refer to the evangelist as Matthew. 
1326
 Davies, and Allison, Jr. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, 9-33, 58. John Meier, however, by 
pointing out that the evangelist made certain errors regarding things Jewish, counter proposes that Matthew 
was either a learnt gentile scholar or a Greek-speaking Diaspora Jewish Christian. See John P. Meier, The 
Vision of Matthew: Christ, Church, and Morality in the First Gospel (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 22-
23. 
1327
 Daniel J. Harrington, The Synoptic Gospels Set Free: Preaching Without Anti-Judaism (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist Press, 2009), 8. 
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century. These and other external and internal allusions support the view that the earliest 
possible date of composition would be around 85 or 90 CE.  
Likewise, although there is no definite answer regarding the place of composition, 
it is generally understood that it was situated in a large Greek-speaking eastern 
Mediterranean city where a substantial Jewish community has settled. One widely 
circulated suggestion is Antioch of Syria. 
 
Setting and Purpose 
In order to find clues on why the evangelist would have composed the gospel, we 
need to first understand the various settings—especially the socio-historical, political, and 
religious settings—of the gospel. Historical criticism shows that the gospel was written in 
a time of crisis that affected the whole Jewish community of the late first century CE: 
After 70 CE Judaism was in its early stage of transition during which various 
movements/communities emerged (including early rabbis and Matthew‘s community).1328 
The survival of Judaism was at stake and hence the tension among these movements was 
severe. In short, the gospel was clearly set in the context of ancient Judaism. 
                                                 
1328
 It is thus noted that Judaism of that period was a very diverse and complex reality. Charles Talbert 
argues that Matthew‘s separation is one within Judaism and not from it. See Charles H. Talbert, Reading 
the Sermon on the Mount. Character Formation and Ethical Decision Making in Matthew 5-7 (Columbia, 
SC: University of South Carolina, 2004). Ulrich Luz, however, claims that Matthew‘s community was no 
longer belonging to the Jewish system and hence Matthew was not responding to a particular Jewish 
sect/movement but the overall Israel‘s no to Jesus. See Donald Senior, What are they Saying about 
Matthew? (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1996), 10. Senior cites J. Andrew Overman, Matthew’s Gospel and 
Formative Judaism: The Social World of the Matthean Community (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1990). See also Luz, Matthew 1-7: A Commentary, 54. 
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As far as Matthew‘s community was concerned,1329 on the one hand, their 
relationship with the broader Jewish community was complicated and a trace of 
sectarianism could be noted; on the other hand, the community was rather fearful of the 
gentile world and thus adopted a policy of distancing. In addition, the law-keeping 
community of Matthew seemed to be having difficulties with those ‗law-free‘ 
Christians.
1330
 As a whole, Matthew‘s community was somehow alienated from the rest 
of the world. Alongside with the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple and the presence of 
Roman (political and military) control, these circumstances had led the Jewish Christians 
of Matthew‘s community to seek identity and continuity (within discontinuity).  
Subsequently, the fundamental purpose of the gospel, as Harrington notes, was to 
point out that Jesus is ―the authoritative interpreter of the Torah and the fulfillment of 
Israel‘s hopes.‖1331 The best way to preserve their heritage is thus for Christian Jews like 
the evangelist himself to follow Jesus‘ teaching and example and to recognize him as the 
Son of David and the Lord.  
 
Sources and Nature 
Regarding the sources upon which Matthew drew for his writing, most Matthean 
scholars generally accept the so-called ‗two-source‘ hypothesis. They agree that the 
evangelist apparently employed the materials from the Markan gospel (like the death of 
                                                 
1329
 See David C. Sim, Apocalyptic Eschatology in the Gospel of Matthew (Cambridge and NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 181-221. Most scholars would agree that Matthew‘s community has separated 
from the synagogue. See Carter, What are They Saying about Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount? 62. 
1330
 The reason for Matthew‘s community to keep the entire law is, as Luz points out, because Jesus 
commands it (5:17-18). See Luz, Matthew 1-7: A Commentary, 48. 
1331
 Harrington, The Synoptic Gospels Set Free, 9. 
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John the Baptist in 14:3-12), the Sayings source Q
1332
 (like the Sermon on the Mount in 
5-7), and other oral (and/or written) traditions peculiar to Matthew (such as the infancy 
stories in 1:18-2:23). In particular, Matthew is noted for incorporating a lot of Mark‘s 
materials in his framework (including theological ideas such as the ‗Son of God‘ sayings); 
hence, the gospel is at times understood as the ‗revised‘ edition of Mark‘s gospel.1333 As 
a whole, German New Testament scholar Ulrich Luz comments that the evangelist is 
related to his sources both linguistically and theologically.
1334
 
Moreover, as will be discussed shortly, although there is no firm evidence that 
Matthew depended directly on particular Jewish apocalypse (and vice versa),
1335
 Matthew 
at least shared their apocalyptic theology.
1336
  
                                                 
1332
 The Saying source Q is referred to as a collection of Jesus‘ sayings. It is after the German word Quelle, 
meaning source. 
1333
 Ulrich Luz, The Theology of the Gospel of Matthew (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9. 
1334
 Luz, Matthew 1-7: A Commentary, 41-43. Luz further claims that such continuity between Matthew 
and his sources extends to sociological and historical continuity. See Luz, Matthew 1-7: A Commentary, 
49-52. 
1335
 Apocalypse is ―a genre of revelatory literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is 
mediated by an otherworldly being to a human recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both 
temporal, insofar as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another, 
supernatural world.‖ Adela Yarbro Collins, ed. ―Introduction: Early Christian Apocalypticism: Genre and 
Social Setting,‖ Semeia 36 (Decatur, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), 2. Based on this definition, two strands of 
Jewish apocalypse can be classified, namely, ‗historical‘ apocalypse that is characterized by visions (like 
the Daniel and 4 Ezra), and ‗otherworldly journey‘ apocalypse that has strong cosmological speculation 
(like 3 Baruch). They all share these essential features: The revelation of a supernatural world and the 
activity of supernatural beings; a final judgment and a destruction of the wicked; and a hortatory aspect. 
They also involve a transcendent eschatology that seeks retribution beyond the limits of history. Some 
scholars, however, propose that the themes of revelation and reversal (and promise of restoration of the 
fortunes of a group) as the only essential elements of apocalyptic genre. Yet, this proposal is criticized for 
not able to clearly distinguish apocalypses from prophetic literature. See John J. Collins, The Apocalyptic 
Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature, 2
nd
 ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1998), 5-11. Collins cites E. P. Sanders, ―The Genre of Palestinian Jewish Apocalypses,‖ in Apocalypticism 
in the Mediterranean World and the Near East: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on 
Apocalypticism, Uppsala, August 12-17, 1979, ed. David Hellholm, (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1983), 447-
59. See also Collins, ed. Early Christian Apocalypticism: Genre and Social Setting, 1. 
1336
 This apocalyptic theology or eschatology, in particular, is concerned with the coming of the Messiah, 
the judgment with rewards and punishments, and the arrival of the new world in its fullness. See Harrington, 
The Gospel of Matthew, 14.  
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Furthermore, taking into account the Jewish identity of the author and the settings 
of the gospel, it is logical to consider the gospel as fundamentally a Jewish text ―in its 
conceptual and rhetorical assumptions, in its sociological setting, and in its theological 
message.‖1337 In fact, the gospel is seen as the most Jewish gospel. However, it is 
sometimes portrayed as anti-Jewish for its polemical tone in certain texts (e.g., 27:25). In 
order to correct this inadequate view, Harrington points out that the polemical parts of the 
gospel should be framed within the ‗inner-Jewish‘ context:1338 The evangelist was solely 
pinpointing the Pharisees and scribes of his time and those Jewish officials who were 
responsible for the death of Jesus. In other words, within its original historical context, 
the Gospel of Matthew needs not be seen as anti-Jewish.  
 
Structure, Style, and Themes 
Luz observes that scholars generally agree on the fact the gospel can be divided 
into sections even though how it is divided is debatable.
1339
  The debate is due to the 
different structural principles like the literary (i.e., narratives vs. discourse) and 
geographical-chronological (i.e., Jesus‘ movement or life sequence) patterns employed in 
dividing the gospel.
1340
 Literary criticism, for instance, focuses on the narrative patterns 
and claims that Matthew was simply retelling the story according to Mark with his own 
                                                 
1337
 Harrington, The Gospel of Matthew, 2. 
1338
 Harrington, The Synoptic Gospels Set Free, 12-13. 
1339
 Luz, Matthew 1-7: A Commentary, 2. 
1340
 For example, some scholars propose that the Gospel is a three-part arrangement that deals with Jesus‘ 
person, proclamation, and passion. Others suggest that the Gospel has a chiastic outline with alternating 
narrative and discourse. See Talbert, Reading the Sermon on the Mount, 15-16. Dale Allison, however, 
notes that these principles tend to fall into two camps: Those who divide the Gospel into three parts based 
on the repeated phrase in 4:17 and 16:21, and those who adopt Benjamin Bacon‘s principle. See Dale C. 
Allison, Jr., Studies in Matthew: Interpretation Past and Present (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2005), 135. 
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various ideas and themes. The gospel is thus divided into three main sections (1:1-4:16; 
4:17-16:20 and 16:21-28:20) in which the second and third sections are corresponding to 
Mark‘s two major sections, namely, Jesus‘ ministry and preaching in Galilee and his 
journey to Jerusalem.
1341
 
Yet, many scholars continue to adopt Benjamin Bacon‘s principle1342—that there 
are five major speeches (chapters 5-7, 10, 13, 18, 24-25), each ending with ‗when Jesus 
finished these words‘. They also agree that the narratives alternate with discourses and 
triadic structure is employed.
1343
 For example, the Sermon on the Mount follows the 
extended introductory narrative in chapters 1-4 and precedes the narrative on Jesus‘ 
activities within Israel in chapters 8-9.  
Nevertheless, based on the evaluation of these diverse structural principles, a 
number of biblical scholars conclude that Matthew‘s ‗plan‘ was ―much less systematic 
and much richer in variety than most scholars have thought.‖1344  Rather, the gospel is 
structurally mixed despite its apparent unity.
1345
  
                                                 
1341
 Luz, Matthew 1-7: A Commentary, 4. 
1342
 This is Benjamin Bacon‘s so-called Pentateuchal theory: Each major speech contains a discourse and a 
narrative. This pattern seems to be modeled after the five books of the Pentateuch. See Senior, What are 
they Saying about Matthew? 26. Senior cites Benjamin W. Bacon, Studies in Matthew (London: Constable, 
1930). In this work, I adopt the traditional view that the Gospel is comprised of five great discourses and 
the preamble/epilogue. 
1343
 Talbert, Reading the Sermon on the Mount, 16. Talbert cites Davies, and Allison, Jr., A Critical and 
Exegetical Commentary, 1-7, 71-72.  
1344
 Senior, What are they Saying about Matthew? 35. 
1345
 Davies, and Allison, Jr., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, 72. Davies and Allison cite R. H. 
Gundry, Matthew: A Commentary on his Literary and Theological Art (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1982), 11 and James Moffatt, An Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament (New York: Scribner, 
1911), 244. 
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On the other hand, Matthew used various literary techniques to construct his 
gospel:
1346
 For instance, he gathered together materials that are similar in content or form 
(like the parables in 21:38-22:14 or the eschatological teaching in 24-25). Matthew also 
demonstrated a penchant for numbers (especially the triad) as learned Jews do with their 
Rabbinic texts. In addition, he was inclined to suggest his themes by repeating key words 
(like ‗righteousness‘ in 5-7) or summarizing statements (7:12). As a result, different 
understandings of the genre of the gospel emerge, such as the genre of ‗biography‘ as 
suggested by Burridge. Still, there exists a strong apocalyptic outlook within the gospel. 
With regards to the themes of the gospel, Harrington identifies five major themes: 
1) The God of Israel is the father of Jesus who is the preeminent presence of God. 2) The 
reign of the kingdom of heaven/God has begun and its fullness is yet to come. 3) Jesus, 
being the Son of God and of Man, and Messiah, is the present embodiment and 
manifestation of the kingdom of God, and the fulfillment of the Torah. 4) The disciples, 
though with little faith, are the closest followers of Jesus (and his teaching) and models 
for Christians. 5) The formation of Christian character through following Jesus and 
cultivating values and practices that help achieve the goal of human life, namely, with 
God in God‘s kingdom. Thus, all followers of Christ, including non-Jews, constitute the 
people of God.
1347
 
These themes somehow reflect the eschatological nature of the gospel:  The 
earthly Jesus as the Son of Man is an eschatological figure who inaugurates the age of 
                                                 
1346
 Luz, Matthew 1-7: A Commentary, 6; Davies, and Allison, Jr., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, 
73-96. Davies and Allison identify thirteen different literary styles and characteristics in Matthew. 
1347
 This understanding points to the question of the Gentile mission. See Luz, The Theology of the Gospel 
of Matthew, 15-21. 
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fulfillment, the kingdom of God.
1348
 In fact, the Gospel of Matthew has long been 
recognized as ―the most thoroughly ‗apocalyptic-eschatological‘ of the gospels in its 
general outlook.‖1349  
 
Apocalyptic-eschatological Outlook 
The Jewish messianic and eschatological apocalyptic movements continued to 
survive and flourish into early Christianity and its writings.
1350
 One such example is the 
character of the Sayings source Q: ―Q‘s perspective is framed both spatially by 
transcendent realities…and temporally by the coming judgment…and the eschatological 
meal in the Kingdom…[For] Q, as for some other expressions of Christian 
apocalypticism, the present already partakes of eschatological realities.‖1351 Thus, 
although there is only one apocalyptic text in the New Testament (the book of 
Revelation), the Synoptic gospels ―are colored by an apocalyptic worldview to a 
significant degree‖ because of the person of Jesus.1352 
                                                 
1348
 Jack Dean Kingsbury, ―The Significance of the Earthly Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew,‖ Ex auditu 14 
(1998): 61-62, 65. 
1349
 Sim, 2n. Sim quotes F. C. Grant, The Gospels: Their Origin and Their Growth (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1957), 137. 
1350
 Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination, 260. Collins cites Adela Yarbro Collins, ―The Early Christian 
Apocalypses,‖ Semeia 14 (1979): 61-121. 
1351
 Ibid., 259. Collins quotes John S. Kloppenborg, ―Symbolic Eschatology and the Apocalypticism of Q,‖ 
HTR 80 (1987): 296. 
1352
 Ibid., 256-57. Robert Miller notes that there is a debate on whether Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet. 
One representative of those who give confirmative answer is Dale Allison. Those who reject this view are 
represented by the members of Jesus Seminar. See Robert J. Miller, ―Introduction,‖ in The Apocalyptic 
Jesus: A Debate, ed. Robert J. Miller (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge Press, 2001), 2-11. Miller points out that 
the ‗kingdom‘ sayings of Jesus, his other ambiguous sayings/deeds, as well as his relationship to the 
apocalyptic thinking of his time can be interpreted either way. In this work, I basically agree with the 
majority‘s/Allison‘s view. 
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Moreover, all the characteristics of Jewish apocalyptic theology—and apocalyptic 
eschatology in particular—are present in the Gospel of Matthew:1353 In the first place, the 
use of cosmic terms (like angels in 4:11 and the evil ones in 13:19), parables (such as the 
parable of the weeds in 13:24-30, 36-43), and comparative terms (the narrow and wide 
gates in 7:13-14, or the faithful and wicked servants in 24:45-51) reveals the evangelist‘s 
adoption of a completely dualistic perspective.  
Second, the gospel is also deterministic regarding the course of history. Both the 
portrayal of Jesus as the fulfillment of the Old Testament (26:56) and his 
knowledge/prophecy of the future (26: 21-25) presuppose that what God has set in 
motion is a history that cannot be changed.
1354
  
Third, Matthew identifies Jesus with the Son of Man
1355
 who had a historical 
mission (8:20, 9:6), is now at the right hand of God (28:16-20), and will return in glory in 
                                                 
1353
 Sim identifies six characteristics of Jewish apocalyptic theology: First, it highlights dualism on various 
levels (such as the present vs. the future). Second, it has a deterministic view of history in that God remains 
in control of all events. Third, within the present time, terrible things are fast approaching and a savior will 
arrive. Fourth, the arrival of the savior introduces the eschatological events—the final and universal 
judgment. Fifth, it concentrates on the reversal of present circumstances in near future. Sixth, there is the 
imminence of the end. Sim, 35-53, 70. The following account is based on Sim‘s reconstruction of the 
Gospel of Matthew. I slightly rearrange its order here. See Sim, 75-177. Apart from these characteristics, 
some scholars further note that the symbol of ‗kingdom‘ found in the Gospel ―lent itself to an 
eschatological interpretation in the context of Jewish literature from around the turn of the era, especially in 
literature deriving from the land of Israel that was originally composed in a Semitic language.‖ They also 
suggest that John the Baptist‘s preaching about the coming of an apocalyptic judgment as narrated by 
Matthew has an eschatological orientation (of restoration) that is typical of the apocalypses. See Collins, 
258-60. Collins cites R. L. Webb, John the Baptizer and Prophet: A Socio-Historical Study (Sheffield: 
JSOT, 1991); Joan E. Taylor, The Immerser: John the Baptist within Second Temple Judaism (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997); and E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 
1985). 
1354
 Sim rightly points out that on the individual level Matthew upholds the notion of free will and 
repentance. He further notes that this inconsistency is commonly found in apocalyptic-eschatological 
writings of that time. 
1355
 Some scholars point out that the ‗Son of Man‘ and ‗Messiah‘ sayings play a significant role in revealing 
the apocalyptic eschatology entailed in Jesus‘ teaching and deeds. In particular, the belief that Jesus as the 
Son of Man has risen and ascended, and will come on the clouds of heaven becomes the key to early 
Christian apocalypticism. See Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination, 261-64. 
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the end time (24:4-31). He also frequently refers to the future coming of the Son of Man 
at the end time (e.g. 10:23; 16:27-28). In addition, he provides us with various 
eschatological scenarios (e.g. 24:4-31). All these echo the characteristic of apocalyptic 
eschatology with regards to the arrival of a savior and the coming of end time events. 
Fourth, both Matthew‘s terminology (like ‗harvest‘ in 3:12 or ‗on that day‘ in 
7:22) and the description of eschatological scenarios converge on the final and universal 
judgment characterized by apocalyptic eschatology. Thus, Matthew depicts Jesus as the 
Son of Man who will be the judge (19:28; 25:31) and describes the scene of judgment in 
detail (in 7:21-23 and 25:31-46). 
Fifth, subsequently, the final judgment and related parables (like the feast banquet 
in 8:11-12) depicted by Matthew foretell the fates of the wicked and the righteous: The 
fate of the wicked is eternal punishment (25:46) while the fate of the righteous is the state 
of the Beatitudes (5:3-10). This description of Matthew is in tune with common 
apocalyptic eschatological thinking that there will be a reversal of fates in the 
eschatological future. 
Sixth, the evangelist likewise detailed the imminence of the end in his gospel, in 
16:28 and 24:24. And the mission discourse in 9:37-10:42 further affirms this view in 
that the disciples will receive comfort in times of distress (10:22). 
Why, then, would Matthew embrace apocalypticism
1356
 and take recourse to 
apocalyptic eschatology? Historical criticism suggests that it is closely related to the 
                                                 
1356
 Robert Miller notes that there is a distinction between the terms ‗eschatology‘ and ‗apocalypticism‘. 
Eschatology within biblical studies refers to a particular way of thinking that is centered on the end time. 
Although Jewish and Christian traditions have different eschatological hopes, both are convinced that God 
will prevail in the end of history. Apocalypticism, in contrast, is a kind of eschatology and, as will be seen 
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socio-historical setting of the Matthean community:
1357
 The characteristics of apocalyptic 
eschatology allow the community to legitimate their existence and sectarian inclination in 
times of isolation. They also allow the evangelist to explain the current situation of the 
community. They further provide consolation and hope for the future, and satisfy the 
need for vengeance. In short, the gospel was constructed in such a way that dealt with the 
needs of the community at a time of difficulty. And the value of Jewish apocalypses lies 
not so much in the providing information about cosmology or future history as in their 
simple affirmation of a transcendent world.
1358
 
In offering pragmatic ethical values, apocalyptic literature ―shape[s] one‘s 
imaginative perception of a situation and so lay[s] the basis for whatever course of action 
it exhorts.‖1359 Its language is commissive in character: It commits us to a worldview that 
entails certain actions and attitudes.
1360
 The ethical value of apocalyptic literature ―lies in 
its demand for a committed life in the face of fierce opposition and conflict, even dualism 
in the realities of good and evil in the world.‖1361 
Many of the basic issues we have covered here are not absolutely resolved; for 
example, biblical scholars still debate on whether Matthew is anti-Jewish. Still, a general 
understanding of the gospel writer, his community, and the gospel itself can be grasped. 
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In particular, the presence of Jewish apocalyptic theology (and eschatology) in the gospel 
is singularly highlighted for it has significant impact on, among others, the evangelist‘s 
views of eschatology, discipleship and attitude toward the Law. From the perspective of 
Christian ethics, Matthew‘s eschatology provides a framework for all of Christian life.1362 
As Harrington points out, on the surface, the Gospel of Matthew seems problematic in a 
number of issues—such as traces of moralism, anti-Judaism, patriachalism, and 
legalism—but these issues can also be interpreted constructively.1363 They also help pave 
the way to our interpretation of the texts as ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. With such 
understanding I now turn to the Sermon on the Mount and its issues in order to lay out the 
proximate setting of the Beatitudes. 
 
7.2 The Sermon on the Mount: Some Specific Issues 
 
Its Place within the Gospel 
Matthew‘s Sermon on the Mount is situated toward the beginning of the 
gospel.
1364
 As far as the storyline of the gospel is concerned, Jesus has started his 
teaching and ministry in Galilee and the people from everywhere were drawn by him and 
to him. He went up to the mountain and addressed the disciples and the crowds (4:23-5:1). 
For those who hold the view that the gospel consists of five major speeches, the Sermon 
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is the first of these five discourses. However, the Sermon is by no means an independent 
speech. Matthean scholars William Davies and Dale Allison, for example, say, ―Although 
the SM has a narrative beginning and conclusion, it should not be partitioned off and 
given a special interpretation…The broader context must be kept in mind.‖1365 Harrington 
likewise states that it ―must never be detached from the narrative of Jesus as told by 
Matthew…[for] it is part of the story of Jesus.‖1366 In other words, the Sermon must not 
be treated as an independent speech and ethical treatise but as an integrated part of the 
whole gospel.  
Yet, Jack Dean Kingsbury notes that there is no consensus among scholars 
regarding the exact place and role of the Sermon within the overall plan of Matthew:
1367
 
Those who employ literary criticism, on the one hand, insist that the narration of Jesus‘ 
passion is the climatic feature of Matthew and hence perceive the Sermon as simply ―the 
example par excellence‖ of Jesus‘ ministry of teaching. Others who employ different 
critical methods, on the other hand, claim that the Sermon dominates the whole of the 
gospel, for ―from it one gains insight into the structure of the Gospel and into its nature 
and purpose.‖1368 Betz, by interpreting the Sermon‘s involvement of discussion of Jewish 
religious issues, further claims that the Sermon enjoys a peculiar relationship with Jewish 
scholarship that is not extended to the rest of the gospel (nor the New Testament as a 
whole). He thus concludes that the entire work of the evangelist is in a sense a 
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commentary on the Sermon although it never explicitly refers to the Sermon again.
1369
 
Allison, in contrast, takes a more nuanced path by pointing out that ―most of the topics 
covered in the Sermon come up again elsewhere in Matthew, where they are often treated 
at further length.‖1370 Nevertheless, the general view is that the Sermon plays an 
important role in the gospel. 
 
Genre 
The origin of the designation of the notion of ‗sermon‘ can be traced back to 
Augustine. However, Betz finds this traditional notion is too broad and thus 
unsatisfactory:
1371
 Matthew‘s use of οἱ λόγοι and ἡ διδατή implies that the Sermon, 
strictly speaking, is not really a speech (λόγος) but a group of ‗sayings‘ or ‗teachings‘ 
respectively. By examining the ‗two ways‘ motif in 7:13-14 (―Enter through the narrow 
gate; for the gate is wide and the road is easy that leads to destruction, and there are many 
who take it. For the gate is narrow and the road is hard that leads to life, and there are few 
who find it.‖) and evaluating its subsequent meaning in light of certain Hellenistic 
ethical/rhetoric literature, Betz then proposes that the specific literary genre of the 
Sermon is one of epitome: An epitome is ―a condensation of a larger work, made by a 
redactor…for a specific purpose…[with] brevity and precision in selection and 
formulation…intended to be a systematic synopsis…[and] intended for those who have 
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[already] made considerable progress.‖1372 As an epitome the Sermon systematically and 
selectively presents the teaching of Jesus and provides the necessary information/tool for 
the disciples of Jesus to creatively implement the teaching in concrete life. Betz further 
claims that the Sermon was oral in nature and in function in spite of being composed as 
written texts.
1373
 
Allison, however, is convinced that the Sermon, rather than being codes of law, is 
partially a poetic text that is both dramatic and pictorial. He also notes that the Sermon 
employs hyperbole that is common among Semitic literature.
1374
 Harrington, from a 
different perspective, suggests that the Sermon is closest to the wisdom instructions 
found in Jewish wisdom literature, especially Proverbs 1-9 and 22-24, Qoheleth, and 
Sirach.
1375
 
 
Sources and Settings 
If we follow the ‗two-source‘ hypothesis and employ source criticism, we will 
note that much of the Sermon on the Mount is originated from the Q document.
1376
  As a 
result, Matthew‘s Sermon is sometimes called the ‗Q Sermon‘. One concrete text of this 
so-called ‗Q Sermon‘ is Jesus‘ radical teaching on ‗love your enemies‘ in 5:38-48. 
However, Matthew did not simply copy from the Q sayings but also carried out 
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redactional work by means of expansions, changes, and reorganization of the order.
1377
 A 
second source employed by the evangelist is the diverse, assortment of material 
(sometimes called the M source) peculiar to him alone, such as 6:1-6, 16-18. A third 
possible (and yet debatable) source, as promoted by the Jesus Seminar, is the person of 
Jesus himself. Others like Davies further sought to find rabbinic parallels and 
demonstrate that Matthew 5-7 is illuminated by a particular type of rabbinic activity.
1378
 
Still, although only a few verses in the Sermon have possible parallels in Mark, 
Matthew might have borrowed from Mark certain sayings and motifs (Mark 3:7-13) in 
his introduction of the Sermon, and inserted the Sermon between Mark 1:21 (//Matthew 
5:2) and 1:22 (//Matthew 7:28-29).
1379
 Based on the investigation of the mountain 
settings in Matthew, some scholars further claim that the Sermon is actually based on the 
―Mark‘s account of the mountain-top commissioning of the Twelve.‖1380  
Finally, Jewish scholar Gerald Friedlander argues for the presence of Jewish 
influence by recalling Tertullian‘s words that the Sermon is ―in agreement with the spirit 
and teaching of the Hebrew Scriptures…[and thus] contains nothing new.‖1381 
As a whole, despite this diversity, one can still claim that the Sermon is at least a 
discourse ―constructed out of discrete sayings either by the anonymous redactors of Q, or 
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by the evangelist.‖1382 And Matthew creatively shapes and interprets those materials 
passed on to him by the early Christian community. 
Being an integrated, important part of the gospel, the Sermon likewise has ―its 
background in rabbinic discussions after A. D. 70 and in the political and social 
conditions of the period.‖1383 Davies thus reminds us that the Sermon needs to be situated 
―in the wider context not only of Matthew‘s gospel but of Judaism and the early 
Church…[for Matthew 5-7 was formulated] in direct confrontation with Pharisaic 
Judaism.‖1384 Together with Allison, Davies further claims that the Sermon is also set in a 
Mosaic context:
1385
 The intentional parallels between Matthew 1-5 and the story of 
Moses indicate that Jesus who delivers the speech is the new Moses, Messiah and 
eschatological lawgiver. Consequently, the Sermon can be understood as the messianic 
Torah in that the Sermon is the teaching of the Messiah who affirms, interprets, and 
deepens the Old Law.  
 
The Mountain and the Audience  
One of the explicit differences between Luke‘s Sermon and Matthew‘s is the 
geographical location where the Sermon was delivered. Matthew‘s Sermon is said to be 
delivered on a mountain instead of a plain. Traditionally, Mount Sinai and Mount Zion 
―[have] dominated the topology of first-century imaginations nurtured by the Old 
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Testament.‖1386 In both instances the symbolic-theological setting is more important than 
historical-geographical setting. Which, then, was the mountain of teaching in Matthew‘s 
gospel? Harrington points out that any attempt to determine the exact site is rather useless 
for there are many mountains along the western shore of the Sea of Galilee.
1387
 Still, the 
common view is that Mount Sinai was the place for it was there that the Torah was given 
and thus fits the view that Jesus came to promulgate a New Law.  Terence Donaldson, 
who is interested in examining the mountain symbolisms and settings in the Bible, 
however, argues for a Zion typology, claiming that Matthew‘s emphasis of Jesus as the 
new messianic Moses points to Mount Zion that played a role in eschatology, and that ―in 
Jewish expectation one aspect of the consummation on Mount Zion was to be a new 
giving of the Torah.‖1388  
With regards to the specific audience to whom the Sermon was delivered, the 
flow of the story indicates that the first disciples and the crowds are the intended 
audience (5:1-2). Betz, who perceives that the Sermon as an epitome, suggests that 
Matthew 5-7 was meant to instruct the disciples alone while the gospel was intended by 
Matthew as for the Jewish Christian community.
1389
 Harrington, on the contrary, claims, 
―The mention of the disciples in 5:1 needs not exclude the crowds,‖ as 7:28-29 
confirms.
1390
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Purpose 
Many scholars suggest that the Sermon is meant to ―[proclaim] the definitive and 
authoritative teaching of Jesus for [the] community…[and provide] guidance on how 
disciples of Jesus are to live and [sustain] the community‘s self-understanding in a 
situation of transition and marginality.‖1391 In other words, it is aimed at interpreting the 
Matthean community‘s concrete experience in relation to discipleship and providing 
direction and encouragement. 
Donaldson adds that Matthew ―attempt[s] to present the Sermon as Christian 
Torah and Jesus as the new Moses.‖1392 Allison similarly claims that the Sermon as a 
discourse ―presupposes and teaches important things about its speaker, whose identity is 
crucial for interpretation.‖1393 In short, the Sermon tells us who Jesus is. 
 
Themes and Structure 
According to Harrington, the basic theme of the Sermon is that ―Jesus came not to 
abolish the Law or the Prophets but to fulfill them,‖ as indicated in 5:17.1394 Still, based 
on Jesus‘ pronouncement at 5:20 (―unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes 
and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven‖), many scholars would add 
that ‗greater righteousness‘ is the structuring principle and core theme of the Sermon. For 
them this ‗greater righteousness‘ is the kind of lifestyle of the disciples who devote 
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themselves to God wholeheartedly by doing God‘s will.1395 However, others counter-
propose that the notion of ‗Father‘ is the core subject matter of the Sermon and hence 
argue that the Lord‘s prayer is the heart of Matthew 5-7.1396 
In either case, the structure of the Sermon is determined by the themes identified. 
For those who focus on the theme of ‗greater righteousness‘, the Sermon can therefore be 
divided into five parts:
1397
 The first part specifies those who practice the greater 
righteousness, namely, those who live according to the Beatitudes and as ‗salt of the 
earth‘ and ‗light of the world‘ (5:3-16). The following three parts focus on the kinds of 
practices Jesus demands—toward the neighbor (5:17-48); before God, (6:1-18); and in 
other areas of life with the Golden Rule as the culmination of all practices (6:19-7:12). 
The final part contains certain concluding commands on practicing the greater 
righteousness (7:13-27). 
Among those who claim the centrality of the Lord‘s prayer (6:9-13), some 
perceive the rest of the Sermon is a continuation of the prayer while others propose their 
own constructions.
1398
  Allison, for example, constructs the Sermon and centers the 
Lord‘s prayer around various triads:1399 Apart from introduction (4:23-5:2) and 
conclusion (7:28-8:1), the rest of the texts are divided into three parts, namely, the 
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Beatitudes (5:3-12), the task of God‘s people in the world (5:13-7:12), and warnings and 
judgment (7:13-27). The middle part, that is, the task of the people of God, consists of 
three pillars—Jesus and the Torah (5:17-48), the Christian cult (6:1-18), and social issues 
(6:19-7:12).
1400
  
Luz, who also notes the evangelist‘s fondness of tripartite division, divides the 
Sermon into three parts based on a chiastic structure:
1401
 In particular, he highlights that 
the central text is 6:1-18 within which the Lord‘s Prayer is exactly the middle of the 
entire Sermon. He further comments that the overall structure of the Sermon resulting 
from Matthew‘s redactional revision is a work of art in which symmetry, poise and unity 
is found. Thus, he insists that the Sermon has to be treated as a holistic entity. 
Still, there are some scholars who suggest that the Beatitudes provides the 
structure for the Sermon:
1402
  The rest of the Sermon is basically an expansion in reverse 
order of the Beatitudes by means of triadic illustration. For instance, they claim that the 
eighth beatitude (in 5:10) is elaborated in 5:11-16. 
Again, there is no real agreement among scholars on what the core theme of the 
Sermon is and how its structure be studied. Still, Joseph Fitzmyer rightly comments that 
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Matthew‘s Sermon on the Mount is better structured than Luke‘s Sermon on the Plain for 
it is constructed around a single core theme.
1403
 
 
A Radical Ethics for All? 
As we saw above, some scholars consider the Sermon as an epitome that presents 
the teaching of Jesus and offers guidance for the disciples to creatively live out the 
teaching in concrete life. This implies that Matthew 5-7 has an explicit ethical function 
for its audience.
1404
 The Sermon is the summation of Jesus‘ moral demand that implicitly 
implies the motif of the imitation of Christ who is the moral exemplar.
1405
  
In fact, during the patristic period Augustine had already understood the Sermon 
as ―measured by the highest norms of morality, the perfect pattern of the Christian life 
[intended for all].‖1406 Luther, while rejecting the traditional view that the Sermon is an 
ethics of the perfect for the spiritual elite, also interpreted the Sermon as an ethics of 
repentance for all Christians.
1407
 Still, later on, the Sermon was interpreted by some 
theologians as either an ethics of law or an ethics of ideal.
1408
 
Harrington notes, however, that the ethical teaching of Matthew 5-7 is analogous 
to Jewish halakah—advice on how the Jews are to behave.1409 Still, he adds that the 
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Sermon is not so much concerned with deciding halakic matters but rather with principles 
and attitudes, and it has both personal and communal ethical implications.
1410
 New 
Testament scholar Charles Talbert further claims that the Sermon has a twofold concrete 
ethical function of ―[serving] as a catalyst for the formation of character…[and 
contributing] to decision making.‖1411  
Nevertheless, these biblical scholars rightly remind us that the ethics of the 
Sermon cannot be separated from the theme of the kingdom of God for it is already 
present in the person of Jesus.
1412
 
However, reflection and discussion on the eschatological nature and ethical 
demand of Matthew 5-7 lead these same scholars to raise the questions of whether the 
Sermon on the Mount contains radical ethics or not, and whether they are meant for all 
people. We have already seen that there is a spectrum of views throughout history:
1413
 
Monastic and medieval commentators perceived the radical teachings as counsels of 
perfection only for certain people; Luther rejected this idea and claimed that the Sermon 
was intended for all even though the demands were impracticable. Reinhold Niebuhr 
likewise perceives that the Sermon ―has the character of a norm that is impossible of 
fulfillment by humans.‖1414 Those who employ the historical critical method, in contrast, 
suggest that the eschatological tone of the gospel would imply an interim ethics of the 
Sermon. 
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In order to respond to these questions, Kingsbury argues that the reality of sin and 
of the disciples‘ little faith is not the determining factor of Jesus‘ ethics; rather, it is the 
reality of God‘s eschatological kingdom that counts—insofar as the kingdom of heaven is 
a present reality, an ethics of greater righteousness is possible.
1415
 Allison thus suggests 
that only when reading the Sermon in light of its eschatological orientation (which is an 
important characteristic of Matthew‘s gospel) that the Sermon‘s radical demands can be 
explained.
1416
 In a similar way, Harrington comments that although Matthew places 
Jesus‘ teaching in an eschatological framework, much of Jesus‘ teaching concerns 
behaviors in the present as well.
1417
 Thus, acting out the Sermon is possible. 
With Allison, Davies further points out that ―while moral perfection cannot be 
achieved, nevertheless one‘s character is built up as one earnestly struggles.‖1418 They 
then conclude that the Sermon is ―not about what we should do but about what we should 
be‖ and the ideal posted by the Sermon is a necessity—it has the ultimate end in the 
Sermon is view and sets forth the means to that end.
1419
 
Finally, by adopting John Climacus‘s view on virtue, Allison suggests that the 
Sermon‘s ethical demand can be perceived as a ladder or as a challenge to Christians to 
become better over the course of time.
1420
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A Summary 
So far I have explored some specific issues regarding the Sermon. We note that 
many of these issues are still undergoing debates and conflicting approaches are present. 
However, they are helpful to construct my own approach: 
 The Sermon is closely related to, and plays an important role in the larger context 
of the gospel. It is more than an epitome and is in close relation with the Jewish wisdom 
literature. The classical two-source hypothesis seems helpful in our understanding of the 
sources of the Sermon and its Jewish/Mosaic settings. Moreover, the primary audience of 
the Sermon tends to be both the disciples and the Israelites who came to listen to Jesus. 
The Sermon depicts Jesus‘ identity as not just the eschatological prophet and moral 
exemplar but the Son of God whose teaching guides us to live out our Christian moral life 
(especially in the midst of difficulty). We are called to have a righteousness that is greater 
than that of the Jewish Pharisees and scribes. Therefore, the ethical demands posed by 
Jesus in the Sermon, when understood in light of eschatological orientation that 
characterizes the gospel, are both possible and realistic. Furthermore, in order to grasp the 
entire teaching of Jesus delivered on the mountain, one must treat it as a united whole 
even though it can be divided structurally into various parts. 
Finally, these findings help us to put the Beatitudes in its proper place and offer us 
needed information that can serve as guidelines in our exegesis of the Beatitudes. In the 
following pages I conclude our background exploration by looking at some critical and 
immediate issues regarding the Beatitudes. 
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7.3 The Beatitudes: Some Critical and Immediate Issues 
 
The Meanings of ‘beatitude’ and ‘blessed’ 
Matthew 5:3-10 is often called the Beatitudes. The term ‗beatitude‘ is derived 
from the Latin beatitudo and is equivalent to the Greek term μακάριζμος (macarism) 
which could have an Egyptian origin.
1421
 It is derived from the adjective μακάριος 
(meaning blessed or happy) and designates a literary genre. In classical Greek literature, 
the blessed is one who ―takes cognizance of the essential harmony which binds him to 
society and to the world.‖1422 Another Greek adjective that has a similar meaning is 
εσδαιμων. It is the adjective for eudaimonia, the notion that was employed by Aristotle in 
his discussion of human happiness. The evangelist, however, opted for μακάριος for a 
specific reason: It points toward the divine realm—it refers to the divine happiness that is 
intended by Jesus for his followers.
1423
 According to Davies and Allison, the adjective 
μακάριος was first found in the work of Pindar (~518BCE) and meant ―‗free from daily 
cares and worries‘, ‗prosperous‘, and was used of the blessed state of the gods, who 
neither toiled nor suffered.‖1424 Only later on did it take on various forms and was evoked 
by diverse spectrum of objects, ranging from praiseworthy children to virtue and wisdom. 
Still, it was always attached to divine providence. 
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As a literary genre macarism refers to a form initiated by μακάριος and means a 
living, multi-sided form of speech when used in the predicative form.
1425
 By examining 
some of the oldest macarisms found in Egyptian literature, Betz suggests that this kind of 
literary form was originated in the liturgical context of religious, mystery cults.
1426
 As a 
whole, both ancient Egyptian and Greek macarisms bear the following characteristics: ―1) 
Their original function is in the ritual. 2) Their nature is that of declarative statements. 3) 
The future orientation is eschatological as well as this worldly. 4) They are connected 
with ethics and morality.‖1427 
Later on, the conventional understanding of macarism—which sanctions 
materialism—was transformed and brought in line with the Greek philosophical trend of 
its day:
1428
 Macarisms were employed by philosophers to formulate a philosophical idea 
in a succinct way, and at times to serve as an introduction to the didactic texts that follow. 
For instance, the ‗macarism of the wise man‘ slowly emerged to counter the conventional 
view. 
Nevertheless, macarisms are also found in the Sacred Scripture (Psalm 1) and the 
adjective is commonly translated into ‗happy‘ and ‗blessed‘ to denote the happiness 
bestowed by God upon those who receive God‘s blessings.1429 Although some biblical 
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scholars find these translations either inadequate or unsuitable,
1430
 I follow the English 
translations adopted by the New Revised Standard Version (i.e., ‗blessed‘) although the 
original meaning of μακάριος is kept throughout this work. 
 
‘Beatitude’ (Macarism) in the Bible 
In the Hebrew Bible, the word ashre (meaning ‗happy‘), though not applied to 
God and less sacred, was the basis of the Septuagint translation.
1431
 It appears forty-five 
times; among them over one half occur in the Psalms and some thirty verses begin their 
sentence with this word.
1432
  
The macarisms in the Old Testament usually appear either in pairs or in series (as 
in Sirach 14:1-2; 25:8-10):
1433
 Specifically, they first appeared in the wisdom literature 
and later employed in apocalyptic writings such as the book of Daniel (12:12). And 
different types of usage are noted: Some macarisms pronounce blessings on ethical 
conducts that are offered as models (as in Genesis 30:13 and Proverbs 3:13) and thus 
point to moral exhortation; others speak of the happiness that is granted and indicate the 
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nature of these blessings (such as Psalm 144:12-15). In addition, they assume that the 
good deeds are rewarded in the present. Those beatitudes found in apocalyptic literature, 
in contrast, focus on assurance and the proffering of hope in future. Blessings are 
pronounced in the present and promises are to follow, as in Tobit 13:14. These 
eschatological macarisms also lead to the development of their counterparts, 
eschatological woes. They are employed as a literary effort to ―create, or recreate, an 
apocalyptic vision in the imagination of the reader of the apocalyptic book.‖1434 
In the New Testament, μακάριος appears around fifty times. Most of them are 
found in the gospels of Matthew and Luke, and are all used to express religious joy.
1435
 
Similar to what is observed in the Old Testament macarisms, New Testament macarisms 
are also diverse in forms and types, and are likewise divided into wisdom and 
eschatological macarisms, as in Romans 14:22 and Revelation 19:9 respectively.
1436
 They 
also appear either in isolation (as in Matthew 11:6; 13:16) or in series—our Matthean 
Beatitudes is a typical example of the latter form.
1437 
 
 
Jewish Influences, Sources, and Development of the Beatitudes 
While the genre of macarism might have ancient Egyptian and Greek origin, Betz 
points out that the macarisms in 5:3-10 are developed out of a Jewish matrix: They share 
the tradition of Jewish wisdom literature despite bearing the characteristics of ancient 
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Egyptian and Greek macarisms.
1438
 Not surprisingly, some exegetes conclude that the 
Matthean beatitudes are sayings of a sophisticated literary nature.
1439
 
As far as the content is concerned, many scholars note that the Beatitudes is 
closely related to certain Old Testament texts, especially passages from the Second Isaiah 
(57, 61, 66), and Psalm 37 (as well as Psalms 24 and 73).
1440
 In order to understand the 
close connection between the Beatitudes and these texts, New Testament scholar George 
Wesley Buchanan explains that it was common for early Jews/Christians to prove their 
arguments by quoting authoritative scriptural texts.  
However, Buchanan insists, ―In dealing with the Beatitudes…it is not enough to 
recognize the quotations of scripture included in them. These texts must be understood 
against their entire background.‖1441 The Babylonian Jews would be redeemed by their 
Lord who also redeems Jerusalem, proclaims good news to the afflicted, and comforts 
those who mourn.
1442
 It was ―this mythological background upon which the author of the 
Beatitudes appealed, assuming that his readers were in the same situation as the captive 
Jews in Babylon.‖1443  
While much of the Sermon on the Mount is originated from the Sayings source Q, 
is the Beatitudes likewise originated from the Q source, if there is also the Lukan version? 
By analyzing the detailed wording of both versions of the Beatitudes as well as the 
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themes occurring in these texts, Christopher Tuckett affirms the widely assumed view 
that at least the three common beatitudes of Matthew (5:3, 4, 6) and Luke (6:20b, 21)  are 
dependent on Q.
1444
 He further claims that all the differences between the two versions 
(such as the additional beatitudes of Matthew and the woes in Luke) are simply due to the 
redaction of the evangelists rather than the result of using slightly different versions of 
the Q source by them.
1445
 Unfortunately, this view is not without challenges, especially 
by those who think that Luke used Matthew.
1446
 As a result, there is no overwhelming 
consensus regarding the exact relationship between the two versions.  
Still, if one takes the view of Tuckett, then stages of redactional development of 
the Beatitudes can be proposed as follows:
1447
 There were three original beatitudes (vv3, 
4, 6) found in both Matthew and Luke that existed before the canonical gospels (i.e., Q 
source) and can be traced back to the historical Jesus. They were expanded with the 
addition of the fourth beatitude (v 5) and all of them employ the ‗π‘ alliteration.1448 
Matthew added three beatitudes that he found in the tradition that reflect the concerns for 
greater righteousness (vv7-9). Finally he rearranged the order and added the eighth one (v 
10) so as to form two balanced sets of beatitude. 
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(vv 7-9) were then composed and added to form eight beatitudes. Matthew finally composed and added 
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The Unity and Structure of the Beatitudes 
Borrowing Luz‘s words, a first glance of the beatitudes gives the impression that 
they are ―self-contained and compactly composed.‖1449 Indeed, a good number of biblical 
scholars are convinced that such a unity is found: Luz himself, for example, claims that 
the first and the eighth beatitudes enclose the texts with the same, long concluding clause 
to form a single unit. New Testament scholar Alfred Plummer also addresses them as 
―eight different elements of excellence which may all be combined in one individual, 
who may acquire them in any order, or simultaneously.‖1450 John Meier comments that 
these verses ―form an ingenious and harmonious whole.‖1451 In sum, the consistency and 
unity of the eight beatitudes lies in their shared meaning, repetition, scriptural 
background, and stylistic composition.
1452
 
However, there is no consensus among scholars on how they are structurally 
united.
1453
 There are two dominating views. Among those who hold the view that there 
are two sets of four beatitudes,
1454
 some note that, based on linguistic evidence, the first 
four beatitudes are grouped together for they employ adjectives that begin with the Greek 
‗π‘ sound. Both sets conclude with the use of righteousness and contain an equal number 
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of (36) words. Moreover, while the first set focuses on the persecuted (passive) condition 
of the disciples, the second set treats the ethical qualities that lead to persecution. Others 
suggest that the Beatitudes can be divided into those emphasizing the disciple‘s vertical 
relationship to God and horizontal relationship to others.
1455
  
Among those who perceive the Beatitudes as comprised of inclusions, they first 
point out that the first and the eighth beatitudes employ the enveloping present tense of 
the verbs as well as the same, concluding clause.
1456
 Building upon this perception, some 
of them propose a chiastic structure:
1457
 Within this chiastic layout, certain structural 
characteristics, such as parallels, rhyme, and alliteration between individual Beatitudes 
are identified. For instance, the Beatitudes consists of an alternating arrangement of pairs 
in which ―the rhyming future passive…alternates with an active verbal form.‖1458 Based 
on these structural characteristics, some scholars further suggest that the Beatitudes 
demonstrates the kind of poetic structure defining Hebrew poetry.
1459
 
In sum, although a universally agreed structure of the Beatitudes may not be 
possible, many biblical exegetes recognize that the Beatitudes is one of the most carefully 
crafted passages and there is a sophisticated web of relationships between the individual 
beatitudes.
1460
 
Regarding the internal structure of each of the eight beatitudes, each macarism is 
comprised of a two-line statement: The first line (protasis) is introduced by μακάριοι 
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while the second one (apodosis) begins with όηι (meaning ‗for/that/because‘) and is 
followed by a promise.
1461
 And as far as its content is concerned, each beatitude has a 
pronouncement concerning who the blessed is as well as a promise concerning why one 
is blessed.
1462
  
However, Augustine argued that there are seven beatitudes, though this has not 
been widely accepted and ongoing debate among scholars continues:
1463
 Many scholars 
insist that there are eight of them and argue that ―verse 11 involves a change from the 
third to the second person plural…[and] verse 12 has a different beginning 
altogether…[thus] the composition destroys the pattern of serial beatitudes.‖1464 Still, 
there are some scholars like Davies, Allison, and Harrington, who would include verses 
11 and 12 as well, making the beatitudes nine:
1465
 These two verses, though different in 
form from the preceding verses, are thematically closer to the eighth beatitude than to 
5:13-16. Having a much longer concluding text of a series with a shift from one person to 
another seems conventional. And the changes in verses 11 and 12 could be simply a 
result of literary design, as in the case of Sirach 25:7-11. Convinced that there are nine 
macarisms, they note that this fits the triadic number. Finally, a few scholars would even 
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opt for ten beatitudes solely based on the numerical popularity in Jewish symbolism and 
employ the Decalogue as a model.
1466
 
Finally, while the Beatitudes enjoys a structural unity in its own regard, there is 
the question of their formal connection to the Sermon:
1467
 On the one hand, some 
scholars attempt to show correlation of the Beatitudes with the Sermon by rearranging, 
pairing up, and dividing the Beatitudes in such as a way that shows coherence with 6:19-
7:12.  Others, on the other hand, adopt a kind of subjectivity and arbitrariness in 
searching for connections (such as the first beatitude corresponds to 7:7-11). Still, there 
are those who claim a double correspondence between the three main parts of the Sermon 
(5:21-48; 6:1-18; 6:19-7:12) and the Beatitudes. 
 Despite the diverse views with regards to the individual beatitude‘s connection 
with the rest of the Sermon, we can still correctly claim that the Beatitudes is not a 
separate entity but closely related to the Sermon and plays a unique role in revealing the 
teaching of the Sermon.  
 
The Function of the Beatitudes 
Though different types of macarisms in the Old and New Testaments are used in 
different ways, three types of functions can be proposed. First, the Beatitudes is primarily 
hortatory in nature as those macarisms in the wisdom literature are.
1468
 It is an ethical 
imperative calling for cultivation of certain character traits, and regulations for the 
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community life.
1469
 Specifically, it is perceived as entrance requirements for the 
kingdom.
1470
  
Second, those who take on the prophetic and apocalyptic view—and the claim 
that the Matthean Beatitudes points to a kind of eschatological ethics as the Sermon as a 
whole does—argue that the Beatitudes is primarily declarative promises rather than 
imperative demands:
1471
 Since the Beatitudes is situated outside the main corpus of 
imperatives found in 5:17-7:12, its moral dimension, though imperatival, is only 
secondary. The beatitudes are offered as eschatological blessings and hope for the 
oppressed rather than entrance requirements for the kingdom. In other words, the 
Beatitudes is conciliatory and implies the notion of grace (especially in the first half of 
the Beatitudes). 
The third group of scholars tends to offer a more nuanced view. Betz comments 
that the Beatitudes must be seen at the same time as both a series of ethical virtues and 
promises.
1472
 He says, ―[While] the [b]eatitudes are ipso facto future-oriented, as 
principles pronounced in the present they have an impact on the present as well.‖1473 
Elsewhere he continues, ―In fact, the [b]eatitudes set forth promises along with demands; 
they are both at once, not one or the other.‖1474 Luz, though he suggests that the 
Beatitudes could become ethicized in Matthew‘s hands, also thinks that they continue to 
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express God‘s grace and hence concludes that these different approaches are 
complementary to each other.
1475
 Harrington, in a similar way, says, ―The [b]eatitudes 
function not as ‗entrance requirements‘ but rather as a delineation of the characteristics 
and actions that will receive their full and appropriate eschatological reward.‖1476 
Last but not least, a related debate regarding the function and ethics of the 
Beatitudes is whether it offers reversals or rewards:
1477
 Those who insist on seeing the 
beatitudes as statements/promises of reversal for the unfortunate would argue that Jesus 
proclaims a revolutionary nature of the kingdom of God that opposes the view of the 
Sadducees or Pharisees that the social order on earth will be repeated in heaven. Others 
like Luz suggest that each macarism should be allowed to be interpreted on its own terms 
even at the expense of diminishing unity. 
 New Testament scholar Mark Allan Powell attempts to resolve this issue by 
suggesting a ‗two-stanza‘ structure of the Beatitudes based on a type of parallelism in 
Hebrew poetry:
1478
 ―The first stanza (5:3-6) speaks of reversals for the unfortunate, the 
second stanza (5:7-10) describes rewards for the virtuous.‖1479 In other words, the first 
stanza attends to the destitute human condition and the second stanza focuses on 
activities.
1480
 In addition, he insists that the blessings are aimed for the entire world rather 
than for the Christian community alone, for the use of third person plural implies a 
distinction between the immediate audience and those who are blessed. However, such an 
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attempt risks dichotomizing and segregating the two sets of Beatitudes even though a 
theological link (that all the blessings are the effects of God‘s rule) among all macarisms 
could be established. 
 
My own Approach 
The above exploration of some immediate and critical issues of the Beatitudes 
reveals that many of these issues, like those of the Sermon, do not have a definite view 
and debates continue among scholars. Instead of getting further into these debates, I state 
some theses that express my own approach in this work. 
First, I opt for the use of ‗blessed‘ throughout the rest of this work without 
diminishing the original meaning of μακάριος. In particular, its direct reference to 
prosperity can be a fruitful means for our later discussion in Part Four.   
Second, by following the two-source hypothesis, I too assume the majority view 
that certain beatitudes are rooted in the Sayings source Q and the remaining ones are a 
result of redaction by the evangelist.  
Third, regarding the structure of the Beatitudes, the beatitudes form a 
sophisticated unified whole with a chiastic structure. Also, while acknowledging that the 
claims of those who argue for the inclusion of verses 11 and 12 are important, I would 
adopt the traditional view that there are eight beatitudes for they form a unified structural 
unit. Their structural coherence (of addressing the blessings in the third person plural) 
also fits the genre of macarism better. Moreover, such a choice is also made by taking 
into consideration the cultural factor that plays an important role in the last part of this 
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work: For Christians and non-Christians alike in a Chinese Confucian society, the 
traditional view of eight beatitudes is widely known and accepted. Considering eight 
instead of nine beatitudes may be more helpful to engage dialogue with them. Still, verses 
11 and 12 as an elaboration of the eighth beatitude will be integrated into the exposition 
knowing that they are thematically close to verse 10. Furthermore, I take the traditional 
and majority claim that ‗mourners‘ precedes ‗meek‘.1481 
Fourth, the Beatitudes is without doubt related to the Sermon and the gospel as a 
whole. I understand the macarisms as playing an important role in our understanding of 
the teaching of the Sermon. Thus, though our exegesis is focused on the eight beatitudes, 
it is done in light of the Sermon and the gospel. 
Fifth and final, I agree with those who hold a more nuanced view about the 
functions of the Beatitudes: It is neither solely a set of moral demands nor of 
eschatological promises; rather, its implications are both eschatological and present, 
personal and communal. Moreover, the blessings need not be construed exclusively as 
either reversals or rewards. They point to the effects of God‘s grace to those who follow 
Jesus‘ teaching and example. 
After stating my own approach, a subsequent question yet needs to be raised, 
―Who, then, are the blessed in the Matthean Beatitudes?‖ Some exegetes who perceive 
the Beatitudes as a unified whole would claim that ―all of these eight [b]eatitudes 
describe as blessed those same people.‖1482 Still, this claim does not really clarify who 
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those same people are. Thus, I now turn to the exegesis of each of these eight beatitudes 
with the hope that some hints can be found during the process. Various exegetical tools 
such as historical, literary, and source criticisms are employed so as to better grasp the 
meaning of the text intended for the original readers.  
 
7.4 The Beatitudes: An Exegesis
1483
 
 
5:3 Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.  
Μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν 
 
This macarism is the first of the four beatitudes found also in the Lukan version 
(Luke 6:20b). The main difference between Matthew and Luke‘s version is that the 
former gives qualification to the meaning of ‗poor‘. For Matthew the poor are those who 
are ‗poor in spirit‘.1484 And for various reasons the dative term ‗in spirit‘ is probably 
redactional.
1485
 The apodosis of the beatitude, on the other hand, is exactly the same as 
that of the eighth one literally. This resemblance thus grounds the argument that the two 
verses serve as an inclusio for the unity of 5:3-10. 
The protasis of the beatitude basically tells us that ‗the poor in spirit‘ are blessed 
by God. It finds direct reference in Isaiah 61:1 (―He has sent me to bring good news to 
the oppressed, to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and 
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release to the prisoners‖). However, there are many other passages in the Old Testament 
that tell about God‘s special care for the poor, such as Exodus 22:25-27 and 
Deuteronomy 15:7-11. It is thus important to read the macarism in light of the Old 
Testament tradition.
1486
 
Regarding the notion of ‗poor‘, the Greek term πτωχος employed here basically 
means beggar. There are several Hebrew equivalents, such as ani, dal, and ebyon, which 
mean ‗poor‘/‗afflicted‘, ‗weak‘ and ‗needy‘ respectively.1487 Thus, the term refers not 
only to those who are poor with few possessions but especially those who are socially 
and economically needy and dependent (such as those being forced to beg). The 
condition of poverty is never regarded as a blessing; and yet the person who is in such a 
condition can be blessed. 
The term also refers to those who are in special need of God‘s help (Psalms 12:5 
and 22:24) and have nothing to rely upon except God (Amos 2:6-8). There is then a 
religious aspect of poverty in the term that is affirmed in these Old Testament 
passages:
1488
 The oppressed and the poor are promised God‘s salvation when they turn to 
God in their need. They will experience eschatological blessing and be made rich. 
This twofold meaning of ‗poor‘—that the religious and economic meanings go 
together—is found in New Testament writings as well, such as Romans 15:26. The early 
church community was aware of (or actually facing) the reality that those who suffer 
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material poverty are at the same time experiencing religious poverty.
1489
 Still, Matthew‘s 
insertion/redaction tends to shift the emphasis from material poverty to the implicit 
spiritual poverty and make it explicit.
1490
 However, it is mistaken to conclude that 
Matthew simply spiritualizes or softens Jesus‘ radical teaching; rather, the insertion could 
be meant to forestall the misunderstanding of the meaning of ‗poor‘ and presuppose 
reflection.
1491
 
Though a redaction by the evangelist, the phrase ‗poor in spirit‘ is not a new 
concept:
1492
 It is found in Hebrew writings to describe the fainthearted, those who opt for 
voluntary poverty, or those who are spiritually poor. However, both Matthew‘s view on 
the renunciation of property (19:21) and the logic of the macarism itself point to the fact 
that the last interpretation is the most appropriate. Accordingly, the phrase implies 
lowliness with reference to one‘s spirit.1493 It is used in the Hebrew writings to contrast 
those who are have a ‗hardened heart‘ or a ‗haughty heart‘ (Proverbs 16:18-19).1494 Still, 
the phrase refers more correctly to an attitude than a condition: In particular, it points to 
the virtue of humility—one that is highly praised in Jewish circles.1495  
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The literary composition of the apodosis of the beatitude deserves some 
clarification:
1496
 First, the term αὐτῶν (meaning ‗of them‘) does not signify a sense of 
possession. The macarism does not mean that the poor will possess the kingdom nor that 
the kingdom will be comprised of the poor either. Rather, the macarism solely proclaims 
the eschatological outcome that the kingdom of heaven will be given to (among others) 
the poor. 
Second, the kingdom of heaven is basically a synonym to ‗kingdom of God‘ 
(19:23-24) and is referred to by Matthew as the reign of God. The use of ‗heaven‘ is 
simply a Jewish substitute for ‗God‘ in order to avoid abuse of the name ‗God‘.1497 
Matthew uses it in two different ways throughout the gospel:
1498
 The first and dominant 
use contains a passive connotation and future tense (e.g., 3:2 and 8:11); the second use 
contains an active connotation and present tense (12:28). Thus, although it bears a strong 
eschatological tone, the kingdom of heaven in the apodosis is understood and used 
conjunctively rather than disjunctively.
1499
 
Third, the use of present tense ἐστιν (‗is‘) signifies a sense of confidence in the 
proleptic present; it also hints that the kingdom is already present and the corresponding 
blessing is now bestowed.
1500
 One of its immediate effects is that the evils that cause 
poverty in present time will be eliminated. 
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As a whole, ‗the poor in spirit‘, who are often suffering from economic poverty, 
are those who acquire the internal attitude of humility. They will be given the kingdom of 
God that is eschatological, although present recompense, especially the lifting of their 
poverty, is considered. And the logic of this macarism is built upon the demand of 
justice—indeed, apart from being the first macarism, 5:3 is also the center of interest in 
the New Testament period because ‗poverty‘ and ‗wealth‘ have been subjects of debate 
since the time of antiquity.
1501
 The beatitude overturns the popular, conventional 
macarism that the rich are those to be blessed and the poor forsaken.
1502
  
 
5:4 Blessed are those who mourn, for they will be comforted.  
μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακληθήσονται. 
 
For those who hold the view that the Beatitudes can be displayed chiastically, the 
second macarism corresponds to 5:9 for they both employ future divine passive—the 
combined use of passive connotation and future tense—in the apodosis.1503 Still, 
Matthew‘s second beatitude is also found in the Gospel of Luke although the two 
versions are ordered differently: For Matthew, this beatitude is put right after the 
macarism on poverty; Luke, in contrast, places it after the macarisms on poverty and 
hunger, and thus it becomes the third beatitude (Luke 6:21).
1504
 In addition, the subjects 
and promises stated by the two evangelists are also quite different: For Matthew the 
mourners (πενθοῦντες) will be blessed and comforted (παρακληθήσονται); Luke, 
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however, tells us that those who weep (κλαίοντες) will be promised laughter 
(γελάσετε) by God.  
Moreover, like the first beatitude this macarism also corresponds to Isaiah 61. In 
specific, it corresponds to verse 2 (―To proclaim the year of the Lord‘s favour, and the 
day of vengeance of our God; to comfort all who mourn‖). Therefore, the order of the 
two beatitudes also corresponds to the order of what Isaiah wrote in 61:1-2. This close 
parallel between the two texts calls for special attention to the ancient Jewish context in 
reading Matthew‘s second beatitude. 
In the first place, according to ancient consolation literature, mourning is an 
expected response to the reality of desperation and suffering.
1505
 And in its most specific 
sense, πενθω (meaning ‗mourn‘) refers to the grief of death and great loss. It is 
contained in rituals and prayers, particularly in those practices related to the burial of the 
dead.
1506
 Therefore, by ordering the two macarisms as they are, the grieving in the second 
beatitude could be a natural response to the experience of the poor identified in the first 
macarism.
1507
 Second, the Old Testament tradition provides us with the context for 
Israel‘s mourning:1508 As we read Isaiah 61:3-7, we are told that the returned Israelites 
were oppressed by their oppressors (v3), their cities were in ruins (v4), and they were 
aware of their own shame and dishonors (v7). In particular, they mourned over Jerusalem 
(Tobit 13:16) as Yahweh has not acted to reverse this situation. Together with many other 
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passages (e.g., Jeremiah 38:13) in the Old Testament Isaiah 61:3-7 depicts the various 
incidents that led the faithful Israelites to grief.  
In the New Testament, Matthew told us that the situation is very much the 
same:
1509
 The righteous are persecuted by the wicked (5:10-12, 7:15-22); they have not 
seen the Twelve on their thrones (19:28); and the Son of Man has not come in his glory 
(24:29-31). In other words, they have not seen the kingdom of God in its fullness and the 
eschatological promise has not taken place. As a result, the people of God mourn over the 
situation they are facing. However, the use of the same Greek word in the 9:14-17 (on the 
parable of the bridegroom) hints that for Matthew, there are times when one needs not 
mourn—for instance, when Jesus is with us.  
Although some Jewish writings (such as Joel 2:12-13) hint that the people‘s 
mourning could be associated with repentance—we mourn for our own sins and the sins 
of others—and Matthew‘s use of the more general term ‗mourning‘ (rather than 
‗weeping‘ in Luke‘s case) could open up a religious interpretation, both the direct link 
with and the context of Isaiah 61 tends to tone down this spiritual view, and clarifies that 
this is not the evangelist‘s motive for using πενθω.1510  
In the apodosis we are told that the mourners will be comforted. This promise 
likewise can be understood in light of the Old Testament tradition:
1511
 πενθοῦντες and 
παρακληθήσονται are paired up as catchwords to associate with prophet Isaiah who 
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consoled the mourners of Zion (Sirach 48:23-25). Also, it is a common theme within the 
Jewish tradition that God turns our sorrow into joy (Jeremiah 31:13).  
How, then, are the mourners comforted? The linguistic nature of the apodosis—
the use of future divine passive—reveals two distinctive features of this comfort:1512 First, 
the use of future tense makes it clear that the promised comfort is an eschatological 
prediction. Second, the use of divine passive—which is a common Jewish way of 
avoiding the use of God‘s name—further indicates that God is the one who offers 
comfort, just as a mother comforts her child (Isaiah 66:13). In fact, God‘s offer of 
comfort can be understood in various ways:
1513
 It is equated with salvation and 
redemption (Isaiah 61:2 and Jeremiah 31:13); associated with healing, pardon for iniquity, 
and nourishment (Isaiah 57:18, 40:1-2, and 66:13 respectively); and understood by the 
Israelites as freedom from and return from exile (Isaiah 49:13, 51:12). As a whole, God‘s 
comfort to the mourners converges to the experience of God‘s salvation and sustenance. 
It is other-worldly and fulfilled when the Son of Man comes in his glory. Still, not all 
who mourn are called blessed—only if their mourning is a sign of their waiting for the 
kingdom of heaven.
1514
  
In conclusion, mourning over poverty, persecutions, and other loss is the concrete 
experience of both the Old Testament Israelites and the people of God in the New 
Testament era.
1515
 They will be comforted by God as God did in the past. The macarism 
is hardly a paraenesis or imperative. And the emphasis is not the state of mourning as 
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such but rather those who lament those causes of grief.
1516
  The comfort promised is an 
act of God that brings salvation, pardon, and nourishment. Again, the fulfillment of this 
eschatological prediction requires divine justice. Finally, in light of its ancient Jewish 
correspondence and closeness with the first beatitude, the practice of mourning in relation 
to the first macarism is to be regarded as a virtue.
1517
 
 
5:5 Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth.  
μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς, ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσιν τὴν γῆν. 
 
As noted earlier, this beatitude does not have a parallel in Luke‘s version and thus 
is probably a later addition by a redactor of the Sayings source or the evangelist 
himself.
1518
 It was inserted for the purpose of expounding the religious dimension of the 
term ‗poor‘ in the first beatitude and hence forming a kind of parallelism with the first 
beatitude. Within a hypothetical chiastic structure, the third beatitude further corresponds 
to the sixth one (5:8) in that they both use future active verb with a direct object in the 
apodosis.
1519
 
However, this macarism does not follow the previous beatitudes in making 
explicit correspondence with Isaiah 61.
1520
 Rather, it makes direct reference to Psalm 
37:11—the poor accept the present affliction, trust in the Lord, wait patiently for the Lord, 
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and refrain from anger or envy.
1521
 They will soon be delivered by the Lord from the 
wicked and inherit the land. In short, this direct reference foretells who the meek are in 
the beatitude. 
The Greek term for ‗meek‘ is πραΰς.  In the New Testament, it runs parallel with 
other Greek terms, such as ἡσυχίου (quiet) and ἡσυχίου (gentle) in 1 Peter 3:4 and Titus 
3:2 respectively.
1522
 Nevertheless, πραΰς appears in Matthew‘s gospel in a few more 
places (11:29 and 21:5) to portray Jesus, like Moses before him, as a model and 
practitioner of meekness and gentleness.
1523
  
The Septuagint, however, employs πραΰς to translate the Hebrew word anawim 
(piety) as well. As we saw in 5:3, anawim has also been translated with πτωχοὶ 
(poor).
1524
 As a result, ‗the meek‘ becomes a synonym and variation of ‗the poor (in 
spirit)‘. And by recalling Isaiah 61:7, the meek are at the same time those who mourn.1525 
Moreover, based on the Old Testament traditions of exodus and exile that speak of the 
disinherited receiving the promised land, the term is also associated with the particular 
human condition of ‗the powerless‘ or ‗the oppressed‘.1526 Still, within the context of 
Jewish paraenesis, πραΰς never means nonviolence or political subordination.1527  
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Finally, the Greek term does not simply refer to a human condition but also to an 
ethical attitude. In Hellenistic culture, meekness (πραότης) is an important ethical 
concept—it is a virtue closely related to philanthropy and a mark of the true philosopher 
like Socrates.
1528
 And by translating anawim into πραΰς, the Greek term further takes on 
the notion of ‗humble‘.1529 For in Jewish literature of piety, meekness becomes a 
synonym for humility and a characteristic of the sage and the ruler.
1530
 Major figures like 
Moses serve as paradigms. Curiously, although both the Greek and Jewish tradition 
praised meekness and gentleness, it was not widely practiced.
1531
 
The apodosis of the third beatitude tells us that the meek and the gentle will 
inherit the land. The verb κληρονομεῖν originally means ‗to inherit‘; however, it was 
translated into ‗to possess‘ or ‗to acquire‘ in the Septuagint—in either case, it never 
means ownership for we are part of God‘s creation; rather, in both the Old and New 
Testament traditions to ‗possess‘ or to ‗inherit‘ the land implies eschatological hope and 
promise (Isaiah 60:21; Matthew 19:29; 25:34).
1532
  
Regarding the land to be inherited, linguistically speaking, the presence of the 
definite article τὴν (‗the‘) could suggest that Matthew was referring to the land of 
Israel.
1533
 However, various evidences show that the term γῆν (‗land‘) tends to have a 
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general meaning instead—it refers to ‗the earth‘.1534 Moreover, although the new earth 
might be given an otherworldly interpretation, the earthly world can still be a mission 
land for the disciples and needs not be excluded (28:18-20).
1535
 
In conclusion, the redactional work of the editor has a particular purpose: It points 
out that ‗the meek‘ are not just ‗the poor‘ and those who mourn but also those who are 
humble (no matter they are the little ones or those in command). They will inherit the 
land just as ‗the poor in spirit‘ will be given the kingdom of heaven. The beatitude also 
calls for the cultivation of humility by following Jesus the exemplar. Although the 
promise of inheriting the new earth (and new heaven) may be eschatological, the 
disciples have to reach out to the world as it is now. 
 
5:6 Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled.  
μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται. 
 
5:6 is the third beatitude shared by both Matthew and Luke and is the equivalent 
of the second beatitude in Luke‘s version (6:21). However, based on the difference 
between the two versions and other literary/linguistic differences, it is most probably that 
Matthew inserted ‗thirst‘ and ‗righteousness‘ to the original macarism.1536 Moreover, if 
one adopts the chiastic hypothesis and the view that the Beatitudes can be divided into 
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two parts, then the fourth beatitude finds parallel with two other beatitudes: It 
corresponds to the fifth macarism chiastically and parallels to the last beatitude by 
focusing on the concept of righteousness.  
The original macarism alludes to Psalm 107:5, 8, 9 where God will satisfy the 
hungry and the thirsty. However, in the Old Testament, the images of hunger and thirst 
have a religious significance as well:
1537
 It points to an active seeking (and not just a 
longing) for God and desiring for God‘s teaching and the words of the Law as one desires 
for food and drink (Psalms 42:2; 143:6; Isaiah 32:6). Subsequently, the phrase ‗to hunger 
and thirst for righteousness‘ can well be compared to 6:33 where one seeks God‘s 
kingdom and his righteousness above all else.  
Regarding the notion of righteousness (its Greek and Hebrew equivalents are 
δικαιοσύνην and sedaqah respectively), it alludes to Isaiah 61:3, 8, 10, 11; 62:1-2; 
63:1.
1538
 It is rendered ‗justice‘ (especially restorative justice in a covenant community 
setting) and its use is in conformity to the Jewish understanding:
1539
 The kingdom of 
heaven is the realm of God‘s righteousness; and righteousness is the basis for the 
interpretation of the Torah and the ethical standard for human conduct. It is the 
realization of God‘s goodness in the world and points to ―the gift of a right relationship 
with God.‖1540 In light of the Sermon on the Mount, δικαιοσύνην is best understood first 
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as God‘s justice (6:33) and only then the right conduct required by God (3:15; 5:20; 6:1; 
21:32).
1541
 
Consequently, Matthew‘s inclusion of δικαιοσύνην in the macarism has several 
meanings; among them are the clarification of the object and nature of hunger and thirst, 
and the provision of a specific content to its meaning.
1542
 Our hunger and thirst for 
righteousness is the response to our unrighteous human condition, it refers again to those 
identified in the first beatitude.
1543
 As a relational term, it is concerned with not just 
personal but also social righteousness.
1544
 Moreover, the blessed are those who hunger 
and thirst for righteousness, rather than those who think they have achieved it.
1545
 In other 
words, what is important is to keep up of the desire for righteousness and make an effort 
to achieve it faithfully.
1546
  
In the apodosis, we see again the use of future divine passive connotation—it 
points out that their satisfaction is eschatological in nature and fulfilled by God, as 
prophesized by Isaiah in 49:10. Indeed, such fulfillment is crucial to apocalyptic literature 
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(1 Enoch 48:1).
1547
 However, how the hungry and the thirsty are satisfied by God can be 
quite diverse, such as the vision of God/God‘s glory (Psalm 17:15) and indwelling of 
righteousness in the world (Isaiah 32:1, 16-17).
1548
 And a more direct understanding 
points to the eschatological messianic banquet (Psalm 107:1-9). 
 In sum, the fourth beatitude calls to our attention the notion of righteousness. We 
need to constantly seek God‘s righteousness with effort. Those who strive for God‘s 
righteousness will be satisfied by God who grants us eschatological banquet. Though we 
seek first God‘s justice, we are also called to acquire certain conducts and relationships 
that have righteousness as the ethical standard. 
 
5:7 Blessed are the merciful, for they will receive mercy.  
μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται. 
 
Starting with 5:7 we note that the remaining four beatitudes are added by the 
evangelist from his own sources, for no parallels are found in the Lukan version. It is 
suggested that the first three of these four macarisms are taken from a tradition that 
reflects the concerns for greater righteousness. In specific, the fifth beatitude corresponds 
to Proverbs 14:21 (and 17:5) where those who are kind to the poor will be blessed.
1549
 
Regarding the Greek term ἐλεήμων (meaning merciful), it appears only twice in 
the New Testament (Matthew 5:7 and Hebrews 2:17). And its synonym οἰκτίρμων is 
                                                 
1547
 Betz, The Sermon on the Mount, 132. 
1548
 Davies, and Allison, Jr., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, 453. 
1549
 Harrington, The Gospel of Matthew, 79. 
 377 
found in Luke 6:36 alone.
1550
 Still, as will be discussed below, the notion of mercy 
(ἔλεος) occurs rather frequently throughout the gospel. The Hebrew equivalent of 
ἐλεήμων is ḥannun. In the Old Testament and Jewish literature, the practice of mercy, 
which is the essence of the works of charity, often refers to deeds done out of compassion 
with the unfortunate and helpless, especially in terms of almsgiving (as in Tobit 4:5-
7).
1551
 It is a well known doctrine among the Jewish people and is often praised in the 
ancient literature.
1552
 
Despite being a praiseworthy human virtue, the disposition toward mercy is first 
understood as an attribute of God (Exodus 34:6; Deuteronomy 4:31).
1553
 God has shown 
mercy to the people (Psalm 72:13) and wants human beings to desire mercy as well 
(Hosea 6:6; Micah 6:8). Subsequently, the exercise of mercy becomes one of the most 
important religious and social duties for the Jewish people. 
Within the context of ancient Greece, unfortunately, mercy was treated with 
suspicion in Hellenistic philosophical ethics because of its impact on the emotions.
1554
 
Nevertheless, in the New Testament, the concept of mercy and its similar sentiments are 
brought up frequently by Matthew.
1555
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In the first place, being merciful and compassionate is a proper attitude towards 
the human condition noted in the first beatitude—the poor, the outcasts, and even 
outsiders (9:10-13; 15:21-28).
1556
 Second, as in the Jewish tradition, to be merciful and 
compassionate is a fundamental demand (9:13; 12:7).
1557
 Third, mercy is regularly 
demonstrated by Jesus‘ words (18:23-35) and examples (9:27-31). Indeed, the demand 
for mercy is placed at the center of Jesus‘ proclamation and challenges the disciples to 
show mercy to all, including one‘s enemy (5:43-48). Fourth, the particular sentiment of 
mercy toward one‘s enemy in turn calls for forgiveness (6:12, 14-15; 7:1-5). A concrete 
evidence is the parable of the Unforgiving Servant in 18:21-35 where Matthew applies 
the principle to a narrative context.
1558
 Fifth, mercy is regarded by Matthew—as well as 
other New Testament writers—as an expression of righteousness and wisdom.1559 
Together with faith and justice, mercy is seen as one of the weightier demands of the law 
(23:13). 
On the other hand, Matthew cites Hosea 6:6 (―For I desire steadfast love and not 
sacrifice‖) twice in his understanding of mercy as a fundamental demand (9:13; 12:7).1560 
Here, ἔλεος is used to render the Hebrew term ḥesed (meaning steadfast, covenantal love 
of God for the people). Thus, ἔλεος connotes the idea of loyalty within a relationship, 
especially loyalty to God.
1561
 In other words, acts of mercy are concrete expressions of 
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loyalty to God and what God desires of the people. As a result, the polemical tone in 
Matthew‘s use of ἔλεος reflects the view that the Pharisees of Matthew‘s time, on the 
contrary, failed to remain faithful to God.
1562
 They failed to act mercifully to others 
(9:10-13; 12:1-7). 
With regard to the apodosis of the macarism, the fifth beatitude also employs 
future divine passive connotation as the second, the fourth, and the seventh beatitudes do. 
In other words, the promise is to be taken eschatologically in that in the final judgment 
God will show mercy to those who have shown mercy to others.  
As a whole, 5:7 is a rather straightforward macarism that poses very few 
exegetical problems, partly because its protasis and apodosis are in exact parallel.
1563
  
The beatitude thus seems to approach the Old Testament‘s idea that ‗deeds determine 
fate‘ and the parenetic motif that there is a correspondence between human and divine 
behavior.
1564
 As far as the addressees are concerned, they are called by God who is 
merciful to be compassionate and merciful particularly to those human predicaments. It is 
an attitude that at the same time demands actions. Jesus‘ words and examples further 
challenge us to extend our mercy to all by means of forgiveness. And our practice of 
mercy, compassion, and forgiveness must be built upon the covenantal relationship with 
God and a response faithful to God‘s steadfast love. 
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5:8 Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God.  
μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται. 
 
The sixth beatitude does not have any parallel in Luke‘s version and was added 
together with the fifth and seventh macarisms by the evangelist. Its explicit Old 
Testament correspondence is Psalm 24:3-5 (―…Those who have clean hands and pure 
hearts…They will receive blessing from the LORD, and vindication from the God of their 
salvation‖).1565 The psalm is to be sung during the temple entrance liturgy to describe 
those who could ascend ‗the hills of the Lord‘:1566 It tells that only those people are fit for 
divine worship. Other relevant passages include Psalms 51:10; 73:1, 13; and Proverbs 
22:11 in which God shows goodness to those who have a clean and pure heart. 
Historically, the idea of purity was commonly found in religions in terms of 
rituals and reflections:
1567
 For instance, in antiquity as well as the Old Testament Judaism, 
purification rituals were conducted to remove impurities. Later in ancient Greek 
reflections, ritual purity was vaguely connected to morality while the internal condition 
of the person was slowly considered as a greater source of impurity than other external 
causes and was thus intensified. 
In both the Old Testament and New Testament traditions, the term ‗heart‘ καρδίᾳ 
(lebab in Hebrew) is a comprehensive term and is at times used interchangeably with the 
word ‗soul‘ (ψνχή):1568 It is referred to as the true self (in Matthew 13:15); the place of 
emotions (such as joy in Proverbs 27:11); the desire or will (in Proverbs 6:18); the 
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intellect (in Mark 2:6); and the inner space where one encounters the deity (in Psalm 27:8 
and Ephesians 3:17). For Matthew, in particular, the heart is the source of outward speech 
and conduct (15:18-19) as well as the realm of inner life (9:4).
1569
 
The phrase ‗pure in heart‘ (καθαρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ) is understood within the Jewish 
tradition as ―an undivided obedience to God without sin‖ and is an important virtue.1570 
In simple terms, it points to ‗singleness of intention‘ and ‗will only God‘s will‘ with 
one‘s whole being.1571 It is used comprehensively although its narrow cultic usage is 
often highlighted.
1572
 In the ancient Greek culture, the idea of ‗purity of the soul‘ is 
similarly significant to the people:
1573
 Only the pure-hearted can enter the land of the 
Blessed. Thus, ‗purity of the soul‘ is associated with the notion of eschatology.  
As far as the New Testament and the Gospel of Matthew is concerned, the 
meaning of ‗pure in heart‘ and its interpretation can be found in the Sermon on the 
Mount:
1574
 It means lacking adulterous thoughts and the like (5:27-30); attending to the 
inner encounter with God and not external piety (6:1-18); and maintaining integrity 
between interior thought and exterior acts (15:8). It is a fundamental virtue (integrity) that 
underlies those ethical attitudes in the Sermon.
1575
 Moreover, in comparison to the Jewish 
tradition, the New Testament emphasizes more on internal purity than external/cultic 
purity. And this emphasis on interior disposition of the person could imply that those who 
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are pure in heart and the ‗poor in spirit‘ are synonymous.1576 Still, it does not mean that 
the Matthean macarism rejects the Jewish cultic usage completely.
1577
 Therefore, ‗pure in 
heart‘ in the New Testament neither points to external purity nor single-heartedness alone 
but a sense of integrity between one‘s external actions and the inner being.1578 
The apodosis of the beatitude says that ‗the pure in heart‘ will see God. Within 
Judaism seeing God is equivalent to knowing God; and the knowledge or vision of God is 
usually associated with the promise of future, as in Isaiah 52:6 and Jeremiah 24:7.
1579
 
Still, two contrasting traditions about seeing God are identified:
1580
 The first one focuses 
on the possibility of physical sight pertaining to this world (Exodus 3:6; 1 Timothy 6:15-
16); the second and dominant tradition, on the contrary, tends to emphasize the blessed 
goal of acquiring spiritual sight in the world to come (Psalm 17:15, Revelation 22:4).  
As a whole, both the use of future active connotation and the influence of Greek 
and Jewish traditions point to an eschatological understanding of the sixth apodosis:
1581
 
Within the ancient Greek world, only the best could achieve the purity of the soul so as to 
experience a full vision of the most sacred. And since the purity of the soul is associated 
with the eschatological future, the full vision will be achieved only in the eschatological 
future. Judaism, while recognizing that God was seen by Moses only (Numbers 12:8; 
Deuteronomy 34:10), likewise, longed for seeing God in eschaton. Finally, this 
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eschatological promise of seeing God is further given interpretation in the Sermon (7:21-
23)—those who enter the kingdom will see God who is the judge. 
In sum, the beatitude points to an eschatological future and vision promised by 
God. It challenges the hegemony of the Pharisees and Sadducees who stressed outward 
manifestations of purity/impurity.
1582
 5:8 reveals that those who are pure in heart will be 
able to see God in eschaton. The ‗pure in heart‘ have their moral righteousness emerging 
from the inner self and finding expressions in outward actions. The beatitude thus 
emphasizes the integrity of the whole being and understands purity in heart as a 
fundamental, all-encompassing virtue. 
 
5:9 Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God.  
μακάριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί, ὅτι αὐτοὶ υἱοὶ θεοῦ κληθήσονται. 
 
Verse 9 is the third macarism added by the evangelist. It has similar verbal usage 
and themes with 5:38-48 (on turning the other cheek and loving one‘s enemy) and finds 
parallel in the apocalyptic literature of 2 Enoch 52:11-12 (―Happy is he who establishes 
peace. Cursed is he who strikes down those who are in peace‖).1583 Unfortunately, 5:9 is a 
rather controversial macarism because of the possible political implications rooted in the 
meaning of peacemaking.
1584
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The Greek term εἰρηνοποιός is a typical verbal adjective found in Hellenistic 
Greek to describe those leaders who establish security and socio-economic welfare.
1585
 
Within ancient Greek society, peacemaking was highly valued since the people longed 
for peace and stability after centuries of wars. It was also understood by the philosophers 
as a proper task within families and between individuals.
1586
 
In Judaism peacemaking has long been considered a virtue. The Hebrew concept 
of shalom (peace) was fundamental to both the Old Testament and Jewish religions:
1587
  
It points to abundance and all-round right relationships. It is the fullness of God‘s gift and 
involves a cosmic dimension in which the creator intends a cosmic order. Still, the term is 
paralleled to mishpat (justice) and is thus closer to the concept of righteousness than to 
that of tranquility or order.
1588
 Therefore, war and violence are not completely ruled out 
by the Jewish tradition, as shown in both Jewish literature and historical events.
1589
 
 Within the New Testament tradition, εἰρηνοποιός occurs only once—Matthew 
5:9—while other verbal composites such as ποιειν εἰρήνην (meaning ‗make peace‘) are 
employed more frequently elsewhere in the New Testament (e.g., James 3:18; Ephesians 
2:15).
1590
 Still, the evangelist promotes peacemaking elsewhere in the Sermon:
1591
 For 
instance, the antitheses in 5:21-48 present instances of peacemaking in the context of 
family and friendship. In fact, both biblical traditions generally envision peacemaking in 
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terms of human relationships. Thus, the religious dimension—that is, making peace with 
God—is only minimal.1592  
Moreover, in light of human relationships, the term implies a positive action and 
thus is best referred to someone who seeks to bring peace (i.e., peacemaker) rather than a 
pacifist. It also envisions the notion of reconciliation which in turn implies 
forgiveness.
1593
 The pursuit of peace is a requirement for following Jesus for he is the one 
who brings peace (Luke 2:14) and God is the principal peacemaker (especially by 
forgiving sins) and a God of peace (Romans 16:20).
1594
  
 Regarding the controversy involving the interpretation of peacemaking, it is 
related to the understanding that peace is constitutive of the kingdom of God (Romans 
14:17, 19) and peacemaking is a direct consequence (and demand) of righteousness and a 
function of the kingdom of God:
1595
 Both righteousness and the kingdom require personal 
pursuit of peace in all aspects of life, including political and economic life. In this sense, 
political implications can be expected. 
However, as seen above, the instances presented by Matthew in the Sermon are 
concerned with those relationships between individuals instead of social/political groups. 
In addition, these and other implications are presented solely as a personal example of the 
individual disciples. They are used to help the disciples cultivate the appropriate attitudes 
and only then that they apply these attitudes to broader social and political 
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environment.
1596
 In other words, these implications do not serve as a general guide for 
political behavior and hence rule out political involvement as a group. Peacemaking 
within a broader political paradigm is at most only secondary.
1597
 
Apart from this controversy, another puzzle regarding this macarism is the 
disharmonization with 10:34-35 when Jesus claims that he does not come to bring peace 
but the sword. In fact, the lack of harmony is typical of the evangelist‘s style (e.g., 8:12 
with 13:38) and Matthew simply tries to preserve the tradition and at the same time be 
creative.
1598
 
Nevertheless, Matthew basically affirms the positive values of peacemaking in 
spite of the hostility experienced by his community:
1599
 By taking up responsibilities 
against all persecutions and injustice and demonstrating the belief that God‘s kingdom 
will prevail, the peacemakers will be rewarded by God. 
The promise of the beatitude is that the peacemakers will be called sons 
(children
1600
) of God. Here, the connection between the promise of divine sonship and the 
exhortation to peacemaking finds parallel from the Old Testament tradition where 
sonship and peace-making were brought together:
1601
 ―See, a son shall be born to you; he 
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shall be a man of peace. I will give him peace from all his enemies on every side…He 
shall be a son to me, and I will be a father to him‖ (1 Chronicles 22:9-10). 
With regards to the phrase ‗sons of God‘ it occurs only once in Matthew. 
However, there are various passages in both the Old and New Testaments that indicate 
who the sons of God are—the righteous ones (Wisdom 5:1-5; Matthew 5:48; Revelation 
21:7). Moreover, although the subject is not specified, it is understood that the one who 
calls is God. And it is generally assumed that ‗called to be something by God‘ is 
equivalent to ‗being that something‘.1602 Therefore, the promise in the apodosis can be 
rephrased as being sons of God. In fact, for Matthew those whose conduct is similar to 
God‘s own are already sons of God—whom they address as Father (5:45; 6:9), and the 
people of God are expected to become sons of God in the eschaton—they will share a 
special kind of intimacy with God that is not experienced in the present time, and a 
likeness to God.
1603
 
Finally, both the use of future divine passive connotation and the notion of ‗sons 
of God‘ point to the overall eschatological nature of this promise. However, Matthew‘s 
understanding of divine sonship differs from Paul‘s in that for Paul the present 
pronouncement does not exempt the people from facing the last judgment.
1604
 
 In conclusion, the seventh beatitude points out that the eschatological promise to 
the peacemakers is that they will be God‘s children. Peacemaking is a long established 
virtue valued by both the Greek and Jewish worlds and is primarily concerned with 
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interpersonal relationship that demands reconciliation and forgiveness. The pursuit of 
peace is a demand by Jesus. Although the notion of peacemaking has posed a couple of 
interpretative problems with regards to political implications and its seemingly 
conflicting relationship with violence, Matthew basically affirms the positive values of 
peacemaking and proposes peacemaking as an appropriate attitude for the followers of 
Jesus rather than a pure political agenda. 
 
5: 10 Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the 
kingdom of heaven.  
μακάριοι οἱ δεδιωγμένοι ἕνεκεν δικαιοσύνης, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν 
οὐρανῶν. 
 
{5:11-12 Blessed are you when people revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of 
evil against you falsely on my account. Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in 
heaven, for in the same way they persecuted the prophets who were before you. 
μακάριοί ἐστε ὅταν ὀνειδίσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ διώξωσιν καὶ εἴπωσιν πᾶν πονηρὸν 
καθ' ὑμῶν [ψευδόμενοι] ἕνεκεν ἐμοῦ: χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς 
ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς: οὕτως γὰρ ἐδίωξαν τοὺς προφήτας τοὺς πρὸ 
ὑμῶν.}1605 
 
The eighth beatitude is the last of the four macarisms added by Matthew. Verse 
10 has no Lukan parallel and is added at a later time.
1606
 It forms an inclusio with the first 
beatitude by employing exactly the same apodosis. As an inclusio, it implies that the 
promises made in 5:4-9 are basically alternative ways of expressing the promise of the 
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kingdom of heaven expressed in the apodosis.
1607
 The beatitude also echoes the fourth 
macarism by focusing on righteousness and prepares for what is required of the greater 
righteousness in verse 20.
1608
  
Moreover, since verse 10 and verses 11 and 12 share the same subject matter of 
‗persecution‘ it is suggested that they are related in one way or another. Some exegetes 
perceive it as the ninth beatitude despite the fact that 5:11-12 differs from the rest of the 
Beatitudes in that it is formulated in the second person plural rather than the third person 
and contains much more words.
1609
 It serves as a bridge between the eight beatitudes and 
the teaching on love of enemies on the one hand and as a smooth transition to the ‗salt 
and light‘ saying on the other.1610 It is further argued that Matthew‘s later addition of 5:10 
was simply a numerical consideration—to form a multiple of three and to complete the 
triadic structure of the Beatitudes that contains the themes of ‗righteousness‘ and 
‗kingdom of heaven‘.1611 However, it is equally argued that 5:11-12 is an expansion of 
the eight beatitude. 
Regarding the motif of the persecution of the righteous, it can be found in many 
Old Testament passages, such as Wisdom 2:10-20, Psalm 7:1-17, and Job 13:20-27. 
Among them the persecution of the prophets was a dominant theme that later became part 
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of the martyrdom ideology.
1612
 In fact, this motif is also found in ancient Greek thoughts 
where major philosophers are at times portrayed as the prototype of the persecuted 
righteous man just like Job of the Old Testament.
1613
 However, none of the Old 
Testament passages grants blessing to the persecuted.
1614
 The New Testament tradition, 
in contrast, poses a possible parallel to the macarism in 1 Peter 3:14 (―But even if you do 
suffer for doing what is right, you are blessed‖).1615 Still, the beatitude does not connect 
the theme with the life and death of Jesus as its parallel does.
1616
 
Nevertheless, the verb form of persecution, διώκω, suggests that the persecution 
suffered by the righteous may refer to physical violence and/or verbal abuse.
1617
 And the 
use of perfect passive participle further implies that Matthew is aware that the 
persecution has begun in the past and continues to the present (5:12; 10:16-33).
1618
 In 
addition, the Greek word ἕνεκεν (meaning ‗on account of‘)—which normally indicates 
the latter is a cause or an occasion of the former—implies that righteousness is the cause 
of persecution:
1619
 Δικαιοσύνης emphasizes what the right conduct demanded by God is 
and gives content to the reason of persecution. 
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Subsequently, this understanding of persecution and the description in verses 11-
12 mutually interpret each other:
1620
 In the first place, the use of the second person plural 
in verses 11 and 12 implies that persecution is constitutive of discipleship (for Jesus is 
now addressing the disciples directly). Second, Matthew‘s three forms of persecution, 
when compared to Luke‘s list (Luke 6:20-23), point to a more severe conflict experienced 
by Matthew‘s community; yet they also hint that those final conflicts between Jewish 
Christians and the Jews (such as complete separation) are not implied by the 
macarism.
1621
 These various forms of persecution find references in both the New 
Testament (Galatians 4:29 and Acts 5:17-18) and the Jewish tradition:
1622
 The first form 
of hostility, ‗revile‘, is a traditional theme from the Jewish wisdom literature and is 
associated with the persecution of the righteous (Psalm 69:10). The second type of 
hostility, διώξωσιν, is used in a peculiar way that implies that persecution could come 
from within, which in turn hints that Matthew‘s community was persecuted by the Jews. 
The third form of hostility, ‗saying all kinds of evil against someone‘, can be viewed as 
slanders and defamation (which are treated extensively in the Old Testament writings 
such as Levi 19:16). Again, it is a traditional theme of the Jewish wisdom literature and is 
associated with martyrdom (Proverbs 6:17, 19). And the qualification ‗falsely‘ might be 
added by a scribe to make the hostility more specific. 
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 Third, both the language employed and the omission of the subject imply that the 
persecutions are rather general and could be applied to various situations.
1623
 Still, verse 
11 supplies the concrete description to the persecution of the righteous in the eighth 
beatitude—those who experience these kinds of persecution are indeed suffering for 
righteousness. 
Fourth, the phrase ἕνεκεν ἐμοῦ (‗on account of me‘) states clearly that the proper 
cause of persecution is Jesus and his teaching.
1624
 In verse 12, the syllogism ‗for in the 
same way they persecuted the prophets who were before you‘ recalls the Old Testament 
tradition (and theme) that suffering from persecution is part of the prophet‘s vocation 
(e.g., 2 Chronicles 36:16; Nehemiah 9: 26; 1 Thessalonians 2: 14-16).
1625
 It also provides 
a historical verdict to the present persecution as well as the reward granted.
1626
 The 
possible subjects of persecution are the Pharisees and scribes who are the sons of those 
who murdered the prophets (23:31-36). 
As far as the Jewish tradition is concerned, persecution for the sake of 
righteousness is understood as the greatest test/education for the righteous and produces 
the highest virtue.
1627
 
With regards to the promise of the eighth macarism, it is the same as that of the 
first beatitude. Still, the first two parts of verse 12 provides additional information about 
this promise—the receiving of great reward. The idea of receiving reward from God 
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because of persecution is actually found in Jewish apocalyptic literature (such as 1 Enoch 
108:10 and 4 Ezra 7:88-100) while the notion of reward is also found in Jewish 
teachings:
1628
 According to Jewish doctrine, reward is a conditional entitlement claimed 
by the qualified person and it can be claimed only once. When Matthew applies it to the 
Sermon and the Beatitudes, he implies that those who follow the teaching of Jesus would 
be guaranteed of treasure in heaven. This guarantee provides the reason for their rejoicing. 
However, one has to wait for the eschatological coming of the kingdom of God in order 
to claim the reward—in fact, the reward is always granted in the last judgment and is thus 
eschatological in nature (6:1, 2, 5, 16).
1629
  
Last but not least, the two imperatives χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε (‗rejoice‘ and 
‗be glad‘) could have a liturgical appeal and the ὅηι clause offers an immediate reason for 
rejoicing:
1630
 The disciples, like the prophets of the past, would be counted as God‘s 
servants and rewarded greatly. This ὅηι clause parallels and sums up other similar clauses 
stated in the previous beatitudes. Although the kingdom of heaven has not arrived in its 
fullness, the promise of future blessing has already transformed the present. Thus, the 
imperatives (and apodosis) point not only to the eschatological future but to the present as 
well. It echoes what is observed in the apodosis of the first beatitude. 
In conclusion, 5:10-12 tells us that those who suffer from various kinds of 
physical and/or verbal persecution for the sake of righteousness as the prophets did and 
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on account of Jesus and his teaching, will be rewarded greatly in the eschatological 
coming of the kingdom of heaven. Still, they should rejoice and be glad right now 
because of the guarantee of this reward. Moreover, by forming an inclusio with the first 
beatitude, this expanded eighth beatitude sums up the basic thoughts of the other 
beatitudes and forms a climax for the ethical teaching of the whole Beatitudes:
1631
 The 
attitude of humility identified in the first beatitude reaches its climax in the cultivation of 
the highest virtue of bearing persecution for righteousness‘s sake. 
 
A Summary 
As a whole, we note that the Beatitudes finds close correspondence with the 
ancient Jewish and Greek traditions, the Jewish prophetic and wisdom literature in 
particular: The first two beatitudes allude to Isaiah 61:1-3; the third macarism finds 
correspondence in Psalm 37:11; the beatitude on seeking God‘s righteousness likewise 
alludes to the Psalm (107:5, 8-9); the fifth beatitude finds parallel in Proverbs 14:21; the 
sixth macarism may allude to Psalm 24:3-5; the beatitude on peacemaking, in contrast, 
finds parallel in the apocalyptic literature of 2 Enoch 52:11-12; and the last beatitude can 
allude to a number of Old Testament passages, especially those related to the persecution 
of the prophets. 
All these allusions and parallels, as well as the situation of Matthew‘s community, 
guide us to understand the original meaning of the macarisms: The poor in spirit, who are 
often suffering from economic poverty, are those who acquire the internal attitude of 
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humility. The mourners lament over the causes of griefs, especially the poverty that 
causes the grief of the poor. The meek, like the poor in spirit, are called to be humble and 
follow the example of Jesus. Those who hunger and thirst for righteousness seek first 
God‘s righteousness with effort. The merciful are those who are compassionate 
particularly to human predicaments, and extend mercy to all by means of forgiveness. 
They do so as a response to God‘s covenantal, steadfast love. The pure in heart live a life 
of moral integrity in that their moral righteousness emerges from the inner self and finds 
corresponding expressions in outward actions. The peacemakers are concerned first with 
interpersonal relationship that demands reconciliation and forgiveness. Finally, only 
those who suffer from all kinds of physical and/or verbal persecution for the sake of 
righteousness and on account of Jesus and his teaching will be rewarded. This 
understanding of these macarisms helps clarify to us who the blessed people are in the 
mind of the evangelist. 
 The subsequent promises—reversals of the present predicament and rewards 
alike—are set within an eschatological framework which contrasts to that of the wisdom 
writings that expects immediate effects in this life: The blessed are given the kingdom of 
heaven that may also contain present recompense; they will be comforted by God who 
brings salvation, pardon, and nourishment; they will inherit the new earth and new 
heaven when the kingdom comes in its fullness; they will be satisfied by God who grants 
us the eschatological banquet; they will also receive God‘s own mercy and steadfast love; 
they will be able to see God in the eschaton and become God‘s children; and they will 
receive great reward in the kingdom of heaven. While these promises converge in the 
 396 
eschatological coming of the kingdom of God, some anticipation of the reward in present 
life is possible.
1632
 The Beatitudes underlines God‘s providence. 
 As far as the ethics of the Beatitudes is concerned, these findings confirm that the 
macarisms are blessings, explanations of certain attitudes and actions that lead to 
eschatological reward, as well as standards for what the Matthean community should 
manifest in enduring their suffering and conflict with others.
1633
 The first and third 
beatitudes highlight the attitude of humility. The second macarism points out that 
mourning over those causes of grief is itself a pious practice. The fourth beatitude attends 
to the conducts and relationships that are built upon God‘s righteousness. The fifth 
macarism states clearly that mercy and compassion to those human predicaments as well 
as forgiveness are practiced by the merciful. Those who are pure in heart highlight the 
importance of integrity in one‘s whole being. The seventh beatitude points out the 
acquisition of peacemaking by means of reconciliation and forgiveness. The last 
beatitude encourages us to cultivate the highest virtue of bearing persecution for the sake 
of righteousness and Jesus‘ teaching. These matching practices and attitudes, in other 
words, are the virtues of the Beatitudes. And among them the demand of justice, though 
not explicitly listed, is to be pursued and possessed by all for it is a manifestation of 
God‘s righteousness. 
Although Matthew does not refer the Beatitudes explicitly to the life and death of 
Jesus, he elsewhere points out that Jesus has all these qualities:
1634
 He is humble, meek 
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and righteous (11:29); he mourns for others (26:36-46) and has mercy on the people 
(9:27); he lives a life of integrity with his words and deeds; and is reviled and persecuted 
throughout his Passion. Thus, the person of Jesus has truthfully illustrated to us the eight 
beatitudes and become the exemplar par excellence for the disciples. Also, those 
correspondences between particular beatitudes and the Jewish tradition (especially the 
Second Isaiah) further point out that Jesus is the anointed one, and the eschatological 
Messiah. 
In sum, as Davies and Allison rightly conclude, the Beatitudes serves as a 
practical theodicy:
1635
 The Beatitudes puts the present difficulties of the Matthean 
community into perspective, lessens the pain and agony of the suffered, and offers 
encouragement by means of eschatological promises. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
So far I have offered an exegesis of the Beatitudes in this chapter as a way to 
concretely illustrate the first phase of doing a more integrated Scripture-based Christian 
ethics that treats the text as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. Various biblical tools and the 
works of some major contemporary Matthean experts are employed so as to present a 
detailed and more accurate exegesis of the Beatitudes in Matthew 5:3-12. Since neither 
the Beatitudes nor the Sermon on the Mount is intended to stand by itself, it becomes 
necessary to first turn to certain issues related to the gospel in general and the Sermon on 
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the Mount in specific prior to exploring the Beatitudes‘s own issues and exegeting the 
text. They are treated in the first three parts of this chapter. Although many of the issues 
are still debatable, some general claims can be made. This acquisition not only helps us to 
understand the gospel itself but also offers useful exegetical guidelines.  
The corresponding attitudes and conducts defined in the beatitudes include 
humility, mourning, striving for God‘s righteousness, mercy and compassion, forgiveness, 
integrity, reconciliation and peacemaking, and bearing all kinds of persecution for the 
sake of righteousness and justice. However, in order to better understand the meanings of 
these identified attitudes and actions as well as to interpret the Beatitudes‘s ethical 
relevance in a contemporary context, we need to read the Beatitudes through a particular 
hermeneutical lens. Thus, in the next chapter I move onto the next phrase of our 
illustration and employ the hermeneutics of virtue ethics as proposed in Part Two to 
interpret the exegeted Beatitudes. 
 In so doing, a legitimate, though specific, question relevant to the overall 
construction of a more integrated Scripture-based theological ethics emerges: What 
difference does it make between interpreting the Beatitudes as most ethicists have done 
and interpreting the exegeted Beatitudes that I have just presented? In other words, what 
can ethicists learn from exegeting the Beatitudes? Generally speaking, an ethicist can 
acquire a more accurate understanding of the Beatitudes than what one understands 
superficially. This subsequently helps produce a more faithful interpretation of the ethical 
relevance of the Beatitudes. Also, the exegeted Beatitudes reveals to us those hidden 
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insights of which an ethicist may be unaware and hence broadens the scope of one‘s 
interpretation. 
 But what is that understanding and hidden insights? Several specific and 
significant features emerge from the ‗scripted‘ Beatitudes that guide our hermeneutics in 
the right direction. In the first place, the overall text bears an explicit Jewish influence—it 
is written by a Jewish Christian for a Jewish Christian community and is grounded in 
Jewish wisdom and apocalyptic literature. Therefore, ethicists are reminded to pay 
special attention to the strong Jewish socio-cultural and religious context when 
interpreting the text and seeking ethical relevance for the contemporary world. In other 
words, while our hermeneutics is never context-free, the text to be interpreted likewise 
has its own context that needs to be addressed. 
Second, the eight beatitudes, though dealing with different attitudes and conducts, 
form a tightly integrated and sophisticated whole. The fruit of exegesis shows that such 
unity—not uniformity—is not only found in terms of literary form but also in terms of 
contents. In particular, the various attitudes, practices, and conducts identified in each of 
the beatitudes converge to certain core loci. For instance, the ‗poor in spirit‘, the 
mourners, the meek, and the merciful are not simple general personal attributes but rather 
are deeply connected to the identity of the community under persecution. Their concerns 
for the community‘s predicaments, embodied by those who hunger and thirst for 
righteousness, the ‗pure in heart‘, the peacemaker, and those who suffer, point to 
righteousness as the foundational relationship between God and the community. Or, in 
terms of moral attitudes, the first, second, and third beatitudes highlight the attitude of 
 400 
personal and communal humility, while the fifth and the seventh beatitudes bring out not 
only virtues of mercy and reconciliation respectively but together the practice of 
forgiveness as well. 
Third, this integration on the level of content points to the overall radical nature of 
ethics in the Beatitudes. On the surface the Beatitudes simply poses certain attitudes and 
conduct as demands of discipleship. There seems no great difficulty in acquiring these 
individual attitudes or acting out their corresponding conducts. However, the internal 
unity among the beatitudes hints that the Beatitudes, like the Sermon on the Mount, 
proposes a radical demand on being disciples of Jesus: Being poor in spirit demands at 
the same time mercy and meekness. In other words, the Beatitudes is a call to strive for 
perfection. Grace is thus needed in practicing and striving for those attitudes. Moreover, 
the exegesis discloses that Jesus is the concrete exemplar par excellence in our moral 
development based on the Beatitudes. In short, the call to discipleship has real great 
expectation in Matthew‘s gospel. 
Fourth, the outcome of exegeting the Beatitudes shows that while each of the 
beatitudes points to a corresponding human response and lays its promise in an 
eschatological framework, God‘s providence is found in all situations. God is not simply 
the giver of rewards but is ever present in the blessed.
1636
 Thus, during the process of 
interpretation, one must not over-emphasize human effort or overlook God‘s providence. 
Fifth, the revelation of the unity among the beatitudes further rejects the 
dichotomy that some beatitudes (like the first and the sixth beatitudes) are concerned with 
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persons (her/himself) while other beatitudes (such as the fourth and seventh beatitudes) 
are concerned with the community. Still, it similarly rejects the opposite view of some 
theologians (like the liberation theologians) that the Beatitudes is solely socio-political 
driven. Rather, the findings of the exegesis hint that the communal aspect of the 
Beatitudes is found in each of the beatitudes despite the fact that it is explicit in some and 
implicit in others.  
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Chapter Eight: The Interpretation of a Key Text through the Hermeneutics of 
Virtue Ethics—The Beatitudes as ‘Scripted Script’ 
 
In our earlier exploration of the audiences of the Beatitudes (and the Sermon on 
the Mount), some scholars like Jack Dean Kingsbury argue that neither the crowds nor 
the first disciples nor the evangelist‘s community are the real intended addressee but the 
‗implied reader‘ ―who is a disciple of Jesus and who lives in the perilous times between 
the resurrection and the Parousia.‖1637 By correlating the Sermon with Jesus‘ instruction 
to the disciples in Matthew 28:20, Ulrich Luz similarly claims that the Sermon is 
―precisely not intended to be limited to the inside of the Church [although] Matthew puts 
special emphasis on [the disciples].‖1638 Rather, it addresses directly its present readers by 
providing a ―guiding principle by which that community is to measure its own 
works.‖1639 That means, the Beatitudes is also written for and spoken to the people of 
God in the twenty-first century. 
This understanding highlights the necessity of carrying out the hermeneutical task 
in reading the Beatitudes. As I have been proposing throughout this work, the 
construction of a more integrated Scripture-based theological ethics challenges us to treat 
the text as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. Therefore, in this chapter, I continue to make my 
case by moving into hermeneutics and see how the Beatitudes is meaningful to our 
contemporary readers in their Christian moral life. 
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Regarding the relevance of the Beatitudes to our contemporary Christian moral 
life, Pinckaers argues that it is still relevant at both personal and social levels, for the 
problems of poverty and wealth, violence, justice and forgiveness, war and peace, and 
persecution have constantly recurred throughout our human history.
1640
 The Beatitudes, 
he suggests, reads like ―a summary of human life crossed with questions and 
contradictions.‖1641 Indeed, the Beatitudes as a whole makes us attentive to those limit-
experiences such as death and suffering, and invites us to find meanings in these 
seemingly meaningless situations.
1642
 Still, it reminds us that our human conditions are 
full of promise in God‘s eyes and thus affirms our deepest longing for goodness, freedom, 
wholeness, and harmony.
1643
 It is the answer of Jesus to the human question of happiness 
and it shows the followers the path to God.
1644
 
Therefore, in order to interpret the Beatitudes and to understand its ethical 
implications for contemporary Christians and their community, as proposed earlier, I 
employ virtue ethics as the hermeneutical tool.
1645
 In fact, interpreting the Beatitudes in 
light of virtue for ethical implications is not the interest of the contemporary Christian 
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virtue ethicists alone:
1646
  Early church Fathers such as Ambrose claimed that the four 
beatitudes common to Luke and Matthew reflect the four cardinal virtues (justice, 
temperance, fortitude, and prudence). Medieval mendicants had also long perceived the 
Beatitudes as a pedagogical touchstone in their teaching of morals and virtues. 
Dominican William Peraldus, for example, wrote a theological treatise on the relationship 
between the virtues and the Beatitudes. Francis of Assisi, in particular, interpreted the 
text literally and physically, and his literal interpretation was noted for underlining a 
trend that claims that one‘s outward action manifests the inner disposition of the person. 
Thomas Aquinas, for instance, though argued that the beatitudes are not virtues but 
actions, agreed that these actions are resulted from proper dispositions.  
Still, it was the fourteenth century Observant Franciscan Bernardino of Siena who 
first specifically interpreted the eight beatitudes in light of virtue:
1647
 The Beatitudes is a 
grace that indicates that one‘s soul is purified. Each beatitude is at the same time an 
extension of the virtues and an action disclosing one‘s inner and proper disposition. For 
example, in his interpretation of the fourth beatitude (on hunger and thirst for 
righteousness), Bernardino perceived that righteousness pertains to God, individual, and 
neighbor. Subsequently, the virtues of honoring God, self-discipline, as well as obedience, 
concord, and beneficence (toward a superior, an equal, and an inferior respectively) are 
needed for the realization of righteousness. Or, in the case of peacemaking, he argued 
that the virtues of active faith, charity, and concord of peace are crucial necessities. 
Moreover, although Bernardino was a preacher and he was solely concerned about the 
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lives of his fellow friars, his interpretation of the Beatitudes in light of virtue is praised 
for focusing not only on individuals but also the community in general. 
Unfortunately, the trend to interpret the Beatitudes for its audience in light of 
virtue has somehow lost ground with the rise of other ethical approaches. It is not until 
the resurgence in attention to virtue that ethicists begin to revisit the relationship between 
the Beatitudes and virtues. For instance, as mentioned at the beginning of Part Three, 
Benjamin Farley identifies several virtues that are extolled in the Beatitudes: Absolute 
renunciation and docility, acceptance of God‘s comfort, meekness, commitment to 
righteousness, mercy, purity of heart, cultivation of peace, and courage. Baptist ethicist 
Glen Stassen, who is interested in peacemaking and social justice, also turns to the 
Beatitudes for guidance in the search of virtues needed for peacemaking:
1648
 He claims 
that all virtues found in the Beatitudes are primarily ―God‘s virtues as merciful deliverer‖ 
and only secondarily are they human virtues. Thus, the focus of the Beatitudes is God‘s 
grace rather than our human virtues. He then briefly identifies certain virtues and 
concludes that the Beatitudes (and other biblical traditions) are a better source than those 
traditional Greek virtues for a virtue ethics of peacemaking.  
Despite these notable exceptions, William Mattison rightly comments that the 
recent resurgence of virtue ethics seems to not draw enough attention to the importance 
of the Beatitudes:
1649
 He notes that a real lacuna does exist and hence hopes to contribute 
to the more prominent incorporation of the beatitudes into contemporary Christian ethics 
                                                 
1648
 Stassen, ―The Beatitudes as Eschatological Peacemaking Virtues,‖ 246-56. 
1649
 Mattison III, ―The Beatitudes and Christian Ethics: A Virtue Perspective.‖ Mattison have employed the 
same approach in his treatment of the Lord‘s Prayer in the Sermon. See ―The Lord‘s Prayers and an Ethics 
of Virtue: Continuing a History of Commentary,‖ The Thomist 73 (2009): 279-31. 
 406 
(and moral theology) and to discussions that are endemic to virtue approaches to ethics. 
By turning to classical Greco-Roman literature and some early Christian thinkers like 
Augustine, Mattison argues that the Beatitudes is appropriately understood in the context 
of the question of happiness and is a rich resource in answering virtue-focused questions. 
In addition, he claims that since the Beatitudes is all about happiness it is only 
appropriate to employ virtue ethics that similarly sought happiness as the interpretative 
tool.  
However, Mattison is more concerned with arguing for an intrinsic relationship 
(or continuity) between the qualifying condition and the state of reward/happiness 
obtained—that is, each promise/reward is a continuation and culmination of a life of a 
particular qualifying condition—than in interpreting the text. He basically follows 
Augustine‘s approach and suggests that the Beatitudes commends the seven virtues—
three theological and four cardinal. And at times, his understanding of the original 
meaning of certain beatitudes (such as mourning) seems superficial and hence leads to a 
mistaken interpretation of those beatitudes. 
Therefore, here I attempt to offer a more comprehensive and more exact 
interpretation for our contemporary world that is based on the outcome of the previous 
exegesis. In so doing, instead of simply proposing corresponding virtue(s) in each of the 
eight beatitudes, I will adopt the foundational questions (based on the threefold structure) 
of virtue theory: Who are we? What ought we to become? And finally, how do we get 
there? 
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To the first question, I will reflect upon our own status within the larger society 
and point out the problems that challenge our moral formation. The second question 
guides us to understand the concrete meaning and content of each proposed virtue. In 
other words, what does it mean to be a particular kind of virtuous person as suggested by 
each beatitude? The last question further leads us to explore the practices of these virtues, 
as well as to identify certain moral exemplars (predominantly) within the Christian 
tradition, beginning with Jesus who is the exemplar par excellence. By practicing the 
virtuous acts and by imitating these exemplary models, we can (partially) achieve the 
goal of becoming a virtuous person. It points to the formation of our moral character that 
is in line with the Beatitudes. 
Moreover, I will briefly reflect upon the social and communal dimension of each 
virtue, for two reasons. First, as discussed before, one of the important yields of 
contemporary virtue theory is ‗community and communal identity‘. In other words, there 
is a communal aspect in our virtuous life and we are called to form a particular kind of 
community. Therefore, by interpreting the Beatitudes through the hermeneutics of virtue 
ethics, we note that Matthew does not only invite us to be a particular virtuous Christian 
but also a specific virtuous Christian community. 
Second, most contemporary scholars agree that the Beatitudes itself has a social 
characteristic. Historically, however, Jesus himself was not a social reformer, and the 
Beatitudes does not suggest a ‗social ethics‘ in the strict sense. Even those exemplary 
saints and theologians before the modern era were not social reformers in any radical 
sense. They did not envision the possibility of bringing about a different social order.  It 
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was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that theologians and 
Christians began to read the beatitudes with a different set of social lenses.  
In order to respond to this basic issue, some ethicists point out that the text 
implies social objectives and serves as the basis of ―a social ethics of consistent 
discipleship action.‖1650 Lisa Sowle Cahill, for instance, by perceiving the overall Sermon 
as a kingdom ethics that portrays right relationship to God and righteous actions towards 
others, argues that although the Beatitudes (and the Sermon) does not directly suggest the 
social dimension of its ethical implications, it is implied in the broader meaning of 
discipleship—there is ―a continuing social meaning of the inclusive call to discipleship 
and of merciful action.‖1651 She thus claims that if the ethics of Matthew 5-7 is one of 
discipleship and forgiving love, then the social dimension presupposes personal 
transformation as necessary.
1652
 Theologian William Cavanaugh further suggests that 
discipleship goes beyond social citizenship for ―the community is invited to enter into a 
deeper kind of social relationship that is based on social justice and the priority of 
poor.‖1653 
Finally, throughout the interpretation, it is important to note that, as far as the 
Christian community is concerned, we are not simply proposing certain human virtues 
but also Christian virtues: First, since virtue is not so much a question of doing as of 
being, the Beatitudes likewise is concerned with our being as Christians in the first place. 
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Second, as one theologian insightfully puts, the beatitudes are ―literally ‗be-attitudes‘ or 
attitudes of being that disclose basic dispositions of Christian character formation.‖1654 
Third, the Beatitudes tells us how to acquire the more abundant life that Christ brought to 
us.
1655
 In particular, though formulated in the indicative mode, it arouses a longing for 
corresponding Christian action.
1656
 Fourth, as the Beatitudes is particularly directed 
toward the victims of unrighteousness, and bestows empowerment and encouragement 
upon them, it thus contains a theological declaration of God‘s mercy and divine 
providence.
1657
 It is therefore argued that the Beatitudes reveals that human virtue is not 
enough because of its limitations and our failure to fully acquire the virtues.
1658
 In sum, 
the Beatitudes describes best ―the Christian virtues that make one worthy of the Kingdom 
of Heaven.‖1659 
 
8.1 The Virtue of Humility in 5:3 
Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.  
 
English Dominican Gerald Vann, in his interpretation of the first beatitude, 
focuses on its spiritual meaning alone without making any reference to reality of material 
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poverty.
1660
 Our exegesis, however, reveals that the ‗poor in spirit‘, who acquire the 
internal attitude of humility, are often those suffering from economic poverty. Though the 
kingdom of heaven given to them is eschatological in nature, present recompense, 
especially the lifting of their poverty, is also considered. Therefore, one cannot talk about 
‗poverty in spirit‘ without looking into the reality of material poverty. Who, then, are the 
‗poor‘ and the ‗poor in spirit‘ in our society? 
 
Poverty as a Human Condition 
Theologically speaking, human beings are created to share God‘s infinity. 
However, because of sin—the pride of autonomy and the will to be one‘s own master—
we lost the docility that makes love and oneness (with God) possible.
1661
 In this sense, 
humankind is inescapably poor—there is poverty intrinsic to our human beings.1662  
Theologian Johannes Metz, based on this understanding of the innate poverty 
within us, further identifies six concrete types of poverty experienced by people in their 
daily life, including:
1663
 1) Poverty of misery and neediness in which one lives a life of 
severe poverty and insecurity; 2) poverty of our provisional nature in that our future is 
unknown and we are overcome by fear; and 3) poverty of finiteness in that the 
inescapable end is near. Here, Metz expands the meaning of ‗poverty‘ to include 
psychological and material poverty. 
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While acknowledging that these various types of poverty are true and real, Servias 
Pinckaers adds that there is also the poverty of error and sin—the most hidden and 
difficult type of poverty in that one faces the painful endurance of the sense of guilt—and 
rightly points out that these various forms of poverty, especially material and spiritual 
poverty, are not isolated from one another for poverty is experienced in both the body and 
the soul.
1664
 He further identifies ―the fundamental emptiness which lies at the depths of 
our being: The consciousness of our condition as creature‖ as the primordial poverty.1665  
The overall experience of poverty, however, can lead us to certain awakenings of 
self-understanding:
1666
 Our helplessness and total dependency on a strange ‗beyond‘, as 
well as our attempts to fuse with others in their poverty.  In other words, it discloses our 
deepest self as dependent, solitary, vulnerable, and nothingness. All these experiences in 
turn help us to be aware of our place in creation and to seek ‗redemption‘. Indeed, Jewish 
theologian Pinchas Lapide is right to claim that all the suffering and struggling from 
poverty, destitution, and marginalization will turn out to be meaningful, especially since 
God dwells among the poor.
1667
And we are challenged to honestly acknowledge this 
poverty within us and accept it with a ‗poverty of spirit‘.1668 
 
The Meaning of ‘Poor in Spirit’ 
What, then, does this ‗poor in spirit‘ or ‗poverty of spirit‘ mean for us nowadays? 
In the context of virtue theory, the notion points to the virtue of humility. Still, various 
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understandings are conceived throughout Christian history. John Chrysostom, for 
example, perceived it as an antidote of pride—the root of all evil and the forerunner of 
original sin.
1669
 For Luther it means the detachment of one‘s heart from temporal things 
and reliance of God‘s grace.1670 Modern Eastern Orthodox Christians similarly 
understand ‗poor in spirit‘ as ―[the] renunciation of any personal velleities, of any desires 
of possession or dominion, directing one‘s entire disposition towards the reception of the 
divine grace...[and a] spiritual emptying.‖1671 It implies a total dependence on God‘s 
grace and has a childlike trust in God‘s providence. Betz, on the other hand, defines it as 
―one‘s self-consciousness of the ‗poverty‘ of the human condition.‖1672 By referring to 
the life and death of Jesus, Metz further depicts it as ―obedient acceptance of our natural 
impoverishment.‖1673 These understandings, though diverse, are not contradictory to each 
other. In fact, a more comprehensive understanding of humility takes on all these aspects. 
 
Humility as a Virtue 
Since the first beatitude is the starting point of the Sermon on the Mount and of 
one‘s journey to the kingdom of God, some scholars thus claim that it is the foundation of 
all the beatitudes (and the Sermon).
1674
  Others also claim that humility, being the virtue 
of the first beatitude, is necessarily understood as the ―lowest and most elementary 
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virtue.‖1675 This understanding runs parallel with John Climacus‘s own metaphor of the 
life of holiness as a ladder and humility being the first step on that ladder. It is further 
seen as it were ―the parent and generation of the virtues.‖1676 This view thus implies that 
every virtue is a form of humility: Justice, for instance, is ―the humility of the man who 
knows that every possession is also a responsibility.‖1677 In a similar way, Metz perceives 
the virtue of humility as the ground of every theological virtue and calls it ―the mother of 
the threefold mystery of faith, hope and charity.‖1678 
Moreover, some theologians argue that humility is not just a virtue among others 
but ―a necessary ingredient in any authentic Christian attitude toward life‖ and through 
which imitation of Christ is possible.
1679
 This argument can be traced back to Chrysostom 
who claimed that the virtue of humility is an indispensible virtue for the Christians at all 
times. He said, ―Without humility all fall away and perish.‖1680 
Nevertheless, humility as a Christian virtue for the ‗poor in spirit‘ implies the 
cultivation of other relevant virtues. In particular, grounded in a strong sense of the need 
of God‘s help, a humble person will therefore be trusting before God, be patient to God‘s 
assistance, and put oneself completely at the disposal of God‘s command.1681 Thus, it 
points to the need of the theological virtues of faith and hope in God and God‘s 
deliverance. Also, as the teaching on Original Sin demonstrates, because of human pride 
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we disobeyed God and lost our original human nature (that is, in communion with God). 
Therefore, in obeying God one acquires humility.
1682
 In this way, the virtues of obedience 
and humility are directly connected.
 
 
 
The Practice of Humility 
As far as the cultivation of the virtue of humility is concerned, Michael Crosby 
rightly points out that the first step is to acknowledge God as our ultimate source and 
meaning of our lives.
1683
 A second step is the renunciation of whatever separates us from 
God—especially spiritual pride that is our biggest obstacle.1684 In practical terms, such 
renunciation or self-emptiness points to detachment.
1685
 Within the Ignatian tradition, it 
does not mean ‗not caring‘; on the contrary, it cares for things, though in a way different 
from how avaricious people do. One learns to see God in all things and hence loves them 
in accordance with God‘s will. Thus, one is more than a steward of God‘s creation but a 
lover as well. And love as such is not a possessive love. Moreover, detachment does not 
simply mean the giving up of things but more importantly, the giving up of the obsessive 
desire for them.
1686
 When one is detached from the desire to possess, one can rejoice in 
whatever things one has and grow in freedom. 
On the other hand, some theologians further suggest the practice of sharing. They 
point out that when one is ready to share all that one has received from God, one is able 
to rejoice and be happy and will not lose one‘s equilibrium in the midst of poverty and 
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hardships.
1687
 Within the sphere of one‘s liturgical and sacramental life, humility is 
further accompanied and expressed by Christian devotion as well as the sacrament of 
reconciliation that help us to recognize our sinfulness and hence remain humble in front 
of God.
1688
 
 
The Exemplars 
In Matthew 11:29, Jesus says, ―Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I 
am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for your souls.‖ These words tell us 
that we can turn to Jesus in our cultivation of Christian humility. Indeed, there are many 
narratives in the New Testament that portray Jesus as a model of humility: He teaches us 
by not just words (e.g., Matthew 19:16-30) but also his own example (Philippians 2:6-8). 
As a whole, these narratives highlight certain traits of Jesus‘ humility: His hiddenness, 
powerlessness, and self-emptying.
1689
 In particular, Christ‘s own humility and obedience 
to God the Father, from incarnation to the cross, is the perfect example of humility.
1690
 
By making himself poor (and a humble servant) and dedicating the whole life to the 
lowly and the poor, Jesus enriches us all (2 Corinthians 8:9) and opens our hearts to a life 
in the service of God and others.
1691
 Häring thus rightly claims that one needs to look to 
Christ the exemplar before asking abstract questions about poverty.
1692
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Apart from Jesus Christ, the first human being identified as a model of humility 
(at least in the Catholic and Orthodox traditions) is the Blessed Virgin Mary, whose 
humility is best manifested in her Magnificat (Luke 1:46-55) and her humble life (John 
2:5). Still, there are many notable saints throughout the Christian history that exemplify 
the virtue of humility:
1693
 Orthodox Saint Basil of Moscow in the fourth century, for 
example, gave away his last clothing and became naked and was called the ‗holy fool of 
Moscow‘. Indeed, concrete practices of asceticism, self-denial, and obedience to the 
spiritual father are commonly found in the Eastern Church tradition.
1694
 
Within the Latin rite of the Catholic tradition, Francis of Assisi is well known for 
embracing poverty literally and concretely:
1695
 He spoke of having poverty as his bride, 
practiced strict poverty voluntarily and insisted that one should ‗hate‘ oneself—especially 
the pride inside us. Dominic, likewise, suggested that his followers possess poverty and 
offered his own interpretation: It is a perfection of freedom so much so that ―it is a 
question less of what you possess than of how you possess it.‖1696 
In our contemporary society, there are also Christians who practice humility as a 
way of discipleship, such as Mother Teresa of Calcutta and the members of her religious 
congregation who are known for living an extremely simple lifestyle and serving the 
poorest of the poor.
1697
 Like their pioneer Christian saints these exemplary Christians 
take on voluntary poverty as a means to acquire spiritual poverty in imitation of Christ. 
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In both cases, these exemplary figures demonstrate that living a simple life for the 
sake of the poor is possible for all. In this way, their simple lifestyle challenges our 
society‘s false beliefs that wealth and material possessions are the goals of human life. 
They effectively call for changes of mentality on both personal and social levels.  
 
The Social, Communal Aspect of the Virtue of Humility 
While these Christian models‘ voluntary poverty is praiseworthy, the reality of 
forced poverty in our contemporary society challenges the followers of Christ to look 
beyond personal spiritual growth. In particular, the people of God are called to serve the 
poor and the suffering:
1698
 Because of their awareness of dependence on God, the ‗poor 
in spirit‘ can accept their responsibility to cooperate with God‘s plan in bringing about 
the original order. In the Gospel of Matthew, this plan of God is identified as doing good 
toward others, especially toward the poor and the desperate by means of sharing (19:16-
22; 25:31-46).
1699
 In fact, our wealth—including the spiritual wealth—is given ―in view 
of the multitude…[and]…in the service of those who are worried and anguished.‖1700 In 
our contemporary world, the practice of sharing is not limited to personal or communal 
levels but more importantly, the societal and international level. The virtue of humility 
challenges our society and nation to share our natural resources, technological 
advancement, and financial wealth with developing countries. One concrete, immediate 
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social action on the international platform should be the cancelation of international debts 
by the developed countries.  
Moreover, Häring notes that human pride—as is manifested in our human lust to 
possess and to dominate (and manipulate) others—is the cause of forced poverty and 
social injustice and rightly stresses the social implications of the Beatitudes.
1701
 Therefore, 
we are called to not just serve the poor but also to combat injustice and promote justice. 
Pinckaers likewise claims that both humility and the acceptance of poverty do not mean 
―passivity in the face of the injustices which cause poverty.‖1702 Some theologians thus 
argue that the ‗poor in spirit‘ include those who trust in God for their security and God‘s 
presence with them when they work for justice.
1703
 Based on Latin America experiences, 
these theologians suggest the need to change the infrastructure that leads to a culture of 
domination/oppression and subsequent social injustice. In so doing, they call for personal 
conversion and creation of alternative communities/societies as the first step of 
promoting changes. Last but not least, humility also reminds us that we are unable to 
change anything without God‘s grace. 
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8.2 Solidarity as a Virtue in 5:4 
Blessed are those who mourn, for they will be comforted. 
 
Some interpreters take a more personal and spiritual approach toward the 
beatitude and interpret it as solely concerning one‘s sinfulness or personal suffering.1704 
Yet, we learn from the earlier exegesis that those who mourn are closely related to the 
‗poor in spirit‘. The object of mourning, therefore, is not so much one‘s own suffering or 
sins but the concrete human experience of poverty and suffering encountered by other 
members of the community. And the fulfillment of the eschatological prediction further 
requires divine justice. Such understanding guides us to grasp the virtue intended by the 
evangelist: We are called to mourn over the suffering of others caused by injustice. The 
virtue of consoling, in contrast, is not the main concern as some ethicists like Häring have 
presumed. 
 
Suffering and Mourning as Human Experience 
Suffering and mourning often go hand in hand in our human experience. In the 
time of gospel writing, it was the concrete experience of the evangelist‘s community; still, 
it is also the experience of our human family nowadays. Indeed, Jesus explicitly tells us 
that suffering, sorrow and mourning are inevitable (John 16:20-22). 
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What are the sufferings in our humankind? Pinckaers offers a brief but helpful 
summary:
1705
 They could be physical (such as pain and poverty), moral (such as 
disappointments), spiritual (like the consciousness of sins), or a result of loss (such as 
death). And the term for ‗mourning‘ normally refers to the grief of death and great loss. It 
designates the keenest of sufferings in that one can do nothing but weep.  
Still, a closer look of the reality in our contemporary world shows that the object 
of our grieving is not limited to individual suffering alone. There is massive suffering in 
every corner of our human society: For instance, the discrimination experienced by the 
illegal/undocumented immigrants in our own countries; our alienation towards the 
HIV/AIDS victims; the severe poverty and political unrest in developing countries; and 
even communal conflicts due to differences in religious belief. Based on our earlier 
discussion on poverty, we can claim that these people also suffer from poverty in one 
way or another. It is further pointed out that the despoliation of the earth is another object 
of our mourning in the twenty-first century.
1706
 
As a whole, the object of our mourning is the various suffering and predicament 
of others caused by injustice in our society, especially but not exclusively, 
material/economic poverty and persecution. 
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The Meaning of Mourning 
In his commentary on this beatitude, Thomas Aquinas systematically 
distinguishes the different kinds of grief experienced by human beings.
1707
 His analysis, 
though correct, seems to overemphasize the self and the spiritual dimension of the self. In 
fact, ‗mourning‘ in the beatitude is other-oriented:1708 It has the other as the center and 
the self as identified with the other in the act of mourning. It is the ready and joyful 
subordination of one‘s own comfort and well-being to the suffering of others in order to 
bring strength and courage to others.
1709
 In this way, one allows one‘s private life to be 
invaded and to suffer with those in agony. This openness and subordination to the other‘s 
suffering, therefore, implies a certain degree of humility. It is thus appropriate to claim 
that humility and mourning are inseparable.
1710
 
Moreover, this other-centered attitude of grieving also points to the notion of 
solidarity—the sharing between the sufferer and the mourner in their experience of 
suffering, the guilt/sin that causes it, and the final redemption. However, mourning as 
such is not a kind of sentimentality in that the emotion is isolated (rather than shared) and 
made as an end in itself; it is not a kind of sensuality either—in which the sense-pleasure 
(of comforting/being comforted) is made an end in itself.
1711
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Mourning as an Expression of the Virtue of Solidarity 
Häring presumes that comforting is the core virtue ascribed in the second 
beatitude and thus focuses on the notion of comfort and consolation in their interpretation 
of the text. However, our exegesis discloses the fact that mourning itself is a virtuous act 
to be practiced. It is also a necessary step prior to consoling others. 
As a virtuous Christian act, mourning refers to an attitude that identifies with 
God‘s will to accompany those who grieve.1712 Thus, the virtuous act of mourning is an 
expression of the virtue of solidarity, which in turn points to the theological virtue of 
charity. Still, the inseparability between mourning and humility also implies that, in one 
sense, mourning is another form of the virtue of humility—a humility that is about and 
toward the other that surrounds the self, and leads to the giving up of one‘s desires 
altogether for the sake of the other.
1713
   
In addition, mourning is related to the virtue of fortitude as well—the courage to 
face the reality of our world.
1714
 Those who mourn over the sufferings of others first take 
the courage to accept the reality of sufferings and pains rather than denial, and then 
address the causes of these sufferings.
1715
 Subsequently, it also points to the need of the 
theological virtue of hope in God and God‘s deliverance. 
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The Practice of Mourning 
Theologians offer some concrete steps that help prepare our inner selves for the 
practice of mourning:
1716
 In the first place, we need to acquire a sense of willingness in 
taking other people‘s troubles to oneself and in sharing of our own selves. Second, one 
also needs to acquire an attitude of single-mindedness so much so that one lets go one‘s 
desire even to the point of discomfort for the sake of bringing God‘s love to others. Third, 
such willingness calls for readiness to accompany others. In order to cultivate this 
readiness, mortification—being a particular form of voluntary suffering—is a helpful 
means. By voluntarily suffering and choosing discomfort as love demands, one further 
learns about other‘s suffering and grief. Such readiness needs to be further supplemented 
by ‗awareness‘. It is through such awareness that the sufferers around us can be 
recognized, and that one‘s mortification becomes other-oriented rather than self-centered.  
In concrete terms, James Keenan highlights the importance of the act of listening. 
It allows and welcomes the sufferer to speak and to be heard.
1717
 For their voice is ―their 
lifeline to the world from which they find themselves progressively isolated. Thus, 
through the voice the one isolated in suffering is able to reach out to others.‖1718 
Finally, as our exegesis shows, mourning is contained in rituals and prayers. Thus, 
in our Christian liturgy, the practice of intercession helps us to be more aware of the 
sufferings and needs of those we know as well as those we don‘t know, and strengthens 
our bonding with them. 
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The Exemplars 
In his reflection on the meaning of the second beatitude, Häring emphasizes that 
Jesus is ‗the consoler‘.1719 However, Jesus is also one who exemplifies the real meaning 
of mourning: In the first place, by his own suffering and death on the cross he is able to 
fully understand the grief of and listen to the voice of those who suffer. Second, he also 
mourns and grieves as ordinary people do in witnessing loss and suffering, as is in the 
case of the death of Lazarus (John 11:33-38). Third, he mourns not for his own suffering 
but that of the others, especially the suffering of the people of Jerusalem—both the 
victims and the evildoers—in the foreseeable future because of sin (Luke 19:41-44).  
 Within the Catholic tradition, the life of ‗Father Damian‘,  who is better known as 
‗The Apostle of the Lepers‘ and has recently been canonized, is a concrete example and 
model of the virtues of mourning for and solidarity with the poor and the suffering. He 
served the abandoned lepers in Hawaiian Islands, comforted their suffering, and was in 
solidarity with them even to point of catching the same disease and dying of leprosy 
himself. His testimony is best depicted in the following memoir:  
On 10 May, 1873, Father Damien, at his own request and with the 
sanction of his bishop, arrived at the settlement as its resident priest. There 
were then 600 lepers…[They] are comparatively comfortable, but as soon 
as the dreadful disease renders them helpless, it would seem that even 
demons themselves would pity their condition and hasten their death…For 
a long time, however, Father Damien was the only one to bring them the 
succor they so greatly needed. He not only administered the consolations 
of religion, but also rendered them such little medical service and bodily 
comforts as were within his power. He dressed their ulcers, helped them 
erect their cottages, and went so far as to dig their graves and make their 
coffins. After twelve years of this heroic service he discovered in himself 
the first symptoms of the disease. This was in 1885. He nevertheless 
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continued his charitable ministrations…On 28 March, 1889, Father 
Damien became helpless and passed away shortly after, closing his 
fifteenth year in the service of the lepers.
1720
 
 
His example has subsequently inspired many missionaries and groups to be in 
solidarity with and care for especially those who are marginalized by our modern world. 
Indeed, Fr. Damien has been named as the un-official patron of those with HIV/AIDS.
1721
 
Moreover, his exemplary life has challenged us to reflect upon our social practices that 
cause massive suffering, especially against the already marginalized. 
 
The Social, Communal Aspect of the Practice of Mourning and the Virtue of Solidarity 
Häring rightly claims that mourning and sorrow can be authentic only when we 
open our hearts to the suffering of those around us in the society.
1722
 However, as we 
open our hearts and listen to their lament, we also become aware of the fact that we are 
part of the cause of their suffering: Have we thought of our global business practices and 
our over-consumption of goods, as causes of the shortage of basic needs in the 
developing world as well as directly creating poor working conditions there? In this way, 
the practice of mourning is never a private matter. Thus, even when one grieves for one‘s 
sin, it is not so much a sorrow for losing one‘s merit but for causing injustice to God‘s 
honor, to the community and the larger society.
1723
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Moreover, mourning that is other-centered is a manifestation of one‘s protest 
against the evil and injustice that causes the massive suffering of our human family, as 
well as one‘s demand for restoration of justice.1724 Mourning makes the voice of the 
sufferers heard and their unjust suffering known. In this way, mourning and the virtue of 
solidarity becomes the first step to bringing about social change. By referring to Second 
Vatican Council‘s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium es 
Spes), one theologian thus claims that mourning (and its corresponding beatitude) points 
to an ecclesial stance in that the Church commits itself to be involved in the pains and 
struggles of the human family.
1725
  
 
8.3 The Virtue of Meekness in 5:5  
Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth. 
 
An examination of the text shows that the beatitude on meekness was inserted for 
the purpose of expounding the religious dimension of the notion of ‗poor in spirit‘ in the 
first beatitude. Its connection with the Old Testament indicates that the meek are the poor 
and the mourners who accept the present affliction, trust in the Lord, wait patiently for 
the Lord, and refrain from anger or envy. Many interpreters thus single heartedly are 
concerned with the meaning of meekness for these powerless people, as Pinckaers 
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does.
1726
 Still, our exegesis shows that the term meekness is also employed to portray the 
moral character of those in power. What, then, can we understand about the powerful in 
our contemporary world?  
 
Arrogance in Human World 
Sadly speaking, we are living in a society that promotes individualism and 
competition in all sectors. We are always told of how important we are and how better we 
are than others. Within human relationships, such mentality is often expressed in terms of 
narcissism and arrogance. Still, such egoism and arrogance is also exercised on the 
communal and cultural level, especially in the form of ethnic and racial discriminations, 
such as Nazism and other forms of anti-Semitism in Europe, or racism against the 
African-Americans that led to civil rights movement in the 1960s.  
In the business sector, our economic policies on both corporate or national levels 
likewise are manipulated in such a way that places our own benefits above all else: Those 
international patenting and trade regulations, for instance, are often criticized as 
defending the profits of the wealthy at the expense of the poor and the weak. Furthermore, 
our advancement in science and technology has also prompted us to think that humankind 
is capable of resolving all the problems and achieving our own happiness.
1727
 On the 
global level, we continue to view that the earth exists for our consumption despite the call 
for environmental conservation by ecologists. 
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A subsequent and related issue emerged here is the use of violence:
1728
 For those 
in power, violence (in whatever form) is a means to control and ‗protect‘ their 
possessions, power and prestige at the expense of others. And for those who are 
victimized and oppressed, it becomes their last resort in fighting for their cause. In order 
to counter-balance such culture and use of violence as a means or solution in our society, 
the virtue of meekness is much needed. 
 
The Meaning of Meekness 
Meekness is sometimes used to signify ‗spiritual sweetness‘, a quality that 
characterizes wisdom and is also attributed to God who is ―slow to anger and abounding 
in steadfast love‖ (Nehemiah 9:17).1729 Still, as far as human behavior is concerned, the 
term meekness does not mean weakness or cowardice or refer to a feminine quality as 
some mistakenly understood.
1730
 Rather, as mentioned above, it refers to the attitude of 
the poor: Being humble and patience without resentment. It is also the proper attitude 
required of the powerful: Being humble and gentle toward others. 
Although meekness points to humility in both cases, we note that it adds a unique 
quality to humility. For meekness, in spiritual terms, is a mental attitude of human beings 
that is ―the combination of open-mindedness, faith in God, and the realization that the 
Will of God for us is always something joyous and interesting and vital and much better 
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than anything we could think of for ourselves.‖1731 In other words, it is trusting God 
above all other options including violence.
1732
 Therefore, meekness is in relation to not 
just humility and poverty of spirit but also to a spirit of peace.
1733
 In the language of 
psychology, it is thus ―the outcome of a long struggle against the disordered violence of 
our feelings, failings, and fears.‖1734 It is not equated with weakness but rather compared 
to taming a tiger. It points to self-control. One theologian thus claims that meekness is 
―the secret of overcoming any kind of difficulty.‖1735 
 
Meekness as a Virtue 
Meekness as a Christian virtue for the poor and those who mourn basically bears 
those qualities of the virtue of humility—awareness of one‘s helplessness, being patient 
to God‘s help, and in obedience to God‘s will. It counteracts those vices such as envy, 
jealousy, and vengeance. For the poor and the suffering, the virtue of meekness is also 
connected to the virtue of fortitude in enduring the suffering.
1736
 
On the other hand, meekness is also an important moral virtue for the powerful, 
such as rulers in our contemporary society. Together with the virtue of humility it calls 
for the acknowledgement of our insufficiency even though we seem to be capable and 
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sufficient. It counteracts the cardinal vice of pride and allows us to ‗see‘ the reality of sin 
and our share of it.
1737
 It also calls for obedience and helps transform our desire to 
dominate into an energy that serves. In other words, our meekness points to the loving 
service of God and God‘s people.1738 
In sum, meekness can be understood as an expansion of the virtue of humility to 
one‘s whole life.1739  
 
The Practice of Meekness 
Like practicing the virtue of humility, the very first step to practice meekness is to 
acknowledge God as our ultimate source which helps us to achieve inner tranquility and 
peace.
1740
 On the part of the poor and oppressed they are further encouraged to practice 
self control and restraint from anger and revenge. The practice of forgiveness is also here 
summoned: By letting go of anger the poor and the suffering become freer and are able to 
forgive others and their wrongdoings.
1741
 For those who are powerful, they are in turn 
called to practice the restraint of power (a specific form of violence) and arrogance.
1742
 In 
so doing, we need to unlearn the pattern of behaviors that controls/dominates others and 
‗defends‘ our possessions and prestige. Crosby, for example, points to the need to tackle 
consumerism as a concrete practice.
1743
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Within the context of spirituality, we (especially with power and prestige) are 
called to practice piety: It is rooted in a kind of justice that is concerned with those one 
cannot repay fully, such as one‘s parents and God.1744 Aquinas, for instance, understands 
piety as giving the due reverence and care to those we obey, especially our parents.
1745
 It 
begins with the family and expands to the society and finally, God. It helps us to cultivate 
a life of worshiping God rather than self-worship.  
Finally, one ethicist further believes that injustice and its subsequent human 
suffering, though they may arouse rebellion and harden one‘s heart, can be a good source 
to cultivate and practice meekness for it unwraps our egoism and makes us sensitive to 
others.
1746
 
As a whole, the practice of meekness by both the poor and the powerful, demands 
tremendous strength—psychological and spiritual alike. We need God‘s grace to 
strengthen us. 
 
The Exemplars 
As quoted earlier, Jesus invites us to learn from him to be gentle and humble in 
heart (Matthew 11:28-29). In fact, there are a number of passages that illustrate Jesus‘ 
meekness toward others, including sinners. For instance, in his encounter with the woman 
who is known as a sinner, Jesus treats her with respect and kindness (Luke 7:36-50). Still, 
his meekness is best revealed throughout his Passion: He chooses to enter Jerusalem on 
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the back of a donkey that symbolizes patience and gentleness. While suffering from all 
sorts of physical pain, betrayal and denial of his disciples, and unjust condemnation by 
the Jews and the authorities, Jesus remains silent like a sheep before its shearer. Even 
during his last moments on earth, he continues to be gentle without anger, and shows 
kindness to those around him. In particular, he consoles the women who wail for him and 
gives assurance to the bandit crucified with him (Matthew 27:45-50; Luke 23:27-28, 39-
43). Some scholars further claim that the culmination of Jesus‘ meekness comes in his 
prayer for those who crucify him (Luke 23:34).
1747
 
Within the Catholic tradition, Francis de Sales has been praised for being a model 
of Christian meekness that is revealed in his renewal of religious life:
1748
 For example, he 
founded a new order with a mild rule for women who are too weak or too old. He also 
encouraged ordinary lay people to pursue holiness by living out a less ascetic state of life. 
He said, ―Always be as gentle as you can, and remember that more flies are caught with a 
spoonful of honey than with a hundred barrels of vinegar.‖1749 Pope Pius XI, in his 
encyclical on the saint, Rerum Omnium Perturbationem, thus commenced that Francis de 
Sales ―excelled in meekness of heart, a virtue so peculiar to himself that it might be 
considered his most characteristic trait…[and] possessed the power to attract hearts in 
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that very measure of success which Christ himself has promised to the meek—‗Blessed 
are the meek: for they shall possess the land‘.‖1750 
In our contemporary era, James Allison, a gay Catholic theologian, demonstrates 
what meekness means on a personal level in his Faith beyond Resentment: By reflecting 
on the embittered experience and resentment of gay Catholics toward the official church, 
Allison points out that ―resentment on either side is complicity in the cycling of sacred 
violence.‖1751 He warns that ―most forms of resistance simply continue the cycle of 
sacred violence,‖ and so urges the use of ―fraternal dialogue‖ by both sides as a genuine 
Christian response. 
Still, in our secular world, one globally recognized contemporary exemplar of 
meekness is Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi who employed the Beatitudes as a source of 
spiritual renewal. His meekness is best reflected in his insistence on nonviolence towards 
social and political injustice of his home country. Although Gandhi was never awarded 
Nobel Peace Prize and was alleged by some for not being consistently pacifist, he has 
been identified as ―the strongest symbol of non-violence in the 20th century.‖1752 His 
example in turn highlights the social dimension of the virtue of meekness. 
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The Social, Communal Aspect of the Virtue of Meekness 
Regarding the social and communal relevance of the virtue of meekness, Häring 
rightly claims that such relevance is rather obvious, for meekness is needed in all aspects 
of our human relationships.
1753
 Apart from building up relationship between individuals, 
it is also needed in other social settings like the business sector. Corporate executives 
must insure that their managers refrain from abusing the employees and neglecting their 
welfare (e.g., in terms of wages and working conditions). Giant corporations should also 
avoid monopolies that undermine the survival of smaller companies. Developed countries 
likewise have to renounce unfair trade treaties that hinder the development of poor 
countries. Employees, small companies, and poor countries, in turn should avoid the use 
of unacceptable practices in defending their welfare and rights. 
Moreover, meekness without embittered criticisms and anger is crucial to 
community building on both national and international levels. In specific, meekness is 
crucial to mutual respect and authentic dialogues with other cultures, religions and 
political views. For instance, in engaging inter-religious dialogues, we need to be humble, 
patient, and gentle in listening to others‘ faith experience, and refrain from violence and 
control in times of conflict and disagreements. In international conflicts, meekness should 
challenge the leaders of the powerful countries to refrain from military actions or 
economic sanctions that would further diminish a weaker nation. 
Finally, the call to non-violence as a demand of meekness, as Crosby insightfully 
notes, can be extended to the relationship between humankind and our environment: It 
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points to the notion of stewardship which is in contrast to the violence and abuse done to 
our earth.
1754
 For instance, meekness challenges the policy makers of our society to 
consider other more environmental friendly lifestyles and alternative sources of energy. 
 
8.4 Striving for and Discerning God‘s Righteousness in 5:6  
Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled. 
 
The notion of righteousness is added to give the fourth beatitude its proper 
content and object. Many theologians, especially those who seek social implications of 
the beatitude, incline to interpret the text narrowly as calling for social justice, as in the 
case of Gerald Vann.
1755
 Our exegesis clarifies that we are called to first strive for God‘s 
righteousness with effort and only second do we seek the right conduct required by God 
as a response to the unrighteous human conditions.
1756
 To what, then, does God‘s 
righteousness refer in today‘s society and how do we strive for it? 
 
God’s Righteousness or Human Justice? 
God‘s righteousness as revealed in Scripture is very different from our 
contemporary human understanding of justice. Historically speaking, the notion of justice 
in our society has changed since the end of the thirteenth century, ―when external 
changes between men, determined by law, became the special domain of the virtue of 
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justice. In order to establish law, justice had to abstract from persons and aim at strict 
objectivity. Only at this price could there be true justice in such a setting.‖1757 As a result, 
human justice has lost its human contact and has become solely a legal affair for the 
society. We become indifferent just as Lady Justice has become blindfolded. And we are 
more interested in the justice done to us rather than to others. 
God‘s righteousness, on the contrary, is built upon personal relationships, first 
between God and God‘s people by means of covenant and the law, and then between 
humankind through mutual respect and rightful relationships.
1758
 It is thus a gift of right 
relationship with God and the right realization of God‘s goodness in the world. It reveals 
God‘s will for us as individuals and community. It has God as the source, is manifested in 
the person of Jesus, and proceeds from our hearts in the form of charity.  
 However, God‘s righteousness is not the same as God‘s mercy and love in the 
strict sense: The former ―stresses the idea of rectitude, uprightness, and the harmonious 
ordering of those things which are fitting, while love and mercy point more directly to 
spontaneity, generosity, and abundance in the gift.‖1759 Consequently, at times we are 
pre-occupied with one particular aspect of God‘s righteousness that calls for the judgment 
of humankind and neglect other aspects of our relationship with God.
 1760
 God is thus 
portrayed as a rigorous judge and vindicator rather than a merciful and loving God who is 
eager to make covenant with us. 
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 Finally, more often than not we fail to distinguish God‘s righteousness from our 
own and hence end up striving for a righteousness that is self-centered rather than what 
God desires for each of us and our community. 
 
The Meaning of Striving 
Gregory the Great rightly observed that we often experience a desire for 
possessing a particular thing before we actually possess it.
1761
 Thus, one‘s hunger and 
thirst for something, which precisely depicts the experience that arouses one‘s desire for 
that something and then seeks after it, is a very fundamental human experience. When 
one strives for something, one commits the whole self so much so that one does not feel 
inhibited or satisfied with less than necessary.
1762
 It is also an ongoing process that does 
not end until that desire is fulfilled. One universal experience of such hunger and thirst is 
our humankind‘s desire for happiness. As far as Christianity is concerned, the first 
evangelist tells us that the object of our hunger and thirst should be God‘s righteousness. 
Therefore, striving for God‘s righteousness means continually and totally orienting one‘s 
heart (including emotions, thinking, and behaviors) to do what God‘s righteousness 
demands.
1763
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Striving for God’s Righteousness as a Christian Virtue 
For Aquinas, fortitude of the soul expresses the determined desire for honoring 
God‘s rights and is thus the principal motive for our hunger and thirst for God‘s justice 
(I.II. 69.3 ad 3). It also offers us strength to combat our inclination to be lukewarm.
1764
 In 
this way, the virtue of hunger and thirst after God‘s righteousness is connected to the 
virtue of fortitude.  
Still, our understanding of the notion of ‗striving‘ implies the need to persevere in 
our striving, while the understanding of God‘s righteousness as right relationship with 
God points us to the virtue of faithful obedience toward God and God‘s covenant. 
Therefore, the virtues of perseverance and obedience are crucial to the fourth beatitude. 
Moreover, since God‘s righteousness implies rightful human relationships as well, 
several Christian virtues are relevant. First, God‘s righteousness is expressed in the virtue 
of justice which is ―the generous and spontaneous will to render to each his due.‖1765 It 
emphasizes generosity and fairness in relationships. Second, our rightful human 
relationship also finds its place in the virtue of charity toward others. Third, the virtue of 
peacemaking, as will be seen later, is also needed in restoring broken relationships. 
 
The Practice of Striving for God’s Righteousness 
Traditionally, religious acts of justice are understood as a reflection of God‘s 
justice. Thus, based on the teaching of the gospel, the practice of piety through fasting, 
praying, and almsgiving, has been seen by Catholics as a concrete expression of God‘s 
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righteousness on earth:
1766
 Fasting makes us more open to experience God‘s 
transcendence and thus shapes our vision in way that we may see the world as God sees it. 
Praying (with the Lord‘s Prayer in particular) helps focus on social transformation; as we 
pray, we are invited by God to bring God‘s kingdom on earth and to deliver others from 
all forms of indebtedness. While justice seeks to correct the suffering caused by unjust 
economic and political structures of our society, almsgiving can alleviate that suffering 
while the structures are being transformed. 
 However, in order to seek and obey God‘s will, we need to know that our striving 
is oriented to God‘s righteousness rather than our own. Ignatius of Loyola, in his 
Spiritual Exercises, thus suggested the practice of discernment of spirits:
1767
  
Both the good and the evil spirit act upon a soul according to the 
attitude it assumes toward them. If it poses as their friend, they flatter 
it; if to resist them, they torment it. But the evil spirit speaks only to 
the imagination and the senses, whereas the good spirit acts upon 
reason and conscience. The evil labors to excite concupiscence, the 
good to intensify love for God. Of course it may happen that a 
perfectly well-disposed soul suffers from the attacks of the devil 
deprived of the sustaining consolations of the good angel; but this is 
only a temporary trial the passing of which must be awaited in 
patience and humility.
1768
 
 
 Through the practice of discernment one becomes clearer what God‘s 
righteousness means to the particular person and hence gives one a better sense of 
direction in one‘s ongoing hunger and thirst for God‘s justice. 
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The Exemplars 
In the Old Testament there are righteous persons, such as Noah (Genesis 6:9) and 
Abraham (Genesis 15:6; Romans 4:3), who strive for God‘s righteousness and live it out 
faithfully. And it is through them and in their relationships with others that others, 
especially those in need, experience God‘s mercy.1769 Still, during his earthly life Jesus 
teaches us how to respond to God‘s righteousness by his very own example. For instance, 
when he asks John the Baptist to baptize him, he says, ―Let it be so now; for it is proper 
for us in this way to fulfill all righteousness‖ (Matthew 3:15). These words reveal that 
Jesus comes to fulfill the law, the prophets, and God‘s will. In fact, Jesus is the 
embodiment and incarnation of God‘s righteousness; and his whole life ―supremely 
manifests God‘s merciful, compassionate justice.‖1770 Thus, by turning to Jesus‘ life 
journey, we learn the true meaning of God‘s righteousness.  
Within the Catholic tradition, Ignatius of Loyola is known for not only advocating 
the practice of discernment but also living a life of discernment throughout his entire 
religious life. In our contemporary society, the lives of many Christians (religious and lay 
alike) can also be concrete demonstrations of what hunger and thirst for God‘s 
righteousness mean. Among them is Mother Teresa of Calcutta. Her hunger and thirst for 
God‘s righteousness is noted from the very beginning of her vocation to serve the poor: 
―I was to leave the convent and help the poor while living among them. It was an order. 
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To fail would have been to break the faith.‖1771 And she continued to hunger and thirst 
for God‘s righteousness in her lifelong struggle to do God‘s will.1772 
Although these exemplars were discerning and responding to God‘s righteousness 
on a personal level, the result of their discernments always pointed to the service of 
others on both inter-personal and social levels. Also, the practice of discernment may be 
applicable on the communal and social levels as the community and society seek to 
discern and strive for God‘s righteousness that leads to change of communal and social 
practices and modify their ways of proceeding. 
 
The Social, Communal Aspect of Striving for God’s Righteousness 
The virtue recognized in the fourth beatitude confronts us to ask if our society as a 
whole indeed strives for God‘s righteousness or otherwise. It also challenges us to discern 
and re-evaluate the values promoted by our society. For instance, is our culture of 
euthanasia, abortion, and death penalty a promotion of God‘s righteousness or our own? 
Or, within the Catholic tradition, do we perceive the challenge of others (say ethicists and 
feminists) regarding certain non-doctrinal magisterial teachings, such as the restricted 
role of conscience in moral decision making, the designation of homosexual inclination 
as ‗objective disorder‘, and the prohibition of discussion on ordaining women, an 
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invitation to re-discern whether our official Church teachings have been in line with 
God‘s righteousness?1773 
In addition, in our diversified society that emphasizes freedom and individualism, 
even when we recognize what God‘s righteousness is, we are often tempted to give up or 
compromise too easily when challenged by other value systems. Thus, one of the biggest 
challenges for our society nowadays is to put into practice—that is, to carry out necessary 
policy changes—after honestly discerning God‘s righteousness for our society. We need 
God‘s grace to enlighten us and to strengthen us in holding firmly to what God‘s 
righteousness demands of us as individual Christians, faith community, and society. 
 
8.5 The Virtue of Mercy in 5:7  
Blessed are the merciful, for they will receive mercy 
 
The fifth beatitude is a straightforward one that does not pose any exegetical 
problem. Still, our exploration confirms that mercy is an attribute of God who is 
compassionate particularly to those human predicaments like the poor and the sufferers 
identified in the previous beatitudes. It is also an attitude that demands actions, and our 
practice of mercy must be built upon the covenantal relationship with God and a response 
faithful to God‘s steadfast love. It has to be extended to all including our transgressors by 
means of forgiveness.  
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Miseries in Our Human World 
During my formation as a Jesuit priest, I have been privileged to live in different 
countries, in both the developed and developing world. One concrete experience common 
to all is the reality of human misery around us: In Manila, every Sunday I served the 
children who live in those ‗smokey mountains‘ and spend their entire day picking up 
‗valuables‘ from the garbage dump. In Belfast of Ireland, I attended funerals of those who 
died in sectarian conflicts and visited prisoners who are imprisoned because of their fight 
for an end to colonization. In a remote island in the Pacific Ocean that is simply known as 
‗within the US missile testing range‘, I too worked with a group of islanders whose 
community was completely abandoned by the outside world and their environment and 
natural resources exploited by the Army. In the post Khmer Rouge Cambodia, I lived day 
and night with a group of landmine victims who struggle to resume a simple life in spite 
of their physical disability. In my daily reflection, a simple but only too familiar question 
raised is, ―Why these unnecessary miseries?‖  
Indeed, the majority of people in our world are still experiencing different kinds 
of miseries: Poverty, struggling for freedom, hatred, exploitation, and physical pain, etc. 
Edward Schillebeeckx rightly says that ―there is an excess of suffering and evil in our 
history…there is a barbarous excess.‖1774 In his own reflection on the human experience 
of suffering, Keenan notes that there are two different types of ongoing discussions, 
namely, the theoretical and speculative question of theodicy—that is, how to reconcile a 
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merciful and providential God with the reality of suffering—in the academic setting and 
those conversations that occur in intimate and concrete situations.
1775
 
From a religious perspective, each religious tradition has its own specific 
interpretation of suffering and responses to the miserable. Christianity, for instance, 
rejects the view that suffering is necessarily a result of one‘s sinfulness. Despite these 
differences they share the same deepest concern that suffering needs to be overcome.
1776
 
For example, during a meeting held by the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences, 
Paul Cardinal Shan Kuo-hsi of Taiwan insisted that the Church‘s mission of love and 
service to life is actualized when it is ―put into action in concrete forms of service in 
alleviating suffering...‖1777 What does this mission of love and service mean in our 
Christian life nowadays? The answer lies in the cultivation of the virtue of mercy. 
 
The Meaning of Mercy 
Literally speaking, the term ‗mercy‘ means ―the perception of an evil or misery 
which moves us‖ and refers to what pertains to misery.1778 Aquinas explained that the 
term takes its name from misericordia which denotes one‘s compassionate heart 
(miserum cor) for another‘s unhappiness. He thus defined it as ―the compassion in our 
heart for another person‘s misery, a compassion which drives us to do what we can to help 
him‖ (II.II. 30.1). 
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Keenan, from a different approach, defines it as ―the willingness to enter into 
chaos of another…[which] often entails an elective suffering for the sake of others.‖1779  
From this he insightfully offers a theological interpretation of mercy as God‘s salvation 
to humankind:
1780
 Creation is God‘s merciful act that brings order into the chaos of the 
universe; incarnation is God‘s entry into the chaos of human existence; and redemption is 
God‘s mercy that delivers us from the chaos of slavery to sin. He further notes that mercy 
is emphasized by Scripture as the condition for salvation, as made clearly in the parable 
of the Last Judgment (Matthew 25:31-46).
1781
 In short, God who is mercy first shows 
mercy to us. 
However, in ancient times mercy was opposed by some philosophers:
1782
 It was 
understood as a defect of character and an impulsive response rooted in ignorance. It was 
considered as a contradiction to justice for mercy implies unearned help or relief. The 
latter charge has been a challenge for both Christians and non-Christians in our 
contemporary world. 
 
Mercy as a Virtue 
In fact, mercy as a virtue is not in opposition to the virtue of justice. Aquinas 
quotes the words of the early church Fathers: ―Justice and mercy are so united, that the 
one ought to be mingled with the other; justice without mercy is cruelty; mercy without 
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justice, profusion.‖1783 Yet, this view must be understood in light of God‘s righteousness: 
God‘s righteousness precedes and presupposes mercy (I. 21.4) and is manifested in it.1784 
Thus, mercy does not oppose justice (as mistakenly understood) but is in the interest of 
God‘s justice first.1785 It echoes what the previous beatitude demands. 
Moreover, the virtue of mercy is inseparable from the Christian virtue of charity 
for mercy is actually the active work and immediate effect of charity. It has to be rooted 
in right reason—truth (II.II. 30.3)—and is interested more in the conversion of one‘s 
heart rather than external deeds. Furthermore, the virtue of mercy takes on the virtue of 
mourning as well because we mourn for and take pity on those who experience suffering 
and misery in their lives.  
Finally, some Catholics claim that although all Christian traditions recognize the 
importance of the virtue of mercy, the Catholic tradition distinguishes itself from others 
by its long tradition of performing corporal and spiritual ‗works‘ of mercy.1786 In other 
words, it is precisely ‗works‘ that differentiates Catholics from Protestants. 
 
The Works of Mercy in the Catholic Tradition 
In our interpretation of the virtuous act of mourning, we noted that solidarity is 
crucial to the sufferers. However, the virtue of mercy further highlights the importance of 
action to relieve their suffering. What are the actions and works of mercy, particularly 
within the Catholic tradition? Keenan notes that the New Testament provides us the 
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foundational guide:
 1787
 First, the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) defines 
‗love of neighbor‘ as the practice of mercy. Second, the Last Judgment in Matthew 
25:31-46 demonstrates that the corporal works of mercy need not be something 
extraordinary; rather, giving food and drink to the hungry and the thirsty, welcoming a 
stranger, sheltering the homeless, or visiting the sick and the imprisoned is already an 
Christian act of mercy. Still, these six (together with burying the dead) specific types of 
merciful acts are later identified by the early Church as the cornerstone of Christian life. 
And almsgiving was particularly praised and encouraged as a merciful giving. 
There are, however, also spiritual works of mercy proposed by the Catholic 
church, such as giving good counsel and praying for the dead. In specific, the acts of 
admonishing the sinner, forgiving the offenses, and bearing wrongs patiently are widely 
practiced.
1788
 As a whole, these spiritual works of mercy are primarily recommended for 
individuals and are often related to the liturgical and sacramental life of the faithful. In 
the celebration of the sacrament of reconciliation, for example, we first experience God‘s 
mercy and forgiveness and from there we are able to do likewise (Matthew 6:12). Or, 
during the Eucharistic celebration, the words Kyrie eleison (Lord, have mercy) continue 
to remind us of our need for God‘s mercy and our mission to bring God‘s mercy to others. 
These liturgical practices further highlight the importance of forgiveness as a 
Christian act of mercy (for Catholics and non-Catholics alike):
1789
 It allows us to 
recognize the deprivation and helplessness of the people around us. Thus, it demands not 
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just compassion but the release of people from their enslavement and their debts. It also 
demands the avoidance of one‘s negative anger. In fact, Lisa Sowle Cahill is convinced 
that the whole Beatitudes confirms the view that one needs to approach the 
enemy/evildoer ―in a compassionate desire to meet the needs of wrongdoers and victims 
as well as possible in the circumstances.‖1790 
 
The Exemplars 
Jesus, being the embodiment of God‘s greatest act of mercy to humankind 
(Romans 5:6-8), is the one whom we should ultimately imitate in the cultivation of the 
virtue of mercy. His attitude (Mark 1:41), words (Matthew 18:23-35) and deeds 
(Matthew 9:27-30) illustrate to us the kind of mercy that God desires. In particular, he 
challenges the disciples to do likewise and show mercy to all, including one‘s enemy 
(Matthew 5:43-48). He says, ―Go and learn what this means, ‗I desire mercy, not 
sacrifice.‘ For I have come to call not the righteous but sinners‖ (Matthew 9:12-13). 
From the twelfth century onward, we note that many religious orders (such as the 
Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul), lay associations and Confraternities (such as 
the Confraternity of Misericordia founded by the Queen Eleanor of Portugal in the 
fifteenth century) have been founded to carry out various kinds of corporal works of 
mercy based on the needs of the society of their times and according to their charisms. 
For instance, the Knights of St. Lazarus was noted for building many hospitals to take 
care of the lepers, blind, and orphans. Some Confraternities were also missioned to visit 
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prisoners and others.
1791
 In fact, many of these organizations and institutions continue to 
serve our society to date. 
One contemporary, specific example is the birth of the Jesuit Refugee Service 
(JRS) in 1980 under the mandate of Fr. Pedro Arrupe, then the Superior General of the 
Society of Jesus. It aims at caring for both the spiritual and physical needs of refugees and 
other forcibly displaced people. Although JRS has been known for emphasizing its 
unique characteristic of ‗accompaniment‘,1792 it also promotes advocacy for human rights 
works as well as engages in academic research work to tackle the root causes of forced 
migration on the international level.
1793
  
Nevertheless, these groups and organizations do not only serve as concrete 
models for us but also channels through which we can practice the virtue of mercy. 
Unfortunately, although mercy is the greatest virtue among those that relate to our 
neighbor (II.II. 30.4), some Christians rightly lament that the virtue seems to be eroded in 
our contemporary society on the national and international levels, as in the case of death 
penalty.
1794
 
 
The Social, Communal Aspect of the Virtue of Mercy 
The virtue of mercy, apart from being a distinctive mark of the Catholic tradition, 
also bears important social and communal implications. I think of two urgent social 
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practices of mercy need to be recovered for our contemporary world. The first is the 
practice of hospitality towards the immigrants. In the past century, we have witnessed 
significant international, massive migrations. These migrants are often victims of those 
inter-related root causes of involuntary emigration: Natural disasters, economic, politics, 
and violence. We need to draft and implement national and international policies that are 
not just humanitarian-based but also in light of Christian virtue of mercy. 
The second is the act of amnesty and the abolishment of death penalty.
1795
 As said 
earlier, the beatitude teaches us to seek first God‘s justice before human justice. Thus, 
while not ignoring what justice demands, God‘s justice and mercy urge us to assure 
social conditions that permit a (normal) person to grow to maturity. Both life sentence 
and death penalty are in principle and in reality contradicting what a merciful society 
demands. Indeed, these social and institutional practices may further perpetuate the cycle 
of violence and vengeance. The Christian virtue of mercy challenges the kind of ‗eye for 
eye‘ justice and urges us to seek alternative ways that meet the needs of both the victims 
and the wrongdoers. Last but not least, amnesty and the abolishment of death penalty are 
not simply an act of clemency or mere forgiveness of enemies by all means. Rather, they 
are acts that promote reconciliation.  
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8.6 Integrity as a Virtue in 5:8  
Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God 
 
Based on Aquinas‘s discussion of the quality that makes one perfect in oneself, 
Vann interprets ‗purity of heart‘ as pointing to the virtue of temperance. He explains that 
temperance implies Christian reverence toward our own nature that extends to all 
creatures and to God.
1796
 Pinckaers, on the other hand, turns his entire attention to the 
meaning of ‗purity‘ in his interpretation of the beatitude.1797 However, our exegesis 
indicates that the ‗pure in heart‘ are those who have their moral righteousness emerging 
from the inner self and finding parallel expressions in outward actions. The beatitude thus 
emphasizes the integrity of the whole being and understands purity in heart as a 
fundamental, all-encompassing virtue. This emphasis challenges the righteousness of the 
Pharisees and scribes of that time who are called by Jesus as hypocrites. 
 
Hypocrisy in Our Church? 
The recent crisis within the Catholic Church on sex scandals and the alleged 
cover-ups by the hierarchy poses a criticism: Is the Catholic Church a hypocrite? For 
example, a leading German weekly newsmagazine, under the headline ―The Hypocrites: 
The Catholic Church and Sex,‖ reported on the continuing sex scandal involving the 
Catholic clergy in the country, and a public official‘s criticism that German bishops 
                                                 
1796
 Vann, 167. 
1797
 Pinckaers, The Pursuit of Happiness, 131-44. It is worthy to note that there is a rather diverse 
interpretation on the ethical meaning of the ‗purity of heart‘ among contemporary theologians and scholars, 
ranging from focusing on ‗purity‘ to the notion of ‗heart‘ to the meaning of ‗seeing‘. However, they seldom 
turn their attention to the notion of ‗integrity‘. See Forest, 89-103; Crosby, 140-58. 
 452 
―have not shown an active interest in a truly open and thorough investigation‖ of the 
institutions under their responsibility.
1798
 Some thus charge that the Catholic Church is 
full of hypocrisy—for instance, as one gay Catholic theologian writes, on the one hand, 
the Church claims that homosexual Christians are all loved children of God; on the other 
hand, the Church systematically excludes them.
1799
  
Within the ancient context of purity, hypocrisy points to the hiding of impurity 
under the cover of external observances.
1800
 Still, according to the Catholic Encyclopedia, 
the notion of hypocrisy refers to ―the pretension to qualities which one does not possess, 
or…the putting forward of a false appearance of virtue or religion.‖1801 It says,  
Essentially its malice is identical with that of lying; in both cases there is 
discordance between what a man has in his mind and the simultaneous 
manifestation of himself. So far as the morality of the act goes, it is 
unimportant that this difference between the interior and the exterior be set 
out in words, as happens in formal lies, or be acted out in one‘s demeanors, 
as is true of simulation.
1802
 
 
As far as moral formation is concerned, this interpretation implies that hypocrisy 
is an attitude that is in opposition to ‗honesty‘ and to ―being in accord with one‘s whole 
being.‖1803  
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The Meaning of Integrity 
According to Reformed theologian Alan Sell, honesty and wholeness are the 
principal meanings of the virtue of integrity.
1804
 Being a kind of wholeness, integrity 
conveys a sense of personal congruence: Congruence of one‘s act and faith/belief, and 
correspondence between one‘s ‗private‘ and ‗public‘ selves.1805 From a religious point of 
view, integrity points to an undivided life commanded by God.
1806
 Hypocrisy, on the 
contrary, implies a divided heart that ―desires one thing but behaves as if it desired 
another.‖1807  
Within the specific context of Christian community, Sell further argues that both 
principal meanings are essential to Christian thought and practice, and from which he 
probes the various aspects of Christian integrity, including doctrinal, ethical, 
ecclesiastical, and pastoral integrity.
1808
 In the aspect of Christian morality, he 
understands integrity as a state: ―Through a ‗spiral‘ in which will and desire direct 
practical intelligence and practical intelligence instructs will and desire, a personal 
subject achieves an integration of self that conforms to the truth of the good as it is given 
by God, and in charity participates in the divine love.‖1809 
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Integrity as a Virtue 
Honesty is one of the two principal meanings of integrity. Thus, integrity as a 
virtue first points to the virtue of truthfulness. Keenan notes that intolerance and ridicule 
often inhibit honesty. By reflecting on certain practices in his North American society, 
such as the ‗don‘t ask, don‘t tell‘ compromise for homosexuals in the armed forces, he 
highlights three obstacles that hinder the promotion of the virtue of truthfulness in the 
society:
1810
 The first obstacle is that litigiousness discourages one from acknowledging or 
apologizing mistakes, errors, and infractions. The second is that ‗privacy‘ sometimes 
shields us from being true to ourselves and others. The third obstacle is the lack of 
credible leadership who promotes the virtue of truthfulness. In fact, many are convinced 
that the leadership‘s failure to honor truthfulness from the beginning is an essential cause 
of the Roman Catholic Church‘s current crisis in the sex scandal. Therefore, in order to 
cultivate the virtue of integrity, both individuals and the leadership of a community need 
first to overcome these three obstacles. 
The second principle meaning of integrity, wholeness, refers to the integration of 
the being in all aspects, especially one‘s inner self and external actions. Now since 
prudence ―guides the moral agent to living a self-directed life that seeks integration [of 
natural inclinations],‖ and in particular, integrates one‘s appetites and practical reason, 
the virtue of integrity is therefore closely connected to the virtue of prudence.
1811
  
A third and yet relevant virtue is the virtue of vigilance or watchfulness: Whether 
one‘s interior thought is in tune with the exterior actions can only be known through 
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ongoing monitoring and evaluation. The disposition of self-evaluation, that is, 
watchfulness, thus helps the person not just to achieve integrity in a single event but also 
to form a moral character of integrity. 
Finally, from a biblical point of view, Jesus points out that hypocrites, while 
focusing on external deeds, neglect the virtues of justice and mercy and faith that we 
ought to practice (Matthew 23:23). Thus, the Christian virtue of integrity that calls for 
congruence of deeds and proclamation urges us to acquire other virtues, especially the 
virtues of mercy, justice, and faith. 
 
The Practice of Integrity 
In order to cultivate the virtue of integrity and its related virtues like truthfulness, 
the role of one‘s conscience is crucial. Conscience differs from superego in that it calls us 
to grow rather than restrains us. It urges us to act in accordance with what the inner self 
believes is good and truth. As the Catholic Church explains, ―In the depths of our 
conscience, we detect a law which does not impose, but which holds us to obedience. 
Always summoning us to love good and avoid evil…In fidelity to conscience, Christians 
are joined with the rest of humanity in the search for truth.‖1812  
Many contemporary moral theologians, by turning to Aquinas who insisted that 
we ought not to violate conscience even to the point of excommunication, further 
advocate for the primacy of conscience even though our conscience may err.
1813
 Thus, the 
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practice of integrity points to the need to nurture and follow an informed conscience. 
Catholic ethicist William Werpehowski, in addition, proposes the practice of repentance, 
renewal, and perseverance as a means to cultivate the virtue of integrity of Christian 
life:
1814
 In particular, he argues that perseverance in repentance and renewal can 
substantively contribute to a life of integrity by ―shattering illusions about our identity, 
making a break with what falsely claims to make it up, and acting in the world from our 
suffering and need for the sake of our needy and suffering neighbors.‖1815 
Still, the virtue of integrity finds expressions in Christian liturgy:
1816
 In the first 
place, liturgy is the worship of the whole person—our words and bodily movements are 
expressions of the self‘s total self-offering to God. Second, it is in the liturgy that one 
experiences integrity on various levels—personal integrity that is the renewal of the self; 
cosmic integrity that unites one to all creation; and integrity of the self in the infinity of 
God. 
In the area of Christian spirituality, since the age of the Desert Fathers of the 
fourth century, the practice of the Prayer of the Heart—the recitation of the Lord‘s Prayer 
that slowly integrates into one‘s breathing and beating of the heart—has been widely 
adopted as a practice to cultivate an integration of one‘s inner life with the external body 
and action.
1817
 Furthermore, the virtue of watchfulness calls for the practice of examining 
our own Christian life. One growing popular practice is that of daily ‗examen of 
conscience‘ as suggested in the Spiritual Exercises: It is a prayer exercise where one tries 
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to find the movement of the spirit in one‘s daily life and through which one identifies the 
incongruence between one‘s inner movement and external action. Examen helps us to be 
more sensitive to the longings and sources of our own spirit and hence becomes more 
open to God.  
 
The Exemplars 
Elsewhere in the Gospel of Matthew Jesus denounces the Pharisees and scribes as 
hypocrites for their behaviors and bad examples: Their self-righteousness (7:1-5) and 
those self-centered and attention-seeking religious acts such as praying and fasting in 
public (6:2, 5, 16) do not match up with what they teach (23:1-33). Jesus, on the contrary, 
lives an exemplary life of integrity by doing exactly what he preached about God‘s 
kingdom, such as praying to God the Father (6:5-13; 14:23; 26:36-44) and serving God 
(20:25-28;  John 13:1-17). 
Within the Catholic tradition, who are the models of Christian integrity? The late 
Pope John Paul II offered his own choice. During his pastoral visit to Lombardy, Italy, 
Pope John Paul II told his audience in Desio, the birthplace of Pope Pius XI, that they 
should cultivate the virtue of integrity as demonstrated in the life of Pope Pius XI. He 
said, 
Dear brothers and sisters! These are only some parts of the synthetic 
personality of Pope Pius XI, which is rooted in virtue ethics and Christian 
faith of the people of Desio. And here I would invite and encourage you to 
grow with increasing commitment to the same values of integrity, 
discipline, dedication to duty, and even more steadfast adherence to Jesus 
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Christ, generous participation in the life of the Church, a strong 
evangelical witness in society.
1818
 
 
Historically speaking, Pope Piux XI‘s pontificate was marked by the emergence 
of the Fascist government and Nazism. Therefore, his Christian integrity was by and 
large manifested in his social teaching that is in tune with the gospel values that he valued 
greatly—in particular, through his writings (e.g. Quadragesimo anno) he advocated for 
social justice and common good, and spoke against the emerging powers of his time, 
including communism, nationalism, racism, and totalitarianism. His virtuous act of 
Christian integrity, subsequently, has had a great impact on the society.  
 
The Social, Communal Aspect of the Virtue of Integrity 
The exemplary role of Pope Pius XI points to the social implication of the virtue. 
However, this social dimension is not a secondary but an essential quality of the person, 
for integrity implies that one is congruent toward others as that person is in oneself.
1819
 
This social and communal aspect of the virtue, in particular, challenges the leadership of 
our society and community to re-examine their roles as leaders. Indeed, Häring rightly 
points out that the beatitude is very important to our social renewal: When we are truthful 
to our own vocation in the society, say as educators, lawyers, or politicians, we contribute 
to the building of the society.
1820
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Within the Catholic community, many Catholics, theologians and lay scholars 
alike, in light of the Church leadership‘s failure to honor truthfulness from the beginning 
of the sex scandal, urge the Church to not just apologize and be humble but also take 
courage to change and to be truthful. Pastoral theologian Michael Jinkins, for instance, 
proposes a communicative model of theological reflection—that experiments with the 
rhetoric of its uncommitted environment and engages in reflections across such 
boundaries—for Church leaders to maintain integrity as leaders.1821 He explains, ―A 
communicative model of theological reflection provides support and critical facility for 
our life-long negotiation between pragmatism of organizational leadership and the 
confessional commitments at the heart of the Christian community‘s identity.‖1822 
In the broader society, integrity and truthfulness particularly challenge the 
unhealthy atmosphere of doing business nowadays. We note from daily news how 
corporations, big and small, local and international, cover up the problems of their 
products.
1823
 Also, most advertisements in the mass media often exaggerate the functions 
and hide the known negative effects of their products, and mislead the possible 
consumers in their choice-making. Thus, the virtue of integrity calls for a conversion in 
the overall mentality of running business today. 
Finally, the social, communal implication of the virtue of integrity brings us back 
to the issue of justice, for one‘s truthfulness and wholeness does not only affect the 
person‘s well being but also that of the community and the society. First, it is a matter of 
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fairness towards others, especially those who are under one‘s leadership or seek fair trade. 
Second, leaders who have acquired the virtue of integrity, by acting truthfully to their 
own beliefs, inevitably challenge the injustice of our society, as in the case of Archbishop 
Óscar Romero who defended the poor Salvadorans and called for international 
intervention, which led to his assassination by the government in 1980. In so doing, we 
need the grace of God in order to act courageously. 
 
8.7 The Virtue of Peacemaking in 5:9  
Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. 
 
An exegesis of the Greek and Hebrew terms for peace shows that ‗peace‘ is 
paralleled to ‗justice‘ and is closer to the concept of righteousness than to that of 
tranquility or order. Most ethicists seem to agree on this point. Some theologians, based 
on this understanding, further claim that the beatitude definitely suggests a political 
agenda. However, our exegesis also makes it clear that peace and peacemaking is 
understood by Matthew as an appropriate attitude primarily for personal and communal 
practice and only subsequently for social change. And it hardly advocates the 
establishment of a Christian political party. 
 
Yearning for Peace in Our Modern World 
Both our personal experiences and historical evidence reveal that our society has 
been a disturbed one: There are disharmonies and conflicts in almost every aspect of 
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human relationships and social life, ranging from marriage and family, to community, 
and to cultural/ethnic groups and nations. Some well-known and specific conflicts of the 
twentieth century, as Catholic ethicist Stephen Pope observes, include the Holocaust in 
Germany, the racist segregation in the United States, Apartheid in South Africa, and the 
so-called ‗Troubles‘ in the north of Ireland.1824 In fact, the recent sex scandals by certain 
clergymen and the alleged cover-ups by the hierarchy also create certain degrees of 
disharmony and conflict within the Catholic Church. Some contemporary conflicts 
further developed into warfare, such as the genocide/civil war between the Hutu and 
Tutsi in Rwanda in the 1990s. 
By reflecting on the experience of Vietnam War, American psychologist Ralph 
White identifies six causes of conflict (or stumbling blocks) in our human relationships 
on all levels:
1825
 First, we perceive the other in terms of the diabolical enemy image. 
Second, we conceive a kind of ‗virile‘ image of the self. Third, we bear a sense of moral 
self-righteousness. Fourth, we selectively attend to (or not attend to) certain aspects of the 
reality and focus only on extreme situations. Fifth, we lack a sense of empathy of the 
other. Sixth, we develop an overall irrational and subjective interpretation of reality. 
These stumbling blocks and their subsequent conflicts often lead to hatred, 
violence and suffering on both sides. On the societal and global level, these conflicts 
further cause massive death, poverty, migration, fear, and other sufferings and miseries. 
Pinckaers rightly comments that we all yearn for peace: ―We yearn for external peace, 
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achieved through good relationships with our neighbors, and interior peace which is 
freedom from anxieties, troubles, and inner conflicts.‖1826 This yearning for peace, as a 
result, calls for peacemaking in all aspects and levels of human relationships. 
 
The Meaning of Peace and Peacemaking 
From a theological perspective, peace is one important blessing of God granted to 
us through Jesus Christ (Luke 24:36; John 14:27; 20:19-26). Christians are in turn 
commanded by Jesus to bring peace to the world (Luke 10:5). Still, we need to 
distinguish genuine peace from false peace that some people have mistaken as peace. 
Genuine peace does not mean to compromise, desert or evade confrontation but rather 
acknowledges the inevitability of conflicts.
1827
 Peace is only achieved by the 
transformation of all human relationships and the resolution of conflicts.
1828
 False peace, 
on the contrary, is expressed and obtained in two contrasting ways:
1829
 The first one is 
modeled on a pax romana that employs force and dominion to achieve peace. The other 
one points to a kind of passivity that accepts all disorder and suffering at all cost in 
exchange for stability. Neither one is the kind of peace Jesus preaches. This 
misunderstanding of peace further leads some activists to claim that justice and peace are 
incompatible.  
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Gaudium et Spes offers a Christian definition of genuine peace (#78):
1830
 
Peace is not merely the absence of war; nor can it be reduced solely to the 
maintenance of a balance of power between enemies; nor is it brought 
about by dictatorship. Instead, it is rightly and appropriately called an 
enterprise of justice. Peace results from that order structured into human 
society by its divine Founder, and actualized by men as they thirst after 
ever greater justice. The common good of humanity finds its ultimate 
meaning in the eternal law. But since the concrete demands of this 
common good are constantly changing as time goes on, peace is never 
attained once and for all, but must be built up ceaselessly.  
 
Here, the document emphasizes and reaffirms that peace is not just the tranquility of 
order but also the advocacy of the work of justice. It also clarifies that peace is a kind of 
‗work‘ to be ‗made‘.1831 
Monika Hellwig offers an interpretation of the meaning of Christian peacemaking 
in a similar manner: It is ―the recentering of God in one‘s own life, and in society…[The 
latter] means not only explicit worship and silent adoration…[but also] the welcoming of 
God‘s order, God‘s reign…[and] living by God‘s law.‖1832 She also suggests that the first 
step to genuine Christian peacemaking is ―to listen to those who have been silenced…and 
restore the means of sustenance and social participation to those who had these things 
snatched from them.‖1833 
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Peacemaking as a Virtue 
As just mentioned above, it is mistaken to view that peace and justice are 
incompatible, for genuine peace is built upon justice. Thus, the cultivation of the virtue of 
peacemaking implies the attainment of the virtue of justice at the same time. Moreover, 
since genuine peace is achieved neither by means of force or dominion nor passive 
acceptance of disorder and injustice at all cost, the virtues of meekness and fortitude are 
called into place respectively: The virtue of meekness insists on patience and the 
rejection of violence while fortitude demands active seeking of peace and endurance in 
the midst of conflict and suffering. In this way, the third and the seventh beatitudes are 
closely connected to each other.  
Still, the virtues implied in the second beatitude, such as mourning and solidarity, 
are also relevant to peacemaking for they motivate us to assist others in achieving peace. 
Also, in order to avoid the building up of those stumbling blocks to peace, one needs to 
cultivate the virtue of humility as well.  
Finally, since peacemakers inevitably encounter opponents in the process of 
making peace, the virtue of mercy (and its particular practice of forgiveness) that leads to 
transformation of relationships and eventual reconciliation is crucial to the whole process 
of peacemaking and restoring the rightful relationships. 
 
The Practice of Peacemaking 
Since peacemaking points to an active transformation of relationships on different 
levels, various practices and precautions can be identified. First, prior to making peace in 
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our human relationships, one needs first to acquire peace in one‘s own heart. Pinckaers 
rightly explains that ―we cannot envisage lasting peace among men without an interior 
rootedness in peace of conscience…[or] to maintain active and stable peace with others if 
we are in inner conflicts.‖1834 Second, there are different levels of human relationships—
interpersonal, familial, communal and international—and peacemaking has to be 
practiced on all levels accordingly. Some ethicists thus insist on the importance of 
building peace in the family first and only then extending to the community and the 
larger society.
1835
 Third, one should not just remove those stumbling blocks but also 
actively build up/create right relationships. In so doing, we need to engage in dialogue 
with and show mutual respect and concerns for the other. Crosby, for instance, suggests 
three stages of creating right relationships within a community based on the practices of 
the early Christian community (Matthew 18:10-20):
1836
 Affirmation of the other‘s 
significance and values; fraternal correction; and communal reconciliation. Indeed, 
reconciliation is a mutual experience of transformation that results in the resolution of the 
existing conflict. 
In fact, these practices are often concretely performed in the Christian‘s liturgical 
and sacramental life, particularly during the Catholic Eucharistic celebration: In our 
personal prayer and the sacrament of reconciliation, we recognize God‘s own blessing of 
peace through the forgiveness of sins. We in turn practice forgiveness by communal 
prayers through which we pray for one another, especially for our enemies, adversaries, 
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and whomsoever we find difficulties to live with.
1837
 The subsequent sign of peace, in 
specific, expresses our willingness to reconcile with one another and to make peace with 
other members of the community.  It is an important liturgical practice of peacemaking 
and it unites faithful of diverse cultural and socio-political backgrounds into a single faith 
community. 
 
The Exemplars 
We are told that Jesus is the Prince of Peace about whom the Old Testament 
prophets prophesied (Isaiah 9:6). Still, Jesus speaks strongly about peace and is the one 
who brings God‘s peace to us (Luke 2:14). Specifically, he brings God‘s peace to 
humankind by forgiving our wrongdoings (Luke 23:34). We are called to imitate him in 
bringing peace in our world (Luke 10:5).  
Within the history of Christianity, Francis of Assisi and Catherine of Siena were 
known for making peace between the Church and the civil powers of their times.
1838
 In 
particular, Francis of Assisi was famous for embracing peace as his lifelong watchword, 
and a prayer is attributed to him that aims at making peace in human relationships: 
―Where there is hatred, let me sow love; where there is injury, pardon; where there is 
doubt, faith; where there is despair, hope; where there is darkness, light; and where there 
is sadness, joy.‖1839  
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In the twentieth century, there are many international figures who have taken 
great efforts to make peace with their enemies and build peace for their own countries.
1840
 
In the United States of America, Dorothy Day is noted for ―drawing together of Catholic 
biblical and theological resources to establish pacifism and conscientious objection as a 
legitimate stance for Catholics and for Americans.‖1841 In South Africa, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, a Nobel Peace Prize recipient, for decades contributed to a peaceful 
struggle against the unjust system of apartheid by not just persistently criticizing the 
apartheid government but also relentlessly urging reconciliation between both sides. He 
continues to make peace by chairing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that has 
become a model for peacemaking in other similar post-conflict procedures around the 
world.
1842
 
Within the Catholic Church, Pope John XXIII is recognized by some scholars as a 
promoter of peace too. He took bold initiatives to promote peace during his pontificate, as 
exemplified in documents like Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris:
1843
 He pointed out 
that a stable world order depends on God‘s order as established in creation and the nature 
of human reality in the world, and offered a radical approach to peacemaking that 
challenges the established oppressive power. Indeed, the Catholic Church has been well 
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known among other religions for considering peacemaking in the public sphere seriously 
through its official documents. 
 
The Social Implication of the Virtue of Peacemaking 
Although the virtue of peacemaking is primarily concerned about the 
transformation and restoration of right relationships on the inter-personal and communal 
level, it does not deny the need for the social implication of peacemaking. In fact, the 
reality of our contemporary world urges us to go beyond the inter-personal and 
communal level in the practice of peacemaking. Some theologians and ethicists also 
argue that since Christ came to bring peace and reconciliation to all people, we too have 
to bring peace on all levels.  
Subsequently, some of them, such as the Mennonite John Howard Yoder, suggest 
that the analogous practice of peacemaking in the social sector could be nonviolent 
resistance or nonviolent direct action.
1844
 They believe that a central norm of Christian 
life is nonresistant love that includes nonviolence and pacifism. Glen Stassen, on the 
other hand, advocates for ‗just peacemaking‘ that suggests that nonviolent direct action 
needs to be accompanied by ‗independent initiatives‘, such as treaties on nuclear weapon 
reduction.
1845
 He argues that the two strategies are not in conflict with one another but 
actually share certain common features, like being proactive in nature and affirming the 
dignity of the enemy. In particular, he emphasizes the need for international cooperation 
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and is convinced that nations involved in active international cooperation ―make war and 
have war made against them less frequently.‖1846 Others further call for national 
forgiveness as a way to peacemaking in the international realm.
1847
 
In a similar manner, Gaudium es Spes appeals for taking serious actions on the 
international scale in the promotion and making of peace:
1848
 It argues that it is not 
enough to restrain the manner of warfare; rather, there is a need to ban war altogether. It 
also affirms that peacemaking is the responsibility of all Christians, and justice is the 
basis for authentic peacemaking in our contemporary world (##88-90). 
Last but not least, Matthean scholar Warren Carter further extends peacemaking 
to the cosmic level. He claims that ‗cosmic peace‘ ―consists not of exploitation but of all 
things cosmically in right relation to God‖ and grounds itself in right relations and justice 
with all.
1849
 I am convinced that the extension to make peace with the earth is not just 
necessary but also urgent in the twenty-first century. 
 
8.8  Bearing Persecution for Righteousness‘ sake as a Virtue in 5:10-12  
Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of 
heaven. Blessed are you when people revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of 
evil against you falsely on my account. Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in 
heaven, for in the same way they persecuted the prophets who were before you. 
 
Our exegesis reveals that the eighth beatitude forms an inclusio with the first 
beatitude and focuses on righteousness as the fourth macarism does (although the eighth 
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macarism emphasizes the ‗task‘ aspect of righteousness). We also saw that persecution 
and suffering, though diverse in nature, are the direct effects of seeking righteousness, 
following Jesus and his teaching, and being prophetic. And the evangelist hints that 
persecution and suffering continue in the present to those who remain faithful to Jesus‘ 
mandate and carry on his mission faithfully. This information enriches our interpretation 
of the last beatitude for the contemporary world. 
 
Persecution and Injustice in Human World 
In many parts of our present world there are still people who are persecuted for 
various reasons, ranging from political and religious reasons to simply because of their 
fighting for justice on behalf of the poor and the suffering. Some of them are physically 
tortured while others are imprisoned or forced into exile, as seen in countries like 
Myanmar. Even in places where physical persecution is abandoned, the persecuted often 
suffer from all sorts of unjust treatment such as censorship, the exclusion of basic human 
rights, and poverty. Pinckaers rightly notes that it is also true among contemporary 
Christians:
1850
  Persecution is not limited to physical or political oppressions but also 
includes all kinds of injustice and ill treatment done to those who try to live their 
Christian life faithfully, such as those underground Catholics in mainland China.  
While the Church has suffered various kinds of persecution throughout its history, 
at times it has played the role of persecutor towards its opponents. For instance, during 
the medieval and Reformation period, the Catholic church became greatly intolerant 
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toward its opponents and other forms of knowledge such as science, and conducted 
interrogation through the setting up of the Inquisition as a means to silence the 
challengers, as in the case of Galileo whose doctrine was denounced by the Inquisition as 
anti-scriptural and heretical.
1851
  
Even in modern time, a number of Christians and theologians continue to 
experience some forms of persecution (such as marginalization and silencing) by the 
ecclesial authority and their faith community because of their sexual orientation or views 
on certain non-doctrinal and/or moral issues like women‘s ordination. Indeed, those who 
persecute others would without doubt believe that they are just doing what is right and 
just.  
 
The Meaning of Martyrdom 
Throughout human history persecutions are best exemplified in the form of 
martyrdom. The Greek term μαρησς (martus) ―signifies a witness who testifies to a fact of 
which he has knowledge from personal observation.‖1852 It first appears in Christian 
literature and points to the disciples‘ witnessing of their Christian faith with the risk of 
persecution and even death. And it was only in a later development that the term is used 
exclusively to refer to those who die for their faith. Martyrdom was thus understood as 
one of the defining characteristics of sainthood in the early church.
1853
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From a different perspective, although we need not always risk our lives in 
witnessing our Christian faith, we are all still called to dying to the self in our ordinary 
life for the sake of loving God and neighbors.
1854
 And as far as moral life is concerned, 
martyrdom and ‗dying to the self‘ point to the attainment of a certain Christian attitude 
and cultivate certain virtues. 
 
Bearing Persecution for the sake of Righteousness as a Virtue 
As a virtue, bearing persecution for the sake of righteousness points to a number 
of Christian virtues. The first relevant virtue is fortitude: According to Aquinas, the 
cardinal virtue of fortitude ―guard[s] the will against being withdrawn from the good of 
reason through fear of bodily evil‖ (II.II. 123.4). It allows the person to face and endure 
the foreseeable persecution without fear. In this way, it also enables one to take on the 
active, prophetic role despite criticisms, rejection or persecution. Aquinas thus claimed 
that martyrdom is a proper act of the virtue (II.II. 124.1).  
A second relevant virtue to be cultivated is the virtue of justice for righteousness 
is the core content and object of the beatitude. In fact, we are persecuted because of our 
hunger and thirst for righteousness on behalf of the poor and the suffering who are 
victims of social injustice. In this way, our striving for righteousness is motivated by the 
reality of the sufferer, which implies the cultivation of those virtues related to the 
beatitude of mourning, such as the virtue of solidarity. Also, as followers of Christ we are 
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called to imitate Christ who refrains from vengeance and forgives those who persecute 
him; thus, the eighth beatitude is related to meekness as well. 
 Finally, the apodosis of this extended beatitude invites us to rejoice and be glad in 
the midst of persecution. This joyfulness points to the virtue of gratitude: It is argued that 
gratitude can be experienced not just as an obligation but also as a virtue.
1855
 Some moral 
theologians further perceive it as the ―pivotal virtue of moral life.‖1856 It is because our 
life is filled with God‘s gifts; the whole Christian life and the entirety of Christian ethics 
is thus the appropriate response to the benevolence of God.
1857
 Moreover, gratitude, and 
not ordinary happiness, is the root of rejoicing:
1858
 It is because of gratitude that we 
become joyful and not vice versa. Our ability to rejoice then builds up further satisfaction 
and makes us more thankful.  Rejoicing is, therefore, the living out and practice of 
gratitude. 
 
The Practice of Bearing Persecution for a Righteous Cause 
Like the practice of mourning, we need to begin with internal preparation—
acquiring a sense of willingness and readiness in taking other people‘s troubles to oneself. 
Externally, we practice mortification as a way to prepare ourselves in facing and enduring 
possible persecution. Liturgically speaking, fasting and abstinence from meat on certain 
days of the liturgical year, as well as participation in the Stations of the Cross and the 
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Holy Triduum are some ordinary and yet helpful practices of experiencing the Lord‘s 
suffering and persecution, which in turn make us ready to accept persecution spiritually. 
Moreover, we learn to practice self control, patience, and to forgive those who 
persecute us, as is in the practice of meekness. Again, in our spiritual and sacramental life, 
the prayer of ‗Our Father‘, the sign of peace, and the sacrament of reconciliation, guide 
us to experience God‘s forgiveness and enable us to forgive others, especially our 
enemies who persecute us in whatever way.  
On the other hand, in order to exercise our prophetic role in challenging injustice 
in our society, we need to learn to discern and follow our own conscience, and hold firm 
to what we believe is right. Last but not least, we learn to rejoice as a way to cultivate the 
virtue of gratitude. However, as Paul points out, our joy is built upon the Lord rather than 
on physical or material pleasure (Philippians 3:1a, 4:4). 
 
The Exemplars 
In the Old Testament, the prophets (such as Jeremiah) were above all the subject 
of persecution, for their prophetic voice challenged Israel‘s own social-political injustice 
and their unfaithfulness to God (Jeremiah 26). 
In the New Testament, although the beatitude does not connect the theme of 
‗persecution for righteousness‘ sake‘ with the life and death of Jesus, we are all aware of 
the fact that he is persecuted because of his hunger and thirst for God‘s righteousness, 
and his Passion is ―the climax and fulfillment of the protracted suffering of the prophets 
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under persecution.‖1859 Indeed, Jesus is ―the Prophet in whom the great prophetic 
tradition of Israel finds its culmination as well as its final class conflict with the priestly 
class.‖1860 Later on, the disciples and the Christians were likewise persecuted for the sake 
of the Lord, as exemplified in the death of Stephen (Acts 6:8-7:60).  
In the medieval time, many Christians held firm to their faith even under the 
wrongful persecution by the Church itself. One famous case is Joan of Arc of the 
fifteenth century. She was first accused of heresy, then imprisoned, deprived of any 
spiritual privileges, and eventually executed.
1861
 Like other Christians who were also 
wrongfully persecuted in the Church history, she exemplifies to us the virtue of bearing 
persecution for the sake of following Christ. 
 Nowadays, in our pluralistic society, while it may be true that we seldom face 
martyrdom solely because of defending our Christian faith; still, there are many 
Christians who bear persecution and risk their lives because of hungering and thirsting 
for justice and exercising their prophetic role of challenging the society‘s injustice. One 
recent exemplar is the six Jesuits and two lay helpers who were murdered by the military 
government in the city of San Salvador in 1989. Although their ministry was within a 
university that basically serves the country‘s elites, their exemplary and prophetic role to 
bring righteousness to the country despite a possible death threat, as was Archbishop 
Romero, is best understood in the following testimony. 
[They] were killed for the way they lived, that is, for how they expressed 
their faith in love…The Jesuits and their colleagues concluded that they 
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could not limit their mission to teaching and innocuous research…[Thus] 
they sought countless ways to unmask the lies that justified the pervasive 
injustice and the continuing violence, and they made constructive 
proposals for a just peace and a more humane social order…That is what 
got them killed…[They] stood for a Church of the poor (in the words of 
Pope John XXIII) which would serve as a vanguard of this new society, 
modeling equitable social relations and solidarity; a prophetic Church like 
the one that Archbishop Romero symbolizes, which gives credible witness 
to the fullness of life that God promises…[They] knew they were risking 
their lives.  But they understood that that was the price of being human in 
their time and place; that was the cost of following Christ.
1862
  
 
The Social, Communal Aspect of the Virtue of Bearing Persecution for Righteousness’ 
Sake 
The above-mentioned Christian models and their exemplary acts rightly confirm 
that the virtue emerged in the last beatitude has an explicit social and communal aspect: 
The virtue is definitely other-oriented for we hunger and thirst for righteousness on 
behalf of the sufferer and the poor. In our contemporary world, we saw from the previous 
reflections that most of the human poverty, suffering, misery, anger/hatred, and conflicts, 
are directly or indirectly caused by structural injustices in our society. Thus, we are called 
to exercise our prophetic role in challenging these unjust structures and in seeking social 
change. This prophetic role in turn calls us to voice out those injustices courageously by 
words and deeds on all levels. Unfortunately, in concrete situations, such prophetic 
voices are often a minority and subsequently are often suppressed or ignored, and their 
advocates are persecuted by the authorities. Therefore, we are in great need of God‘s 
grace so as to persevere in our prophetic role and to embrace persecution joyfully. 
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8.9 Conclusion 
 
So far I have offered an interpretation of the Beatitudes through the lens of virtue 
ethics. In particular, I adopt the three foundational questions based on the threefold 
structure of contemporary virtue theory as a basis for our hermeneutics: I first focus on 
the kind of moral person we are by reflecting upon the situation we are currently facing. 
Then I examine the meaning and content of the virtues identified in the Beatitudes as a 
way to point out the kind of moral person we ought to become. Finally, I treat the last 
foundational question of ‗how do we get there‘ by exploring the practices correspond to 
each of these identified virtues, as well as those moral exemplars to which we can turn. It 
points to our character formation as Christians. The social, communal aspect of these 
virtues is also succinctly reflected on, showing that it is an important yield of virtue ethics 
and the Beatitudes has a social character. This reflection in turn helps us to respond to the 
question of what kind of Christian moral community and society the Beatitudes calls us 
to form. 
Our answers to these questions can be summarized as follows. First, based on our 
earlier exegesis of the Beatitudes, we acquire a better understanding of and deeper insight 
into the text which guides us to depict and focus more accurately our own situation as 
moral agents within society. We note that humankind continues to face different 
predicaments in our contemporary world: Poverty, suffering and human loss, violence 
and abuse of power, miseries, hypocrisy, disharmony, and persecution. They are the 
 478 
result of unrighteousness and we hold responsibility for these happenings. It is the same 
concrete world in which the disciples of Jesus are situated. 
Second, many of the Christian virtues identified are inter-related to each other. 
That means, a virtue implied in one beatitude is also needed for another beatitude (such 
as the virtues of humility and fortitude in the first three and the last two beatitudes 
respectively), or the cultivation of one virtue naturally calls for the attainment of other 
virtues (such as mourning over others‘ suffering calls for virtuous acts of mercy towards 
the other as well as justice). Still, core Christian virtue(s) for each beatitude can be 
proposed here: The first beatitude points to the virtue of humility; the beatitude of 
mourning implies the virtues of solidarity and humility; the third beatitude points to the 
virtue of meekness that is humility expanded to the poor and the powerful; the fourth 
beatitude highlights the virtue of obedience in our relation with God; the fifth beatitude 
suggests the virtue of mercy which is an immediate effect of the virtue of charity; the 
beatitude on ‗pure in heart‘ implies the virtue of integrity of one‘s inner self and outer 
actions; the next beatitude attends to the virtue of peacemaking that is built upon the 
virtue of justice; and the eighth beatitude stresses the virtue of fortitude for the sake of 
justice and the virtue of gratitude toward God.  
Third, subsequently, various corresponding Christian practices are proposed and 
exemplary models are recognized. Some of them are biblical figures and canonized saints 
while others are ordinary Christians who have exemplified a particular Christian virtue in 
their lives. Still, Jesus is the example par excellence for he has acquired all these virtues 
in his teaching and entire life. Indeed, Jesus‘ exemplary life and the inter-relatedness of 
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the virtues show that the Beatitudes poses a radical ethical demand upon the followers of 
Christ. To be a disciple of Jesus means not only being humble but also meek and merciful 
at the same time, eager to make peace and strive for righteousness to the point of being 
persecuted, etc. Thus, in the cultivation of the proposed virtues, the acting out of their 
respective practices, and the imitation of those virtuous models, we need the gift of God‘s 
grace. 
Fourth, our reflection on the reality of our contemporary human world further 
reveals that we need God‘s grace not just for our individual moral/character formation 
but also God‘s providence here and now so as to form a Christian community living by 
the Beatitudes. In short, a community (and society) as such has the following 
characteristics: 1) It humbly acknowledges and is aware of the presence of poverty, 
suffering, miseries, and other forms of injustice in its society and that each member of the 
community contributes to the actual cause of such poverty and suffering. 2) It has 
sympathy to the poor and the suffering, and is eager to accompany and serve them by 
promoting corporal works of mercy. 3) It takes courage and commits itself to the combat 
against injustice (and promotes justice) on their behalf regardless of criticisms, 
oppositions, and persecution. 4) It has a leadership that honors truthfulness and personal 
integrity. Such leadership will regularly re-examine its policies and value systems in 
order to be in line with God‘s will and in the service of the common good of the society. 
5) Specifically, it advocates amnesty and hospitality toward those who are perceived by 
us as ‗a threat‘ to the society. It also encourages mutual respect and dialogue among 
different interest groups and refrains from the use of violence or abuse of power. 6) With 
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regards to its relationship with other communities and societies, it makes and builds 
peace with those of different ethnicity, culture, religion, and belief by engaging in 
dialogues and reconciliation. 7) It promotes harmony with and care for our natural world 
and environment. 8) Finally, it lives not by its own efforts alone but also hopes in God‘s 
providence and grace as well. 
 
However, each Christian community living by the Beatitudes is necessarily 
situated in a larger society that has its own unique cultural and historical construct that 
produces an impact on the community. For instance, as Chinese theologian Archie Lee 
rightly points out, in the case of engaging in the hermeneutics of biblical texts for their 
society within the larger context of Asia, Asian Christians have to deal with ―their 
connection with their community and its cultural-religious [contexts and] texts, which 
had nurtured and shaped their lives and continued to sustain and nourish their well-
being.‖1863  
How can we bring the Beatitudes and its corresponding Christian moral virtues 
into a particular society and engage in meaningful dialogue between the two? In my 
particular identity of being a Chinese Catholic ethicist in a Chinese society like Hong 
Kong that is deeply influenced by Confucianism
1864
 and where Christianity and 
Confucianism encounter each other in many different ways, how do we engage in fruitful 
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dialogue between Christian ethics and Confucian ethics, and in specific, how can the 
Beatitudes as scripted script be meaningful to the people? 
The methodological argument for a more integrated scriptural ethics proposed in 
this work can be beneficial to this enterprise. First, there exists a multi-scriptural 
phenomenon within Asian cultures (and religions); and Asians have become familiar with 
pluralistic scriptural traditions.
1865
 Sri Lankan Christian scholar Aloysius Pieris, for 
example, urges that biblical interpretation in Asia needs to ―acknowledge and take into 
account scriptures of other Asian religions in their search for the divine-human encounter 
and the ‗God experience‘ in the human concern for liberation praxis.‖1866 Lee likewise 
comments that the Christian Bible should constantly ―engage and negotiate with other 
scriptures in order to shape a Christian identity in a multi-scriptural context, which 
is…ambiguously hybrid in a postmodern and postcolonial setting.‖1867 Our proposed 
Christian ethics that understands Scripture as not just ‗script‘ but also ‗scripted‘ thus can 
be helpful to make Christian ethics more explicable to the multi-textual Asian society.  
Second, in the case of the Chinese society, one of the major scriptures is the 
Confucian text. Methodologically speaking, Confucianism goes to the texts in its search 
of ethical teachings. That means, Confucian ethics is primarily the fruit of careful 
interpretation of their ‗sacred‘ texts. Thus, a more integrated Scripture-based Christian 
ethics that perceives the text as both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘ can better engage in cross-
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cultural dialogue with Confucian ethics, for subsequent comparative work of moral 
traditions needs to be both text-based and interpretative. Moreover, if biblical texts are 
constitutive of Christian theological ethics, and if Confucian texts are constitutive of a 
Confucian ethics, then doing a cross-cultural ethics begins not with analogous 
generalities but very specific texts. 
Therefore, by way of demonstration, in the next and final part of this work, I will 
attempt to bring the Beatitudes as ‗scripted script‘ into the Confucian society and engage 
in dialogue between Confucian ethics and Christian ethics. In so doing, I will discuss the 
nature of Confucian ethics and its conception of virtue found in specific classical 
Confucian texts, especially the writings of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi. I will also 
briefly explore the possible Confucian understanding of certain key ideas fundamental to 
the Beatitudes, such as ‗blessed‘, ‗next life‘, and ‗reward‘, so as to provide a platform for 
the discussion of Confucian engagement of the Beatitudes. Finally, in concrete terms, I 
discuss how the Beatitudes as ‗scripted script‘ can be comparable to Confucian texts and 
what precautions and uncertainties should be noted. 
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Part Four: Bringing the Data Forward  
 
In this last part of my work, I bring the fruit of previous chapters into a specific 
context, namely, the Confucian tradition in East Asia in general and in Chinese society in 
particular. I am hoping that such an attempt may help engage meaningful dialogue 
between Confucian ethics and Christian ethics. 
Indeed, the special Synod of Asia held in Rome in 1998 re-confirmed the need to 
show ―esteem for the ethical values in the customs and practices found in the teachings of 
the great philosophers of Asia, which promote natural virtues and pious devotion to 
ancestors…[and called for] dialogue with the cultures of Asia, dialogue with the religions 
of Asia, and with the peoples of Asia.‖1868 However, in order to engage in such a 
dialogue in our specific Confucian context and bring the Beatitudes and its virtues to its 
Chinese audience, we need to first acquire a basic understanding of this particular 
tradition and its approach to morality. Only then can we see how the Beatitudes and its 
virtues can be compared to the Confucian tradition. 
Therefore, in this final chapter, I begin with a brief overview of the Confucian 
tradition.
1869
 It is followed by an examination of its religious claims and those key 
concepts that emerged from the Beatitudes, such as ‗blessed‘, ‗reward‘, and ‗next life‘. 
Then I attend to the argument that Confucian ethics is a virtue-based ethics, from which I 
explore how those virtues identified in the Beatitudes can be received by those in the 
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Confucian tradition. Finally, I conclude with some precautions in engaging dialogue 
between the two traditions. 
However, prior to exploring the possible Confucian reception of the Beatitudes, a 
few words about the Confucian sacred texts employed here are needed. They are the 
Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the book of Mencius, and the 
writings of Xunzi. These texts belong to the classical period of Confucianism. They 
become, as we will see, part of the canon of Confucianism.
1870
 
The Analects, widely accepted as the most reliable source of Confucius‘s 
doctrines, is a collection of sayings by the Master and his disciples pertaining to 
Confucius‘s teachings and deeds.1871 These sayings are short, unsystematic, and often 
with little or no context; hence its literary form is close to that of a collection of wisdom 
sayings or proverbs.  
The Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean, whose authorships and dates 
of composition are debatable, are two texts relevant to transmission of the teachings of 
Confucius.
1872
 They are not really ‗books‘ but essays in the strict sense and are rather 
comprehensive in content. Specifically, the Great Learning is a short text on Confucian 
learning with commentaries by one of Confucius‘s disciples. It mainly deals with social 
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and political matters. The Doctrine of the Mean, in contrast, is a discourse on 
metaphysics, psychology and spirituality.
1873
  
The book of Mencius consists of both sayings of Mencius and dialogues between 
Mencius and other people. Its literary style differs greatly from that of the Analects in that 
they are often lengthy and contextualized.
1874
 Thus, the book is divided by into seven 
smaller books, each of which contains questions and answers.  
Finally, the writings of Xunzi, unlike the book of Mencius, are self-contained 
essays on various subjects, such as the role of Heaven, the regulations of a king, or the 
functions of rites and music. In particular, the essay on human nature is one of the most 
philosophical works by Xunzi and has drawn significant attention among many 
contemporary scholars.
1875
 
As a whole, these Confucian sacred texts are rather diverse in their literary genre 
and style. None of them has anything like those macarisms in the Beatitudes. Thus, 
throughout this chapter I am not seeking structural or literary parallels between the 
Beatitudes and the Confucian texts. And I am not looking for a set of eight macarisms or 
proverbs either. Rather, I simply look for parallel virtues promoted by the Confucian 
sacred texts. 
                                                 
1873
 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 95-96. 
1874
 D.C. Lau, introduction to Mencius, trans. D.C. Lau (London: Penguin Classics, 1970). 
1875
 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 116. 
 486 
Chapter Nine: Bringing the Beatitudes into the Confucian Chinese Society in East 
Asia 
 
9.1 Confucian Tradition at a Glance 
 
When talking about the history of Chinese philosophy, renowned Chinese 
philosopher Chan Wing-tsit commented that it can be characterized in the single word 
‗humanism‘—one that emphasizes the unity of humankind and Heaven—that reached its 
climax in the teaching of Confucius.
1876
 In other words, the history of Chinese philosophy 
is inseparable from the emergence and development of the Confucian tradition itself. 
Harvard Confucian scholar Tu Wei-ming divides this development of the 
Confucian tradition into three epochs:
1877
 The first epoch began with Confucius and 
ended in the third century when the Han dynasty was disintegrated.  Its representative 
thinkers, apart from Confucius (551-479 BCE) himself, include Mencius (390-305 BCE) 
and Xunzi (298-238 BCE). They formed what we call nowadays the classical Confucian 
tradition.  
Confucius lived in a period when ―the ‗feudal‘ ritual system had been so 
fundamentally undermined that political crises precipitated a profound sense of moral 
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decline.‖1878 He longed for a well-ordered society that was politically stable and based on 
good government that was responsive to the citizens‘ basic needs.1879 Confucius is best 
known for evolving the concept of jen 仁 (humanity/benevolence):1880 Although the term 
was a pre-Confucian word and denoted the particular virtue of kindness originally, it was 
Confucius who interpreted it in a totally new way, transformed it into a general virtue, 
and made it the core theme of his overall conversations. It is the virtue of chün tzu 君子 
(the gentleman) who wishes to establish his own character and that of others, be a 
prominent person, and helps others to be likewise. As far as one‘s moral formation is 
concerned, Confucius advocated the need of self-cultivation
1881
 which points to a kind of 
‗acquisition model‘ that emphasizes xue 學 (learning), which in turn prompts actions and 
the development of character.  
We should note that in the alleged androcentric ancient Confucian society, only 
men can be chün tsu, and all of Confucius‘s disciples seemed to be men. The notion 
literally means ‗ruler‘s son‘ and is translated into various terms, including the ‗noble 
man‘, ‗gentleman‘, and the ‗superior person‘.1882 And the most cited and controversial 
Confucian text for anti-feminism is found in the Analects 17:25 in which Confucius said 
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that both women and small men are difficult to deal with. However, some scholars 
interpret the term ‗women‘ narrowly to mean solely ‗concubines‘ and not women in 
general.
1883
 Sandra Wawrytko further argues that the qualities of chün tsu (such as 
intelligence) are gender-spanning while those ‗feminine‘ characteristics like gentleness 
are incorporated into the Confucian moral ideal. Also, although the gender interfusion of 
chün tsu could open for misunderstanding, she is convinced that for Confucius ―feminism 
was an appropriate option…[and] the chün tsu ideal epitomizes it!‖1884 It is with her 
argument that we move forward. 
Mencius was a pupil of Confucius‘s grandson‘s pupil. His teachings were 
basically derived from those of Confucius but he differed from Confucius‘s doctrines in 
that he claimed that xing 性 (human nature) is not just good but is originally good:1885 
One possesses innate knowledge of the good and innate ability to do good for we are born 
with four duan 端 (‗sprouts‘ or ‗germs‘, nascent moral dispositions), namely, jen 
(benevolence), yi 義 (righteousness/dutifulness), li 禮 (ritual propriety), and zhi 智 
(wisdom).
1886
 Thus, one only needs to recover this original nature of humankind and all 
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can become a sage. In short, he suggested, in contemporary terminology, a kind of 
‗discovery model‘ of moral self-cultivation.1887 
Xunzi was a contemporary figure to Mencius. Like Mencius he believed in the 
perfection of the self through self-cultivation, and the significance of virtues like 
benevolence and righteousness. However, he differed greatly from Mencius on how these 
could actually come about. In particular, Xunzi opposed Mencius by claiming that human 
nature is originally evil. The very first sentence of Man’s Nature is Evil reads, ―Man‘s 
nature is evil; goodness is the result of conscious activity.‖1888 The transformation of 
human nature relies on external conscious activity from which the sage creates ritual 
principles and lays down regulations to reform, train and transform one‘s nature.1889 In 
this way Xunzi emphasized the role of law/regulations and ritual principles and pointed 
to a ‗re-formation model‘ of moral self-cultivation.1890 As a whole, Xunzi‘s doctrine on 
human nature has been understood as comparable to Augustine‘s notion of the Original 
Sin or the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Sinologist Homer Dubs even refers Xunzi‘s 
doctrine as ―an Augustinian turn in the Confucian tradition.‖1891 Still, in contemporary 
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philosophical terminology, Xunzi‘s overall philosophy is seen as representing naturalistic 
Confucianism that is in contrast to Mencius‘s idealistic view of Confucianism, and their 
differences are compared with those between Aristotle and Plato. 
The second epoch started after the collapse of the Tang dynasty (in the tenth 
century) when Confucian thinkers offered a creative intellectual response to the growing 
challenge of Buddhism and Taoism of that time. They also re-interpreted and re-
appropriated those classical Confucian thoughts, with special interests in metaphysical 
enquiry. This epoch was recognized as the period of Neo-Confucianism and was 
represented by Chu Hsi (1130-1200 CE) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529 CE). Chu 
offered a great synthesis of the concepts of those classical thinkers and grouped the 
Analects, the book of Mencius, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean as the 
Four Books.
1892
 Some scholars thus have likened Chu to Aquinas. Wang, on the other 
hand, proposed doctrines of ―the extension of the innate knowledge of the good‖ and ―the 
unity of knowledge and action.‖1893 In this way, Wang differed from Chu in a 
fundamental way: Wang‘s approach is moral whereas Chu‘s is intellectual.  
Nevertheless, since the fifteenth century, the thoughts of Neo-Confucianism were 
spread beyond China to other parts of East Asia (such as Korea and Japan) till the early 
twentieth century: According to Tu, prior to the appearance of the Western powers in the 
mid-nineteenth century, Neo-Confucianism had had a great impact on East Asia‘s polity, 
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society, and culture, and had become an integral part of East Asia.
1894
 Even now, he is 
convinced that ―the pervasiveness of ideas such as network capitalism, soft 
authoritarianism, group spirit, and consensual politics throughout the East Asia economy, 
polity, and society‖ suggests that the Confucian tradition continues to be relevant in East 
Asian modernity.
1895
 It defines the meaning of being modern in East Asia and at the same 
time being restructured by modernization.
1896
 Still, Mary Evelyn Bucker comments that 
the Confucian tradition finds distinctive expressions in different parts of East Asia and is 
thus problematic to view it as a singular tradition.
1897
 
Nevertheless, Tu rightly concludes that Confucianism has gone through 
significant transformations throughout the past two millennia. He suggests that it is more 
important in seeking new ways of approaching the Confucian way in the twenty-first 
century than simply reflecting on the past. He describes the possibility of carrying out the 
New Confucian movement as the third epoch. Its distinctiveness lies on the ambition to 
advance the exploration of the Confucian way beyond East Asia and into the West. But 
this is for the future. 
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9.2 Confucianism as a Religion and Its Worldview 
 
In the book Our Religions, Confucianism is introduced as one of the seven 
historical world religions.
1898
 Some scholars wonder if it is appropriate to treat it as a 
world religion in tandem with Christianity and Hinduism. Contemporary Confucian 
scholar Rodney Leon Taylor rightly notes that the question of whether Confucianism is a 
religion is not a new one, and various attempts have been made by philosophers and 
Confucian scholars alike to seek the definition of the religious character of 
Confucianism.
1899
 Nevertheless, Tu claims that the question is timely as we continue to 
explore the possibility of the third epoch of Confucianism. He explains, ―Confucian 
religiousness is crucial to…the current conversation among theologians and comparative 
religionists in the West, a conversation occasioned by a shared need to realize 
authenticity and wholeness personally and communally in an increasingly pluralistic 
world.‖1900 
Historically speaking, Christian missionaries of the past (such as Mateo Ricci), by 
noting the practice of rituals in filial piety, qualified Confucianism as a major religion 
and even tried to incorporate these rituals into Christianity as incidental additions.
1901
 
Pioneer Sinologist James Legge of the nineteenth century, likewise defined Confucianism 
first an ancient religion of China and only then the thinking of the great philosopher 
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himself.
1902
 Twentieth century British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, who approaches 
religions by family resemblances, also comments that Confucianism, together with 
Judaism, belongs to the family of ‗prophetic‘ religions despite the fact that Confucianism 
does not have explicit belief in deities.
1903
 Herbert Fingarette, in his pioneer and popular 
book Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, argues that ―not only Confucius‘s teaching 
originated from the concept of Heaven [tien 天], but also that his notion of holiness of 
life teaches that the secular is the place where the sacred is manifested.‖1904 Christian 
ethicist Lee Yearley, in addition, employs a particular theory of religious thought to 
analyze the religious elements of classical Confucian thought.
1905
 He concludes that such 
analysis clarifies how Confucian thinkers can be compared to other recognizable 
religious thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas of the West.
1906
 
Still, Tu offers his own view: Although radical transcendence like the concepts of 
‗God‘ and ‗the ultimate other‘ is absent in Confucian symbolism, the notion of tien that is 
widely accepted by Confucian thinkers as a source for self-transformation points to a 
kind of religiosity that is comparable to other great world religions. He says, ―Heaven is 
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omniscient and omnipresent, if not omnipotent.‖1907 Tu further claims that although 
Confucianism‘s spiritual orientation is this worldly, it still has a transcendent 
dimension—transcendence in immanence, as seen in a passage from the Analects: 
―Heaven is about to use your Master as the wooden tongue for a bell [to rouse the 
empire].‖1908 In short, Tu‘s understanding of Confucian religiosity points to a kind of 
‗anthropocosmic‘ vision that emphasizes the ―comprehensive interaction of Heaven, 
Earth, and humans.‖1909 
Nevertheless, it is Taylor who offers us a more comprehensive discussion of the 
religious dimensions of the Confucian tradition:
 1910
 He first clarifies that the absence of 
the term ‗religion‘ in Confucian literature does not mean the tradition does not have a 
religious dimension. He then, as Tu did, turns to the notion of tien (Heaven) as a basis of 
his own argument that Confucianism, other than being an ethical system and humanistic 
teaching, is profoundly religious. He claims that tien in the classical Confucian text is not 
an abstract philosophical concept as some have argued but ―functions as a religious 
authority or absolute often theistic in its portrayal.‖1911 And its role in the ultimate 
transformation of humankind (into a transformed person like the sage) further makes this 
tien religious in meaning. Taylor concludes that the recognition of this religious core 
allows a religious interpretation of other elements of the Confucian tradition. For instance, 
                                                 
1907
 Tu, ―Confucianism,‖ 145-46. 
1908
 Ibid., 203; The Analects, 3:24. 
1909
 Mary Evelyn Bucker, introduction to Confucian Spirituality Vol. 1, eds. Tu Wei-ming and Mary 
Evelyn Tucker (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2003), 24; Tu, Centrality and Commonality, 
102-07. 
1910
 Taylor, 2-4. 
1911
 Ibid., 2. 
 495 
the prominent writings of Confucianism are not mere ‗Classics‘ but ‗Scripture‘ that has 
religious authority. 
Taylor later turns to two relevant issues for support. The first issue is the religious 
understanding of sainthood. In the Confucian tradition, the sage is a perfect human being 
whose role is to restore humankind and the world to the ways of virtue—the Way of 
Heaven.
1912
 Still, Taylor argues that the sage can be a religious figure in the sense that, 
like the saint, he suggests ―characteristics of both ‗otherness‘ or inimitability, associated 
with the veneration of the saint, and exemplariness or imitability, resulting in the 
emulation of the saint by his followers.‖1913 He points out that this ‗otherness‘ has been 
present but was only consciously suppressed by the Confucian tradition. Even the 
ordinariness of the sage‘s deeds ―has the character of the religious when seen within the 
soteriological context of the tradition.‖1914 Taylor concludes, ―Although any wholesale 
adoption of the term saint for sage is premature at best, the sheer possibility of 
commonality at least partially adumbrates the religious potential found within the 
Confucian sage.‖1915 In fact, for Confucius, the sages were ―the semi-divine architects of 
the golden age [the ideal world].‖1916 This partially explains why, Confucius, who was 
perceived by his disciples as a sage, has been venerated as a god (of culture) in East Asia 
for the past two millennia.
1917
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Regarding the second issue, the question of religious response to suffering, Taylor 
rightly notes that suffering remains a crucial element in the definition of religion and 
every religious tradition struggles to offer its own unique interpretation and religious 
response. In the Confucian tradition, Mencius, for example, perceived suffering as 
constitutive elements for human greatness: ―That is why Heaven, when it is about to 
place a great burden on a man, always first tests his resolution, exhausts his fame and 
makes him suffer starvation and hardship, frustrates his efforts so as to shake him from 
his mental lassitude, toughens his nature and makes good his deficiencies.‖1918 However, 
by arguing that there exists a Confucian soteriology—that recognizes ―the Way of 
Heaven as an Absolute and the provision for the ultimate transformation of 
humanity‖1919—Taylor is convinced that the Confucian tradition‘s acceptance of the 
reality of suffering, and its commitment to overcome it, is a proper religious response to 
suffering in spite of the fact that it does not share an explicit Christian eschatology.
1920
 
Bucker, while defending the religious dimension of Confucianism as Taylor does, 
refrains from employing the term ‗religion‘ because it associates with formal institutional 
structures and obscures rather than clarifies the distinctive religious dimension of the 
Confucian tradition. Rather, she suggests that the religious dimension of Confucianism is 
better understood as a religious worldview with distinctive spiritual elements and 
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cosmological orientation.
1921
 It echoes the above-mentioned ‗anthropocosmic‘ view 
envisioned by Tu.  
Finally, in a more recent book on Confucianism, John Berthrong and Jeffrey 
Richey attempt to demonstrate that Confucianism is an authentic East Asian religious 
tradition.
1922
 They argue that Confucianism, as other religions do, ―attempts to develop a 
unified (though not necessarily uniform) set of beliefs, institutions, and practices in 
response to fundamental questions about the universe (cosmology), human beings 
(anthropology), and how to live (ethics).‖1923 
In sum, these contemporary scholars generally argue that there is a more than an 
implicit religious dimension in the Confucian tradition. However, they seem to equally 
admit that one should not label Confucianism as a religion in the same way as one does 
with other world religions. 
This caution is grounded on a number of observations.
1924
 First, Confucian 
tradition does not have the view that the deity is a person even though tien is sometimes 
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portrayed as if it is a person on high. Likewise, while the Mandate of Heaven is at times 
interpreted as a decree from such a deity, it is also understood as the law of nature. 
Second, although Heaven can be argued as the source of spiritual transformation and 
perfection of the self, it does not claim to be the source of the natural world and universe. 
Confucian tradition simply does not develop any doctrine of creation. Hence, tien is not 
the creator of humankind and the natural world. And Tu‘s claim of interaction between 
Heaven and human beings cannot be referred to as the kind of creator-creature 
relationship either. Third, there is also the lack of the idea of establishing personal 
relationship with God. Despite the fact that ritual sacrifices to the deity were approved by 
Confucian thinkers, they were done out of respect to the unknown deity rather than out of 
personal relationship with the deity. Fourth, while some Confucian scholars argue that 
Confucianism affirms the presence of the deity, negation of God is also found in 
Confucian tradition.
1925
 In particular, its entire philosophy is androcentric rather than 
theo-centric. 
 Apart from holding a distinguished religious view of Heaven, the Confucian 
tradition also holds a rather unique worldview. This worldview is based on the Confucian 
vision of the unity of Heaven, Earth, and humanity. In the Doctrine of the Mean the 
author says,  
It is only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity that can exist 
under Heaven, who can give its full development to his nature. Able to 
give its full development to his own nature, he can do the same to the 
nature of other men. Able to give its full development to the nature of 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Mean, trans. James Legge (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), The Great Learning 10:5 (375), The 
Doctrine of the Mean 19:6 (404). Still, Confucius did not elaborate or explain the term in these texts. 
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other men, he can give their full development to the natures of creatures 
and things. Able to give their full development to the natures of creatures 
and things, he can assist the transforming and nourishing powers of 
Heaven and Earth. Able to assist the transforming and nourishing powers 
of Heaven and Earth, he may with Heaven and Earth form a ternion.
1926
 
 
As noted earlier, Tu describes this Confucian worldview as one of 
anthropocosmic in which ―the human is embedded in the cosmic order, rather than an 
anthropocentric worldview, in which the human is alienated, either by choice or by 
default, from the natural world.‖1927 And the vision of comprehensive unity further leads 
some scholars to conclude, 
 The Confucian worldview, rooted in earth, body, family, and community, 
is not ‗adjustment to the world,‘ submission to the status quo, or passive 
acceptance of the physical, biological, social, and political constraints of 
the human condition. Rather, it is dictated by an ethic of responsibility 
informed by a transcendent vision. We do not become ‗spiritual‘ by 
departing from or transcending above our earth, body, family, and 
community, but by working through them. Indeed, our daily life is not 
merely secular but a response to a cosmological decree. Since the Mandate 
of Heaven that enjoins us to take part in the great enterprise of cosmic 
transformation is implicit in our nature, we are Heaven‘s partners…The 
ultimate goal of being human is to enable the ‗Heavenly virtue‘ to flow 
through us.
1928
 
In other words, the ultimate goal of morality and self-cultivation based on 
such a worldview is for the sake of forming a union with the community, Heaven 
and Earth. As a result, Confucian worldview forms and promotes a particular 
mode of morality and culture that differs from that of the Christian tradition. The 
latter, in simple terms, holds a worldview that is biblical, theological and 
eschatological. It understands the world as God‘s creation and the presence of the 
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‗already but not yet‘ kingdom of God. Christians are called to be followers of 
Christ and live a moral life in this world that brings about kingdom of God and 
eternal union with God. Although it is concerned with the earthly world as 
Confucian worldview is, Christian worldview emphasizes far much more the 
eschatological coming of the reign of God. The former is not other-worldly 
(though it seeks moral progress), has not an other (God) beyond the human, and 
no matter how rich and inclusive as a real moral paradigm the notion of chün tsu 
is, it does not offer a historical figure who acts as a model and redeemer of all his 
followers. 
 
9.3 The Ideas of ‗Blessed‘, ‗Reward‘, and ‗Next Life‘ in Confucian Tradition 
 
By far Taylor has examined two specific issues in his search for the religious 
dimension of the Confucian tradition. However, there are other issues and ideas—that are 
specifically related to the Beatitudes—which are relevant to the quest of Confucian 
religiousness. Among them are the concepts of ‗blessed‘, ‗reward‘, and ‗next life‘ that are 
key to the macarisms in Matthew 5:3-12. The discussion of these issues in turn can 
contribute to our task of bringing the Beatitudes into the Confucian society.  
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Blessedness and Happiness 
Throughout the Chinese history, prosperity and long life are two main goals of the 
people:
1929
 Regarding the notion of prosperity within the Confucian tradition, it is more 
commonly used than ‗blessing‘. It refers to the possession of what is needed for human 
life, such as the presence of respectful parents, loving spouse and children, and 
harmonious family. It is believed that prosperity must come from outside. Although one 
cannot grant it to oneself, one can surely ask for it. 
Specifically, for Confucius, prosperity and even virtues are given by Heaven. The 
Master said, ―Heaven is the author of the virtue that is in me. What can Huan Tui do to 
me?‖1930 In this way, it echoes the Israelites‘ understanding that Yahweh is the source of 
blessing: In the Hebrew Bible, blessings are granted by God either directly (Genesis 1:22) 
or through the prophets, the leaders, or the elderly member of the family, as in the case of 
Isaac‘s blessing of Jacob (Genesis 27:23). And Israelites constantly seek God‘s blessing, 
especially in times of persecution and oppression. 
Surprisingly, Confucius himself was seen as one without much of the above-
defined prosperity:
1931
 When he was still a child he lost his father. As a teenager he was 
poor and was forced to acquire different skills to earn a living. He got divorced after a 
few years of marriage and his son died early. And his career as a civil servant was, 
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unfortunately, unsuccessful also. Consequently, he took up the career of teaching for the 
rest of his life. 
Nevertheless, in advocating the reading of the Beatitudes through virtue ethics, 
Mattison argues that it is more appropriate to translate the opening word of each beatitude 
into ―happy‖ rather than ‗blessed‘ in English.1932 How is happiness understood in the 
Confucian tradition? 
In the first place, for all the three Confucian thinkers, one will be happy when jen 
(benevolence), yi (righteousness), and tao (the Way) are actualized.
1933
 This 
understanding is expressed in the following conversation between Confucius and his 
disciple: 
Tzu-kung said, ―‗Poor without being obsequious, wealthy without being 
arrogant.‘ What do you think of this saying?‖ The Master said, ―That will 
do, but better still ‗Poor yet delighting in the Way, wealthy yet observant 
of the rites.‘‖1934 
 
For Confucius, the wise man will be joyful and the benevolent will have long life.
1935
 
Xunzi further claims that when righteousness and benevolence reign, happiness will be 
found in the whole society.
1936
 
Second, happiness is not built upon wealth or other material possessions but 
rooted in inner joy. In other words, true happiness can be found in simple things and 
ordinary daily experience. In the very beginning of the Analects the Master said, ―Is it not 
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a pleasure, having learned something to try it out at due intervals? Is it not a joy to have 
friends come from afar?‖1937 In another occasion, Confucius commented, ―In the eating 
of coarse rice and the drinking of water, the using of one‘s elbow for a pillow, joy is to be 
found. Wealth and rank attained through immoral means have as much to do with me as 
passing clouds.‖1938 Here, Confucius made it clear that we should not seek happiness 
through unrighteousness or means that are contradictory to jen. 
Third, even in the midst of hardship happiness can also be found. In the Analects, 
the Master said, ―How admirable Hui is! Living in a mean dwelling on a bowlful of rice 
and a ladleful of water is a hardship most men would find intolerable, but Hui does not 
allow this to affect his joy. How admirable Hui is!‖1939 In this way, it is not unlike Paul‘s 
teaching on rejoicing in the Lord even in the midst of suffering and persecution 
(Philippians 4:4-7). 
 
Prosperity as a Reward 
According to some pre-Confucian literature such as the book of Changes, since 
the time of Western Chou Dynasty, it had been a common belief that prosperity and 
calamity are the corresponding results of doing good and bad.
1940
 The thinkers of 
Confucianism continued this tradition and highlighted the causal relationship between 
prosperity (and calamity) and one‘s moral life. For example, Mencius recalled 
Confucius‘s own comments:  ―There is neither good nor bad fortune which man does not 
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bring upon himself. The Odes say, ‗Long may he be worthy of Heaven‘s Mandate and 
seek for himself much good fortune.‘ The Tai chia says, ‗When Heaven sends down 
calamities, there is hope of weathering them; when man brings them upon himself, there 
is no hope of escape.‘‖1941 In other words, prosperity and calamity are the immediate 
result of our own deeds and we are responsible for whatever outcome it produces. 
Mencius further illustrated this causal relationship between doing good and 
prosperity by looking at different levels of human relationship. He said, ―He who loves 
others is always loved by them; he who respects others is always respected by them.‖1942 
Or, in the case of the relationship between the king and his people, he said: ―The people 
will delight in the joy of him who delights in their joy, and will worry over the troubles of 
him who worries over their troubles.‖1943 With regards to the causal relationship between 
calamity and doing bad, Mencius said: ―If you killed his father, he would kill your father; 
if you killed his elder brother, he would kill your elder brother. This being the case, 
though you may not have killed your father and brother with your own hands, it is but 
one step removed.‖1944 
Xunzi also made it clear that only when one accords with what is proper to one‘s 
species that one will be blessed, and those who do not do so will eventually suffer from 
misfortune.
1945
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In short, Confucian prosperity can be understood as a reward to those who do 
good things. However, the emphasis here is the presence of a relationship between the 
two and the responsibility of the doer. It does not consider the role of reward as the 
motivating force for doing good. In fact, these same Confucian thinkers explicitly 
rejected the utilitarian and consequentialist view that our human goal is to attain reward, 
or that we do good merely for the sake of being awarded. On the contrary, they insisted 
that one should focus on doing what is good and righteous, and then prosperity will be 
bestowed. For instance, in the Analects, ―The Master said, ‗The gentleman understands 
what is moral. The small man understands what is profitable.‘‖1946 Mencius, in particular, 
strongly opposed the mentality of doing good for the sake of reward. He said,   
There are honors bestowed by Heaven, and there are honors bestowed by 
man. Benevolence, dutifulness, conscientiousness, truthfulness to one‘s 
word, unflagging delight in what is good, these are honors bestowed by 
Heaven. The position of a Ducal Minister, a Minister, or a Counselor is an 
honor bestowed by man. Men of antiquity bent their efforts towards 
acquiring honors bestowed by Heaven, and honors bestowed by man 
followed by a matter of course. Men of today bend their efforts towards 
acquiring honors bestowed by Heaven in order to win honors bestowed by 
man, and once the latter is won they discard the former. Such men are 
deluded to the extreme, and in the end are sure only to perish.
1947
 
 
Xunzi even claimed that such behavior of the ‗men of today‘ is an evil act.1948 
As a whole, this causal relationship between moral good/bad and 
prosperity/calamity has two distinctive characteristics:
1949
 First, prosperity is this-worldly, 
even if it happens after one‘s death by being extended to one‘s descendants. Second, 
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since Confucianism does not have the concept of the reincarnation, this causal 
relationship cannot offer explanation to all situations, especially in the case that good 
people suffer while bad people prosper. 
In order to respond to this challenge, Confucian thinkers elsewhere pointed out 
that attaining prosperity is not as important as acting out righteousness. As quoted above, 
Confucius said, ―Wealth and rank attained through immoral means have as much to do 
with me as passing clouds.‖1950 Mencius likewise said, ―Fish is what I want; bear‘s palm 
is also what I want. If I cannot have both, I would rather take bear‘s palm than fish. Life 
is what I want; dutifulness is also what I want. If I cannot have both, I would choose 
dutifulness rather than life.‖1951 He also insisted that ―if it is not in accordance with the 
Way…one should not accept even one basketful of rice from another person.‖1952 In other 
words, reward is plausible only if there is an appropriate ground for receiving it, and it is 
better still to first follow the Way than long for prosperity. 
 
The Question of Destiny and Next Life 
In general, the Confucian tradition believes that one‘s destiny and fate—that is, 
life and death, and wealth and poor, etc.—are predestined by the Mandate of Heaven. 
Confucius said in the Analects, ―Life and death are a matter of Destiny; wealth and honor 
depend on Heaven.‖1953 Thus, Confucius seldom talked about fate and destiny and 
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discouraged his disciple to discuss them either. As the Analects recalls, ―The occasions 
on which the Master talked about profit, Destiny and benevolence were rare.‖1954  
Even when he talked about the issue of human destiny with his disciples, 
Confucius plainly suggested that one should accept it. The Master said, ―If Heaven 
intends culture to be destroyed, those who come after me will not be able to have any part 
of it. If Heaven does not intend this culture to be destroyed, then what can the men of 
Kuang do to me?‖1955 In another occasion, he similarly said, ―It is Destiny if the Way 
prevails; it is equally Destiny if the Way falls into disuse. What can Kung-po do in 
defiance of Destiny?‖1956  
Mencius further suggested that one should welcome one‘s own destiny. He said, 
―Whether he is going to die young or to live to a ripe old age makes no difference to his 
steadfastness of purpose. It is through awaiting whatever is to befall him with a perfected 
character that he stands firm on his proper Destiny.‖1957 
Among the three Confucian thinkers Xunzi showed the most progressive view on 
the question of destiny and fate.  He strongly believed that one can change one‘s own 
destiny. He asked, ―Is it better to wait for things to increase of themselves, or to apply 
your talents and transform them?‖1958 In this way, his view differed greatly from that of 
Confucius and Mencius.
1959
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Regarding the issue of ‗next life‘, we have to bear in mind first that the Confucian 
tradition does not believe in immortality at all; rather, life and death are part of the 
unavoidable cycle.
1960
 Similarly, Confucianism does not believe in the existence of (an 
immortal) soul after death either.
1961
 Yet, this does not mean that the Confucian tradition 
denies the existence of spirits of the dead (ancestors) and gods. Confucian thinkers 
simply did not to talk about them. In the Analects, it is mentioned that ―the topics the 
Master did not speak of were prodigies, forces, disorder and gods.‖1962 Confucius also 
told his disciples, ―You don‘t understand even life. How can you understand death?‖1963 
His reluctance to talk about gods and spiritual beings, as one theologian suggests, is 
because Confucius did not want to engage in discussion of superstition.
1964
  
Moreover, when the issue of spirits and gods was actually brought up, Confucius 
would advise the disciples to stay away from the spirits and gods. He said, ―To keep 
one‘s distance from gods and spirits while showing them reverence can be called 
wisdom.‖1965 And when offering sacrifices to them as a gesture of respect, he too 
reminded the disciples that one should do so only to the spirits of one‘s own ancestors.1966 
He further claimed that if one lives a life of benevolence and righteousness, one needs not 
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pray to gods even at the moment of sickness, for such a life is already a kind of 
prayer.
1967
 
Nevertheless, Confucius believed that one can be eternally present analogically. 
He proposed three hierarchical ways in which eternity can be implied:
1968
 The first and 
most important way is by means of cultivating virtue. Confucius made his point by noting 
the different reactions of the common people toward the deaths of virtuous Po Yi and Shu 
Chi, and the un-virtuous Duke Ching. The second and less significant way is by means of 
praiseworthy deeds, as in the case of Kuan Chung who was remembered for helping 
Duke Huan to become the leader and saving the Empire from collapse. The last and least 
effective way among the three is by means of writings, for the author of memorable 
sayings and writings is not necessarily virtuous. 
 
9.4 Confucian Virtue Ethics  
 
Confucianism as Moral Teaching 
The ongoing discussion on whether Confucianism is a religion both challenges 
and enriches the common view that the tradition is simply a kind of ethical teaching. Still, 
Confucianism is a distinctive ethical teaching in its own regard because of the above-
mentioned unique worldview within which it is formed. What, then, is this distinctive 
Confucian ethics? In exploring the characteristics of Confucian ethics, Chinese 
philosopher Liu Yu-li argues that the distinctiveness of Confucian ethics lies on its 
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understanding of morality: There are two related and united aspects of Confucian 
morality, namely, tao 道 (the Way) and te 德 (virtue).1969   
Literally speaking, the term tao means a path or a road. It is also understood 
philosophically as truth or principle. It is employed by the Confucian tradition to refer to 
‗the Way‘ that is originated from Heaven and manifested in the wisdom of the ancient 
sage kings, the teaching of Confucius, and the exemplary life of virtuous people.
1970
 It is 
thus not beyond reach and human beings have the potential to pursue and understand 
it.
1971
  
Moreover, the Way is universal because it is ―the foundation of a harmonious 
universe, a peaceful society and a good life, and without it the transformation of the 
universe would break down, human society would fall into chaos, and the state would 
weaken and collapse.‖1972 Some philosophers thus compare the Way to the Western 
notion of universal ‗Truth‘ that covers all the truths about the universe and 
humankind.
1973
  
As far as Confucian ethics is concerned, these philosophers perceive the Way as 
the cornerstone to understand Confucian ethics, for it is that ―which wise and good men 
follow and always have followed as they sought to conform their lives to the will of 
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Heaven.‖1974 Thus, Tu claims that tao functions as ―a governing perspective and a point 
of orientation.‖1975 James Bretzke, in addition, notes that tao furnishes less as a map for 
the moral life than as a moral vision that is realized in the fulfillment of one‘s 
humanity.
1976
 He also suggests that tao operates in a way that parallels moral discernment 
and from which he claims that tao is ―obviously quite congenial to an ethics of virtue, 
especially if the tao is viewed akin to prudence as the form of the virtues, as well as to the 
related notion of moral virtuousity.‖1977 Specifically, it ―guides the Confucian chün tzu 
[the gentleman]…in the application and integration of…individual virtues.‖1978 
Regarding te Yearley offers us a truthful description: ―The conception of virtue 
(te 德) operative in ancient time is a complex one that bears the marks of its long 
history.‖1979 Yearley continues, 
Originally the notion of virtue probably referred only to the sacred king.  
By at least the sixth century B.C.E., however, it signified a property that 
rises from a laudatory life or is given as a reward for one.  It, furthermore, 
is a property that enables the holder to accomplish things that would 
otherwise be impossible.  The idea of virtue, then, is thought of as a 
property tied to a commendable life.  Moreover, the possession of 
virtuousness generates special abilities; indeed, ‗power‘ often is an 
appropriate translation for te. 
 
Indeed, for Confucius virtue ―was originally the almost magical power of the 
King that induced others to obey him without the need for the use of military force or 
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other forms of violent coercion.‖1980 The Master said, ―He who exercises government by 
means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all 
the stars turn towards it.‖1981 Xunzi, in whose writings (especially in his A Discussion of 
Kings) the term te appears most, particularly referred te to as ―the state or power of a 
person who has a high degree of ethical development,‖ such as kings and rulers of 
society.
1982
 Still, te is also understood by the Confucian tradition as ―a kind of moral 
character trait which is obtained from oneself…in the xing 性 (human nature) as a result 
of personal cultivation.‖1983 In this way, it is comparable to the Greek understanding of 
virtue. 
 With regards to the source of virtue, Confucius claimed that all virtues are 
originated from and rooted in jen (humanity).
1984
 Mencius developed this view of 
Confucius and pointed out that te naturally develops from the good human nature: 
―Benevolence, dutifulness, observance of the rites, and wisdom do not give me a luster 
from the outside; they are in me originally.‖1985 Elsewhere he said, ―If a man is able to 
develop these four germs that he possesses, he will be like a fire starting up or a spring 
coming through.‖1986 As mentioned earlier, he adopted a kind of discovery model of 
attaining virtue. Xunzi, who held an opposite understanding of human nature, argued that 
one should distinguish human nature from human effort (or conscious activity), and 
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hence the cultivation of te is a person‘s conscious activity in following the ritual 
principles that are produced by the sage.
1987
 Still, Xunzi agreed with Mencius that virtues 
can be cultivated.
1988
 
 
Confucian Ethics as Virtue Ethics 
Those who focus on the te aspect of Confucian morality would claim that virtue 
ethics is the implicit theory behind Confucian ethics.
1989
 This claim can be understood in 
two ways. First, Confucian literature bequeaths a large and complex ethical vocabulary in 
which a significant number of virtue-related terms are found.
1990
 For example, the 
opening sentence of the Great Learning points out clearly that ethical education depends 
on the exemplification of the virtues: ―What the Great Learning teaches, is—to illustrate 
illustrious virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence.‖1991 In the 
Analects, virtue is explicitly discussed on various occasions. For instance, ―The superior 
man thinks of virtue; the small man thinks of comfort;‖ ―I set my heart on the Way, base 
myself on virtue;‖ and ―A good horse is praised for its virtue, not for its strength.‖1992 
Still, Confucian thinkers did not only highlight the importance of virtue in general but 
also named them in particular. The Master said, ―The man of wisdom is never in two 
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minds; the man of benevolence never worries; the man of courage is never afraid.‖1993 At 
times they also hinted that some virtues are more central than others: ―There are five 
things and whoever is capable of putting them into practice in the Empire is certainly 
‗benevolent‘…They are respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness in word, quickness and 
generosity.‖1994  
Second, according to Tu, ―the fundamental concern of the Confucian tradition is 
learning to be human.‖1995 Learning to be human entails a process of self-cultivation 
which is an end in itself and results in attainment of the cardinal virtue of jen.
1996
 In other 
words, self-cultivation is closely related to the cultivation of virtue. Aaron Stalnaker 
likewise claims that the specific subject of the cultivation of virtue and its analogous 
questions ―were central to widespread debates in ancient China about…‗self-
cultivation.‘‖1997  
Taking all into consideration, these scholars are convinced that the discussion of 
virtue is appropriate to the discussion of the Confucian tradition, and a virtue-based ethics 
is inevitably a significant component of Confucian ethics. Bryan Van Norden further 
points out that although Aristotelianism and Confucianism may disagree on certain issues 
regarding virtues—such as what the virtues are—it is appropriate to approach Confucian 
ethics from the perspective of virtue ethics at least on the ‗thin‘ level.1998 
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Key Virtues in Confucian Ethics 
The concept of jen is crucial to the Confucian tradition in general and the teaching 
of Confucius in particular. For Confucius, on the one hand, ―[it renders] the inner 
cultivation of an inborn tendency to be humane…on the other hand, jen means 
establishing real loving relations with other people.‖1999 Thus, jen is understood as ―a 
universal virtue underlying all the particular ones.‖2000 Another important virtue 
advocated by Confucius is yi (righteousness) which appears in the Analects many times. 
These appearances basically depict yi as what is right, just, and moral, and is a virtue of 
chün tzu.
2001
 The Master said: ―The superior man in everything considers righteousness to 
be essential.‖2002 Moreover, Confucius pointed out that jen is expressed in following right 
ritual forms and hence stressed the virtue of li (propriety) as well.
2003
 In short, jen, yi, and 
li are the essential qualities of chün tzu. Still, for Confucius, the three virtues are inter-
dependent:
2004
 1) The ethical significance of li depends on the presence of jen. The 
Master said, ―If a man has no jen, what has he to do with li?‖ 2) The rationale for 
accepting li is provided by the ethical significance of yi.  
Apart from these three inter-dependent virtues, Confucius also emphasized the 
virtues of wisdom and courage that are found in the Doctrine of the Mean. He said, ―The 
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man of wisdom is never in two minds; the man of benevolence never worries; the man of 
courage is never afraid.‖2005 Together with jen they form a triad of virtues that are 
universal binding and through which one attains the Way. Furthermore, Confucius is 
convinced that the perfection of virtue lies in the mean. He thus said, ―Supreme indeed is 
the mean as a moral virtue.‖2006  
Mencius developed Confucius‘s emphasis on the virtue of jen in various ways. In 
the first place, he heightened the tension between jen and yi and advocated them as the 
two guiding principles and cardinal virtues in governing human relationships:
2007
 Jen is 
needed to bind people together and yi makes necessary distinctions. In this way, Mencius 
promoted the virtue of righteousness to the highest level among other virtues. Still, he 
clarified that righteousness comes from jen.
2008
 Second, for Mencius the four sprouts 
within us are actualized by the four central virtues—benevolence, righteousness, ritual 
propriety, and wisdom. Third, Mencius highlighted the Five Relationships (that is, the 
five fundamental human relationships of ruler-minister, father-son, husband-wife, elder-
younger, and friend-friend) and from which the virtues of righteousness, intimacy, 
reciprocity, respect, and fidelity emerged.
2009
 
Finally, Xunzi agreed with Mencius that benevolence and righteousness are very 
important virtues.
2010
 However, based on his view that human nature is evil, the virtue of 
li became significantly important. Xunzi said, ―Since man‘s nature is evil, it must wait for 
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the instructions of a teacher before it can become upright, and for the guidance of ritual 
principles before it can become orderly.‖2011 Rituals are also created ―to train men‘s 
desires and to provide for their satisfaction.‖2012 He explained, ―Through rites men‘s likes 
and dislikes are regulated and their joys and hates made appropriate.‖2013 Thus, Tu rightly 
comments that for Xunzi ―learning to be human, in this sense, can be understood as a 
process of ritualization.‖2014 
 In conclusion, Tu offers a rather helpful synthesis of these various understandings 
of virtues within the Confucian tradition—there is a ‗priority of virtues‘ that reflects the 
basic Confucian structure of virtues as ―a progressive articulation of the concept of 
humanity‖:2015 1) Jen is ‗the cardinal virtue‘ to which all the other virtues are internally 
linked; 2) together with the virtue of wisdom they are called ‗the two primary virtues‘ 
that support each other; with courage these two primary virtues are understood as ‗the 
three universal virtues‘ that aims at the realization of humanity; and 3) the two primary 
virtues are part of ‗the four primordial virtues‘ that also includes righteousness and ritual 
propriety. Still, Yearley rightly comments that the Confucian tradition contains not only 
these core virtues but also other ‗lesser‘ and yet relevant virtues such as equanimity, and 
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it still lacks the kind of schematization of virtues found in Western philosophy and 
Christianity.
2016
  
 
Confucian Religious Virtues? 
The earlier discussion of Confucian religiousness naturally leads one to ask if 
certain virtues found in the Confucian tradition can be religious virtues just as those 
infused, theological virtues named by Thomas Aquinas are. Yearley responds that 
although the Confucian tradition does not make formal distinction between religious and 
non-religious virtues, it does make distinctions on the objects pursued, the intentions 
manifested, the behavior produced, and the empowerment displayed.
2017
 In other words, 
he is convinced that certain forms of Confucian virtues contain qualities of religious 
virtues and have a very special character that allows them to nurture attitudes and 
produce actions that are profoundly different from other forms of the virtue.
2018
 For 
example, he notes that there are three different forms of the Confucian virtue of courage: 
The first form deals with normal instance while the second one ―seems to live in a 
symbiotic relationship with other high spiritual attainments, most notably an unmoved 
mind…and a refined form of righteousness.‖2019 The third kind of courage is further 
defined by ―a spontaneity that completely transcends the division, and even hesitancy, 
                                                 
2016
 Lee H. Yearley, ―Virtues and Religious Virtues in the Confucian Tradition,‖ in Confucian Spirituality 
vol. 1, ed. Tu Wei-ming and Mary Evelyn Tucker (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2003), 143, 
146. 
2017
 Ibid., 145-46. 
2018
 Ibid.. 
2019
 Ibid., 147. 
 519 
that defines even the best forms of ordinary courage‖ and hence can be understood as a 
religious virtue.
2020
  
Of course, we have to bear in mind that even if certain Confucian virtues can be 
religious virtues, they would not have a supernatural source as Christian theological 
virtues do. Also, the cultivation of Confucian virtues has self-cultivation as the end while 
Christian virtues are aimed at forming a community of disciples that has God as the 
ultimate end. 
 
The Four Yields of Virtue in Confucian Ethics 
Finally, I turn to the four yields of virtue briefly to further the claim that 
Confucian ethics can be virtue ethics. 
 
Character and Self-cultivation 
According to Tu, the Confucian concept of self-cultivation can be generally 
characterized as ―a gradual process of character formation…[for it makes] ‗oneself 
receptive to the symbolic resources of one‘s own culture and responsive to the sharable 
values of one‘s own society.‘‖2021 Chinese philosopher Antonio Cua likewise points out 
that the formation of character through the self-cultivation of virtues is stressed by the 
Confucian tradition.
2022
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How then can self-cultivation be attained? Liu points out that it is achieved 
through learning, thinking, self-examination, and practicing:
2023
 Regarding learning, 
Confucius explicitly claimed that it is for the sake of the self: ―Men of Antiquity studied 
to improve themselves; men of today study to impress others.‖2024 Elsewhere the Master 
also said, ―To love benevolence without loving learning is liable to lead to foolishness. 
To love cleverness without loving learning is liable to lead to deviation from the right 
path…To love courage without loving learning is liable to lead to insubordination.‖2025 In 
other words, learning is the first step to the cultivation of the self and one‘s character. 
Moreover, for Confucius the process of learning begins with ‗elementary learning‘ (such 
as the learning of the six arts of ritual, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and 
arithmetic).
2026
 Xunzi further claimed that particular virtues (such as endurance) are 
required in the process of learning. 
Learning, however, needs to be reinforced by careful thinking: ―If one learns from 
others but does not think, one will be bewildered. If, on the other hand, one thinks but 
does not learn from others, one will be in peril.‖2027 Regarding self-examination, the 
disciple of Confucius said, ―Everyday I examine myself on three counts. In what I have 
undertaken on another‘s behalf, have I failed to do my best? In what dealings with my 
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friends have I failed to be trustworthy in what I say? Have I passed on to others anything 
that I have not tried out myself?‖2028  
On the other hand, although cultivation of virtues and character formation aim at 
becoming a man of jen, the Confucian tradition does not claim that perfection is a 
realizable goal for the formation of the self.
2029
 Even a gentleman still has a lot to learn 
from others and has his own incapacities. And despite being seen as a sage by his 
disciples, Confucius clarified that there are certain qualities of the gentleman which he 
has not succeeded in following.
2030
 
 
Practice 
As I have just said, one way to attain self-cultivation is by means of practicing. It 
is because only when one puts what one learns into practice can one become chün tsu.
2031
 
Confucius, by reflecting on his own experience, thus made it clear that a lifelong attempt 
at accumulating righteous acts is necessary for achieving spontaneity in his words and 
deeds.
2032
 Xunzi likewise insisted that one needs to, apart from receiving instructions of a 
teacher, accumulate and practice these good acts. He said, ―If the man in the street applies 
himself to training and study…continuing his efforts over a long period of time and 
accumulating good acts without stop, then he can achieve a godlike understanding and 
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form a triad with Heaven and earth.‖2033 Xunzi explained the importance of practice by 
employing various agricultural metaphors, ―A man who accumulates (practice in) hoeing 
and ploughing, becomes a farmer; who accumulates (practice in) chopping and shaving 
wood, becomes an artisan…who accumulates (practice in) the rules of proper conduct (li) 
and standards of justice (yi), becomes a superior man.‖2034 As a result, Cua concludes that 
there is an assumption of the primacy of practice implicit in the Confucian tradition.
2035
 
 
Exemplar 
For Confucius we do not only learn from the books alone—we also learn from our 
friends and even the common people: ―Even when walking in the company of two other 
men, I am bound to be able to learn from them.‖2036 Still, he clarified that the ideal moral 
character to be learnt is found in chün tsu and the sage. This clarification has led 
contemporary scholars to identify Confucius as one of the first moral teachers in history 
to ―recognize the role of paradigmatic individuals in moral education.‖2037 
Simply speaking, chün tsu is a person of many virtues.
2038
 He is also one who has 
the power to influence the course of human affairs: ―The virtue of the chün tsu is like the 
wind, the virtue of the small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is 
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sure to bend.‖2039 He is thus understood as the paradigmatic individual in the inculcation 
of jen, and an exemplar of virtues.
2040
 Yet, as an exemplary individual, chün tsu serves as 
a ―standard of inspiration by providing a point of orientation rather than specific target of 
achievement.‖2041 This is similar to the Aristotelian admonition not to imitate or do what 
the prudent person does but to act as the prudent person would. 
The sages, in contrast, are almost unattainable for Confucius: First, they do not 
only acquire the virtues of chün tsu but also attain the highest exemplification of 
virtue.
2042
 Second, they need to be capable of bringing salvation to all by playing a kingly 
role and by educating the common people as well.
2043
 In other words, they are perfect 
human beings of jen who can establish a harmonious social and political order. Thus, 
sagehood was not the practical end or attainable ideal for ordinary moral agents.
2044
 Still, 
many of his disciples would regard Confucius as not just the transmitter of the Way but 
also as an exemplar of sagehood even though Confucius did not consider himself a sage 
at all.
2045
 For Confucius, then chün tsu is a model for ordinary life. 
Mencius developed Confucius‘s view of moral ideals by dividing these ideal 
moral characters into various levels: Chün tsu, as the ‗great man‘, is one who shines forth 
with the full possession of goodness, practices the Way alone, and is not affected by 
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others.
2046
 The sage is one who is totally transformed by this greatness. They are ―men 
who manifest perfectly the virtues that govern human relationships.‖2047 The divine, in 
contrast, is one who transcends our human understanding. However, Mencius differed 
from Confucius in that he was convinced that anyone can become a sage—for goodness 
was grounded in our human nature and we all have the power to become morally 
perfect.
2048
 Xunzi agreed with Mencius on this point although they disagreed on how 
sagehood can be achieved.
2049
 
Despite the differences among these Confucian thinkers, it is their general 
conviction that virtues can be learnt from chün tzu and the paradigmatic sage.
2050
 And the 
sage and chün tzu function as a moral character within the community representing the 
people‘s desire for the self-cultivation of virtues.2051 
 
Community 
Moral self-cultivation as stressed by Confucianism is expressed in terms of 
character formation and the cultivation of virtue of the individual. Still, Tu rightly claims 
that self-cultivation is never a private matter.
2052
 First, the self is the focal point for all 
relationships. We find in the Great Learning: ―The ancients who wished to illustrate 
illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own States. Wishing to 
order well their States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their 
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families, they first cultivated their persons.‖2053 The dynamic transformative power of 
self-cultivation leads outward and upward ―from self and family through the universal 
state and even to the universe itself.‖2054 
Second, the five fundamental human relationships imply that the self, the 
community, and the society cannot be divided, and their corresponding virtues have a 
social, communal dimension.
2055
 For example, Fingarette points out that virtues like 
chung 忠 (loyalty) and shu 恕 (reciprocity) ―inherently involve a dynamic relation to 
other persons.‖2056 An implicit illustration of this claim can be found in the virtue of filial 
piety. Tu notes, ―A filial son is likely to be watchful over his personal conduct, 
conscientious about family affairs, responsive to social obligations and, as a result, 
qualified for political assignments. It is therefore the belief of Confucian thinkers that 
filial sons often turn out to be loyal ministers. Consequently they value filiality as an 
importance instrument for fostering political leadership.‖2057  
Third, our self-cultivation can be an act of service to the community and the 
society as well. We find in the Analects, ―A benevolent man helps others to take their 
stand insofar as he himself wishes to take this stand, and get others there insofar as he 
himself wishes to get there.‖2058 
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Therefore, for Confucian ethics, ―the individual never operates alone, but always 
within the matrix of…human relationships.‖2059 In this way, self-cultivation is not only 
extended to the communal, but also to the social and global levels. And the community is 
the basis of this moral matrix and an integral part of the overall enterprise of self-
cultivation.
2060
 Indeed, some advocates of Confucian ethics would claim that Confucian 
virtue ethics has a stronger communal character than its Western counterpart.
2061
 
Curiously, some of those who oppose Confucianism would charge that Confucianism 
emphasizes on community so much so that the individual‘s identity is either absorbed or 
compromised.
2062
 
 
Critics on Confucian Virtue Ethics 
 In a very recent book on Buddhist ethics, the author argues against the common 
view that Buddhist ethics is a form of virtue ethics. He insists that the various Buddhist 
traditions of thought ―fall within the family of a welfare-based, universalist 
consequentialism‖ rather than virtue ethics and claims that Buddhist ethics is not 
eudaimonistic at all.
2063
 One reviewer, however, rightly points out that the author admits 
and accommodates the fact that Buddhism ―is interested in the intrinsic value of virtues 
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by counting virtue (along with happiness) as constitutive of the objective good.‖2064 She 
thus suggests that Buddhist ethics is at least a form of ‗character Consequentialism‘ and 
concludes that ―the question of whether Buddhist ethics is best understood in terms of a 
consequentialist or virtue ethics…may not be an either/or proposition.‖2065 
 This kind of debate is likewise found in the case of Confucian virtue ethics. By 
interpreting li as moral principles and jen as moral feelings, Liu claims that there exists a 
unity of the two in Confucian ethics:
2066
 They are the external and internal aspects of 
morality and both have the universal tao as the common source. They are also mutually 
dependent in that jen is the essence and the content of li while li is the concrete 
manifestation of jen. Liu thus perceives the view that Confucian ethics is virtue ethics as 
inadequate. Subsequently, she counter-proposes that Confucian ethics is a unique kind of 
ethics in that it is at the same time rule and virtue-based ethics. 
 But Liu would do well to understand the place of norms in virtue ethics. Virtue 
ethics has norms, principles, guidelines, and maxims, that is, a variety of directives 
toward exercising practices that lead to the development of virtue. Without practices, we 
cannot acquire virtue. But in order to teach virtue, we rely on rules and norms to instruct 
us to exercise certain practices. Thus, parents try to teach children virtues by using rules, 
norms, and maxims. For instance, to teach honesty, a parent might say to her son ‗never 
lie‘ or offer the maxim ‗a good boy never lies‘.2067 
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9.5 Confucian Reception of the Virtues of the Beatitudes 
 
According to some Christian theologians, the Beatitudes has been perceived as ‗a 
spiritual synopsis‘ that is comparable to the eightfold path of Buddhism.2068 Still, our 
work shows that the Beatitudes is more than spiritual text but the basis of a particular set 
of Christian virtues that touches the personal, communal, and social levels of the moral 
agent. Based on our conviction that Confucian ethics can be virtue ethics, I am interested 
to see how this set of Christian virtues can be received to the Confucian Chinese audience 
in East Asia. In so doing, I explore how each of the key virtues identified our previous 
chapter can be compared to those found in the Confucian tradition. As I said earlier, 
because of the differences in literary forms between the Beatitudes and the Confucian 
texts, I do not look for eight corresponding maxims but rather for parallel virtues. 
Obviously, benevolence and righteousness are the overriding virtues for Confucian 
tradition. But we will see a simple correspondence between the Beatitudes and the 
Confucian text in the virtues that they each promote. 
 
Humility 
The first beatitude is concerned with both material and spiritual poverty and hence 
calls for the virtue of humility toward God. It also reminds us our responsibility to tackle 
poverty by practicing sharing and changing the unjust infrastructure on the social level. In 
the Confucian tradition, we likewise find the discussion of poverty and the need of 
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humility. In the first place, Confucian thinkers like Confucius were born at a time of 
political and social unrest. The experience of poverty was a concrete reality. Mencius 
lamented, ―Nowadays, the means laid down for the people are sufficient neither for the 
care of parents nor for the support of wife and children. In good years life is always hard, 
while in bad years there is no way of escaping death. Thus simply to survive takes more 
energy than the people have.‖2069 Still, it was also the personal experience of these 
thinkers, as in the case of Confucius. They thus dealt with this concrete human 
experience in their moral teachings. 
Second, Confucius was convinced that the most effective means to eliminate 
poverty is to initiate social change from the top. He thus insisted that it is a fundamental 
task of the government: When being asked about what should be done to the numerous 
people in a country, Confucius said without hesitation, ―Make the people rich.‖2070 
However, Confucius did not make the elimination of material poverty the final end of 
human flourishing. He continued, ―When the people have become rich…train them.‖ And 
the pursuit of wealth, though points to an important basic good for which one strives, is 
not the absolute goal of human life either. The Master said, ―If wealth were a permissible 
pursuit, I would be willing even to act as a guard holding a whip outside the market place. 
If it is not, I shall follow my own preferences.‖2071 In particular, he rejected the use of 
immoral or unrighteous means to attain this good. He said, ―In the eating of coarse rice 
and the drinking of water, the using of one‘s elbow for a pillow, joy is to be found. 
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Wealth and rank attained through immoral means have as much to do with me as passing 
clouds.‖2072 Here, as discussed earlier, Confucius was convinced that happiness can also 
be found in the midst of poverty and other hardship. 
Mencius further insisted that only when the basic needs of the people are fulfilled 
can they follow the leader and be formed. He explained,  
Only a gentleman can have a constant heart in spite of a lack of constant 
means of support. The people, on the other hand, will not have constant 
hearts if they are without constant means…Hence when determining what 
means of support the people should have, a clear-sighted ruler ensures that 
these are sufficient, on the one hand, for the care of parents, and, on the 
other hand, for the support of wife and children, so that the people always 
have sufficient food in good years and escape starvation in bad; only then 
does he drive them towards goodness; in this way the people find it easy to 
follow him.
2073
 
 
Regarding the teaching on being humble, the Doctrine of the Mean is seen as an 
excellent commentary on the virtue of humility.
2074
 Tu, in his analytical interpretation of 
this book, succinctly writes, ―The way of the profound person strongly suggests a sense 
of humility…The profound person is plain, simple, amiable, for he knows that the 
ultimate manifestation of his true nature can never be attained by breaking away from 
human commonality. Thus, in a quiet and modest manner he goes about the great task of 
self-realization. He does not assume an air of superiority; nor does he pretend to have 
privileged access to an extraordinary truth.‖2075 
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In the Analects, we too find various texts that advocate the cultivation of humility. 
For instance, the Master turned to the example of a historical figure to illustrate the 
meaning of humility. He said, ―Meng Chi-fan was not given to boasting. When the army 
was routed, he stayed in the rear. But on entering the gate, he goaded his horse on, saying, 
‗I did not lag behind out of presumption. It was simply that my horse refused to go 
forward.‖2076 Later Confucius also spoke against boasting, ―Extravagance means 
ostentation, frugality means shabbiness. I would rather be shabby than ostentatious.‖2077  
Last but not least, in modern western society Confucianism is often understood as 
a promoter of filial piety. Xunzi‘s formulation of the virtue of filial piety is significant in 
the understanding of humility:
2078
 Xiao 孝 (filial piety/filiality) is the proper response 
toward one‘s family (especially the parents) that makes fullness of life possible. By 
attending to one‘s origin, filiality reveals and expresses one‘s fundamental dependence, 
frailty, and emotions toward the origin from which one receives so much so that one can 
never fully repay the debt incurred. It calls for humility toward one‘s origin. Now since 
there are many levels of origins in our human relationships and lives, such as the origin 
of life given by Heaven, Xunzi‘s formulation and interpretation extends to one‘s humility 
toward the transcendence (by means of virtues like li) and hence finds parallel with the 
first beatitude‘s view of being humble to God. In the case of the kings and rulers, the 
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recognition of their origin and humility thus call them to govern and rule justly and not to 
be a dictator.
2079
   
 
Solidarity 
Those who are sensitive toward and mourn for the suffering of the poor, as 
described in the second beatitude, demonstrate to us that mourning is an expression of the 
virtue of solidarity. It calls for our awareness of the suffering in our world, protest against 
social injustice, and reflection on our personal, communal, and social practices. Although 
the concept of solidarity is not explicitly found in the Confucian tradition, stories of 
mourning and ritual practices of mourning can be identified. 
A concrete incident is Confucius‘s response toward the death of his beloved 
disciple Yen Hui. In the Analects we find, ―When Yen Yuan died, the Master said, ‗Alas! 
Heaven has bereft me! Heaven has bereft me!‘‖ It continues, ―When Yen Yuan died, in 
weeping for him, the Master showed undue sorrow. His followers asked, ‗You are 
showing undue sorrow.‘ ‗Am I? Yet if not for him, for whom should I show undue 
sorrow?‘‖2080 In other words, Confucius grieved seriously on the occasion of the death of 
a good disciple. 
Though he did not experience mourning personally, Mencius suggested that 
sensitivity toward the sufferer is an innate response of humankind. He said, ―No man is 
devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others…Suppose a man were, all of a 
                                                 
2079
 Xunzi, ―The Regulations of a King,‖ in Basic Writings, trans. by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963), 33-55. 
2080
 Analects, 11:9, 10. 
 533 
sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be 
moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor 
because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he 
disliked the cry of the child. From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart 
of compassion is not human.‖2081 Thus, what one needs to do is to develop this heart of 
compassion. 
Xunzi, who stressed the importance of the virtue of li, perceived mourning as a 
proper ritual practice to express due reverence and grief toward the deceased by the 
community members:
2082
 Once the person is confirmed dead, a fixed three-year mourning 
period then begins. When the fixed three-year mourning period is over, sacrificial 
memorial rites are conducted at various times with certain symbolic, expressive acts, 
including the wearing of a mourning garment that expresses the feelings of grief. For 
Xunzi, such a long, fixed period of mourning has a multi-level and practical purpose and 
has to be promoted—it accommodates the emotions involved and extends the honor due; 
it distinguishes the duties owed to different relatives and prevents forgetfulness by the 
mourners; and it represents the ultimate principle of harmony and unity within a 
community. In this way, the practice of mourning becomes a communal event (and even 
a social one depending on the status of the one who died). 
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With regards to being in solidarity with the sufferer, Confucius pointed out that 
the first step is to empathize with the sufferer. In so doing, he thus said, ―When eating in 
the presence of one who had been bereaved, the Master never ate his full.‖2083 
Finally, although it is the belief of the Confucian tradition that chün tzu, who has 
fully developed his moral nature, would understand this ultimate mystery of suffering and 
accepts it willingly; it is also the Confucian thinkers‘ common belief that one‘s moral 
nature commits the person to accompany and help others to understand and ease their 
suffering. For them this commitment is a moral responsibility of the moral person.
2084
 
Unfortunately, they did not discuss this moral responsibility beyond personal level. 
 
Meekness 
The third beatitude points to the virtue of meekness that is humility expanded to 
the lives of the poor and the powerful. For the poor and the sufferer, humility as such 
urges the practice of self control and restraint from anger and revenge. For those who are 
in power and authority, they are in turn called to be gentle and restrain from abuse of 
power or being arrogant. And its social relevance is obvious.  
Perhaps the weakest link between the Beatitudes and the Confucian virtues is 
meekness. In the Confucian tradition, we find only some similar teachings on meekness 
where both the inferior and the superior have to cultivate gentleness according to their 
status. Regarding the poor and the oppressed, Confucius was fully aware of their strong 
inclination toward anger and vengeance. He thus said, ―It is more difficult not to 
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complain of injustice when poor than not to behave with arrogance when rich.‖2085 He 
then explained that chün tzu would learn to refrain from revenge toward 
unrighteousness.
2086
    
In fact, Confucius was perceived by his disciples as a man of meekness—benign, 
upright, courteous, temperate, and complaisant.
2087
 He did not seek anger or revenge 
toward what had happened to him. One concrete incident was his response towards the 
death of his beloved disciple. He said to the Duke Ai, ―There was one Yen Hui who was 
eager to learn…Unfortunately his allotted span was a short one and he died. Now there is 
no one.‖2088 Taylor interprets that Confucius grieved without bitterness toward Heaven 
but accepted the death of Yen Hui as the Mandate of Heaven.
2089
 
Mencius, by commending the virtuous acts of sage king Shun who did not store 
up his anger and bitterness toward his brother who often plotted against his wife, likewise 
pointed out that meekness is a virtue of the benevolent man. He said, ―A benevolent man 
never harbors anger or nurses a grudge against his brother.‖2090  
For the powerful, Confucius commented that it is not enough for the powerful and 
rich not to be arrogant. We find in the Analects, ―Tzu-kung said, ‗Poor without being 
obsequious, wealthy without being arrogant.‘ What do you think of this saying?‖ The 
Master said, ―That will do, but better still ‗Poor yet delighting in the Way, wealthy yet 
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observant of the rites.‘‖2091 Here, Confucius again suggested that the wealthy and the 
powerful should imitate the rite-observing chün tzu who shows forbearance and 
gentleness in teaching those who are inferior to them.
2092
  
 
Obedience to and Discernment of the Mandate of Heaven 
The fourth beatitude highlights the virtue of obedience in our relation with God 
and, in so doing one strives first to discern what God‘s will is for each of us. The 
community and society likewise strive to discern God‘s will and hold up to it faithfully. 
Although Confucianism as a religion does not hold any view on establishing active 
relationship between Heaven and humankind, it does talk about the Mandate of Heaven 
and discusses the issues of understanding of and responding to the Mandate of Heaven. 
First, Confucian thinkers acknowledged the existence of the mysterious Mandate 
of Heaven. According to Chinese philosopher D. C. Lau, the theory in the Mandate of 
Heaven was innovated (by the Duke of Chou) long before the time of Confucius. Lau 
notes, ―Heaven cares profoundly about the welfare of the common people and the 
Emperor is set up expressly to promote that welfare…As soon as he forgets his function 
and begins to rule for his own sake, Heaven will withdraw the Decree and bestow it on 
someone more worthy. Thus the Decree of Heaven is a moral imperative.‖2093 In this way, 
the fate of the Emperor (the Son of Heaven) echoes that of the kings in the Old Testament 
such as Saul who were anointed by God to guide the Israelites. However, Confucian 
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understanding of the Mandate of Heaven as moral imperative tends to echo the task 
aspect of God‘s righteousness rather than the gift aspect intended in the fourth beatitude. 
Second, since the time of Confucius, the Mandate of Heaven was no longer 
confined to the Emperor but to everyone who was ―subject to the Decree of Heaven 
which enjoined [one] to be moral and it was [one‘s] duty to live up to the demands of that 
Decree.‖2094 As a result, the Mandate of Heaven has been conceived as individual 
mission and personal commitment, and each individual has the responsibility to respond 
to it.
2095
 In particular, Confucius emphasized the following of the Mandate of Heaven and 
warned against any attempt to disobey the Mandate of Heaven: ―When you have 
offended against Heaven, there is nowhere you can turn to in your prayers.‖2096 This 
emphasis on following the Mandate of Heaven, as some scholars suggest, is to ―exercise 
a moral political conscience in all human affairs…[to] provide a cosmic dimension to the 
individual‘s own moral understanding…[and to] furnish the human person with the 
capacity for self-transcendence.‖2097  
Third, in order to follow the Mandate of Heaven, one needs first to know and 
understand what the Mandate of Heaven is. Confucius thus insisted that knowing and 
understanding is crucial: ―A men has no way of becoming a gentleman unless he 
understands Destiny.‖2098 He also claimed that it is a long process: ―At fifty I understood 
                                                 
2094
 Ibid.. 
2095
 De Bary, 5. 
2096
 Analects, 3:13. However, for Confucius such emphasis does not mean passive dependence on the 
Mandate of Heaven. He was convinced that one should still work hard for one‘s well-being. Also, at times 
Confucius seemed to refer the Mandate of Heaven as the law of nature. 
2097
 Bretzke, ―The Tao of Confucian Virtue Ethics,‖ 38. Bretzke quotes de Bary, ―The Prophetic Voice in 
the Confucian Noble Man,‖ 7. 
2098
 Analects, 20:3. 
 538 
the Decree of Heaven.‖2099 Such a claim also implies that understanding the Mandate of 
Heaven is a difficult task even for the sage. Still, Lau rightly comments that for 
Confucius, by the same token, understanding the Decree of Heaven is possible.
2100
 
How then can one know and understand the Decree of Heaven? Although the 
Confucian tradition does not contain the Western notion of discernment, Mencius‘s view 
is not far from it. He argued that the acceptance of one‘s destiny should be conditional—
one only accepts what is proper to one‘s destiny. Mencius said, ―Though nothing happens 
that is not due to Destiny, one accepts willingly only what is one‘s proper Destiny. That 
is why he who understands Destiny does not stand under a wall on the verge of 
collapse.‖2101 For Mencius one‘s proper destiny is to follow only the Way and hence one 
needs to discern carefully the Mandate of Heaven. 
Finally, Confucius did not agree that one should strive for something that is 
unattainable.
2102
 In this way, Confucius seemed to oppose the author of the fourth 
beatitude who stresses on hungering and thirsting for God‘s righteousness. 
 
Charity and Benevolence 
The fifth beatitude suggests the virtue of mercy which is an immediate effect of 
the virtue of charity. It calls for concrete merciful and charitable acts toward those who 
are living a miserable life including our enemies. In the field of comparative ethics, many 
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scholars agree that jen as a specific virtue ―offers parallels to the Christian virtue of love 
or charity.‖2103 For example, jen is inclusive in nature as Christian charity is: Mencius 
said, ―A benevolent man extends his love from those he loves to those he does not 
love.‖2104 
Two caveats are needed. First, Christians love one another because God first 
loved us. That corollary is not in Confucianism: The Confucian teaching of benevolence 
does not offer Heaven‘s love for humankind as a reason for imitation. Second, in the pre-
Confucian era, jen was understood as an aristocratic virtue of the superior showing 
kindness toward the inferior and having pity on the helpless.
2105
 It was only much later 
that Confucius transformed it into a general virtue. Thus, in order to understand jen as a 
virtue of benevolence, I turn to the view of other Confucian thinkers, especially that of 
Mencius.  
In the first place, for Mencius, the most destitute and helpless are ―[those] old 
men without wives, old women without husbands, old people without children, [and] 
young children without fathers.‖2106 They are the most disadvantaged people in the 
society because they are deprived of even the most basic human relationships. Together 
with the lesser virtue en 恩 (kindness) jen shows kindness and mercy to the destitute and 
the helpless. 
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Second, the virtue of benevolence emerges from our human nature. Mencius said, 
―The heart of compassionate is the germ of benevolence.‖2107 And a gentleman‘s 
compassion and benevolence extend to the natural world: ―It is the way of a benevolent 
man…once having seen them alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once having 
heard their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh.‖2108 
Third, there are different levels of benevolence according to its various objects: 
―A gentleman is sparing with living creatures but show no benevolence towards them; he 
shows benevolence towards the people but is not attached to them. He is attached to his 
parents but is merely benevolent towards the people; he is benevolent towards the people 
but is merely sparing with living creatures.‖2109 In other words, benevolence and mercy 
are practiced differently towards family members, community members, and nature.  
Fourth, Mencius perceived benevolence more as a virtue of the leader in helping 
the people than simply a personal virtue in human relationship. He claimed that 
benevolence and righteousness are all that matters for a leader and they are the guiding 
principles in government.
2110
 In this way Mencius strongly advocated for a benevolent 
government.  Elsewhere he suggested concrete acts that such a government should do. 
For example, such a government will take the people away from their work only after 
they have tilled the land and ministered to the needs of their parents. It will have its 
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resources opened for all to use, exempt them from border duty/tax, and limit the scope of 
punishment to solely the one who committed the crime.
2111
  
These institutional practices, as a whole, have demonstrated to us the possible 
social implications of benevolence, especially in the context of government.
2112
 First, 
people are the center of governance. Mencius said, ―The people are of the supreme 
importance…last comes the ruler.‖2113 Therefore, it can and must be claimed that all 
political roles exist at the service of the people. Second, a benevolent government will 
therefore commit itself to the welfare of its people. In so doing, benevolence is 
manifested, as Mencius explained in various places, through satisfying the basic needs of 
the people, educating them in the fundamental human relationships, and demanding their 
service without hardship.
2114
 Third, one should vigorously oppose those practices that are 
motivated simply by utility, advantages, and profit. In this way, institutional and societal 
reforms, even to the point of revolution, for the good of the society are permissible.
2115
  
 
Integrity  
The beatitude on ‗pure in heart‘ implies the virtue of integrity of one‘s inner self 
and outer actions. In particular, it calls for truthfulness in one‘s words and the practice of 
self-examination. In the Confucian tradition, chung renders a virtue close to that of 
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integrity. It refers to one‘s action being loyal to one‘s own heart and conscience.2116 And 
its counterpart is the virtue of shu (reciprocity) that is an extension of chung to others. 
For Confucius, it is important to act in accordance to what one says and vice versa. 
The Master said, ―Earnest in practicing the ordinary virtues, and careful in speaking 
about them; if, in his practice, he has anything defective, the superior man dares not but 
exert himself; and if, in his words, he has any excess, he dares not allow himself such 
license. Thus his words have respect to his actions, and his actions have respect to his 
words.‖2117 However, Confucius did not elaborate this specific virtue further. Rather, 
elsewhere he talked about the primacy of one‘s deeds over words—one should be quick 
in action and exceed in his deeds.
2118
 
Nevertheless, Confucius was aware of the lack of integrity in the daily life of 
many people. He said, ―Men all say, ‗We are wise;‘ but being driven forward and taken 
in a net, a trap, or a pitfall, they know not how to escape. Men all say, ‗We are wise;‘ but 
happening to choose the course of the Mean, they are not able to keep it for a round 
month.‖2119 He thus compared one who lacks integrity to a small man.2120  
Finally, within the context of Confucian spiritual practice, the Confucian tradition 
advocates the examination of the self as Christian spirituality does. As quoted earlier 
from the Analects, Confucius‘s disciple practiced such examination frequently: 
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―Everyday I examine myself on three counts.‖2121 In this way, self-examination is 
regarded as a practice recommended for all. Taylor further claims that the whole spiritual 
process of self-cultivation implies the virtue of integrity, for self-cultivation is aimed at 
―attaining authenticity…through conscientious study, critical self-examination, continual 
effort, and a willingness to change oneself.‖2122 
 
Peacemaking 
The virtue of peacemaking in the seventh beatitude is built upon righteousness 
and is concerned primarily with personal and communal practice and only subsequently 
for social change. It does not, however, advocate for forming Christian political groups. 
Within the Confucian tradition, a peaceful society is an important goal of the Confucian 
thinkers who witnessed the negative impacts of war during their life times. For example, 
as noted before, Confucius lived in a time of political unrest and hence longed for an 
ideal society that is well-ordered and politically stable, and is based on good government 
that responds to the citizens‘ basic needs. Like Aristotle, Confucius was concerned about 
the establishment of a good society rather than inter-personal relationship. 
In order to achieve such a peaceful and ordered society, the Confucian tradition 
generally rejects the idea of warfare as an effective means. Mencius, in particular, 
inherited Confucius‘s view and said: ―In wars to gain land, the dead fill the plains; in 
wars to gain cities, the dead fill the cities. This is known as showing the land the way to 
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devour human flesh. Death is too light a punishment for such men. Hence those skilled in 
war should suffer the most severe punishment; those who secure alliances with other 
feudal lords come next…‖2123 In other words, he perceived waging war and its related 
behaviors as a grave crime.
2124
 Instead, he was convinced that it is the virtues of 
benevolence and righteousness in the person that ‗conquers‘ the people and hence 
achieves peace.
2125
   
In his debate on military affairs, Xunzi further stressed that the virtue of li is 
greatly needed in establishing order and peace. He said, ―If he honors rites and values 
righteousness, the state will be ordered…To honor rights and seek to achieve merit is the 
highest manner of action.‖2126 Here, we note that Xunzi did not reject the possibility of 
war for the sake of righteousness. He explained, ―The benevolent man does indeed love 
others, and because he loves others, he hates to see men do them harm. The righteous 
man acts in accordance with what is right, and for that reason he hates to see men do 
wrong. He takes up arms in order to put an end to violence and to do away with harm, not 
in order to contend with others for spoils.‖2127 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on benevolence, righteousness, and ritual propriety 
points to the Confucian tradition‘s claim that it is the inner forces within the person rather 
than the external forces of government and military that holds the society together.
2128
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This claim in turn implies that self-cultivation is the means by which peace of the world 
can be achieved. The Master said, ―[The gentleman] cultivates himself and thereby brings 
peace and security to the people.‖2129 The Great Learning explains this relationship 
between self-cultivation and peacemaking, and stresses the need of learning as the 
starting point:  
Wishing to order well their States, they first regulated their families. 
Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. 
Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing 
to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. 
Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost 
their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of 
things.
2130
  
 
In particular, one should learn literature, fine arts, and craftsmanship.
2131
  
In sum, although Confucius (and his followers) did not discuss peacemaking on 
inter-personal and communal levels, he was convinced that peacemaking should begin 
with one‘s inner self and then extend to the family (and community) and finally the state 
(and the universe). In this way, Confucius partially shared the view of the beatitude with 
regards to the path to peacemaking. 
 
Righteousness 
Our exegesis and interpretation indicate that the virtue of righteousness runs 
through the Beatitudes and is specifically stressed in the seventh and eighth beatitudes by 
the author in relation to the virtues of peacemaking and fortitude respectively. We also 
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note that Christian understanding of righteousness has both the gift aspect (that 
emphasizes God‘s righteousness) and the task aspect and hence cannot be solely 
understood as human justice. In the Confucian tradition, the term yi, though generally 
translated into righteousness or justice, as some scholars rightly point out, likewise 
should not be totally equated with fairness or justice understood in a Western 
philosophical context.
2132
 Both Confucius and Mencius offered helpful interpretations of 
righteousness.  
For Confucius, yi is frequently paired up with the vice of excessive concern for 
profit—these sayings imply that righteousness renders both fair distribution of wealth and 
the lack of greed.
2133
 Still, it also renders other meanings, such as the need to address the 
problem of poverty, the provision of assistance to the needy, and the importance of doing 
what is right.
2134
 In the Doctrine of the Mean, Confucius thus said, ―Righteousness is the 
accordance of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honoring the 
worthy.‖2135 Subsequently, Confucius claimed that the right thing to do is to repay those 
who harm us with justice rather than with goodness.
2136
 Here, Confucius‘s view was quite 
different from the Christian commandment of love. Still, Confucius‘s emphasis on 
righteousness has led some Chinese scholars to liken him with prophets of the Old 
Testament such as Amos who stresses more on morality than religiosity.
2137
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Nevertheless, we should briefly examine a rather controversial passage in the 
Analects: 
The Governor of She said to Confucius, ―In our village there is a man 
nicknamed ‗Straight Body‘. When his father stole a sheep, he gave 
evidence against him.‖ Confucius answered, ―In our village those who are 
straight are quite different. Fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover 
up for their fathers. Straightness is to be found in such behavior.
2138
 
 
Clearly Confucius would agree that stealing is wrong and that lying, generally 
speaking, is wrong, but he was more concerned about familial responsibilities and 
loyalties.
2139
 One scholar interprets that for Confucius, who definitely had an appreciation 
for a sense of justice, ―legal justice is considered secondary to parental loyalty.‖2140  
Mencius developed the view of Confucius and argued that profit cannot be the 
metric for choosing or determining what is right. He said, ―What is the point of 
mentioning the word ‗profit‘? All that matters is that there should be benevolence and 
rightness.‖2141 Mencius also insisted that ―there are things we do not currently regard as 
unrighteous, that we should regard as unrighteous, because they are similar in ethically 
relevant respects to things we do recognize as unrighteous.‖2142 In addition, he connected 
the virtue of righteousness with the emotions of xiu 羞 (shame) and wu 惡 (dislike) to 
explain the psychological reason for choosing righteousness: One will not allow oneself 
to be disgraced by committing an unrighteous act.
2143
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Fortitude for the sake of Righteousness 
The eighth beatitude stresses the virtue of fortitude for the sake of justice as well 
as the virtue of gratitude toward God. It calls for readiness to embrace opposition and all 
kinds of persecution. In the Confucian tradition, although Confucian thinkers did not talk 
about enduring persecution per se, they recognized the virtue of fortitude and named it as 
one of the three universally binding virtues for chün tzu.
2144
 However, they also made it 
clear that courage must be accompanied by yi. When being asked if courage is esteemed 
by chün tzu the Master answered, ―The superior man holds righteousness to be of highest 
importance. A man in a superior situation, having valor without righteousness, will be 
guilty of insubordination; one of the lower people, having valor without righteousness, 
will commit robbery.‖2145 
Confucius further insisted that the virtue of fortitude does not simply accompany 
righteousness; rather, it must be practiced for the sake of yi. The Master thus said, ―If on 
looking within, one finds oneself to be in the wrong, then even though one‘s adversary be 
only a common fellow coarsely clad one is bound to tremble with fear. But if one finds 
oneself in the right, one goes forward even against men in the thousands.‖2146  
On the other hand, Confucian thinkers agreed that sacrificing one‘s life is a 
courageous act.
2147
 Thus, Mencius found giving up one‘s life for the sake of 
righteousness most praiseworthy. The book of Mencius tells one of the most famous 
conversations of Mencius:  
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Fish is what I want; bear‘s palm is also what I want. If I cannot have both, 
I would rather take bear‘s palm than fish. Life is what I want; dutifulness 
is also what I want. If I cannot have both, I would choose dutifulness 
rather than life. On the one hand, though life is what I want, there is 
something I want more than life. That is why I do not cling to life at all 
costs. On the other hand, though death is what I loathe, there is something 
I loathe more than death. That is why there are troubles I do not avoid.
2148
   
 
Confucius, who paid special attention to the cultivation of jen, had similarly 
suggested that one should, for benevolence‘s sake, sacrifice one‘s earthly life. He said, 
―For Gentlemen of purpose and men of benevolence while it is inconceivable that they 
should seek to stay alive at the expense of benevolence, it may happen that they have to 
accept death in order to have benevolence accomplished.‖2149 
As a whole, the Confucian tradition‘s rigorous view on upholding righteousness 
and benevolence runs parallel to the Christian practice of martyrdom although the latter‘s 
ultimate object is Christian faith in Christ. Furthermore, some scholars rightly perceive 
the teachings of Confucian thinkers as a manifestation of the prophetic voice found in 
Christian Scripture—they rendered severe judgments and criticisms on their unrighteous 
rulers by appealing to the authority of Heaven.
2150
 One concrete example is Mencius‘s 
fearless criticism against the pretention of the powerful and the prestigious:  
When speaking to men of consequence it is necessary to look on them 
with contempt and not be impressed by their lofty position. Their hall is 
tens of feet high; the capitals are several feet broad. Were I to meet with 
success, I would not indulge in such things. Their tables, laden with food, 
measure ten feet across, and their female attendants are counted in the 
hundreds. Were I to meet with success, I would not indulge in such things. 
They have a great time drinking, driving and hunting, with a retinue of a 
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thousand chariots. Were I to meet with success, I would not indulge in 
such things. All the things they do I would not do, and everything I do is 
in accordance with ancient institutions. Why, then, should I cower before 
them?
2151
 
 
With regards to the virtue of gratitude, there is no direct discussion by Confucian 
thinkers. Still, as noted in our earlier exploration of Confucian humility, Xunzi 
highlighted the need to attend to one‘s origin in our relationships with others. He thus 
suggested that jing 敬 (respectful reverence) is the appropriate virtue and gratuitous 
response to Heaven and earth, the origins of the unpayable debt of human life.
2152
 In this 
way, jing can be comparable to Christian virtue of gratitude toward God. 
 
A Radical Demand? 
 Finally, for Confucian thinkers our self-cultivation of moral virtues and 
transformation into chün tzu imply that we need acquire all these and other virtues 
throughout our entire moral life. In this way, they called for a radical ethical demand in 
the same way as the virtues of the Beatitudes do—they are not independent ethical 
dispositions but form a tightly integrated and sophisticated whole that proposes a radical 
ethical demands on being followers of Christ.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2151
 Mencius, 7B:34. 
2152
 Yearley, ―Virtues and Religious Virtues in the Confucian Tradition,‖ 143. 
 551 
9.6 Some Reflections and Precautions 
 
According to Yearley, the history of comparison in religious thoughts can be 
traced back to the sixteenth century when Catholic missionaries entered China.
2153
 Within 
the field of philosophical ethics, Stalnaker notes that there is a twofold motivation 
(especially on the part of the Western world) for engaging comparative work. On the one 
hand, due to the reality of ―its colonialist past and current global hegemony, the modern 
West has simultaneously developed traditions of attentive and empathetic attention to 
other religions and philosophical systems.‖2154 On the other hand, there is also a more 
intellectual and ethical need to ―nurture and follow more specific traditions of personal 
development in order to (1) follow with integrity our considered conclusions about 
ultimate values; and (2) have the rich philosophical, metaphysical, ritual, and artistic 
resources for personal formation that particular, historically extended traditions 
provide.‖2155 From an intellectual point of view, both Stalnaker and Yearley are 
convinced that the process of comparison helps show the distinctiveness and complexity 
of those previously assumed ideas, and expand the scope of other subjects by examining 
conceptions that were ignored previously and adjusting those general accounts about 
these conceptions. 
Nevertheless, among those who work on comparative ethics between the 
Christian and Confucian traditions, Yearley and Stalnaker are noted for taking efforts to 
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reflect on the contemporary trend of comparative work and offer personal suggestions 
and precautions on future direction of doing comparative work on these two traditions. I 
find them helpful for my own reflection on bringing the Beatitudes to the Confucian 
Chinese audience. 
The first insight is that certain general, major motifs, such as worldview and 
intellectual emphases, often appear in contemporary comparative works between Chinese 
and Western thoughts.
2156
 In our case, we too have turned to, among others, the motifs of 
virtue, religiousness, and worldview of the two traditions. By comparing these general 
perspectives, abstract ideas, as well as cultural contexts, they observe that there are 
substantial differences between the Confucian tradition and Christianity.
2157
 For instance, 
the Confucian tradition perceives the Heaven as an uncreated, organismic, and 
naturalistic one; and it emphasizes the practical realm rather than the theoretical one in its 
intellectual pursuit. In addition, Confucian thinkers prefer the use of narratives to lengthy, 
rigorous analysis in presenting ideas.  
In our specific context of bringing the Beatitudes to the Confucian Chinese 
audience through the lens of virtue, we too identify certain dissimilarities between the 
two traditions. First, the difference in their overall worldviews within which the virtues of 
the Beatitudes and of the Confucian tradition are formed leads to different goals. For the 
Confucian tradition, the ultimate purpose of self-cultivation of virtues is the self-
transformation and subsequent transformation of the universe through which the self is 
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united with Heaven and Earth. Christian acquisition of virtues, in contrast, is aimed at 
following Christ (discipleship), bringing about the kingdom of God, and achieving union 
with God. Subsequently, by cultivating certain virtues like filial piety Confucian tradition 
tends to confirm and affirm traditional cultural order albeit while incorporate moral 
progress, whereas Christianity maintains a variety of stances of affirmation and negation 
towards its cultures.
2158
 
 Second, although the Confucian tradition may have a religious element, it does 
not uphold the idea of a personal God but an impersonal Heaven. There is no dominant 
goal of union with God but self-transformation and subsequent transformation of the 
universe. Thus, Confucian virtue ethics does not have a transcendental being as the 
source of its virtues and as telos. And the overall self-cultivation of moral virtues is this-
worldly. Christian virtue ethics, in contrast, points to a triadic relationship with God and 
others, and has God‘s grace as the source for the cultivation of virtues. Third, certain 
virtue-relevant concepts related to the Christian tradition are absent in the other tradition. 
One particular example is the notion of grace that we explored earlier. For Confucian 
virtue ethics, there is no conception of external help in the process of self-cultivation of 
virtues. Fourth, regarding the set of virtues identified in the Beatitudes and its parallels in 
the Confucian texts, some of these virtues likewise find no equivalent in its counterpart. 
For example, the virtue of ritual propriety is unique to the Confucian tradition even 
though some contemporary Christian virtue ethicists would suggest that Christian 
spirituality (and liturgical life) can be compared to Christian virtue ethics on a thin level. 
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Fifth, the meanings of those matching virtues are not exactly the same. There are two 
reasons for this dissimilarity: 1) Some virtues have more than one meaning within their 
own tradition, such as chung in Confucian ethics; 2) the lack of a transcendental being as 
the ultimate end of acquisition in the Confucian tradition implies that its virtues do not 
have a clear religious aspect as Christian virtues do. In this way, one may claim that there 
is no Confucian religious virtue in the strict sense. The virtue of benevolence, for instance, 
is referred to the love towards other worldly beings only.      
However, our exploration also shows that there are resemblances between 
Confucian ethics and Christian ethics. First, Confucian ethics bears many qualities of 
virtue ethics, especially the four key yields of virtue—character formation, practices, 
exemplar, and community. In this way, Confucian ethics as virtue ethics is comparable to 
Christian virtue ethics. Second, Confucian literature contains and presents many concrete 
moral virtues as Christian scripture does. In particular, both traditions identify (and share) 
certain virtues as fundamental. For instance, the Confucian tradition highlights the virtues 
of benevolence, righteousness, fortitude, wisdom, ritual propriety, and filial piety. 
Christian virtue ethics, similarly, advocates for the virtues of charity, justice, fortitude, 
and wisdom, and adds other key virtues like faith, hope, and temperance. Third, they hold 
similar understanding of the meaning of certain virtues. A concrete example is the virtue 
of fortitude. Both traditions agree that courage is crucial for human fulfillment and there 
is a religious aspect of the virtue. Fourth, by the same token, the specific set of Christian 
virtues emerged in the Beatitudes—though is not exactly the same as its counterpart—
finds general, matching parallels with those of the Confucian tradition. For example, both 
 555 
traditions emphasize the importance of the virtues of righteousness and benevolence in 
one‘s moral life and hence urge us to attain the virtue of fortitude for the sake of 
righteousness even to the point of being persecuted or laying down one‘s life. 
The identification of both dissimilarities and resemblances, subsequently, leads to 
a second insight—there exists a relationship between the two. In order to explain the 
relationship between the resemblances and dissimilarities among the conceptions 
identified (especially on the theoretical level), Yearley first adopts the distinction 
between ‗primary‘ and ‗secondary‘ theories:2159 Primary theory refers to what is universal 
and trans-cultural, and underlies one‘s ability to cope with normal situations. Secondary 
theory, though it is built upon primary theory to explain peculiar happenings, is culture-
driven and has an equivocal character. Therefore, the dissimilarities identified above, 
such as those peculiar notions of grace and filial piety, often occur in the secondary 
theory, while the common understanding of the concept and yields of virtue belongs to 
the primary theory. He then suggests that there is a third ‗practical‘ theory—that partially 
overlaps the ‗primary‘ and ‗secondary‘ theories—that accounts for the co-existence of 
resemblances and dissimilarities within those complicated conceptual forms, such as the 
conceptions of Confucian self-cultivation and jen in our case.  
Grounded in Yearley‘s practical theory, Stalnaker advocates for a holistic 
approach in the quest of their relationship:
2160
 He argues that the trio of ‗primary‘, 
‗secondary‘, and ‗practical‘ theories are often mixed together into a generally coherent 
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whole in the mind of the sophisticated thinkers that represent their traditions. For instance, 
the primary theory of ‗sacred texts‘ in both Christian virtue ethics and the Confucian 
tradition cannot be comprehended without making reference to or being shaped by 
secondary theory. Or, engaging in practical theory such as rituals would require 
simultaneous address of certain secondary theoretical concepts. 
In short, their adaptation of the theory allows us to probe and understand the 
rather complex relationships between those resemblances and dissimilarities we have 
identified in the Beatitudes and the Confucian tradition.  
A third insight is the claim that ―establishing focal and secondary meanings helps 
facilitate comparisons:‖2161 While the focal meaning of particular virtues might be set in 
one specific tradition, the secondary meaning of the virtues can be used to interpret the 
other tradition‘s account and from which one is able to relate certain qualities of the 
virtues. Therefore, for instance, in the reception of the Christian virtue of fortitude in the 
Confucian context, while its focal meaning (i.e., fortitude as a cardinal virtue) is unique 
to Christian virtue ethics, its secondary meaning (i.e., endurance and self-sacrifice for the 
sake of righteousness) can help us understand the Confucian tradition as well as the 
religious aspect of fortitude in these two traditions. Subsequently, Yearley proposes the 
use of analogical imagination in engaging the comparative task—to compare the subjects 
analogically and articulate similarities in differences (and differences in similarities), and 
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to use our imagination to examine and construct analogies, to set focal and secondary 
meanings, and to articulate their relationships.
2162
  
Finally, Stalnaker, who believes that the approach to comparative work goes 
beyond the debate on ‗exclusivism‘, ‗inclusivism‘, and ‗pluralism‘, proposes a 
multifaceted ‗global neighborliness‘ as an ideal for comparative studies of religious 
thoughts and ethics:
2163
 This ideal basically perceives the other tradition in comparison as 
potential teacher rather than convert or threat. It has several aspects, including 
attentiveness/curiosity toward the other tradition; charitable interpretation of seemingly 
strange ideas without hasty negative judgment; critical engagement in those resemblances 
and dissimilarities identified without rush to assimilation; being mindful of the 
complexity of the tradition itself and avoid over-generalizing about it; and being discrete 
throughout the process.  
I note that these facets also rightfully remind us that we need to take practical 
precautions as well in doing cross-cultural comparative studies. I identify some of these 
precautions as follows. 
In the first place, there exists diversity within the tradition itself. As we saw 
throughout this chapter, although both Mencius and Xunzi inherited and developed 
Confucius‘s doctrines, they differed from each other in various issues. In particular, they 
differed greatly in the understanding of human nature and the subsequent means for self-
cultivation of virtues. The Christian approach to virtue, as discussed in Part Two, also 
reveals a similar diversity. Thus, in exploring the possible reception of the Beatitudes and 
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its virtues in the Confucian tradition, the internal divergence of Confucianism needs to be 
addressed and stated. 
Second, one needs also to be aware of the various aspects of tradition—such as 
history and political impact—that are involved in the development of a specific tradition 
and its understanding of certain conceptions. Bretzke rightly comments that ―no one 
philosophical or religious tradition can stand alone in isolation, or hope to express in a 
credible and comprehensive fashion the totality of [those] complex, multifaceted and 
polyvalent notion[s].‖2164 
Third, one should not evaluate the compatibility of the traditions solely by their 
explicit resemblances or dissimilarities. For instance, although the Confucian tradition 
does not systematically present or involve in analytical discussion of their virtues, it does 
not mean that their insights and understanding of virtues is less important than that of 
Christian virtues. Or, although Confucian virtue ethics focuses on self-cultivation, one 
should not rush to the conclusion that it does not have social implications. As we have 
seen above, for Confucian thinkers self-cultivation is the very first step to the 
transformation of the state and the universe. Yet, we need to be careful that we do not 
overlook the dissimilarities as we search for commonality. 
Fourth, there is the substantial linguistic and textual problem: On the one hand, 
we are dealing with ancient Chinese sacred texts that are quite different from 
contemporary Chinese; on the other hand, we are also dealing with ancient 
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Greek/Hebrew texts and present them in contemporary English.
2165
 Therefore, the work 
of exegesis is needed on both sides. This linguistic precaution points us back to the 
argument throughout this entire work—the need to treat the sacred text as ‗scripted 
script‘. Now since scriptural texts are constitutive of both traditions, then doing a cross-
cultural ethics begins not with analogous generalities but very specific texts. 
Finally, from the perspective of East Asian context, there are some concrete 
challenges for doing comparative work on the part of the West. First, there is the 
unhealthy assumption that ―Asia has nothing to contribute but is there to receive.‖2166 
Thus, while examining the possible Confucian reception of the Beatitudes and its virtues, 
I am equally convinced that the process can be done in reverse order, that is, the Christian 
reception of Confucian virtues. Second, more often than not it is the Confucian tradition 
(or other non-Western traditions) that strives to develop its own distinctive conception of 
certain Western (and Christian in particular) notions (such as ‗rights‘) and not vice 
versa.
2167
 Third, within the religious context, there further exists a biased presupposition 
that the Christian Bible is of supreme and absolute authority over other sacred texts.
2168
 
Indian biblical scholar Stanley Samartha rightly reminds us that the multi-scriptural 
reality of Asia (including East Asia) would resist any claim of supreme authority of one 
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scripture over another.
2169
 Subsequently, we need to be open and respectful in our reading 
of the Confucian text. 
In conclusion, with these insights and precautions in mind and being a Christian 
ethicist in a Confucian context, I agree with Yearley and Tu that cross-cultural 
comparative work is an important intellectual activity for both our contemporary 
theological quest and the exploration of the third epoch of Confucianism.
2170
 In my own 
attempt to bring the Beatitudes and its corresponding virtues to the Confucian Chinese 
audience, I hope I have engaged in some of these facets of global neighborliness and 
taken the precautions seriously.  
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout this entire work I have been advocating for a more integrated 
approach for doing Scripture-based Christian theological ethics that treats Scripture as 
‗scripted script‘. For a variety of reasons—from the growing complexities of each field to 
the lack of communication and competency in the other‘s field to the problems in 
interdisciplinary exercise—Scripture scholars do not use much ethical theory, while 
theological ethicists do little actual exegesis.  
Despite these difficulties, contemporary scholars from both fields agree that a 
better integration and cooperation between biblical studies and moral theology is much 
needed. Since the 1980s we began to see different attempts among these scholars to better 
bridge Scripture with Christian ethics and to address the relationship between the two. In 
my own attempt to propose a more integrated approach to scriptural ethics, I believe that 
only through careful observation of the contributions and limitations of these scholars 
that we can identify specific methodological insights that will rightfully shape the future 
of a Scripture-based ethics. Thus, this work begins with a review of the recent 
development by both biblical scholars and Christian ethicists in their attempts to 
construct an integrated scriptural ethics. 
Among the works of contemporary biblical scholars we note a couple of 
contributions to and signs of methodological development. First and foremost, their 
exegetical task goes beyond traditional critical methods and attends to even the 
philosophical/ethical theory behind the text. They also show greater appreciation of the 
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task of hermeneutics in their works. However, their hermeneutical and ethical claims are 
inadequate and unconvincing, for these claims are not grounded in any sustaining, sound 
ethical theory. 
Christian ethicists likewise have offered certain methodological insights. They 
advance the field of Scripture-based ethics by not simply using Scripture but also 
attempting to understand the original meanings of the texts employed. Yet, their attempts 
are not without problems, especially regarding their exegesis that is either superficial or 
selective. Subsequently, they are still concerned more about interpreting the text‘s 
meaning for contemporary world than with first examining its original meaning to see if 
the text can be rightly employed. 
In both cases, we can conclude that they still have either stressed the importance 
of the scriptural text or the importance of ethical hermeneutics. In other words, they see 
Scripture as either ‗scripted‘ or ‗script‘. This lack of balance could lead to incomplete, 
inconsistent, or even incorrect interpretation of the text for today‘s readers. I am thus 
convinced that a balanced view of Scripture as ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘ seems to be the 
right direction toward constructing a more integrated scriptural ethics. This conviction is 
shared by some scholars from both disciplines whose works have demonstrated what this 
new direction could be. Their advancement also reveals that the methodological goal that 
I am advocating is attainable. 
Still, writing as a Catholic theological ethicist who does ethics by working with 
scriptural texts, I further my advocacy in concrete by suggesting a particular model for 
the construction. Plainly speaking, I take virtue ethics as a worthy hermeneutical tool for 
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doing Scripture-based ethics. It has several unique characteristics that can complement 
other principle-based ethical theories, such as its teleological structure and those key 
yields of virtue that attend to not just the character formation and identity of individuals 
but also that of the moral community. Moreover, some pioneer Christian virtue ethicists 
have further convinced us that a Christian adoption of virtue ethics is possible—there 
exists theological links that help translate virtue theory‘s philosophical language into 
Christian ones.  
Apart from those theological links, there is also a strong biblical link between the 
two: Scripture exposes us to and advocates for certain virtues, forms virtues, shapes 
moral character and identity, provides exemplary models, and reforms the faith 
community. Indeed, this explicit biblical link provides a very helpful argument for the 
virtue theory‘s suitability as the hermeneutical tool in our construction of a more 
integrated Scripture-based Christian ethics. 
Subsequently, after presenting the hermeneutical tool, I move on to consolidate 
my argument with a concrete illustration: Treating the Beatitudes in Matthew 5:3-12 as 
both ‗scripted‘ and ‗script‘. In other words, I would offer both exegesis and interpretation 
of the text. In fact, by treating the Beatitudes as ‗scripted‘, we can be benefited by 
acquiring more accurate understanding of the original meanings of each of the macarisms 
and their corresponding eschatological blessings. We also gain certain overlooked/hidden 
insights that help guide our subsequent hermeneutics in the right direction. Specifically, I 
note that the entire Beatitudes bears an explicit Jewish influence; its macarisms form a 
tightly integrated and sophisticated whole; it depicts a radical ethical demand of the 
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disciples; it highlights the need of God‘s grace and providence; and it has a communal 
quality. As a whole, it makes a substantial difference to the hermeneutical task that 
follows. 
In the subsequent interpretation of the Beatitudes through the hermeneutics of 
virtue ethics for Christian moral living, I identify a new set of core virtues (and 
corresponding practices) that is not just for personal formation but also for the formation 
of the community, and effects social change: Humility, solidarity, meekness, obedience 
in our relation with God, mercy and charity, integrity and truthfulness, just peacemaking, 
fortitude, and gratitude toward God.  
Whenever renowned Catholic historian John O‘Malley sees conceptual arguments 
endorsing one methodology over another, he asks ‗so what?‘ O‘Malley‘s question asks us 
to give at least a concrete example of how a more integrated scriptural ethics leads to 
actual benefits and improvements. Our twofold treatment of the Beatitudes as ‗scripted‘ 
and ‗script‘ only partially responds to his challenge. Thus, I conclude this work by 
bringing its fruits forward. In particular, I turn to my own Confucian Chinese culture and 
explore the possible reception of the Beatitudes and its virtues by the Confucian tradition. 
It is because—apart from the general view that Confucian ethics can be virtue ethics—
methodologically speaking, Confucianism goes to the texts in its search of ethical 
teachings, that is, Confucian ethics is primarily the fruit of careful interpretation of their 
‗sacred‘ texts. Now that I have been arguing for greater attentiveness to the scriptural text 
throughout my advocacy for a more integrated Scripture-based Christian ethics, common 
grounds are thus created that can be helpful to make Christian ethics more explicable to 
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Confucian society and more supportive of cross-cultural dialogue with Confucian ethics, 
for doing a cross-cultural ethics as such begins not with analogous generalities but very 
specific texts, and needs to be both text-based and interpretative.  
Therefore, by way of demonstration, I explore how the Beatitudes as ‗scripted 
script‘ can be compared to the virtues of the Confucian tradition, and meaningful to its 
Confucian Chinese audience. By turning to the sacred texts of the Confucian tradition and 
extracting their moral virtues I note that they match those of the Beatitudes in many 
positive areas. Still, dissimilarities in terms of specific contents and fundamental 
conceptions are also recognized. There exists a complex relationship between these 
findings and we have to take precautions and at times re-think our own presuppositions in 
doing cross-cultural ethics. 
In sum, I am convinced that this comparative exercise can provide an opportunity 
to demonstrate the possible benefit resulting from the methodological shift into a more 
integrated scriptural ethics—one that is more capable of cross-cultural exchange. Being a 
Catholic theological ethicist who does ethics by working with Scripture and engages in 
cross-cultural dialogue within a Confucian context, I hope that this work does not only 
advocate further advancements in the field of Scripture-based Christian ethics within the 
Christian tradition but also encourages cross-cultural exchange with other ethical systems.  
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Glossary of Chinese Terms 
English Pin-yin Chinese character English translation 
chi 智 Wisdom 
chung 忠 Conscientiousness/Loyalty 
chün tzu 君子 The Gentleman/Superior Person/Noble Man 
duan 端 Sprouts or Germs (nascent moral dispositions) 
en  恩 Kindness 
jen 仁 Humanity/ Benevolence 
li 禮 Ritual propriety 
shu 恕 Reciprocity/Altruism/Empathy 
tao 道 The Way 
te 德 Virtue 
tien 天 Heaven 
wu 惡 Dislike 
xiao 孝 Filiality/Filial Piety 
xing 性 Human Nature 
xiu  羞 Shame  
xue 學 Learning 
yi 義 Righteousness/Dutifulness 
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